

The Journal of Historical Review

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Special Treatment: The Untold Story of Hitler's Third Race

—HISTORICAL NEWS AND COMMENT—

All Denials of Free Speech Undercut a Democratic Society

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Editorial Note

A New Cycle

That marvelous entity, the human body, goes through a process whereby it constantly renews its cells. Old, injured, or malfunctioning cells die off and new ones replace them. After a cycle lasting approximately seven years, the human body is completely renewed; all the cells are brand new, and the body starts a fresh cycle.

The Institute for Historical Review has just held its Seventh International Revisionist Conference and, like the human body, is about to embark on a new cycle. The trials and terrorism that plagued us in the past are behind us. We have been tried, but not been found wanting. The strength of the truth has sustained us and will continue to do so.

Through the generosity of our supporters, we now have a new, secure, and functionally efficient building from which we can conduct our business, part of which is bringing this journal to you. We also have an infusion of new blood, replacing and augmenting our staff, who with their energy and ideas will rejuvenate and invigorate the Institute and its work.

The IHR stands firm in its commitment to restore historical truth by bringing history into accord with the facts, and with innovation and unswerving dedication during this new cycle we shall make sure that the truth is heard.

Robert Karl Berkel
Director

Theodore J. O'Keefe
Assistant Director for Publications

The Siege of South Africa

IVOR BENSON

[Paper Presented to the Seventh International Revisionist Conference]

The main argument which I seek to establish in this paper falls into three parts and can be summarised as follows:

1. The history of South Africa, since shortly before the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899, epitomises the history of the world over the same period.
2. The world revolutionary movement which was to precipitate a century of conflict had its first clearly visible debut in South Africa, and
3. The Anglo-Boer War marked the beginning of the end of the British political imperium and the beginning of an entirely new kind of imperium, that of international finance-capitalism.

We must, therefore, expect to find in the history of South Africa all the distinguishing features of conflict in most other parts of the world in our time, including propaganda as a major weapon of aggression, and the infliction of barbarities on civilian populations.

The fact of the unity and coherence of the history of the world in our century is freely admitted today. Three American historians, F.P. Chambers, C.P. Harris, and C.G. Bayley, have this to say:

Two world wars and their intervening wars, revolutions and crises are now generally recognised to be episodes in a single age of conflict which began in 1914 and has not yet run its course. It is an age that has brought to the world more change and tragedy than any other equal span in recorded history. *Yet, whatever may be its ultimate meaning and consequence, we can already think of it—and write of it—as a historic whole.*¹ (Emphasis added.)

The "ultimate meaning" of our age of conflict which these professional historians sought in vain is more easily read out of happenings in South Africa since the 1890s than out of happenings possibly anywhere else.

It is only to be expected, therefore, that we should find in South Africa powerful endorsement of the Orwellian dictum that forms the foundation stone of all Revisionist historical analysis: "Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past."²

Here is a sample of suppressed history which offers to throw a radically different light on the Boer War, the pivot of all Southern African history.

On December 18, 1898—that is, shortly before the outbreak of the Boer War—one Lieutenant-General Sir William Butler wrote as follows from Cape Town to the Secretary for the Colonies: "All the political questions in South Africa and nearly all the information sent from Cape Town are being worked by what I have already described as a colossal syndicate for the spread of false information."³

No one was in a better position to know the truth, for General Butler was then Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in South Africa and Acting High Commissioner during the absence in England of Sir Alfred Milner (later Lord Milner), one of the principal architects and instigators of the war that was soon to follow.

Immediately after Milner's return to Cape Town, General Butler resigned and returned to England; and successive historians have found it expedient to exclude from their writings any reference to his despatches.

General Butler, who had paid personal visits to the Boer Republic of the Transvaal, had seen for himself that the alleged "grievances" of the so-called "uitlanders," most of them British, who had flocked to the newly discovered goldfields, were a fraudulent invention.

It is significant that there is no more than an occasional passing reference to General Butler in the official histories of that period—and to this day few students of history in South Africa would even recognise his name if they read it or heard it.

Here is another sample of the long-suppressed history of that period, a paragraph from a book written by one of the most respected writers of his day, J.A. Hobson, who had visited the Transvaal Republic before the outbreak of the Boer War:

We are fighting in order to place a small international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators in power in Pretoria. Englishmen will do well to recognise that the economic and political destinies of South Africa are, and seem likely to remain, in the hands of men, most of whom are foreigners by origin, whose trade is finance and whose trade interests are not British.⁴

It says much for Hobson's powers of perception that in another book, *The Psychology of Jingoism*, he was able to present an analysis

of propaganda and disinformation which bears comparison with George Orwell's masterly study of this subject in his *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Another writer of that time who seems to have escaped the attention of historians was L. March Phillips, an officer in Rimington's Scouts, who had worked in the Transvaal for several years before the war. This is what he wrote:

As for the uitlanders and their grievances, I would not ride a yard or fire a shot to right all the grievances that were ever invented. Most of the uitlanders (that is, miners and working men on the Rand) had no grievances. I know what I am talking about for I have lived and worked among them. I have seen English newspapers passed from one to another and laughter raised by the *Times* telegrams about those precious grievances . . . We used to read the London papers to find out what our grievances were, and very frequently they would be due to causes of which we had never heard. I never met one miner or working man who would have walked a mile to pick a vote off the road and I have known and talked with scores of hundreds.⁵

These were not the views of men habitually critical of the British Empire. General Butler had served the Empire loyally and with distinction in India, Egypt, Canada, West Africa and elsewhere. And Hobson was one of the many great Englishmen of his time who, like Edmund Burke before him, could happily identify themselves with the Empire's role in history.

What Butler, Hobson and other critics of the Milner policy saw in South Africa was something new and unprecedented: fraudulent misrepresentation on a colossal scale used by British leaders against their own people and their own parliament as a means of drawing them into a planned war.

Dishonourable conduct was being used for the first time as an instrument of imperial policy.

A revised history of South Africa which is now beginning to emerge exposes the enormity and impudence of the falsehood then used—and which is again being used in a renewed onslaught against the people of South Africa.

The biggest breakthrough for honest historical reporting came in 1979 with the publication of Thomas Pakenham's well-documented and richly illustrated book *The Boer War*, in which we read as follows about the causes of the war:

First there is a thin golden thread running through the narrative, a thread woven by the 'gold bugs,' the Rand millionaires who controlled the richest gold mines in the world. It has been hitherto assumed by historians that none of the 'gold bugs' was directly concerned in making the war. But directly concerned they were . . . I have found evidence of an informal alliance between Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, and the firm of Wernher-Beit, the dominant Rand mining house. *It was this alliance, I believe, that gave Milner the strength to precipitate the war.*⁶ (Emphasis added.)

Pakenham lays bare the real motives at work in precipitating the Boer War but does not fit the facts into a coherent interpretation of the history of South Africa that will absorb and explain some of its glaring paradoxes:

- How was it possible for methods to be used in precipitating the war which shocked many old and trusted servants of the British Empire?
- How was it possible in 1907, so soon after a long and bitter war, for General Louis Botha, then prime minister of the Transvaal colony, now British, to be so much in love with the Empire that he could make a present of the famous Cullinan diamond to King Edward VII?
- How was it possible for General Smuts, first prime minister of the Union of South Africa, to bring both the English South Africans and the Afrikaners into World War I on the side of the British?
- Even more paradoxically, how was it possible for an English-orientated South African Labour Party to help overthrow the pro-Empire Smuts government in 1924 and virtually reverse the verdict of the Boer War by putting an Afrikaner nationalist party in power?

These are questions we shall need to be able to answer if we are to understand the history of South Africa and the present rapidly mounting undeclared war against that country.

The situation in which the people of South Africa find themselves today is in many ways similar to the situation in which the Transvaalers found themselves in the years preceding the Boer War.

Then it was the alleged denial of political rights to the English-speaking "uitlanders" which served as ammunition for massive hate propaganda and pressure, and as *casus belli*. Today it is the grievances of the Blacks which are called on to supply the propaganda ammunition and justify internal revolutionary activity, most of it masterminded and financed from abroad.

In the 1890's, as also today, demands for so-called reforms were of a kind clearly aimed not at reform but at the complete displacement of the country's existing rulers.

One big difference is that in the 1890's the Transvaal's enemy was Britain, whereas today South Africa finds itself apparently in confrontation with the whole world; and another difference is that Afrikaners and English-speakers today find themselves equally endangered.

The maximum deployment of all the forces of parliamentary politics since the end of World War II having failed to dislodge Afrikaner nationalism from its position of power, what we now see is, in effect, a *renewal and resumption of the Boer War*.

Before we go on to seek a broad explanation of all this, it might be well to examine briefly the allegation that it is the unredressed grievances of the Blacks which lie at the root of all the present troubles and which call for intervention from abroad.

Substantially, the reasons given for the present world condemnation of South Africa are just as spurious as those given by Milner and his associates for hostility towards the Kruger government in the Transvaal.

It is true that there is much discontent among South Africa's Blacks, as there is discontent everywhere else in the world where Blacks find themselves in a human environment which is not of their own making. There is bitter discontent among Blacks in the United States, in Britain, and elsewhere in the West, exploding from time to time into violence and destruction.⁷ Black discontent is something for which no remedy can be found even inside the British Labour Party, one of South Africa's most vehement critics, as Black members continue to defy their leaders and demand "apartheid" in the form of separate branches of their own.

There is Black discontent in South Africa it is true, but evidently even more of it across that country's borders—for how else has illegal Black immigration become one of South Africa's major problems?

It is also necessary at this point to expand a little on the subject of the "golden thread" which Pakenham found running through the story of the Boer War and its causes—that "international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators" of which Hobson writes.

The funding which enabled Cecil Rhodes to consolidate his grip on the diamond mining industry was supplied by the British branch of the Rothschilds, but most of the Transvaal's financiers came from the continent.

The mining groups listed by Hobson include Wernher, Beit and Company, with 29 mines and three financial companies; but even this great group he found to be only the leading member of "a larger effective combination" which included, for all practical purposes, Consolidated Goldfields, S. Neumann and Co., G. Farrar, and Abe Bailey. Goldfields (virtually Beit, Rudd, and Rhodes) owned 19 mines. Hobson traces some of the lines of financial control to Rothschild and the German Dresdner Bank in which Wernher and Beit had substantial holdings.

In a chapter headed "For Whom Are We Fighting?," Hobson declares that even at the risk of seeming to appeal to "the ignominious passion of *Judenhetze*," he found it a duty "not to be shirked" to point out that "recent developments of Transvaal gold mining have thrown the economy of the country into the hands of a small group of international financiers, chiefly German in origin and Jewish in race."

In this scenario, as Hobson shows, Cecil Rhodes, the arch-imperialist and empire-builder and main instigator of the Boer War, figures as no more than a small planetary wheel in a vast international financial machine which he, no doubt, believed he had harnessed to his grandiose imperial purposes.

For General Butler, also, the duty of identifying what he called "the train-layers setting the political gunpowder" was not to be shirked. In

a despatch to the War Office in June 1899 he wrote: "If the Jews were out of the question, it would be easy enough to come to an agreement, but they are apparently intent upon plunging the country into civil strife . . . indications are too evident here to allow one to doubt the existence of strong undercurrents, the movers of which are bent upon war at all costs for their own selfish ends."

For the people of Britain, the Boer War was a traumatic experience. A war that was expected to last only a few weeks dragged on for nearly three years and could only be brought to an end by an application of draconian measures which produced reactions of revulsion at home. The cost of the war also came as a shock: 350 million pounds—a great deal of money in those days—and 20,000 soldiers' lives.⁸

The trauma had something to do with the moral aspects of the struggle; it is one thing to fight against a dangerous enemy who threatens a nation's existence, quite another to suffer a succession of reverses with appalling losses of life in what is plainly a European fratricidal struggle for reasons which become increasingly dubious with the passage of time.

Paradoxically, too, a struggle which was to be labelled "the last gentlemen's war," in which there were continual displays of chivalry on both sides on the field of battle, was characterised also by reveries to barbarism, involving non-combatants.

Kitchener's scorched-earth policy, the only means by which Britain could be extricated from an intolerable situation, reduced the whole of the Transvaal and Orange Free State to a wilderness of devastated farms and uncultivated fields, and resulted in the death of more women and children in his concentration camps, mostly from typhoid, than there were men killed on both sides in the actual fighting.⁹

As was only to be expected, the intoxication of patriotism—Hobson called it "jingoism"—with which the war was launched and promoted was followed in Britain at the war's end by the moral equivalent of an acute hangover.

In the post-war general election, the Unionists—the "victorious" party—were defeated and a Liberal Party government under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to treat the conquered Boers with the utmost kindness and consideration. The two Boer republics became British colonies but with wide powers of self-rule; and the stage was set for the introduction of a party political process—"war by other means"—which has continued to this day.¹⁰

The rest of the South African story is about the reasons why the new policy of conciliation was doomed to fail.

Or, to put it differently, the political history of South Africa for more than 50 years after the Boer War can be said to have revolved around two mutually antagonistic perceptions of the British Empire or British connection.

The British Empire had acquired a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde split personality, by some encountered as a model of respectability and virtue and by others as a monster of iniquity.

The Empire ideal, as verbalised with great power and eloquence by John Ruskin and Rudyard Kipling, had something in common with the socialist ideal by which it was due to be replaced later as an intellectual frame of reference and motivating system of ideas; for socialism, too, was destined to acquire a double character, loved by some and abominated by others.¹¹

How is all this to be explained?

At a time in the history of the peoples of the West when a vacuum had been created in the minds of men by a new "enlightenment" which devalued the old religious orthodoxy, a secular Empire ideal (like socialism, a programme for world improvement) was found to serve quite well as a substitute for the abandoned religion; for it supplied a sense of purpose and direction and a coherent and self-explanatory intellectual frame of reference. That was the sunnier side of the "ideal," symbolised by Dr. Jekyll.

The dark side of the ideal was to be found in what some men were prepared to do in its name and for its furtherance.

The shock which ended General Butler's career in South Africa was experienced by him as the betrayal of an ideal which had hitherto served him unfailingly as a lodestar; the methods used by Rhodes and Milner and their circle were, from his point of view, decidedly not "British," and policies designed to precipitate a war with the Transvaal Republic were, for him, clearly not in the British interest.

It had been possible for several generations of Englishmen, products of the best schools and universities, to reconcile the conduct of imperial affairs with the preservation of standards of personal conduct which drew the clearest distinction between the "cad" and the "gentleman"—a state of affairs nowhere better illustrated than in Edmund Burke's impeachment of Warren Hastings.

What Butler saw in Cape Town was the employment of dishonourable means for the attainment of the most dubious ends.

The appeal of the Empire ideal, or "English idea" as it came to be called, was by no means confined to the British; it had its votaries on the other side of the Atlantic, as Dr. Carroll Quigley has shown in his "history of the world in our century," *Tragedy and Hope*¹².

And Boer leaders, like General Louis Botha and General Smuts, when the fighting was over and a generous policy of conciliation was being applied by the victors, were not immune to the charms of an ideal which offered glowing possibilities for the future of mankind; moreover, it had much to show for itself wherever the Union Jack had been planted. Botha and Smuts were wholly won over; and Smuts figured from 1914 onwards more as an Imperial statesman than a South African party political leader.

That partly explains why Botha, on behalf of the Transvaal colony, was able to make a gift of the Cullinan diamond to King Edward VII and why, in 1914, he was able to crush a rebellion of Boer "bitter-enders" and bring South Africa into World War I on the side of Britain.

A split in South African politics came shortly after the formation of the first government of the Union of South Africa in 1910 with the resignation from Botha's cabinet of another former Boer leader, General J.B.M. Hertzog. Hertzog launched the National Party, and a pattern of party political strife was initiated that was to continue to this day.

Now let us examine more closely that negative perception of the British connection, or "English idea" as it came to be called in the United States, which formed the basis of Hertzog's political thinking, and that of a succession of other National Party leaders, including Dr. Daniel Malan, Mr. J.G. Strijdom and Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd.

It is significant that hatred of the ethnic "English" was never an important component of Hertzog's negative attitude towards the British connection, nor the main reason for a resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism. Hertzog's Christian names "James" and "Barry" provide some evidence of his parents' response to English influence in the Cape Colony, Barry being the name of the much loved English doctor who had attended at his birth.

The perceived enemy of the Afrikaner, from the very beginning, was not "die Engelse" but "die geldmag," or "money power," symbolised in Afrikaner folklore as "Hoggenheimer," the stereotype of the mining financier. It was also fear and hatred of financiers—Pakenham's "gold bugs"—which motivated the armed rebellion in 1914, triggered by Botha's decision to join Britain in declaring war on Germany.

On the positive side, what motivated Hertzog was the ideal of the unity of the two language groups in a shared patriotism under the slogan "South Africa First," a policy which took care not to disturb the cultural integrity and unity of either group—something like the patriotism that has prevailed in Switzerland and Belgium. This he called his "two stream policy." His attitude towards the "English" in South Africa was, therefore, always frank and honourable.

That helps to explain how it was possible in 1924 for an English-oriented South African Labour Party to join forces with Hertzog's National Party against a Smuts government which had so recently helped Britain to win the war against Germany.

The trouble began with the mine-workers on the Witwatersrand, whose accumulated grievances at the hands of the great mine-owners finally exploded in the Rand Rebellion of 1922. General Smuts, who had become prime minister after the death of General Botha in 1919, used troops, artillery, and even bombing by aircraft to crush this rebellion. Smuts had come down firmly on the side of the mine-owners, and the mine-workers were left worse off than ever.

Workers all over the country were infuriated and rallied to the support of the two opposition parties in parliament—the Afrikaners to the National Party and the English-speakers to the Labour Party. The two opposition parties then formed an alliance, and in the elections of 1924 the Smuts government was defeated.

But did this amount to an actual reversal of the verdict of the Boer War? Not quite. Constitutionally, South Africa remained a component of the British Empire, or Commonwealth of Nations, as it came to be called, under a governor-general appointed by the monarch; and South Africans were still British citizens carrying British passports.

What many would have found it hard to understand was the fact that this radical change in the course of South African history had been accomplished with the whole-hearted assistance of the English-speaking supporters of the Labour Party, a few of the older ones actual "uitlanders" of the former Republic for whose supposed "liberation" from Afrikaner domination the Boer War had been fought. Those English-speakers who helped the National Party to get into power also included many who only a few years before had been fighting for Britain on the battlefields of France and elsewhere.

The result of all this was a most unusual political phenomenon: a nationalist Afrikaner South Africa tacitly accepted by a substantial English-speaking population, while still held on a slender constitutional lead by the ruling powers in Britain.

The nationalist government proceeded at once to give effect to Hertzog's policy, replacing as quickly as possible some of the symbols of a subordinate association with Britain, including the flag, and drastically Afrikanerising the civil service, army and police—with little or no opposition from the Labour Party's "English" representatives in Hertzog's cabinet.

If we can get our central historical thesis right, we can expect the facts to continue to fall into place.

Policies aimed at making South Africa increasingly independent and self-directed always enjoyed the silent support of the English-speakers, who felt equally threatened by policies promoted in the name of opposition to Afrikaner nationalism.

In particular, there has been almost unanimous support down the years for policies designed to keep political power in White Afrikaner hands. In other words, unity of understanding and of purpose in race matters has been strong enough to prevail over all the inconvenience and irritation suffered by the English under an exclusively Afrikaner administration.

It is for this reason that those who continued to promote internal revolutionary activity against Afrikaner nationalism were able to draw very little assistance and support from the broad stream of the English-speakers; hence, too, only the Blacks were available in any number as revolutionary fodder.

The story of opposition politics in South Africa is told with surprising candour by Dr. Gideon Shimoni in his well-documented book *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910-1967*.¹³

Shimoni writes of the period following World War II: "Jewish names kept appearing in every facet of the struggle; among reformist liberals; in the radical Communist opposition; in the courts, whether

as defendants or as counsel for the defence; in the list of bannings and amongst those who fled the country to evade arrest. Their prominence was particularly marked in the course of the Treason Trial, which occupied an important place in the news media throughout the second half of the 1960s. This trial began in December 1966 when 156 persons were arrested on charges of treason in the form of a conspiracy to overthrow the state by violence and replace it with a state based on Communism. Twenty-three of those arrested were Whites, more than half of them Jews.”¹⁴

After naming some of the Jews involved, Dr. Shimoni goes on: “To top it all, at one stage in the trial the defence counsel was led by Israel Maisels, while the prosecutor was none other than Oswald Pirow. The juxtaposition was striking: Maisels, the prominent Jewish communal leader, defending those accused of seeking to overthrow White supremacy.”

Dr. Shimoni remarks that when the secret headquarters of the Communist underground was captured intact by the police at Rivonia, near Johannesburg, in 1964, five Whites were arrested, all of them Jews, and he names them: Arthur Goldreich, Lionel Bernstein, Hilliard Festenstein, Denis Goldberg, and Bob Hepple. The expensively equipped Communist command post was situated in a luxury house in extensive grounds, owned by another Jew, Vivian Ezra.

There is no need for an analysis of the relationship of the English-language mining press and the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, for a statement by Abram Fischer, leader of the South African Communist Party underground, says it all: “A section of our press is doing a magnificent job.” It was revealed at Fischer’s trial in 1965 that these words, referring to this English-language press, formed part of a progress report which Fischer had prepared for his comrades.

So, now we know what it was that made the two perceptions of the Empire, or British connection, so different.

Botha and Smuts saw it in its original idealised form, as the philosopher John Ruskin may have seen it; Hertzog, Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd saw it as it actually was—an Empire that was undergoing a mysterious change of identity, an Empire that had come under the influence of forces and motives very different from those which had attended its creation, an Empire which had begun to embrace a radically different system of ethical values.

The story of Hertzog’s career until his displacement by Smuts on the outbreak of World War II can be summarised as follows:

Hertzog took a lead at the conferences of Commonwealth prime ministers in London in securing radical constitutional changes, culminating in the Statute of Westminster in 1932 which, if it did not free the dominions entirely, gave them the right to decide whether to stay in the Commonwealth or get out.

Feeling that his main objective had been attained, Hertzog agreed to join Smuts in a “government of national unity” as a response to the

challenge of the economic depression then prevailing. Most of the nationalists supported Hertzog in an electoral alliance with Smuts's South African Party, but many broke away when the two parties fused to form the United Party. These dissidents under the leadership of Dr. Malan then took over the "National Party" label.

Hertzog opposed South Africa's entry into World War II but was narrowly defeated when the issue was put to the vote in Parliament. Hertzog resigned and Smuts took over. However, in the first general election after the war's end, Dr. Malan and his National Party, revitalised by its role as wartime opposition, was swept back into power—again with slogans about "die geldmag," or money power.

From the vantage point of 1986, we can now see that the history of South Africa in this century has a meaning very different from that which was previously read into it. It never was a struggle between "Boer and Brit." For where now is that Empire which Ruskin, Rhodes, Milner and Smuts dreamed of as the foundation of a new world order? It has passed away, to be replaced by the grotesque caricature of a "New Commonwealth."

And what happened to that little country in Central Africa which was to have been an ever-lasting memorial to Cecil John Rhodes, one of the founders and architects of the Empire? The statue of Rhodes in imperishable bronze was cast down from its granite plinth in Jameson Avenue, Salisbury, and the whole country purged of all associations with the Empire-builders.

But it is not only in Rhodesia that this change of attitude has occurred; all establishment or consensus thinking—that is, thinking among those who rule in the world—has been purged of any associations with the British Empire as a ground plan for the future of mankind.

We can now see more clearly than was possible in 1898 that the alliance between Milner and the so-called "gold bugs" of the Witwatersrand, most of them of foreign origin, was the beginning of the end of British power in the world, and the beginning of a struggle which Professor P.T. Bauer has so aptly described as "an undeclared one-sided civil war in the West."¹⁵ Concerning this struggle, Solzhenitsyn has written as follows:

"We have to recognise that the concentration of World Evil and the tremendous force of hatred is there, and it's flowing from there throughout the world. And we have to stand up against it, and not hasten to give to it, give to it, give to it, everything that it wants to swallow."¹⁶

All the signs of what was happening in South Africa since before the beginning of the century can, therefore, be understood only in the context of what was happening, and continues to happen, all over the world. In the words of the three historians earlier quoted, our "age of conflict" must be considered as an "historic whole," presupposing the existence of "some ultimate meaning." Or, to put it differently again, the immediate and obvious causes of the major changes which

constitute South African history find their full meaning only as part of the "ultimate meaning" of our age of conflict.

What precisely was the cause of the mysterious change of identity which preceded the British Empire's dissolution and its replacement with a socialist ideal and a new and unprecedented world imperium of high finance? The change which was to produce a worldwide chain-reaction of other change, starting with the British Empire, can be said to have begun in the realm of high finance shortly before the turn of the century.

Before then, high finance—not to be confused with private-ownership capitalism—existed in great national concentrations, each one largely geared to a national set of interests. There was a British finance-capitalism, then the most powerful in the world, a German finance-capitalism, an American finance-capitalism, and so on.

There had always existed also an international high finance operated by great banking families or dynasties, the most famous of these being the Rothschilds. These all formed part of the national concentrations of financial power but were able to operate with varying degrees of success *across* national frontiers.

The great change came, unannounced and unreported, when these international banking families were able, by joining hands, to bring all the national concentrations of financial power into coalescence, increasingly under their power.

High finance became fully internationalised. A new world imperium was established. A new kind of Caesar came to power in the world.¹⁷

The clearest documentary evidence in support of this interpretation of history will be found in Professor Carroll Quigley's monumental history of our century, *Tragedy and Hope*.

Some historical changes are unrecognisable when happening, yet noticeable after they have happened. The fact that powerful international banking families had long been established in Britain and even formed part of the nobility would have made it even more difficult at the time to penetrate the mystery.

It is now obvious that the assistance which financiers like Rothschild, Beit and Wernher so willingly gave to Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner had long-range purposes very different from the purposes of these two enthusiastic British race-patriots. What these financiers were, in fact, doing was to initiate a shift of the centre of gravity of world power away from the different nations of the West towards a new imperialism.

Rhodes and Milner, we may be sure, confidently believed that they were harnessing these financiers to the chariot of their political ambitions, but events have shown that these financiers, organised increasingly on a global basis, had political ambitions of their own.

And it was because the real power had begun to flow from this new centre that British public affairs began to exhibit signs of a different

morale in which little value, if any, is attached to airy realities like those of personal honour and truthfulness. In other words, there was a moral transformation involved in a change which began to permit pure finance to prevail over national politics.

No one exemplified this moral transformation better than Cecil Rhodes himself with his well-known axiom, "every man has his price"—a corrupting influence which he did not hesitate to exercise within his own community for the attainment of ends he believed to be good.

This interpretation is strongly endorsed by everything that has happened in South Africa since the National Party was restored to power in 1948.

More obviously than ever after the fall of Rhodesia, English-speakers in South Africa have felt very deeply the need to depend on Afrikaner solidarity for their preservation against a similar disaster. Hence nothing could have been less British or English than the massively financed campaign of subversion and urban guerilla warfare which has been so conspicuous a feature of the post-World War II years in South Africa.¹⁸

So, it is now the question of South Africa's fitness to survive which must engage our attention. Are the Afrikaners as solidly united today as in 1948 and thereafter under Dr. Malan, Mr. Strijdom and Dr. Verwoerd?

There can be only one answer to that question: *No!* At a time when solidarity is most needed, Afrikanerdom is sharply divided. The government has moved to the left and is being opposed with great vehemence by a revived nationalism led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party and Mr. J.A. Marais's *Herstigte Nasionale Party*.

What happened to bring about this major disturbance of Afrikaner solidarity can be explained quite simply. After 1938 there came rapidly into existence an Afrikaner moneyed elite whose declared purpose it was to secure for the Afrikaners a larger stake in the nation's economy. This new moneyed elite with its own investment houses, banks, building societies, etc., prospered enormously by exploiting a highly inflated nationalist sentiment; so much so that by 1965 these wealthy Afrikaners felt strong enough to break into the magic circle of mining high-finance. In fact, an opening had been made for them—a trap into which they fell most readily in spite of warnings by Dr. Verwoerd and others. An important part of Afrikanerdom entered into an alliance with the traditional enemy, "die geldmag" or money power, and could no longer fight it because inseparably joined to it with veins and arteries of shared interest—including, of course, a shared attachment to the principle of credit financing by which they were doomed sooner or later to be yoked.¹⁹

The existence of this partnership in high finance will help to explain why South Africa's present strategy has been based almost exclusively on principles of appeasement and accommodation.

What then are the prospects for South Africa?

The South Africans are in much the same situation as the Trojans at the siege of Troy; the Trojans could not have defeated the Greeks in battle—but they could have won if they had not allowed themselves to be tricked into defeat. Like the Greeks who surrounded Troy, those now waging an undeclared war against South Africa, maintaining as it were a state of siege, are falling increasingly into disorder and disarray. The new world order which they are trying to build can now be seen as a Tower of Babel which is bound to collapse about their ears sooner or later. They are having to pay an enormous price for being out of register with reality.

Thus, whether South Africa survives or not may depend on two questions which the future will answer:

1. Will the South Africans be able to resist the temptation of a "settlement" of the kind that beat the Rhodesians?
2. Will enough of the history of this century be known to enough people in the West to collapse that "Tower of Babel" while the South Africans are still holding out?

Meanwhile, is there nothing South Africa's rulers could do to hasten the collapse of that "Tower of Babel"? Is there no alternative to a strategy of endless conciliation, negotiation, and accommodation? Many of South Africa's friends, especially in the United States of America, have answered "Yes!" to such questions but their suggestions have been ignored—just as the suggestions of Rhodesia's friends around the world were ignored.

The Republic of South Africa, armed with full knowledge of the forces and motives involved in the present struggle, and the skill with which to make the best use of that knowledge, could be a far more formidable opponent than the little Boer Republic at the turn of the century.

One of the major factors in South Africa's present position of strength is the vulnerability of all the political regimes in the West, which have joined hands with the Soviet Union in the present undeclared war aimed at grabbing political control of an area of immense strategical importance and one of the world's greatest repositories of mineral wealth. Their vulnerability exists mainly in the realm of public opinion—as demonstrated in 1965 when the peoples of the West responded instantly and spontaneously to Rhodesia's declaration of independence by setting up innumerable "Friends of Rhodesia" organisations; this public response caused great embarrassment to those Western governments which had joined the Soviet Union and Red China in promoting revolutionary change in Central Africa, and would have expanded enormously had it not been discouraged by an Ian Smith government bent on achieving what it was pleased to call a "settlement."

There can be no doubt that a resolute stand by South Africa, supported with skilful deployment of the country's considerable

resources, could deliver a staggering blow at that conspiratorial "network" so accurately described by Professor Carroll Quigley in his book *Tragedy and Hope*.

Millions of concerned people in the countries of the West are just waiting for some nation to raise the counter-revolutionary standard with a cry that will ring around the world: *So far and no further!*

South Africa with its vast resources in strategic and other minerals, its manufacturing potential, its ability to feed its own people, and a military power, both conventional and nuclear, without equal in Africa, is one of the few developed countries capable of severing links of dependence on the rest of the world and of adopting a bold and heroic attitude—for the benefit of the whole of the West.

South Africans should be further strengthened in a resolution to resist by the knowledge that a willingness to negotiate will win them *no* remission of the penalties of defeat—as the Rhodesians earlier learned to their sorrow.

This, then, is the message I bring from South Africa: The peoples of the West have allowed themselves to be drawn into yet another of this century's fratricidal struggles. That is the meaning of what those history professors call "this century of conflict."

NOTES

1. F.P. Chambers et al., *This Age of Conflict* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1943).
2. George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1949).
3. Lt. General Sir William Butler, *An Autobiography* (Constable, 1911).
4. J.A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa* (James Nisbet, 1900).
5. L. March Phillips, *With Rimington in South Africa*.
6. Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 1979.
7. See *Behind the News*, October 1985, "Britons Shaken as Riots Spread."
8. H. Rider Haggard records that Sir Abe Bailey, one of Rhodes's closest associates, when reminded of the cost of the war to Britain in lives and money, replied: "What matter? Lives are cheap"; in the *Cloak That I Left*, a biography, by Lilius Rider Haggard (Hodder and Stoughton).
9. See Arthur Davey, *The British Pro-Boers 1877-1902* (Tafelberg); S.B. Spies, *Methods of Barbarism?* (Human and Roussouw); Douglas Reed, *Somewhere South of Suez* (Jonathan Cape and Devin-Adair); and books by Deneys Reitz, and by the Boer War hero General Christian de Wet.
10. See Chapter 1, "This Worldwide Conspiracy," in *The Battle for South Africa*, Ivor Benson (Dolphin Press).
11. The difference between British imperialism until the turn of the 19th century, and socialism since the end of World War I, is not simply a difference of political theory; it was the voices of the blood which supplied the original ideas of Ruskin, Rhodes, and Milner with a powerful energising principle. But as it turned out, race-patriots like Rhodes and Milner were not sufficiently armed with insight, intelligence, and money to win the ensuing struggle. See also *The Battle for South Africa*, op. cit.

12. Carroll Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966).
13. Dr. Shimoni's account of opposition politics in South Africa may be compared with that of Dr. B.A. Kosmin for Rhodesia, *Majuta: A History of the Jewish Community in Zimbabwe* (Mambo Press, Zimbabwe), equally candid; Shimoni's book is published by Oxford University Press.
14. Detailed information about the South African treason trials is given in *Traitor's End* by Nathaniel Weyl (Tafelberg).
15. P.T. Bauer, *Equality, the Third World and the Economic Delusion* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson).
16. From Solzhenitsyn's address to the leadership of the AFL-CIO in Washington, D.C., 30 June 1975.
17. This thesis of the revolution in the realm of high finance was first published in the present writer's pamphlet, *The Middle East Riddle Unwrapped* (1984), and has been further developed in his book *The Zionist Factor* (Veritas).
18. See the present writer's pamphlet *Behind Communism in Africa* (Dolphin Press, 1975).
19. See *Behind the News*, January 1979, "The Broederbond Boss Speaks"; February 1983, "Mr. Heunis Unveils Government Thinking"; July 1985, "South Africa: Politics of Confusion."

Further Reference: In addition to works cited in this paper, detailed chronological sequences of political affairs in South Africa since the Anglo-Boer War will be found in *A History of Southern Africa* by Eric A. Walker (Longmans Green), and *500 Years: A History of South Africa*, edited by Professor C.F.J. Muller (Academia, Pretoria).

Response to a Paper Historian

ROBERT FAURISSON

Introduction

Pierre Vidal-Naquet is professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (School of Higher Studies in the Social Sciences) in Paris and has been a very determined adversary of mine. He has attacked me in the academic and journalistic worlds and even in the courts. Along with Léon Poliakov, he is the author of a declaration, published in Le Monde on February 21, 1979, p. 23, which was signed by 34 historians:

It is not necessary to ask how, technically, such a mass murder was possible. It was possible technically since it took place. That is the necessary point of departure for any historical inquiry on this subject. It is our function simply to recall that truth: There is not, there cannot be, any debate about the existence of the gas chambers.

Pierre Vidal-Naquet is also the author of a long article entitled "Un Eichmann de papier" ("A Paper Eichmann") which was directed against me. I responded to that article with my own "Réponse à un historien de papier" ("Response to a Paper Historian"). The article by Vidal-Naquet first appeared in the review Esprit (No. 45, September, 1980, pp. 8-52), and later in a new form, with additions, in a book entitled Les Juifs, la mémoire et le présent (Maspero, 1980, pp. 195-282).

My response first appeared in a short book entitled Réponse à Pierre Vidal-Naquet (La Vieille Taupe Publishers, 1982) and later in a second, expanded edition, in December 1982. It appears here for the first time in English.

An abridgement of the Vidal-Naquet article has been published in English (Democracy, April 1981, pp. 67-95) but I have not checked to see whether that translation is faithful to the original. Vidal-Naquet is very hard-hitting and even insulting, but his article is interesting and even unique: For the first and last time an Exterminationist has tried to answer the arguments of a Revisionist. When the Revisionist replied to the Exterminationist, the latter abandoned the discussion and retreated into silence. Vidal-Naquet no longer talks about gas chambers.

In France there have been two other attempts to answer the Revisionists' arguments, but they were so weak that they fell of their own weight. The first was by Nadine Fresco ("Les Redresseurs de morts" [The Revisers of the Dead], Les Temps Modernes, No. 407, June 1980, pp. 2150-2211) and the second by Georges Wellers (Les Chambres à gaz ont existé [The Gas Chambers Existed], Paris, Gallimard, 1981).

After being burned in the French venture, the Exterminationists have preferred not to cross swords with the Revisionists. Two recent examples illustrate this: First, the collective undertaking directed by Eugen Kogon, Hermann Langbein, and Adalbert Rückerl (NS-Massentötungen durch Giftgas [NS Mass Killings with Poison Gas], Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1983); then, Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of the European Jews, revised and definitive edition (New York/London: Holmes and Meier, 1985). In neither book are the names of the Revisionists mentioned, or their publications or arguments. For a book to be considered scholarly, however, it must treat both sides of the issue at hand; present the arguments of the opposing side; furnish bibliographical information that would let the reader consult the original sources, all the sources; and finally, it must answer the opposing party if it can.

One of the most notable differences between the Exterminationists and the Revisionists is that while Revisionists spend most of their time mentioning and examining the arguments of the other side, Exterminationists maintain a policy of ostracism against their opponents.

Let us imagine for a moment a layman who would like to know who is right—those who claim that there was a genocide carried out against the Jews by using homicidal gas chambers, or those who claim that this is an historical lie. Such a layman would like to attend a debate between representatives of those two theses, but he cannot. The Exterminationists refuse all proposals for debate that the Revisionists offer them. In place of attending such a debate, this layman might want to read publications in which each side tries to answer the arguments of the other. But he cannot do that either, because while the Revisionists do discuss the opposing arguments, the Exterminationists either turn a deaf ear or reply with insults.

There is only one way to satisfy to some extent our layman's desires; that is to have him first read Vidal-Naquet's "A Paper Eichmann" and then my own "Response to a Paper Historian." Failing that,

"Response to a Paper Historian" offers an introduction to a debate between an Exterminationist and a Revisionist that is unprecedented, both in its scope and its detail.

The historian cannot avoid spending a good part of his life in paper. He goes through documents; he collects them; he compares archives and written documents of all kinds. But at the same time the historian must not neglect the material aspect of the facts; therefore he must also transform himself at times into an on-site inspector: an archeologist, a physicist, a chemist, an explorer. Visiting a place, he looks at it, searches through it, measures it, photographs it; he touches it with his fingers. He transforms himself sometimes into a police investigator. He carries out physical reconstructions or, when that is impossible, he carefully reconstructs things in his mind. He needs to have his feet on the ground. It is very good for him to inform himself, from the documents, about democracy in Rome; but it is wise to go to the spot in Rome to see what a small area was occupied by the Forum, the focal point of that democracy. His illusions take flight; so much the worse! Reality replaces them; so much the better!

When he deals with the Ancient World, which is his speciality, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, I suppose, is not content with documents only, but also investigates sites. On the other hand, when that historian calls himself an historian of the "gas chambers," he goes around and around in documents and abstractions. Settled comfortably far above us in a half-philosophical, half-religious empyrean, he writes about other writings and does not even take the effort to reflect on what he writes.

That is why I call him a Paper Historian.

Beginning with the first paper he wrote on the question of the "gas chambers," we discover two striking examples of that dangerous mind-set. We recall that *Le Monde* on 21 February 1979 (p. 23) had published a text entitled "The Nazi Policy of Extermination: A Declaration by Historians." That text was written by Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Léon Poliakov and signed by thirty-four historians without any competence on that subject.

To begin with, the *Le Monde* text reproduced an extract from the "confession" of SS-man Kurt Gerstein. The extract was intended to persuade us that it contained an "indisputable" and "striking" testimony about the Nazi "gas chambers." In halting French, Gerstein had, we are told, written: "The naked men [in the gas chambers] are standing up at [sic] the feet of the others. Seven hundred to eight hundred in 25 square meters, in 45 cubic meters; the doors are closed." Any reader alert to reality would conclude: 28 to 32 men standing on one square meter—that is physically impossible; the admissibility of that strange testimony is at least questionable. But settled in their common philosophical-religious empyrean, our thirty-four scatter-brains did not see what leaped to the eye of the layman.

Here again is the triumphant (and also silly and empty) conclusion of our paper historians' manifesto:

It is not necessary to ask how, *technically*, such a mass murder was possible. It was possible technically since it took place. That is the necessary point of departure for any historical inquiry on this subject. It is our function simply to recall that truth: there is not, there cannot be, any debate about the existence of the gas chambers.

Tautology? A double redundancy? Pure silliness? How to describe such a pearl of wisdom? Remember well the last phrase: "There is not, there cannot be, any debate about the existence of the gas chambers."

In good logic, Vidal-Naquet would not have had, nineteen months later, to publish in *Esprit* a long article on the subject; an article that he expected me to honor with a response (*Les Juifs, la mémoire et le présent* [The Jews, Memory, and the Present], Paris: Maspero, 1980, p. 280). Here is the explanation: The text in *Le Monde* had been conceived to ward off a very pressing problem. In the confusion that was provoked by my article on "The Rumor of Auschwitz," Vidal-Naquet and Poliakov hastily drew up a manifesto, and then took it to some signers, saying to them: "We say there cannot be any debate, but it is very clear that you must not pay attention to that phrase and that you all have to get busy replying to Faurisson." That is how Vidal-Naquet ingenuously puts it on page 196 of (*Les Juifs . . .*) when he writes:

A good number of historians signed the declaration published in *Le Monde* on 21 February 1979, but very few got busy; one of the rare exceptions being F. Delpech.

As to the argumentation which was hidden behind this silliness, I leave to others the job of answering. I will let Claude Guillon and Yves le Bonniec speak (*Suicide, mode d'emploi* [Instruction Manual for Suicide], Alain Moreau, 1982):

We are quite prepared for our part to consider any method of elimination, including gas chambers. It is possible that the technical arguments of Faurisson will be shown to be without value. Having said that, it is *inevitable* to ask oneself how *technically* the gas chambers function, that is to say simply *whether they existed or did not exist*. Such is the obligatory course of every historical inquiry. If by chance no one can be found to show *how* a single gas chamber was able to *function*, from that we would deduce that no one could have been asphyxiated (p. 205).

That remark of the two authors is preceded by the following:

After Rassiner (whose estimation of the gas chambers is more reserved), Faurisson is interesting for having, at the same time that he claims to denounce a forty-year-old lie, revealed *numerous lies*, and having aroused among his opponents one of the most formidable pro-

ductions of new lies of the decade. The official historians themselves recognize that today people still visit a gas chamber, where there never was one, which ought not, according to them, to diminish at all the influence of other "historical" truths. (op. cit., pp. 204-205)

Claude Guillon and Yves le Bonniec use here a key argument of the Revisionists against the Exterminationist thesis. Vidal-Naquet does not breathe a word of that in his innumerable writings and interventions in court.

I want to speak of what I call the "drastic revision" of 19 August 1960. On that day, the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit*, which subscribes to the victors' "Holocaust" story, published a letter, a simple letter from Dr. Martin Broszat of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich. In that letter, which was simply entitled, "No Gassing at Dachau," he conceded to us, or rather, he finally conceded to historical truth, that there had never been any homicidal gassing in the Old Reich (Germany within its 1937 frontiers). Since 1960, that is to say for 22 years, we have awaited the rigorously documented study which would let us see why it had been suddenly necessary to stop believing in the "gassings" at Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, and Neuengamme, while at the same time continuing to believe in the "gassings" in the camps located in communist Poland. Do we not have at our disposal for all the camps an indiscriminate mass of "proofs," of "testimonies," of "confessions"? Have they not executed or driven to suicide the officials of camps where, finally, it is revealed, as if by the working of the Holy Spirit, that there had never been a homicidal "gas chamber"? But no more of this candor: If Dr. Broszat, since 1972 the director of his institute, has never dwelt on those questions, it is because he knows perfectly well that in showing the inanity of the "proofs," the "testimonies," and the "confessions" relating to the camps located in the Old Reich, he would demolish simultaneously the "proofs," the "testimonies," the "confessions" relative to the camps in communist Poland. That is so because for an honest observer all those "proofs," all those "testimonies," and all those "confessions" are worth nothing. They are really of interest only to sociologists specializing in the study of mechanisms of belief.

I now come to the article by Vidal-Naquet. I am going to follow it step by step at the risk of appearing disjointed or of repeating myself, because his entire article is confused.

1. From page 195 to page 208, Vidal-Naquet piles up generalities and digressions which do not seem to me to have great relevance to the subject.

Response: No response.

2. From page 208 to page 210, Vidal-Naquet talks about the *Secret Speeches* of Himmler (*Heinrich Himmler: Geheimreden 1933-1945 und andere Ansprachen* [Heinrich Himmler: Secret Speeches

1933-1945 and Other Talks], ed. Bradley F. Smith and Agnes F. Peterson, Berlin: Propyläen, 1974), about the statistician R. Korherr, and about the word *Sonderbehandlung* (special treatment). He insinuates, but without great conviction, that a passage from those speeches shows a will to carry out "genocide" against the Jews, and that *Sonderbehandlung* is a code word for extermination.

Response: I would first like to make a remark about the seductive title, *Secret Speeches*. Those speeches were not at all secret! In this regard, I note a marked tendency among the Exterminationists to fool the ordinary reader with tendentious titles. So it was that Serge Klarsfeld's *Memorial to the Deportation of the Jews from France* is only a list of the Jews who embarked on the trains for deportation. There is no question here of a list of the dead, as they would often have us believe, especially when they go to deposit these lists at a funeral monument near Jerusalem. Georges Wellers himself, in his hatred for Vichy, goes so far as to entitle one of his books *L'Etoile jaune à l'heure de Vichy* (The Yellow Star in the Vichy Era) although the Vichy government always successfully opposed the wearing of the yellow star in its zone. Vidal-Naquet, himself, does not know what tone is proper to take about Himmler's remarks. He speaks of his "direct or nearly totally direct language." Here he believes he sees him "at maximum frankness," even though he adds that "a description of the real process would be a thousand times more traumatic." There's the rub—Vidal-Naquet proclaims that he has found in Himmler what the Exterminationist historians have sought in vain since 1945: either an order or a simple instruction verifying a decision to exterminate the Jews. But at the very moment that he presents to us the result of his search, he looks sulkily at what he has found: The language of Himmler is "direct or nearly totally direct," there is no "description of the real process." (Dare we ask if that "description of the real process" happens to exist only in Vidal-Naquet's head?) But that's not all. Vidal-Naquet adds another puzzle to the puzzle. He is astonished at a "toning down" by Himmler; that devil Himmler was facing a "well-informed" audience! Why, then, this "indirect or nearly totally indirect" language? Then, suddenly, enveloping himself in an analysis more and more abstract and autistic, Vidal-Naquet believes he has discovered that Himmler "codes," and even "supercodes," what he had in his mind. Vidal-Naquet deciphers this alleged "code" with supreme speed and ease; he decodes on first reading, off the top of his head. He decrees, without the least proof, that *Sonderbehandlung* is a codeword and, in our presence, he decodes it instantaneously: That word means "extermination." But things get really complicated when our analyst, seized by a sudden scruple, adds as a footnote a remark very likely to mislead a reader who no longer knows whether Himmler is "direct or nearly totally direct"; whether he "is at maximum frankness" or is being secretive; whether he "codes" or whether he "supercodes": "Of course *Sonderbehandlung* could also have a perfectly benign meaning."

The reality was the following: *Sonderbehandlung* could have a whole series of meanings, from the most serious to the most benign. The context should instruct the reader. The primary meaning seems to be medical, and one will find, for example: "*Sonderbehandlung: Quarantänelager* (quarantine camp)." On the other hand, in document PS-502, the same word means explicitly "executions." *Sonderbehandlung* was also applied to the favored treatment enjoyed in captivity by high officials. See what defendant Kaltenbrunner says about it at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (French edition, Volume XI, pp. 347-348):

In those two deluxe hotels [for special treatment] were lodged some of the best people such as M. Poncet, M. Herriot, etc. They received rations triple those normal for a diplomat; that is to say, nine times the wartime rations of a German. Every day each received a bottle of champagne; they corresponded freely with their families, they could receive parcels from their families left behind in France. These internees received frequent visits, and we would inquire about all their desires. That is what we called "*special treatment*."

Arrivals and departures were noted in the reports of the daily population of each camp. Among the departures might be noted the dead, the "S.B." (*Sonderbehandlung*), the freed (people forget that many of the concentration-camp inmates could leave Auschwitz after completing a sentence of several months), and those transferred. They would have us believe that the "S.B." were those condemned to "gassing." There were, however, "S.B." in the camps that had no gas chambers, even according to the Exterminationists. These "S.B." must have been, in all probability, internees assigned to other camps for some reason (Bergen-Belsen for health; Bergen-Belsen for categories of Jews to be exchanged with the Allies; Ravensbrück for women; Dachau for priests; Theresienstadt for old people, etc.). The "transferred" category, properly speaking, was made up of people assigned to a particular job either in the camp, or in a distant camp.

We find, in the travel authorizations, telegrams from the WVHA (the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office) allowing trucks to pick up material either for *Sonderbehandlung* or for *Desinfektion* (disinfection); these two words being used interchangeably. It was a matter, more precisely, of going to Dessau to obtain quantities of Zyklon B in order to disinfect the Auschwitz camp, where typhus was prevalent (radio message of 22 July 1942 addressed to the Auschwitz camp under signature of General Gluecks [Raul Hilberg, *Documents of Destruction*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971, p. 220]). In one and the same book (*Sachso*, by the Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen Society, Minuit-Plon, 1982) the expression "special treatment" is applied on page 99 to the act of marking in blue pencil on the left breast of a bearer of lice, and on page 327 it is applied to an execution.

When we seek an expression which can take account of all these meanings at the same time, we ask ourselves what would be most

suitable for *Sonderbehandlung*: would it not be *to isolate*? One finds that meaning in *gesonderte Unterbringung* (isolated stay), an expression often applied to arrivals.

The fact remains that although *Sonderbehandlung* could occasionally mean *to execute*, we know very well that Himmler, after receiving the work of his statistician Korherr, told the latter that in a certain passage of his report he ought to replace the word *Sonderbehandlung* with *Transportierung* (transport).

Long after the war, Korherr protested against the interpretation of *Sonderbehandlung* as meaning massacre. In *Der Spiegel* of 25 July 1977, cited by Dr. Wilhelm Stäglich on page 391 of *Der Auschwitz Mythos* (The Auschwitz Myth) (Tübingen: Grabert Verlag, 1979), he wrote:

The statement according to which I supposedly was able to establish that more than a million Jews could have died in the camps of the General Government in Poland and of the territories of the Wartheland from the results of a special treatment (*Sonderbehandlung*) is absolutely incorrect. It is necessary for me to protest against the use of the verb *to die* in this context.

Korherr goes on to say that *Sonderbehandlung* was supposed to mean *Ansiedlung* (displacement).

The context is really the last concern of someone like Vidal-Naquet. I willingly concede to him that on page 169 of the German edition (*Geheimreden . . .*), Himmler says this to his audience (6 October 1943):

We came up against the question: What about the women and children? In this case as well I decided on a very clear solution. That is, I did not feel justified in exterminating the men—in other words, to kill or allow to be killed—while allowing the children to grow up into avengers against our sons and grandsons. The difficult decision had to be made to let this people disappear from the earth. (op. cit., p. 169)

If we end the quotation here, as Vidal-Naquet does, Himmler assumes the proportions of a General Turreau intent on killing men, women, and children and making of the Vendée (during the French Revolution) a great cemetery. However, the continuation is curious and makes clear that Himmler has indulged in a bit of braggadocio. He goes on to say that in his conduct of the anti-partisan struggle he was able to spare the German officers and soldiers a double danger:

That of becoming too hardened, of becoming heartless and of no longer respecting human life, or of becoming too weak and of losing one's head to the point of having a nervous breakdown—the path between Scylla and Charybdis is terribly narrow. (p. 170)

But how then, one may ask, did Himmler's men in fact proceed? The answer is found in many pages of his so-called *Secret Speeches*, and in particular on pages 201 and 203.

Two months after the speech mentioned above, Himmler returned to the subject (16 December 1943). Again, it is the partisan war that he is talking about, a war carried out as savagely on one side as on the other. He says:

Wherever I was forced to take action in a village against partisans and against Jewish commissars—I'm saying this to this circle, as meant exclusively for this circle—as a basic rule I also gave the order to have the women and children of these partisans and commissars killed as well. I would be a weakling and a criminal against our descendants if I were to allow the hate-filled sons of the sub-humans wiped out by us in the struggle between humans and sub-humans to grow up. Believe me: It's not easy to give such an order, and not as simple to carry out as it is to think through correctly its consequences and put them into words in a meeting hall. But we must always recognize just how naturally basic and primitive is the racial struggle in which we find ourselves. (p. 201)

More interesting yet is the speech Himmler gave five months later to a number of generals at Sonthofen (24 May 1944). Here we find less than ever the "genocide" we might fear. Himmler declared:

Regarding the Jewish women and children, I did not consider myself justified in allowing the children to grow up into avengers who would then kill our fathers and our grandchildren. I would have regarded that as cowardly. Therefore, the issue was dealt with uncompromisingly. Nevertheless, right now—and this is unique in this war—we are first bringing 100,000 male Jews from Hungary, and later another 100,000, with whom we are building underground factories, into concentration camps. None of them, though, will come into any contact at all with the German people. (p. 203)

The Germans were haunted by the possibility that uprisings like that of the Warsaw ghetto would recur behind their lines. Concerning the fear of seeing happen at Budapest what had taken place in Warsaw, we can read *Ich, Adolf Eichmann* (I, Adolf Eichmann), published by Dr. Rudolf Aschenhauer (Druffel Verlag, 1980), page 33.

3. On page 211, Vidal-Naquet, reciting the history of the "extermination," talks about "the halt to the extermination of the Jews on Himmler's order at the end of October 1944."

Response: That order never existed and I challenge Vidal-Naquet to produce it for us. Just as there existed no order by Hitler or by Himmler or by anyone to *start* the extermination of the Jews, so also was there no order by anyone to *stop* an extermination which had not occurred.

4. In a footnote on page 212, Vidal-Naquet asserts, "I see no reason to doubt the existence of the gas chambers at Ravensbrück, Struthof, and Mauthausen."

Response: With regard to Ravensbrück, Vidal-Naquet refers us to the book by Germaine Tillion (*Ravensbrück*, Paris: Le Seuil, 1973), which

contains a plan of the camp. The location of the alleged "gas chambers" is not even noted! Nowhere else is there either the slightest plan or the slightest physical trace. This is a strictly metaphysical "gas chamber."

Regarding Struthof, I was the first to publicize the condition of the premises, guaranteed to be "in original condition." I proved that the "gasser" would have been the first to gas himself with his mysterious gas (see the *two* contradictory confessions by Josef Kramer about the "gasings" at Struthof camp in Alsace.) Vidal-Naquet does not resolve the technical puzzle; besides, nothing that is technical interests him.

With regard to Mauthausen, things are even simpler. The handles that open and close the pipes bringing the alleged gas into the shower are within reach of the victims! That is what is clearly evident from a normal photo. The photo exhibited at the recent display about the deportation which was held on the Esplanade of the Trocadéro in Paris (April-May of 1982) showed it not quite as well. The handles were cropped out.

5. On page 212, in footnote 23, Vidal-Naquet confesses that there exists on the subject of the concentration camps "a sub-literature which represents a really vile kind of appeal to consumerism and sadism." He adds: "All that is dependent on hallucination and propaganda must be eliminated." On these bases he denounces Christian Bernadac, Silvain Reiner, Jean-Francois Steiner, and V. Grossman. He admits having fallen "into the trap set by Steiner's *Treblinka* (Fayard, 1966)."

Response: Very well, but that hardly moves us forward. What would be instructive for the reader would be to know why Vidal-Naquet fell into such a trap and how he got out of it. He insults Bernadac without our knowing exactly why, and he touts Nyiszli, leaving us none the wiser as to his motives. He proceeds by ukases. He decrees that one narrative is credible and that another one is not. He devotes himself to none of the analyses that the Revisionists carry out. When a Rassinier asserts to us that the best-seller, *Doctor at Auschwitz*, by Nyiszli, is only a "rascally trick," it is after a long analysis and an inquiry of the most serious kind. Rassinier arms us for future reading, leaving it to our judgment as mature adults to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Vidal-Naquet disarms us. In his presence we are like children who, each time a new work appears, await the judgment which will fall from the mouth of their father—a father at the same time peremptory and fallible. What does he think of Martin Gray who, to write *Au nom de tous les miens* (published in English as *For Those I Loved*), took as his ghost-writer a purveyor of moral lessons named Max Gallo who helped Gray, in cooperation with the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation, to fabricate his deportation to Treblinka? Does he sense an odor of authenticity in the rubbish piled up by Filip Müller in *Trois ans dans une chambre à gaz*, à

Auschwitz (Three Years in a Gas Chamber at Auschwitz) (Pygmalion/Gerald Watalet, 1980), a book launched with a great fuss by Claude Lanzmann [director of the documentary *Shoah*, 1985) and by *Le Nouvel Observateur*, a book which drew tears from the actor François Perrier who came to talk about it on television?

What does he think about Constantin Simonov on *Maidanek* (Editions sociales, 1946)? How does he judge a hundred other works, either histories or first-person accounts, where we find over and over again the same clichés, the same inventions, the same foul smells, the same physical impossibilities as in the works that he denounces as false? What does he think of Fania Fénelon as she expresses herself on what she experienced at Auschwitz (which is not without interest) and as she tries to make us believe in the existence of the gas chambers (which she did not see)? What does he think of the quite recent *Sachso*, in which the Association of Former Inmates of Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen had the effrontery to tell us that the camp had a homicidal "gas chamber," when for nearly a quarter of a century it has been accepted by authorities in Exterminationist history that the place never had any such installation? What does he think, in that regard, of the way in which faith is transformed into "science"?

6. On pages 212-213, Vidal-Naquet concedes to us that the theologian Charles Hauter, who was deported to Buchenwald, "never saw a gas chamber" and "is deranged on that subject." He quotes him:

The machinery for extermination literally abounded. To be accomplished quickly, extermination demanded a special kind of industrialization. The gas chambers answered that need in quite different ways. Some of them, of a refined style, were supported by pillars of a porous material, inside of which the gas formed, then passed through the walls. Others were of a simpler structure, but all were sumptuous in appearance. It was easy to see that the architects had conceived them with pleasure, planning them for a long time, drawing on all of their esthetic resources. They were the only parts of the camp constructed with love.

Response: I do not see why Vidal-Naquet takes exception to that testimony. It is neither worse nor better than everything else to be read under the rubric of "gas chambers" at Buchenwald, Auschwitz or elsewhere. By what right does Vidal-Naquet assert that the theologian never saw any gas chambers, and that he "is deranged on that subject"? The answer is simple and disarming, like reasoning in the Vidal-Naquet style, and must be formulated as follows: "The theologian did not see gas chambers at Buchenwald because it offends the official truth on the question, the official truth admitted by tacit and secret consent among the establishment historians, according to whom, definitively, Buchenwald had no gas chamber." In other words, to remain faithful to the tautological, redundant, and autistic reasonings of a Vidal-Naquet, here is what one would have to say to

Charles Hauter: "It is not necessary to ask oneself how, *technically*, such a mass murder was possible at Buchenwald. It was impossible technically since it did not take place. That is the necessary point of departure for any historical inquiry on this subject. It is our function simply to recall that truth: There is not, there cannot be, any debate about the non-existence of the gas chambers at Buchenwald."

7. On page 213, Vidal-Naquet concedes, "The number of six million Jews killed, which comes from Nuremberg, has nothing sacred or definitive about it, and many historians arrive at a slightly lower number." "So it is," he adds in a footnote, "that R. Hilberg arrives at a total of 5,100,000 victims."

Response: This remark of Vidal-Naquet jibes with what Dr. Broszat finally declared before a court in Frankfurt: "The six million is a symbolic number." I am surprised that Vidal-Naquet does not quote a more convincing argument in support of his thesis than the total proposed by Raul Hilberg. Gerald Reitlinger himself, on page 546 of his *The Final Solution* (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1971), presents a "Summary of Extermination Estimates (Revised 1966)." His table gives us a choice between a minimum of 4,204,000 and a maximum of 4,575,000 Jewish dead. Still, he takes great care to add that it is a matter of totals based on conjectures. Vidal-Naquet ought to inform us that all such totals are based on pure conjectures. After 37 years, with the electronic means that we possess, the approximate number of Jewish victims ought long since to have been established, but it sadly happens that the Exterminationists do not wish to establish it. When a regime like that in France has kept secret its own figures for over ten years now, it is hiding them for fear of Jewish reaction, and, as we shall see farther on, Vidal-Naquet has taken part personally in this refusal to communicate a bit of information which inevitably would embarrass the liars and jugglers of numbers.

8. On pages 213 and 214, Vidal-Naquet writes of Klarsfeld: "In the same way, Klarsfeld, by the thorough work which characterizes his *Mémorial*, has decreased by more than 40,000 the number usually given for the deportation of Jews from France (from 100,000 to a little more than 76,000)."

Response: I have already said what I thought of Klarsfeld's book. The content is worthy of a photograph which appears on the cover. The photo is cropped in order to appear pitiful: The smiling persons have disappeared. One can find the photo in its complete form on page 188. Second distortion: On page 28, Klarsfeld leads us to believe that General Kohl was in favor of the physical destruction of the Jews, when it was a question of a destruction of their influence, "like that of the political churches." The words omitted are: "Er zeigte sich auch als Gegner der politischen Kirchen" ("He showed himself to be also an enemy of the political churches.") This very serious distortion of a text from [SS-Hauptsturmführer Theodor] Dannecker originates with Josef Billig, followed by Georges Wellers, followed by Michael R.

Marrus and Robert O. Paxton. Each one has replaced the missing phrase with an ellipsis, the typographical sign of an omission. Each therefore could say, "here finally is proof of the decision to exterminate. The only proof, to tell the truth." With Klarsfeld the distortion is all the more conscious since, before publishing his *Mémorial*, he had published *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich* (The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem in France) (Paris: Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation, 1977) for the German courts that were to try [Kurt] Lischka. In that work it was impossible to conjure up those three periods (ellipsis) all of a sudden in the middle of a letter by Dannecker (page 36). I can cite a third attempt at trickery on Klarsfeld's part on page 245 of his *Mémorial*, in regard to the diary of Dr. Johann-Paul Kremer: see my *Mémoire en défense*, p. 125.

There is something infinitely more serious, however. In order to determine the number of the dead among the 76,000 Jews deported from France, Klarsfeld used an astonishing procedure: He declared DEAD all those who had not taken the trouble to go declare themselves ALIVE to the Ministry of Veterans by the deadline of 31 December 1945! And that at a time when that step was neither obligatory nor official. Truth obliges me to note that Klarsfeld did go to Belgium to find out whether it would be possible to gather there more names of survivors. The majority of Jews deported from France were foreigners. I do not think they had a great longing to return to a country which had turned them over to the Germans.

Klarsfeld has not troubled to find out how many Jews deported from France, then liberated, migrated to Palestine, the United States, South Africa, Argentina, etc. He has had no scruple about counting as dead all those who, after returning to France, presented themselves, without being asked to do so, at the door of the Ministry of Veterans after 31 December 1945. One could say a great deal about his *Mémorial*, about the appendix to *Mémorial*, or about the thousands of "gassed persons" made up out of whole cloth by the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris, according to Klarsfeld's own statement.

Vidal-Naquet says that the number usually given for Jews deported from France was 100,000 and that Klarsfeld reduced that to a little more than 76,000, thus bringing about a revision of about 40,000 (?). There is an error there. The number usually given was 120,000 and not 100,000, and the revision is therefore about 44,000. According to Klarsfeld, in 1939 France had about 300,000 Jews (French, foreign, stateless) out of its 39 million inhabitants (see his page 606). From that we conclude that three quarters of the Jews settled in France were not deported; a strange phenomenon to reconcile with a supposed policy of "extermination." A phenomenon still stranger in Bulgaria and in pre-war Romania or in Denmark or Finland. A phenomenon all the stranger when we think of all of the associations throughout the world

which include survivors of the "Holocaust" who, like Simon Wiesenthal himself, went from death camp to death camp without Hitler ever killing them.

The "Wannsee Protocol," which I do not feel has any value, for reasons that I do not have time to give here, is considered authentic by the Exterminationists. For this reason, I point out that the transcript notes 865,000 Jews for France in 1941. From that we would have to conclude that not even one tenth of the Jews of France were deported.

9. On page 214, in footnote 28, Vidal-Naquet writes:

Faurisson declares (*Vérité* . . . , pp. 98, 115) inaccessible the findings of the Committee for the History of the (Second) World War on the total number of non-racial deportees. They can be checked very simply in J.P. Azema, *De Munich à la Libération* (From Munich to the Liberation, 1979), p. 189: 63,000 deportees, of whom 41,000 were members of the resistance, an estimate obviously lower than those which were formerly accepted.

Response: I have never limited my criticism to the fact that the Committee hid from us "the total number of non-racial deportees." I had always reproached it for hiding from us the total number of true deportees; racial or non-racial. One will note that my criticism remains as valid today as yesterday, and that neither the Committee, nor Azema, nor Vidal-Naquet dares to reveal to us the number of racial deportees. I am going to do it for them: THE NUMBER WHICH THEY HAVE HIDDEN FROM US FOR NINE YEARS IS 28,162. (For the non-racial, it is exactly 63,085). Obviously that number—28,162 Jews—is terribly embarrassing for the Exterminationists. It was obtained at the end of an investigation which lasted twenty years. How to reconcile it with the number from Klarsfeld: about 76,000? Here is a good subject for our Exterminationists to reflect on. Must we assume that the Committee worked scientifically and that it assigned the characteristic of Jewishness to those for whom that characteristic meant deportation? Must we believe that Klarsfeld for his part counted as Jews all the Jews, whether they had been deported for that characteristic or for another such as resistance, sabotage, spying, black market, common-law crime? I don't know anything about it. I pose the question and I would certainly like some clarification. Let our people play their violins in unison!

Vidal-Naquet talks about 63,000 deportees, including 41,000 resistants, as an "estimate obviously lower than those formerly accepted." I find him a little bit shift. He ought to be more precise and recall for us that at the main Nuremberg trial, the number of deportees from France was officially 250,000 (IMT, Vol. VI, p. 325), which, we might note in passing, gives us an idea of the seriousness of that tribunal which called itself "military" and "international" when it was only a judicial masquerade. It was neither military (with the exception of the judge from the USSR) nor was it international but inter-

Allied, with the victors alone cynically judging the vanquished on the basis of a statute which contained judicial abominations like Articles 19 and 21.

10. On pages 214 and 215 Vidal-Naquet writes, "It is quite simply a shameless lie to compare the Nazi camps with the camps created by a perfectly scandalous decision of the Roosevelt administration to house Americans of Japanese origin (Faurisson, in *Vérité* . . . , p. 189)."

Response: In fact, I wrote, "I describe 'genocide' as the act of killing men because of their race. Hitler no more committed 'genocide' than did Napoleon, Stalin, Churchill or Mao. Roosevelt interned American citizens of Japanese race in concentration camps. That was not 'genocide'." Let people reread my sentences. Where is there a *comparison* of the German camps and the American camps? Where is the "shameless lie" on my part? If I had had to compare them with anything, it would have been to say that in any case it would probably be better to live in a concentration camp run by a wealthy nation like the United States in 1941 rather than by a nation like Germany where shortages of all sorts were rampant. Azema, already quoted, wrote in footnote 2 of page 189, in regard to the mortality rate in the German camps: "During the last weeks, the epidemics reached an endemic stage, and the last transfers were particularly deadly."

Having said that, concentration camps are a modern invention that we owe not to the British in their war against the Boers, but to the Americans during their Civil War, and I think that the horrors of Andersonville must have been as bad as the horrors of the English, German, Russian, or French camps. Let us recall modestly in what conditions, right after the war, we put many of our German prisoners of war, and for those who have a short memory, let us recall that the Americans demanded the return from France of the Germans whom they had given to us, and that the transfer operation had the name "Operation Skinny"; an operation involving those who had nothing more than skin on their bones.

11. On page 215 Vidal-Naquet wrote: ". . . it is the job of historians to take historical facts out of the hands of ideologues who exploit them. In the case of the genocide of the Jews, it is obvious that one of the Jewish ideologies, Zionism, exploits that great massacre in a way that is sometimes scandalous."

Response: Very well. But when I say that, people cry anti-Semitism and have me heavily sentenced by the French judicial apparatus: 360 million old French francs in fines, three months suspended prison sentence, and not one colleague to express his astonishment at the sentencing of a professor with but a single income. The only parties whom I accuse in this enormous lie about the "gas chambers" and about "genocide" are international Zionism and the State of Israel. To be exact, I accuse them of being the principal beneficiaries of it.

12. Vidal-Naquet spoke, on page 216, about the "demonstration made by Faurisson that the *Diary of Anne Frank* is, if not a 'literary

hoax,' at least a doctored document." Then comes the following commentary: "On the scale of the history of the Nazi genocide, that change removes one comma."

Response: Here is what is troubling. The same Faurisson who finds himself treated on nearly every page as an inveterate liar and as a complete falsifier supposedly has the analytical qualities necessary to detect a doctored document where millions of readers saw a work of a staggering authenticity, which all by itself has supposedly done more good for the Exterminationist cause than have the six million dead. Are there two Faurissons? Does he thus divide himself from one suddenly into two? If that is the case, we must be shown how. Very many readers are going to think that, after all, he has used one and same method (textual, pragmatic, in accord with the facts) to distinguish the true and the false in every instance.

13. On page 216, in footnote 30, Vidal-Naquet writes: "You will find in her article [that of Nadine Fresco, "Les Redresseurs de morts," op. cit.] an excellent analysis of the methods of revisionist history."

Response: In that long article, loquacious and, as has been said, "ridiculing in tone," I have found no trace of any analysis whatsoever. I was named 150 times. I believe that I had the right to reply. I therefore sent the journal a text for that purpose. *Les Temps Modernes* let me know that there was no question of publishing it since I denied the existence of the "gas chambers" (oral response).²

14. On page 220, Vidal-Naquet reproaches the American Revisionist Dr. Austin App for having written: "The Third Reich wanted the emigration of the Jews, not their liquidation. If it had wanted to liquidate them, there would not be 500,000 survivors of the concentration camps in Israel [an imaginary number, Vidal-Naquet says] being paid German indemnities for imaginary persecutions."

Response: In volume 14 of the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, in the article on "Reparations, German," it is said that on 12 March 1951, Moshe Sharett, in support of the demand for financial reparations from Germany, pointed out the necessity of absorbing 500,000 victims of Nazism into the land of Israel. Twenty-seven years later, in *Le Monde* of 3 November 1978, page 10, we read this: "An important part of the Israeli people escaped from the holocaust and is a living witness to the genocide committed by the Nazi beast," declares a communique of the Israeli embassy in Paris. Thirty-five years after the war, in *L'Agence Télégraphique Juive* of 9 December 1980, under the title "Le Parti des survivants" ("The Party of the Survivors"), we read: "There are between 200,000 and 500,000 survivors of the Holocaust in Israel. They are from 45 to 75 years old, says Tuvia Friedmann."

15. On page 221, Vidal-Naquet reproaches the Revisionists for asking proof from those who claim that the "gas chambers" and the "genocide" really existed. He does so in the following terms: "For here we are obliged, finally, to *prove* what happened to us. We, who

since 1945, *know*, here we are occupied with being demonstrative, eloquent, with using the weapons of rhetoric, with entering into the world of what the Greeks called *Peitho*, Persuasion, which they made into a goddess who is not ours. Do you really understand what that means?"

Response: It seems normal to me for a historian to prove what he alleges and it seems to me abnormal to consider oneself dispensed from furnishing one's proofs. We note in the passage a confession which is quite considerable; that up to the present the Exterminationists *proved* nothing because they *knew*! Such is indeed the reproach that we always made against them. On the question of the "gas chambers" and the "genocide," the Exterminationists have contented themselves with a sort of intuitive knowledge; infused, metaphysical, religious, elusive. They were convinced that that would be enough. Ah well, that is no longer quite enough.

16. On page 222, in note 41, Vidal-Naquet writes that Faurisson and Thion have dared to maintain that no expert report on a gas chamber has ever been done. He says: "That is false; I have in front of me the translation of an expert report carried out at Cracow in June 1945 on the ventilation openings of the Birkenau gas chamber (Crematorium No. 2), on 25 kilograms of women's hair, and on the metallic objects found in the hair. This report which uses, Georges Wellers tells me, the classic methodology, reveals compounds of hydrogen cyanide in the material."

Response: I am familiar with the expert reports ordered by examining magistrate Jan Sehn and carried out by the laboratory located on Copernicus Street in Cracow. *They are not reports establishing specifically that such and such a building was a homicidal gas chamber.* I ask why they did not make that elementary investigation (which, besides, is still possible today). What Vidal-Naquet calls or lists as the "gas chamber" of Crematorium No. 2 was a "Leichenkeller," that is to say, an ordinary morgue; half buried to protect it from the heat, in a cul-de-sac, 30 meters by 7 meters in size, with support pillars in the middle. I know the ventilation system in great detail. A morgue has to be disinfected. For this they used Zyklon B, an insecticide invented in 1917, and still used all over today. Zyklon B is an absorbent of hydrocyanic acid on an inert, porous base—diatomaceous earth—which slowly releases gaseous hydrocyanic acid on contact with the air. It is therefore normal that an expert report turn up traces of that acid. As regards the hair, I recall that, during the war, hair was gathered in all of the barbershops in Europe. In factories or in the camps, it was used to make carpets, shag material, insoles for boots, etc. The camps were crammed with materials for recycling, which are explained today to tourists as all coming from the personal effects of victims. I personally have a series of documents which prove that part of the hair displayed in the Na-

tional Museum at Auschwitz came in fact from a carpet and shag factory located at Kietrz, about 90 kilometers as the crow flies from Auschwitz. Traces of hydrocyanic acid were found in them, which again was very normal.

I renew here my repeated request that finally, 37 years after the end of the war, someone order an expert report on every place (either in its original condition, or in ruins) that is said to be a homicidal gas chamber. Let them begin with Struthof after, if necessary, a rereading of the Simonin, Fourcade Piedelièvre report and, especially, of the unlocatable report of the toxicologist Professor René Fabre.

17. On page 223, Vidal-Naquet writes: "Faurisson contents himself with stewing . . . about 'the miraculously rediscovered manuscripts,' the inauthenticity of which he does not even try to demonstrate."

Response: In my *Mémoire en défense*, which appeared after the present book of Vidal-Naquet, I prove the inauthenticity of those manuscripts. I do it on pages 232 to 236, in the chapter entitled *The Trickeries of the LICRA and All the Others*. I advise Vidal-Naquet to read, further, the special issue of the *Hefte von Auschwitz*, Special Issue 1, "Handschriften von Mitgliedern des Sonderkommandos" (Manuscripts by Members of the Special Commandos) (Auschwitz State Museum Publishing Company, 1972). In the preface he will see on pages 5 and 17, not without surprise, to what extent the Poles chided the first publisher of those manuscripts because of his changes and manipulations. That publisher was none other than the illustrious Professor Bernard Mark, director of the Institute for Jewish History at Warsaw, who was denounced as a falsifier by the Polish Jew Michel Borwicz in the *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, January 1962, page 93.

18. On the same page 223, Vidal-Naquet reproaches me for having included *The Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto*, by Emmanuel Ringelblum, among the "false, apocryphal, or suspect" works.

Response: Let us decide about this simply by the way in which the book is introduced! I have in front of me: Emmanuel Ringelblum, *Chronique du Ghetto de Varsovie* (French version by Léon Poliakov from the adaptation by Jacob Sloan [Paris: Robert Laffont, 1978]). On page 7, the note by the translator begins as follows:

At the request of the editor, I have followed for this version of the *Chronicle* of Emmanuel Ringelblum the abridgment by Mr. Jacob Sloan, published in the United States in 1958 by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. I have nevertheless taken care to collate this text with the original edition in Yiddish, published in 1952 by the Institute for Jewish History in Warsaw [. . .] The Warsaw edition presents *gaps motivated principally by the place and date of publication*. Unfortunately, neither Mr. Jacob Sloan nor myself have been able to familiarize ourselves with the *original text of the manuscript preserved in Warsaw*. [emphasis added]

Must I recall here—last but not least—that the Institute's director, whose name Léon Poliakov does not give, was the forger Bernard Mark?

19. On page 224, Vidal-Naquet comes back to a quotation from Himmler and talks about "coded language," then quotes Goebbels who, in his *Diary*, on 13 May 1943, wrote: "There is therefore no other recourse left for modern nations except to exterminate the Jews . . ."

Response: As regards Himmler, I refer back to my paragraph 2, above. As regards what is "decoded," I would say, "Enough talk about decoding!" As regards Goebbels, I would say that wartime phraseology is always the same; it is always a question of exterminating the enemy to the last man. Look at the words of our "Marseillaise." I look likewise at the examples quoted by Dr. Wilhelm Stäglich in *Der Auschwitz Mythos* (The Auschwitz Myth) pages 82-85; statements by Vansittart, Ilya Ehrenburg, and Zionist officials, etc. Even a Jewish intellectual like Julien Benda, who claimed that he was a rationalist, wrote as follows on page 153 of *Un Régulier dans le siècle* (Paris [trans. Gallimard]: 1938):

For my part, I maintain that by their morality the modern Germans are collectively one of the plagues of the world, and if I had only to press a button to exterminate them entirely, I would do it on the spot, even if I had perhaps to cry about any good people who would die in the process.

That said, Goebbels repeats, on several occasions in his *Diary*, "The Jews must be chased from Europe." At the time he spoke, on 7 May 1943, they had not even been chased from Berlin, and at the time of "liberation," in May 1945, the surprising discovery was made that there still existed in Berlin at least one Jewish day-nursery and a home for old Jews. As for Europe in general, it contained millions of Jews.

20. On page 224, Vidal-Naquet wrote that it is "a little surprising [. . .] that no SS leader denied the existence of the gas chambers."

Response: That is quite simply false. In the transcripts of the trials we observe quite often the obstinacy camp officials displayed in not wanting to accept the "evidence." See, in my *Mémoire en défense*, on page 45, what Germaine Tillion dares to write about the commandant of Ravensbrück:

Commandant Suhren was naturally interrogated on several occasions on the subject of the gas chamber. He began by denying its existence, then he admitted it, but said that it was outside of his control and maintained that position in spite of the evidence to the contrary. "I estimate," he said (in the course of the interrogation of 8 December 1949), "the number of women gassed at Ravensbrück at about 1,500."

It is now recognized that there was never a gas chamber in that camp, where, furthermore, the location of the astonishing "gas chamber" has never been given! The same obstinacy was shown by Josef Kramer in regard to Auschwitz. He said in his first deposition

that he had heard the allegations of former prisoners from Auschwitz according to which a gas chamber was supposed to be located there, adding that that was entirely false. In a later deposition, however, he said that there was ONE gas chamber but that it was under the authority of Höss (*Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-four Others* [edited by Raymond Phillips, London: William Hodge and Co.] pp. 731 and 738).

Regarding the same Josef Kramer, the French military court outdid itself in the matter of the alleged homicidal "gas chamber" at Struthof. It extorted from him two totally contradictory confessions as to the conduct of the gassing operation (Celle, on 26 July 1945 and Luneburg on 6 December 1945). If Richard Baer, in the course of an interrogation in about 1962 or 1963, had admitted the existence of "gas chambers" at Auschwitz, where he was commandant, there is no doubt that in the course of the Frankfurt trial the prosecution would have used it against his 22 accomplices, who were so stubborn and vague on the subject.

I repeat here that it is impossible to scoff at a taboo. One comes to terms with it, as all the German lawyers have done by counseling their clients to deny nothing about the matter; to let the prosecution say what it wished and to content themselves with affirming that, as regards themselves, they had nothing to do with so foul an affair.

Thus in the Renaissance witchcraft trials, the witch did not go so far as to say, "the best proof that I did not meet the devil is that the devil does not exist." She would have appeared diabolic. She used subterfuges. The devil without a doubt was there. There was loud noise some distance away. "But that was at the top of the hill, and I was at the bottom."

Not one of the defendants at the main Nuremberg Tribunal had known about the "gas chambers" and the "genocide"—not even Frank, the former governor of Poland, who was overcome by the worst Christian repentance; not even Speer, the most "collaborative" with his judges and with his conquerors. Speer was later to publish, at the request of his Jewish friends, a text in which he said that he held himself responsible . . . for his blindness! He, the minister of armaments, having, all things considered, supreme control over the activity of the concentration camps, had not SEEN any formidable human slaughterhouses, needing thousands of tons of coal for the incineration of the bodies of the victims of genocide, which operated, it would seem, night and day! Speer has been rewarded for his goodwill. Millions of copies of his books have been sold with the proviso that "after the withholding of taxes, he made a fifty-fifty split with Jewish organizations, notably French ones." (Remarks made to French television at the time of the appearance of his first book.)

In Volume 42 of the transcripts and documents of the International Military Tribunal, one discovers document PS-862. It informs us that, of the 26,674 former political leaders interrogated, not one had heard

talk about the "extermination" of the Jews or about the "extermination camps" before the surrender in May 1945. Can it be imagined that the power of the taboo is such that thirty-six years after the war, a French professor who dares to deny the "genocide" and the "gas chambers" see himself condemned to three months suspended prison sentence and to 360 millions of old French francs in fines and publication expenses? And then in order to deny that those horrors existed, it is still necessary to be entangled for years with the question from the technical point of view. The common people, the Germans and their conquerors, scientists and laymen alike, all have a tendency to imagine when one talks to them about homicidal "gassing" that it was a very simple operation. After that, go on to deny that such and such a shower, such and such a concrete building was used for "gassing"! You think, "How will I procede to show that that commonplace operation did not take place in the building that they show me?" And you keep quiet. And your silence passes for agreement. About you they say triumphantly: "You see! He did not deny it!"

21. On page 225, Vidal-Naquet writes that my technical considerations on the American gas chambers, where one sees that it is very difficult to kill a single human being, do not at all prove that it would be impossible to carry out mass gassings. He adds that "the operation of gassings, like that of eating, can be carried out in vastly different conditions."

Response: I understand nothing of that reasoning, of those abstractions, and of those allusions. It seems to me that, if it is dangerous to gas one man, it must be still more dangerous to gas masses of men. I must reveal here that the LICRA [International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism—ed.], on 4 February 1981, consulted with the top toxicologist in France, Mr. Louis Truffert, in a completely fallacious and abstruse letter, to ask him if it were as difficult to ventilate a place gassed with Zyklon. Mr. Truffert then made a response which went rather in the direction expected by the LICRA. Unfortunately for them, I know Mr. Truffert, whom I have never yet talked to about my thesis about the non-existence of the Nazi "gas chambers," but with whom I have had a very long discussion on hydrocyanic acid. In company with my publisher, Pierre Guillaume, I went to see Mr. Truffert again, but this time I showed him the plans for Auschwitz, and in particular the "reconstruction" (*sic*) of a "gassing" which is located in Block 4 of the Auschwitz Museum. Please believe that the reaction of Mr. Truffert was instantaneous. He immediately exclaimed about the impossibility of a homicidal gassing operation in such conditions. It is that which he wanted to confirm for us in a letter of 3 April 1981, a copy of which was to be received by the LICRA. Here is the passage which directly concerns the question:

Nevertheless, the observation that I made [in my response to the LICRA], concerning the possibility of going into a room containing bodies poisoned with hydrocyanic acid without a gas mask, involves the

case of a gas chamber at ground level, opening to the fresh air, and it is evident that important reservations must be made in the case of underground installations. Such a situation would require a very large ventilation apparatus and draconian precautions in order to avoid pollution likely to be caused by accidents.

Could Vidal-Naquet be more precise about how I have used an "arsenal" that is not technical, but "pseudo-technical"? Is the consulting of six American penitentiary officials insufficient, and is Vidal-Naquet in a position to make suggestions of a scientific order to the Americans to bring about a remarkable simplification of the gassing process in their penitentiaries?

22. On page 225, Vidal-Naquet reproaches me for translating "Vergasung" as "gassing" when I translate "Keine Vergasung in Dachau" (Dr. Broszat) and as "carburation" when, in a document from January 1943, I encounter "Vergasungskeller," a word which Raul Hilberg is careful not to quote.

Response: It is all a matter of context! "Vergasung" can have still other meanings besides. Applied to a battle narrative about the gas war in 1918, it can be translated as "gassing." It can also be a question of non-homicidal gassing. For example, in a radio message of 22 July 1942 addressed to the Auschwitz camp, over the signature of General Glücks, we read, "I hereby give authorization for one five-ton truck to make the round-trip journey from Auschwitz to Dessau [the place where Zyklon B was distributed] and back in order to pick up gas intended for the gassing of the camp, in order to fight the epidemic which has broken out." The German text says "Gas für Vergasung": gas intended for gassing. Finally, at Dachau, the building which contained the disinfection gas chambers was called the "Vergasungsgebäude."

23. On page 225, Vidal-Naquet reproaches me for not devoting a line to the Einsatzgruppen, nor to Babi-Yar.

Response: Those were not my subjects. Similar police operations and similar places of execution existed among the enemy fought by the Germans on the Russian front. Euthanasia or medical experiments are likewise unrelated to the subject. On those two last points, I have the impression that people have made up an awful lot. I know researchers who are interested in all these supplementary subjects. Let us await their conclusions.

24. On page 225, Vidal-Naquet reproaches me for saying that numerous gypsy children were born at Auschwitz, without saying what became of them. He adds that they were exterminated.

Response: I quoted my sources: *Hefte von Auschwitz* (The Auschwitz Notebooks). If those children had been the victims of a Herod-like massacre at the time of their birth, *Auschwitz Notebooks* would not have failed to inform us in regard to each of them. I suppose that some of the children died, and that some of them survived and were

found in the long line of children in good health whom the Soviets filmed at the time of liberation of the camp. I recall that bands of Gypsies continued to wend their way through Europe during the war (see *Nord*, by Céline). Vidal-Naquet asserts to us that those children were exterminated. Where does he get that information?

25. On page 226, Vidal-Naquet writes: "[Faurisson] maintains that in France it was the Resistance which made the Gypsies disappear."

Response: In reality, I wrote on page 192 of *Vérité* . . . : "I recall that in France even the Resistance could see the Gypsies in a bad light and suspect them of espionage, informing, and black-marketeering." One of my footnotes refers to the following text: "I have personally made a detailed inquiry about the summary executions carried out by the Resistance in a small region of France. I was surprised to discover the Gypsy communities had paid a heavy tribute in dead; not at the hands of the Germans, but at the hands of the Resistance." Where, in fact, did Vidal-Naquet get the idea that the Gypsies have disappeared?

26. On page 227, in a footnote, Vidal-Naquet is pleased to recall a sentence which I have repeated for some years and that I am going to repeat here one more time: "I have searched, but in vain, for one single former deportee capable of proving to me that he had really seen a gas chamber with his own eyes."

Response: Vidal-Naquet does not propose any name to me; neither that of Martin Gray, nor that of Filip Müller (with whom I have asked television personality Bernard Volker to be good enough to confront me), nor Maurice Benroubi (discovered by *L'Express*), nor Yehuda Bauer or one of his friends (whom I said I was prepared to meet on Israeli television), nor Elie Wiesel, nor Samuel Pisar, nor Simone Veil, nor Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier, nor Louise Alcan, nor Fania Fénelon, nor Dr. Bendel. In two years of research, the LICRA and its colleagues have been able to find for me only Mr. Alter Fajnzylberg, known as Jankowski. From him they obtained a very short deposition given to Mr. Attal, a notary in Paris. I was delighted at the prospect of meeting the latter in court. In his place, there came a very repetitive spokesman.

27. On page 228, Vidal-Naquet quotes "some documents on Auschwitz and on Treblinka (spelled Trembinki) which served as the basis for an American publication in November of 1944, attributed to the 'Executive Office of the War Refugee Board.'" He states: "There is nothing there that is not in accord in its essentials with either the documents of the members of the Sonderkommando or the testimonies of the SS leaders."

Response: I did not notice that in the document from the War Refugee Board it was a question of Treblinka or of Trembinki. It dealt particularly with Auschwitz, and to some extent with Maidanek (where they do not mention the existence of "gas chambers"). It is curious that that document was not used in the main Nuremberg trial,

where one page of fantastic statistics was simply reproduced from it (Document L-022).

As regards Auschwitz, that document is so little in agreement with the physical realities that it was sufficient for Dr. Wilhelm Stäglich, in his work mentioned above, to juxtapose two photographs: on the one hand, the plan from photographic plate number 12 (= reality), and on the other hand, the plan from photographic plate number 13 (= War Refugee Board fiction).

The fabrication by the War Refugee Board is obvious. I recall it was in that document, published by the Roosevelt entourage, and among others, by the famous Morgenthau, that Katyn is attributed to the Germans (p. 11 of the "Polish Major's Report").

As regards "gassings," they were carried out, according to an anonymous Polish officer, by a spray from "hydrogen cyanide bombs" (page 13 of the English text)! This report had quite a suspicious and interesting history, very well revealed by Butz and by Stäglich. It is sufficient to find in their indexes the names of the presumed authors of the first report: Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler. We also find an interesting study by Stäglich in the journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Tübingen: Grabert Verlag, 1981/I) pp. 9-13.

I note that the alleged plan of the sites appears on page 15 of the American version and that it did not appear in the French version *Les Camps d'extermination allemands d'Auschwitz et Birkenau* (The German Extermination Camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau) (Office Français d'Édition, 2nd quarter of 1945).

28. On page 228, Vidal-Naquet dares to call on the "confessions" of Kurt Gerstein, which he says have been confirmed by Professor Pfannenstiel himself, who is supposed to have gone to find Rassinier in Paris in order to talk to him about them.

Response: In the different and seriously contradictory versions of the "confessions" of Gerstein, the incongruities, the stupidities, the nonsensical things (see above the 28 to 32 persons per square meter) are so numerous that one cannot believe that the Gerstein argument is still used. Léon Poliakov has inundated us with these different versions of what Vidal-Naquet himself had been obliged to recognize as some "faulty mistakes." This is a beautiful euphemism!

A thesis is presently being prepared which will expose the Gerstein "confessions" and what Léon Poliakov has made of them.³ In her 1968 thesis, Olga Wormser-Migot was prudent enough to write on page 426: "For our part we have difficulty in accepting the complete authenticity of the confession of Kurt Gerstein or the veracity of all its elements." As to what Dr. Pfannenstiel declared on several occasions to the German courts, here it is: 1) he treats Gerstein almost as a liar on several points; 2) he is extremely vague about the "gassing" which he is supposed to have witnessed one day side by side with Gerstein; a "gassing" with a Diesel engine, which is a curious way of gassing

when we know the small amount of deadly carbon monoxide furnished by a system very rich in carbon dioxide.

Pfannenstiel is supposed to have gone to find Rassinier in Paris? That is very often said, but I know nothing about it since the visitor refused to give his name. It could be. How many times has a Nazi, bound by his "confessions" and compensated for them, served the good Exterminationist cause on command in respect to a Revisionist or hardened Nazi? When Dr. Johann-Paul Kremer came back from his long detention in Poland and wished to begin speaking again, the German courts gave him to understand that it was in his interest to keep quiet. He kept quiet. They re-employed him as a witness for the prosecution at the Frankfurt trial (1963-65) but always with that extraordinary discretion of the German judges about the actual conduct of the "gassings." I was able to become acquainted with a short correspondence between Rassinier and Pfannenstiel. I propose to publish it one day in order to show how Pfannenstiel sought to evade Rassinier's simple technical questions.

It is, furthermore, necessary to be clear on Belzec. Gerstein said that they "gassed" there; but there exist other theses quite as believable (or unbelievable), and I do not see how our establishment historians have been able to eliminate them in favor of the Gerstein thesis. According to Jan Karski, the Jews were killed with quicklime. According to the *New York Times* of 12 February 1944, page 6, the Jews were electrocuted. According to Dr. Stefan Szende, they proceeded in a quite sophisticated fashion: The same platform which electrocuted the Jews was raised from the water, then made red hot, and the Jews incinerated. Karski is today a professor at Georgetown University in Washington. In 1944 he published *Story of a Secret State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1944). Here is what is to be read on pages 349-351 of Karski's book:

. . . I know that many people will not believe me, will not be able to believe me, will think I exaggerate or invent. But I saw it and it is not exaggerated or invented. I have no other proofs, no photographs. All I can say is that I saw it and that it is the truth.

The floors of the car containing the Jews had been covered with a thick, white powder. It was quicklime. Quicklime is simply unslaked lime or calcium oxide that has been dehydrated. Anyone who has seen cement being mixed knows what occurs when water is poured on lime. The mixture bubbles and steams as the powder combines with the water, generating a large amount of heat.

Here the lime served a double purpose in the Nazi economy of brutality. The moist flesh coming in contact with the lime is rapidly dehydrated and burned. The occupants of the cars would be literally burned to death before long, the flesh eaten from their bones. Thus, the Jews would "die in agony," fulfilling the promise Himmler had issued "in accord with the will of the Fuehrer," in Warsaw in 1942. Secondly, the lime would prevent decomposing bodies from spreading disease. It was efficient and inexpensive—a perfectly chosen agent for their purposes.

It took three hours to fill up the entire train by repetitions of this procedure. It was twilight when the forty-six (I counted them) cars were packed. From one end to the other the train, with its quivering cargo of flesh, seemed to throb, vibrate, rock, and jump as if bewitched. There would be a strangely uniform momentary lull and then, again, the train would begin to moan and sob, wail and howl. Inside the camp a few score dead bodies remained and a few in the final throes of death. German policemen walked around at leisure with smoking guns, pumping bullets into anything that by a moan or motion betrayed an excess of vitality. Soon not a single one was left alive. In the now quiet camp the only sounds were the inhuman screams that were echoes from the moving train. Then these, too, ceased. All that was now left was the stench of excrement and rotting straw and a queer, sickening, acidulous odor which, I thought, may have come from the quantities of blood that had been let, and with which the ground was stained. As I listened to the dwindling outcries from the train, I thought of the destination toward which it was speeding. My informants had minutely described the entire journey. The train would travel about eighty miles and finally come to a halt in an empty barren field. Then nothing at all would happen. The train would stand stock-still, patiently waiting while death penetrated into every corner of its interior. This would take from two to four days.

When quicklime, asphyxiation, and injuries had silenced every outcry, a group of men would appear. They would be young, strong Jews, assigned to the task of cleaning out these cars until their own turn to be in them would arrive. Under a strong guard they would unseal the cars and expel the heaps of decomposing bodies. The mounds of flesh that they piled up would then be burned and the remnants buried in a single huge hole. The cleaning, burning, and burial would consume one or two full days. The entire process of disposal would take, then, from three to six days. During this period the camp would have recruited new victims. The train would return and the whole cycle would be repeated from the beginning.

Let us however go on to Dr. Szende. The first edition of his book appeared in Sweden under the title *Den Siste Juden från Polen* (The Last Jew From Poland) (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 1944). The second edition appeared in Switzerland as *Der letzte Jude aus Poland* (Zurich: Europe Verlag, 1945). The third edition appeared in Great Britain as *The Promise Hitler Kept* (London: Victor Gollancz). The fourth appeared in the United States of America with the same title (New York: Roy Publishers, 1945). I am reproducing here a short passage from page 161 of the American edition:

When trainloads of naked Jews arrived at Belzec, they were herded into a great hall capable of holding several thousand people. This hall had no windows and its flooring was of metal. Once the Jews were all inside, the floor of this hall sank like a lift into a great tank of water which lay below it until the Jews were up to their waists in water. Then a powerful electric current was sent into the metal flooring and within a few seconds all the Jews, thousands at a time, were dead. The metal flooring then rose again and the water drained away. The corpses of the slaughtered Jews were now heaped all over the floor. A different current

was then switched on and the metal flooring rapidly became red hot, so that the corpses were incinerated as in a crematorium and only ash was left.

The floor was tipped up and the ashes slid out into prepared receptacles. The smoke of the process was carried away by great factory chimneys. That was the whole procedure. As soon as it was accomplished, it could start up again. New batches of Jews were constantly being driven into the tunnels. The individual trains brought between 3,000 and 5,000 Jews at a time, and there were days on which the Belzec line saw between twenty and thirty such trains arrive.

Modern industrial and engineering technique in Nazi hands triumphed over all difficulties. The problem of how to slaughter millions of people rapidly and effectively was solved.

The underground slaughter-house spread a terrible stench around the neighborhood, and sometimes whole districts were covered with the foul-smelling smoke from the burning human bodies.

This narrative, which Dr. Stefan Szende is supposed to have gotten from one Adolf Folkman, is crazy, but less crazy and more coherent than the "confessions" of Kurt Gerstein, which, let it be said in passing, are found to be in serious contradiction with the "truth" about Treblinka, such as it was established at the main Nuremberg trial. At Treblinka, with all due deference to Gerstein, the Jews were not gassed, but were scalded (see, for the racy details, document PS-3311).

Here again I ask Vidal-Naquet: Which story to believe? And why this one rather than that one?

29. On page 223, Vidal-Naquet writes that there are some more than doubtful "testimonies" in which an SS man, like Pery Broad, for example, seems to have adopted entirely the language of the victors. He adds that the memoir of Pery Broad on Auschwitz was drawn up *for the English* (the last three words are underlined by Vidal-Naquet himself).

Response: I know of few forgeries as obvious as the memoir of Pery Broad. Vidal-Naquet seems in agreement with me in seeing a forgery there, but he draws no conclusion from that. This forgery is *English* and at the same time of a workmanship and a tone that are perfectly Stalinesque, to the point of caricature. I say this to respond to the naive people who claim, contrary to all proof and to every investigation, that no torturing was done in the Allied prisons, and who add: "Look at how much agreement there is between the confessions collected in the West and those collected in the East." I point out in passing that in the lawsuit which was brought against me by the LICRA and eight other associations, the Pery Broad memoir was placed in evidence as an exhibit. They must really be in trouble if they have to present that kind of "proof" of the existence of the gas chambers!

30. On pages 232 and 233, Vidal-Naquet talks about Höss, the first of the commandants of Auschwitz. He recognizes that it is perhaps true that Höss's English captors beat him on several occasions. He says that he was "likewise maltreated by his Polish guards at the beginning

of his incarceration in Cracow." He says that Höss could not have known the exact number of his victims and that "all the speculations made by Höss on the subject of the numbers of victims are useless." He recognizes that Höss gave absurd figures regarding the numbers of Romanian and Bulgarian Jews. He says, in return, that Faurisson is wrong to "make a great fuss on the subject of an error, repeated on several occasions, which in the testimonies collected by the English has him talking about the imaginary camp of 'Wolzek near Lublin' (probably a confusion and reduplication with Belzec and Maidanek)."

Response: Vidal-Naquet makes many concessions here. I dare say that a fair number of them come from his reading of my writings. But I admire the way that everything is minimized here! An outsider could believe that the speculations made on the numbers given by Höss come from Faurisson. Nothing of the kind! As to that affair of the Romanian and Bulgarian Jews, it is very serious. I point it out in order to show how Dr. Broszat mutilated the text of Höss's diary in order to remove certain blunders.

As to the camp of Wolzek, which in reality never existed, it cannot result from a confusion with Belzec, since Höss mentions the two camps side by side. Nor is it a question of a 'recopied error,' but of a *second error*.

One looks forward to a complete judgment on the personality of Höss and on the degree of authenticity which one can attribute to the writings of a man tortured by everyone, committing enormous errors, either about numbers or places; whose writings, published in German eleven years after his hanging by the Communists, were seriously tampered with.

31. On pages 234-236, Vidal-Naquet attempts, without great conviction, it seems to me, to defend the principle of a trial like the main Nuremberg trial, or, in the case of Eichmann, that in Jerusalem. In order to know what was said at the Jerusalem trial, he refers particularly to the book entitled *Eichmann par Eichmann* (Eichmann by Eichmann).

Response: It is clever not to seek to defend the indefensible, especially when, like Vidal-Naquet, one voluntarily relies on humanitarian good conscience. I hope for his sake that he will never find himself in the defendant's dock with a representative from his conquerors on the judges' bench, someone who, of course, will have armed himself beforehand with all the moral justifications in the world for judging the vanquished.

I recommend the reading of these three pages for their mealy-mouthed tone: "That the material gathered at Nuremberg is not always of very good quality is certain [etc.]." As to using the compilation by Pierre Joffroy in order to know what was said at the Jerusalem trial, that shows an astonishing laxity. Vidal-Naquet could have consulted the transcripts of the trial at the Paris Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation. He entertains us with the following quota-

tion: "Eichmann, in prison or at his trial, referred often to the works of Léon Poliakov as an authority and the best source about events." For my part, I can indeed believe it. Eichmann, in his cell, was fed like a Christmas goose. He ended up no longer knowing what he had heard, what he had seen, what he had read. Here, for example, is a very important passage from his interrogation by the Israeli government commissioner regarding the "gas chambers" directly from Transcripts, J1-MJ at 02-RM:

The Commissioner: Did you talk with Höss about the number of Jews who were exterminated at Auschwitz?

Eichmann: No, never. He told me that he had built new buildings and that he could put to death ten thousand Jews each day. I do remember something like that. I do not know whether I am only imagining that today, but I do not believe I am imagining it. I cannot recall exactly when and how he told me that and the location where he told me. Perhaps I read it and perhaps I am now imagining that what I had read I heard from him. That is also possible.

32. On pages 236-244, Vidal-Naquet talks about Paul Rassinier.

Commentary: He does so with a great deal of confusion. He clutches especially at what he calls the "fantastic calculations" by Paul Rassinier regarding the number of Jewish losses. It seems to me that in the matter of "fantastic calculations" and of cock-and-bull stories, no one could surpass our Exterminationists. We have seen from the foregoing that on these points Vidal-Naquet has made a fair number of concessions, and that it seldom happens, to tell the truth, that he leaves his rarefied atmosphere to set his feet on our earth for a moment. But he loses his temper when Rassinier uses statistics that come from a Russian Jew: David Bergelson. According to the latter, the Red Army was able to save a very large number of Jews at the time of the entry of the Germans into the Soviet Union in 1941. Vidal-Naquet says that source is worthless. For this he gives us two reasons, and I am personally completely in agreement with Vidal-Naquet on one of them, as to how David Bergelson could have known those numbers as early as 5 December 1942; but Vidal-Naquet will not allow me to use the same reasoning when I challenge a mass of numbers given hot and heavy immediately after the war by the Exterminationists. And what is there to say about the numbers of those supposedly massacred that the Polish resistance or Zionist groups in Geneva and Bern dared to give in the midst of the war?

Vidal-Naquet gives another reason for challenging Bergelson, and this time he makes himself hard to understand. He writes: "D. Bergelson was a writer who was a member of a Jewish committee created by the Soviet authorities for the purpose of making propaganda addressed precisely to American Jews. After the war, in 1952, his mission accomplished, he was shot." Let us reread each of those words slowly! What reproach can one make to this Bergelson? Was it a crime to be part of such a Jewish committee? Was it a crime to tell

American Jews that a number of their fellow Jews in Russia had died? What does this "mission accomplished," so long after the war, mean, and does Vidal-Naquet find that the Stalin courts and police did good work by shooting that Jew, at the very moment of the famous "doctors' plot"? No. Vidal-Naquet is certainly engaged in hiding part of the truth from us. We are going to have to tell it for him.

In 1977, Georges Wellers did not hide the truth in *Le Monde Juif* (April-June, page 65), when he told us that David Bergelson was part of an *ad hoc* Jewish committee created in the USSR at the end of 1941 and charged by the government with winning the sympathies and the financial support of American Jews for Russia in the war. In other words, Bergelson exaggerated the number of Jews in order to obtain more money. So it happens that, when confronted with many of the Exterminationist statistics, I think of what I call the "Bergelson complex."

Was it a sort of "Bergelson complex" which was suffered by those comedic showmen of relics who, like Salomon Mikhoels from the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee formed in Moscow, made a tour of American cities and showed the public a cake of soap allegedly made from the fat of Jews, and allegedly brought from a concentration camp? The sums of money brought in by those tours were important, as noted by Gerald Israel in *Jid/Les Juifs en URSS* (Yid/The Jews in the USSR) (Editions Spéciales/Jean-Claude Lattes, 1971).

33. On pages 246-247, Vidal-Naquet writes: "It is perfectly evident that Faurisson has not read the text that he mentions." He says that in regard to the declaration of war on Hitler's Germany by Chaim Weizmann, a declaration for which I gave as reference *The Jewish Chronicle* of 8 September 1939, page 1. He adds that this declaration of war "is made up." Finally he adds that Chaim Weizmann was not the president of the World Jewish Congress.

Response: That is true. I give Vidal-Naquet credit. Chaim Weizmann was the president, not of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), but of the World Zionist Organization (WZO). After the war he was to become the first president of the State of Israel. In 1939 and for some years before, Jews and Zionists were active in pushing the West into a crusade against Hitler. Even before the date on which the British and the French entered into a war against Germany, Chaim Weizmann had taken the initiative of writing, on the date of 29 August 1939, to the British Prime Minister in order to assure him of the support of the Jewish Agency for the cause of the democracies. He wrote: "The Jews stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies."

Furthermore, a declaration made on 8 September 1939 at Jerusalem by the Jewish Agency assured the British that, despite the White Book of 1939, the Yishuv of Palestine would be loyal and would struggle for the victory of the British Empire. *The Times* of 6 September 1939 headlined it exactly: "Jews To Fight Against Nazi Germany," while in New York *The New York Times*, on page 9, headlined: "Jews Stand by Britain."

Curiously, Vidal-Naquet seeks to minimize the importance of Weizmann's act, while underlining that the latter expressed himself only in the name of the Jewish Agency. I will not be treacherous enough here to insist on the various motives which could have moved the Zionists themselves, some of whom had maintained contacts with Hitler's Germany. Zionism and Nazism had some points of agreement. I will simply say that rightly or wrongly Weizmann intended to speak in the name of the world Jewish community, and that it was indeed in that way that his initiative against Hitler was received by the whole world.

In the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, published in Jerusalem in 1971, we read in the article on Weizmann: "When World War II broke out, Weizmann immediately promised the British government all possible aid by the Jewish population in Palestine and the Jewish people outside." (emphasis added)

John Toland, in his *Adolf Hitler* (Doubleday, 1976, page 574), reports this, which would merit verification at the source: [regarding Chamberlain] "(Later, according to Ambassador Kennedy, he said that the 'Americans and the world Jews had forced him into the war.')" "

Having said that, let no one accuse me of having made the Jews responsible for the Second World War. I have never been able to determine who was responsible for any war.

34. On page 248, Vidal-Naquet points out a page of mine "which ought to be included as part of an anthology of filth." (!) I had written (see page 190 of *Vérité* . . .):

Where there were large concentrations of Jews impossible to watch over carefully except through the intermediary of a Jewish police force, the Germans feared that which was to take place elsewhere, in the Warsaw ghetto, where suddenly, just behind the front in April of 1943, an insurrection took place. The Germans were amazed to discover that the Jews had built 700 blockhouses. They put down the insurrection and transferred the survivors to transit camps, work camps, and concentration camps. The Jews there lived through a tragedy.

Response: For Vidal-Naquet, the "filth" would rest in the fact that my informant here supposedly is Himmler, and that I had taken good care to hide my source. He says that "any reference to a note has charitably disappeared." I do not understand what he means by "charitable disappearance of a footnote reference." Actually, as the result of a typographical error, the number 48, which was to have appeared after the word "Blockhaus," was dropped. But note 48 shows up in its proper place, and reads as follows: "Speech given at Poznan on October 6, 1943, page 169 of the *Discours Secrets* of Heinrich Himmler (Paris: Gallimard, 1978). This is the French translation of *Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen* (Propyläen Verlag, 1974). That work is to be used with caution, especially its French translation." So where is the "filth"?

35. On page 249, Vidal-Naquet reproaches me for having written that the Warsaw ghetto insurrection took place just behind the front, in April 1943. He says that the front was then very far away, more than a thousand kilometers distant.

Response: Vidal-Naquet here confuses the "front" with the "front line." The front line was located perhaps more than one thousand kilometers away, but the Russian front (as we say, the German front, the Pacific front, etc.) really began at the Pripet Marshes.

36. On pages 249-250, Vidal-Naquet reproaches me for not giving more details on that insurrection, and begins to talk again about "[my] master, Himmler."

Response: I do not have to spend time on what was not my subject. I left the subject of the ghetto and what Himmler has said about it with the following sentence: "The Jews there lived through a tragedy."

37. On pages 250-251, we think that Vidal-Naquet is finally going to come to the subject itself, that is to say, the homicidal "gas chambers." In fact, he talks about one document in German (a commonplace travel order), in which we read: "One hundred twenty-five men and 684 women and children have been subjected to special treatment (*sonderbehandelt wurden*)."

He asks, "Will he dare say that those persons were taken to a rest camp?"

Response: I note that Vidal-Naquet does not dare to say that those people were gassed. I note that he comes back to "Sonderbehandlung." On the one hand, I believe that I have already answered that question; on the other hand, I note that in the same convoy 406 men and 190 women were put to work. For the men it is specified that the work was in the Buna factories; for the women, it is not specified. The other men, women, and children, therefore, benefited from special treatment; they did not have to work. This is what can explain why, at the time of the liberation of Auschwitz, so many men, women, and especially children were found very much alive among those "incapable" of marching and taking part in the evacuation—along with, of course, the sick and the dead. In the calendar from the *Hefte von Auschwitz* (1961, Volume IV, p. 81) the writers had no fear about stating quietly that the 125 men and the 684 women and children were all gassed. Elsewhere, the same calendar considers two convoys which left Drancy on 4 and 6 March 1943 to have been gassed. But Serge Klarsfeld, in his *Mémorial* (p. 110, pp. 386-389), rectifies the "mistake"—those two convoys went to Maidanek and he found the survivors.

38. On page 251, in note 86, Vidal-Naquet makes a very brief allusion to the famous aerial photos of Auschwitz recently revealed by the CIA. We talk about them on page 319 of *Vérité*. He says that "it seems in fact that one photo taken on 25 August 1944 [. . .] shows the process [of extermination] in action."

Response: With the photo in front of us Vidal-Naquet would never dare claim such a thing. That photo, like all the photos from Brugioni

and Poirier, issues a stinging reproof to the whole Exterminationist legend. The two Americans themselves, quite crestfallen, are obliged to write on page 11: "Although survivors recalled that smoke and flame emanated continually from the crematoria chimneys and was (*sic*) visible for miles, the photography we examined gave no positive proof of this." The two authors add in a footnote: "The imagery examined from records of the extermination period include (*sic*) 4 April, 26 June, 26 July, 25 August, and 13 September 1944."

Personally, I would permit myself to add here that in a letter which can be consulted in the National Archives in Washington (letter of Robert G. Poirier to Professor David Wyman on 6 March 1979), it is said that there were as many as 32 aerial missions over Auschwitz from 27 December 1943 to 14 January 1945. Since it happens, on the other hand, that I possess copies of the intelligence reports of the OSS (ancestor of the CIA) about the region, as well as certain technical commentaries on the photos, I can state here that the knowledge that the Allies had about Auschwitz was astonishingly precise. Had there taken place at Auschwitz or in its region anything at all that resembled enormous massacres on an industrial scale, there is no doubt that the Allies would have revealed it immediately. The official announcement of such massacres would have been a stupendous psychological weapon whose destructive effect the Nazis would not have been able to counteract. It is clear that if the Allies refused to believe the allegations of the Zionists of Geneva or of Bern, or those of the Polish Resistance it is because they knew, just as did the Vatican and the International Red Cross, that to stick to the facts, and not to the malicious wartime gossip, there was in reality neither an extermination nor a holocaust.

39. On pages 251 and 252, Vidal-Naquet writes: "Auschwitz was, they [Butz, Faurisson, Thion] all tell us again and again, a great industrial center, specializing in the production of synthetic rubber. But no one has ever explained to us why babies had to go there, and no one has told us what became of those babies. The complete inability of the 'revisionists' to tell us what became of those who were not registered in the camp and whose names nevertheless appear on the lists of the convoys is proof of the lying character of their statements."

Response: In the beginning, the Germans wanted to intern in their camps only those from 16 or 18 to 55 years of age who were capable of working. They supposedly dispensed with persons unable to work. Why, nevertheless, did they, little by little, deport those incapable of working—even babies?

There are several reasons for this. The first is the insistence of the governmental authorities of the occupied countries on not having families dislocated. The religious authorities especially protested against breaking up families, and the fact that some children were turned over to houses of correction, to homes, to foster parents, etc. Georges Wellers in *L'Etoile jaune* . . . (op. cit.) shows very clearly

that no one imagined that he was leaving Drancy for an extermination center (see pp. 4, 5, 233 *et seq.*, 254 about the "grouping of families"). Indeed some people, allowed to live at Drancy in idleness, said that all in all, it was better to go to the East where their lot would doubtless be difficult, but less depressing. To the children they explained that they were leaving for the mythical country of Pitchipoï. Among those who left, there were even some "volunteers."

Sometimes they allowed families to vote on the question of whether to take their children with them or to leave them in France (C. Levy and Paul Tillard, *Le Grand Rafle du vélodrome d'hiver* [The Great Round-up at the Vélodrome d'hiver], Robert Laffont, quoted by Georges Wellers in *Le Monde Juif*, July/September 1980, p. 109).

A section of Auschwitz-II was called the family camp, and there remain on the walls of the areas virtually never visited by tourists numerous drawings or paintings made by the children. What became of the babies? We know, at least for a part of them, through inquiries carried out twenty years after the war by the Poles, the results of which have been partially gathered in the volumes of the blue *Anthology* of Auschwitz (copy typed in French, in English . . .). This *Anthology* is very seldom read. On the subject which interests us here, I would recommend particularly, but not exclusively, Volume II, third part, pp. 31-114: "Results of the Psychiatric Examinations of Persons Born or Interned During Their Infancy in the Nazi Concentration Camps." This study, published in Polish in 1966, was translated into French in 1969. I quote here the French edition.

In the same volume, we can read an article on "The Examinations of the 'Children of Auschwitz'" (pp. 18-30). We find there sentences such as these: "The children examined up to the present were eight years old at the time of Liberation. Most of them were less than five years old when they were interned" (p. 18); "The youngest children had their numbers tattooed on their legs. As they grew, the number became unreadable" (p. 25); "The examinations and the studies continue. They are finding [written in 1965] more and more of the 'children of Auschwitz'" (p. 30).

People often reproach Laval for having strongly insisted to the Germans that they deport the children. The reproach is unjust. Laval in fact wrote: "I have in particular succeeded in not having the children separated from their parents" (*Mémoire en réponse à l'acte d'accusation* [Memoir in Response to the Bill of Indictment]), 1945. This is because, like the religious authorities, he did not want families to be broken up. Henri Amouroux (*La Grand Histoire des Français sous l'occupation* [The Great History of the French Under the Occupation], Volume 5: "Les passions et les haines," page 333, note 3) reports this reflection made by Laval to Jean Jardin: "I have just come from a terrible meeting [with Oberg]. They want to leave the children with us. I said to them, 'It is not customary for us to separate children from their parents.'"

Certain authors claim, in contrast to Georges Wellers, that the Central Consistory, for example, "knew" from 1942 that the deportees were destined for extermination. They give as proof a text which one can read on page 207 of Klarsfeld's *Mémorial*, something that the latter has entitled "The Vehement and Lucid Protest of the Central Consistory" (25 August 1942). I have some doubts about the authenticity of that document. Excluded from the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation, under threat of physical force by its director, M. Meram, I have had to ask someone to go to verify the original text for me (references CCXIII-15 and CDLXXII-89). Here is the response that I received: "Alleged duplicate which is in fact a sheet of onion-skin paper, without a letterhead, without a signature and bearing only the date of 25 August 1942."

There were other causes for the deportation of children: for example, the systematic clearing of the ghettos, or systematic expulsion (see the examples of Warsaw or Budapest).

In the blue *Auschwitz Anthology*, we can read the report of a Polish midwife who, as part of her thirty-eight year career, had, in the course of two years spent at Auschwitz-Birkenau, delivered the babies of 3,000 Jewish and non-Jewish women; and that was done, she said, with an exceptionally high rate of success (Warsaw, 1969, Vol. II, 2nd part, pp. 159-169: "Rapport d'une accoucheuse d'Auschwitz" [Report of a Midwife at Auschwitz], S. Leszczynska, translated from an article that appeared in 1965 in the medical review *Przegląd Lekarski*).

40. On page 252, in note 88, Vidal-Naquet writes: "Pierre Guillaume, questioned by me on that subject [where did those not registered in the camp go?] answered that those persons were transferred to the station at Kielce. Why?"

Response: He meant Kosel (120 kilometers from Auschwitz) and not Kielce. Pierre Guillaume was alluding to a fact that Klarsfeld reports on page 12 of his *Mémorial*. Klarsfeld recalls the astonishing method used in Paris by the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation and at Auschwitz by the National Museum of Auschwitz in order to determine the number of persons gassed. For example, when it was discovered that a convoy that had left France did not seem to have reached Auschwitz, both places calmly deduced that the convoy did reach Auschwitz, but that it had been completely gassed there!

So it is that a convoy of 3,056 persons was counted as gassed, when in fact it had stopped at Kosel and not at Auschwitz. As we have already seen above, they assumed the same for convoys numbers 50 and 51, which instead of proceeding to Auschwitz made their way to Maidanek. The same for convoy number 73 which went to Kaunas and Reval. In short, there, and again elsewhere, they invented mass gassings. But the irony of the affair is that Klarsfeld, who rectifies these errors, commits still worse errors in counting as dead the persons who did not return to France before 31 December 1945 to declare themselves alive.

41. On page 253, Vidal-Naquet writes that Faurisson "triumphantly publishes the photo of Simone Veil, who was thought to have been gassed, but is still alive. The reason for that error is extremely simple [etc.]."

Response: I would certainly not contradict Vidal-Naquet. The reason for that "error" could not be more simple. As Vidal-Naquet tells it, "The camp archives, incomplete, no longer include the names of the women who were registered [for work]." The Exterminationists, then, completed those archives, "decoded" their incompleteness, and made them speak; they made them say one more time: Here is the proof that all the women of such and such a convoy were gassed. The case of Simone Veil is far from being an exception. It shows, thanks only to the celebrity of the lady in question, the incredible dishonesty of all of these statistics about the gassed or the dead.

42. On page 255, Vidal-Naquet allows a digression about poetry. To borrow his own expression, that "is obviously absurd." I am even less inclined to pause here since it would get us away from our subject.

43. On pages 255-261, Vidal-Naquet tries to "code" in order then to "decode" the diary of Dr. Johann-Paul Kremer.

Response: I would say first, one more time: Enough decoding! I would then add that Vidal-Naquet wrote these pages before the publication of my *Mémoire en défense* which deals in large part with the diary in question. The reader of that *Mémoire* will find there, I think, an answer to the questions and the criticism of Vidal-Naquet.

44. On page 261, in note 102, Vidal-Naquet talks about a report by a delegate of the Red Cross concerning his visit to Auschwitz.

Response: Vidal-Naquet probably did not expect that I would return in my *Mémoire en défense* to that report which had been mentioned on page 115 of *Vérité*. For each reader who would like to form for himself an idea of Vidal-Naquet's scrupulousness in reading a text, I advise careful reading of pages 241 to 247 of my *Mémoire*. He will find there, on the one hand, an analysis of the essential passage of the delegate's report, and on the other hand, an enumeration of the procedures by which either private persons or organizations have distorted that document, which is very embarrassing to the Exterminationists. Vidal-Naquet is to be added to the list of private persons who distort the meaning of the text, without going so far, it is true, as a Marc Hillel (see p. 255 of *Les Archives de l'espoir* [Archives of Hope], Fayard, 1977, vi + 261pp).

45. On page 268, in note 113, Vidal-Naquet talks about John Bennett, an Australian leftist, secretary of the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties (the equivalent, in some sense, of the American Civil Liberties Union), a convinced Revisionist, who is struggling calmly and courageously, in my opinion, against the Exterminationist lie. Vidal-Naquet talks about "the campaign which has led to his being excluded from the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties," and his drawing near

to the far right. Vidal-Naquet says that he gets his information from Charles Sowerwine, of Melbourne.

Response: I have in front of me *Your Rights*, which is the publication of the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties. It is the 1982 edition. I certify that John Bennett appears there (with his photo) as its secretary "since the founding of the association in 1966." I learn further that John Bennett had just been named president of the Australian Civil Liberties Union.

46. On page 269, Vidal-Naquet refers to "the hype surrounding *Holocaust*, the last stage in the transformation of Auschwitz into merchandise."

Commentary: The intellectuals have cleared the way for the merchants. Auschwitz, a place of suffering, has been transformed into a sort of Disneyland with, further, a Hilton in Cracow for tourists. We in France are awaiting the arrival of a new Wiesenthal film: *Genocide*.

47. On pages 273 and 279, Vidal-Naquet relies on Pitch Bloch, a chemical engineer, for the job of answering me about the chapter on Zyklon B.

Commentary: The course given by Pitch Bloch on Zyklon B smells terribly of improvisation, and I could not advise this chemical engineer too strongly to refer to the studies and to the works of G. Peters on the question, especially those which are mentioned on page 204 of *Vérité*. I would advise him likewise to read *Blausäuregaskammern zur Fleckfieberabwehr* (Hydrocyanic Acid Gas Chambers for the Prevention of Typhus) by Dr. Franz Puntigam, Dr. Hermann Breymesser, and engineer Erich Bernfus (official publication of the Reich Ministry of Labor [Berlin, 1943]). At no point does Bloch explain to us how, at Struthof, Josef Kramer would not himself have been the first to have been asphyxiated while "pouring out crystals of a gas about which he could have said nothing except that with a little excess water that gas killed in ONE minute." I wrote that salt and water can not give off such a gas. Bloch replies shrewdly that "salt" (note the quotation marks) and water can produce a gas. Let us leave him to his subtleties and let him be good enough to answer the question which is asked, which is: Let someone give me the name of the salt, with or without the quotation marks, which, on contact with water, releases an acid the toxicity of which would be higher than that of hydrocyanic acid!

I recall here that the hydrocyanic acid used in American gas chambers puts the condemned person to sleep in approximately forty seconds and kills him in several minutes (Caryl Chessman in 14 minutes, I believe). While I discuss the foolish testimony of Höss regarding "gassings" at Birkenau, Bloch contents himself with "correcting" the surface area of the alleged "gas chamber" (in reality, a morgue called a *Leichenkeller*), stating that they put 2,000 persons in 236.78 square meters, and not in only 210 square meters.

Sorry. The plan shows very clearly that the dimensions of the *interior* of the room, including the support pillars, were 7 meters by 30

meters = 210 square meters. Bloch does not even outline a solution to the famous mystery: How the members of the Sonderkommando could, without a single gas mask, enter immediately a room full of 2,000 bodies just poisoned by cyanide gas, since we know of the strict precautions taken by the Americans before going into a small gas chamber and touching the body there even slightly. Bloch creates a diversion by talking about "the testimony of R. Vrba and F. Wetzler." I have already dealt with that above, in paragraph 27. But this time Bloch runs out of luck. Vidal-Naquet cites that testimony according to the remarks by Georges Wellers, who had used a French version from the Office Français d'Édition, 2nd quarter of 1945.

Bloch himself quotes for us the same document according to quite another source that he gives us in note 7 on his page 276; CIM, 1944. He thereby offers us, altogether unwillingly, the occasion for a treat, a comparison of the edition of 1944 with that of 1945. We notice then that, as usual in these stories concerning "testimonies" about the "gas chambers," they have grossly manipulated the text. I do not have the time to stop for that here. Nor do I have time to show how Georges Wellers in *Les Chambres à gaz ont existé* mutilated the quotations from the same document while using ellipses in parentheses where the "testimony" was too strong a brew (p. 115). I leave it to readers interested in the mechanisms of forgeries to go there to see it at close hand.

I will content myself with one example. According to this testimony, and according to the plan that is found in the American version (but not in the French version, as I said in paragraph 27 above), the "gas chamber" with 2,000 bodies and the crematory ovens are located on the same level: that of the ground. Therefore the bodies would have been transported from the "gas chamber" to the crematory ovens without using an elevator. In the real plan of the rooms, however, the multiple photographs, the visible ruins, ALL prove to us that the room with the ovens was located above ground and that the alleged "gas chamber," in reality a morgue, was located below ground. According to the "witness" invoked by Vidal-Naquet and Bloch, the transferral of the bodies took place either on "flat-hand trucks" (1944 version), or on "flat-bed trucks" (1945 version)!!!

Bloch also does not tell us where they put the 2,000 bodies before burning them. That would have required an immense place, which appears nowhere, either in the real plans, or in the fictional plans (like the War Refugee Board Report), or today at the site. But since Mr. Bloch believed that he ought to cite for us a "testimony" which now becomes very embarrassing, permit me to cite another one of equally striking veracity; that of Zofia Kossak (*Du fond de l'abîme, Seigneur* [From the Depths of the Abyss, O Lord], translated from the Polish, Albin Michel: 1951):

There was no water; therefore, where were the showers? Above the doors were some narrow, oblong windows. Behind the window panes,

German uniforms and faces are waiting, emotionless, but strangely evil and hostile. Have they all entered? . . . The door closes with a crash. That was not an ordinary door; it was a double door, impervious to gas . . . *A shrill ringing sound, and immediately, through some openings in the floor, the gas began to rise* [emphasis added]. From an exterior balcony which overlooked the door, the SS men observed with curiosity the agony, the terror, the spasms of the condemned. This was a spectacle that those sadists would never tire of. They contemplated it with the same pleasure several times each day. They noted the convulsions, the contortions, the particularly unusual postures. They had the time. The agony would last from ten to fifteen minutes. Certain ones died immediately, but others took a longer time. It depended on the dosage of the gas. When it happened that the crematorium office was economizing, the martyrdom took longer. At length, no one in the room stirred. *Five hundred* [emphasis added] women and children lay in a disorderly heap. Their dead eyes, wide with fear, stared up at the ceiling.—*New ringing sound* [emphasis added]. Powerful ventilators drove out the gas. The "Sonderkommando" appeared in masks and opened the door located opposite the entrance. There was a ramp there, *hand trucks* [emphasis added]. The team loaded them with bodies, quickly, quickly. Others were waiting. And then the dead were able to come to life again. The gas in such doses stuns, it does not kill. It happened many a time that the victims loaded on the last round came to on the hand carts . . . the hand carts *got down* [emphasis added] the ramp and *unloaded directly into the oven* [emphasis added] . . . —The annihilation of five hundred human beings has taken no more than *an hour and a quarter* [emphasis added]. Except for a handful of ashes [500 bodies of women and children would leave behind at least a ton of ashes—author's note] there would remain no other trace. The following group crossed the threshold of the bath. Chattering, the little girl held her mother's hand, and without interrupting her ditty, she crossed the threshold . . . (pp. 127-128).

To see, in a general way, the incredible contradictions between the witnesses in a single trial, regarding the manner in which Zyklon was introduced into the alleged "gas chamber," one could read the unintentionally humorous summary made by a German court which, for once, lingered for a short time on the technical aspects of the "gas-sings" (see *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen* [Justice and NS-Crimes], Amsterdam: University Press, 1975, Volume XIII, the case of Dr. Gerhard Peters, p. 134 or 415 b-5).

48. On pages 280-289, Vidal-Naquet continues with an "Appendix II." There he mentions and criticizes briefly my *Mémoire en défense* which had just appeared (fourth quarter of 1980). He says that I had "not devoted a single line to trying to respond to the dismantling" that he, Vidal-Naquet, had done to Faurisson's lies. Vidal-Naquet adds that by various details of editing of *Mémoire* (correction of all too evident errors), it is evident to him, Vidal-Naquet, that Faurisson was nevertheless familiar with his text. He gives only one example of a correction for which I should allegedly be indebted to him. That ex-

ample relates to the translation of the German "darniederliegen" used by Dr. Johann-Paul Kremer.

Response: On page 20 of my *Mémoire*, I say to my readers that the translation into French by the Poles was "annihilated," when the original German text said "liegen [. . .] darnieder," which meant there, "were sick in bed." My editor has been able to prove clearly to Vidal-Naquet that I was not at all indebted to him for that detail since my translation was done prior to the article by Vidal-Naquet. In a letter that he sent in response to my publisher, Vidal-Naquet has indeed been willing to agree with that.

49. On page 280, Vidal-Naquet writes:

[I have shown that] not *one single time* in [the Kremer diary] did the "special actions" in which the doctor participated have any connection whatsoever with the struggle against typhus. Faurisson is incapable, for good reason, of producing a single argument, a single response on this point. I have said it before and I repeat it now; his interpretation is a forgery, in the full meaning of the term.

Response: On 5 September 1942, Dr. Kremer was present at a special action at the *women's hospital* and he adds, in parentheses, "Musulmans [*sic*]." That term was applied to sick persons who had reached the last stage of consumption. Then, on 7 October 1942, Dr. Kremer writes: "I was present at the ninth special action (people from outside and Musulman women)." How could Vidal-Naquet claim that the condition of those male and female "Musulmans" had no connection with the formidable epidemic of typhus which ravaged both the camp and the city, causing deaths among the camp inmates as well as among the German soldiers and their families?

50. On page 281, in note 3, Vidal-Naquet recalls briefly, and as if it went without saying, that "special action" was the "code word for gassing."

Response: Once again, enough decoding!

51. In the same passage, Vidal-Naquet writes: "A falsehood that has been changed without informing the reader remains of course a falsehood," and he remarks that in *Vérité* . . . , on pages 109-110, I defined "special action" as being "the sorting out of the sick and healthy," while later on, in my *Mémoire*, on page 34, "the special action" becomes, in addition, the cleaning of the railway cars, either third-class coaches or especially freight cars, in which newly detained persons had just arrived."

Response: It is sufficient to go back to my text in order to see that the accusation by Vidal-Naquet is based on a bad reading. In fact, in *Vérité* . . . on pages 109-110, I defined the sorting out of the sick and the well as "ONE of the forms of the doctor's 'special action.'"

52. On page 286, Vidal-Naquet writes: "Faurisson has been banned neither from the library nor from the public archives." He recalls that

the personnel of the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris "after some years of forbearance" have refused to serve me and that to him that "seemed quite normal" since I questioned the Center "in its fundamental activity, that of remembering the crime" (*sic*). Vidal-Naquet adds that the Center is a "private foundation."

Response: The staff of the Center, or at least a part of the staff, is paid by the French taxpayer. For some months the staff increased its provocations so that I could no longer come to work at the Center. I was driven away by the director in person, Mr. Meram, who threatened me with physical assault if I tried to return. Thereupon, I received from Georges Wellers a letter in which he informed me of his refusal to let me have access to the library and the archives; all done in the name of the noblest ideals. In doing that, he was, he said, "sure of finding himself in the noblest traditions of this country, where freedom and the respect for human dignity are indissoluble" (27 April 1978).

I have likewise been driven away from an institute in Paris and from a research center and library in Vienna. I state explicitly that in spite of what he supposedly declared to a French journalist, Mr. Simon Wiesenthal has never forcibly shown me to the door of his home. To the contrary, he received me with a very Viennese courtesy. It is true that at the time he did not know my opinion about the "gas chambers"!

But, in fact, does the Vatican Library refuse access to agnostics? I note that, if I am prosecuted like a criminal in the courts by a swarm of organizations, it is likewise done in the name of the noblest ideals; they are not harming the freedoms of thought and expression—they are protecting them!

53. On page 286, Vidal-Naquet writes: "I myself claim, and I prove, that Faurisson, outside of the very limited case of the *Diary of Anne Frank*, is not seeking truth but falsehood."

Question: How can that be reconciled in the same man?

54. On the same page, in note 12, Vidal-Naquet obviously does not know what to say in response to the forty pages (pages 181 to 222 of *Mémoire en défense*) which I devote to the "drastic revision of 1960." I recall there how the "gas chambers" of the Old Reich went, so to speak, down the chute, and I amuse myself collecting "strikingly true testimonies about the non-existent gassings, for example, at Buchenwald and Dachau." Here is how Vidal-Naquet gets rid of the thorn. He writes:

In order to be complete, I would say that [in Faurisson's new book] there is a file about the imaginary or non-functioning gas chambers in the camps in the West, Buchenwald, Dachau. But all that is so badly analyzed historically that even that documentation is usable only with difficulty.

Response: There is no analysis on my part, either historical or otherwise. I content myself above all with a simple enumeration of the false

testimonies. The enumeration in and of itself speaks volumes. In it we can read, between the lines, the famous question which no one has yet answered: "What difference do you see between the 'testimonies' about Buchenwald or Dachau and the 'testimonies' about Auschwitz or Belzec?" Had I wanted to do an analysis of each of the false testimonies that I cite, I am sure that my analysis would have been of a biblical simplicity. Let us take a short example. Here is a false testimony about Dachau. It is from Fernand Grenier and I quote it on page 218 of my *Mémoire en défense*. First I shall give the text and then I shall analyze it.

TEXT OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY

To the side of the four crematory ovens which never stopped working there was a room: some showers with sprinkler heads in the ceiling. In the preceding year [1944] they had given a towel and a piece of soap to 120 children, from 8 to 14 years of age. They were quite happy when they went inside. The doors were closed. Asphyxiating gas came out of the showers. Ten minutes later, death had killed these innocents whom the crematory ovens reduced to ashes an hour later.

ANALYSIS OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY

Since it is admitted that nobody was ever gassed in Dachau, the false witness Fernand Grenier has totally made up:

- (1) The four crematory ovens which never stopped working;
- (2) The room with the false showers and shower heads;
- (3) The year in which the event took place (in contrast to many witnesses, he does not go so far as to give the month, the day, and the hour);
- (4) The children;
- (5) The number of those children;
- (6) The ages of those children;
- (7) The 120 towels and pieces of soap;
- (8) The complete joy of the children on entering;
- (9) The closing of the doors (in the plural);
- (10) The asphyxiating gasses;
- (11) The 10 minutes it took for death to occur;
- (12) The record time for the cremation of 120 children's bodies in four ovens—only one hour, when today, with more modern means than those of 1944, four ovens of the kind that function at Père-Lachaise Cemetery in Paris would need 225 hours, or about nine days (45 minutes per body without antibiotics; if not, 50 to 60 minutes per body).

My analysis will stop here. To continue would serve no other purpose than to measure the candor of all who believe that such stories are not made up.

With regard to false testimony, I would be happy if Vidal-Naquet would give me his opinion on *Sachso* (op. cit.). There, on numerous

occasions, the "gas chamber" of that camp is discussed, although it was located 30 kilometers from Berlin; that is to say, in the Old Reich, where, as we have known officially since the drastic revision of 1960, there was no homicidal gassing.

In 1968, Olga Wormser-Migot, in her thesis on *Le Système concentrationnaire nazi 1932-1945* (The Nazi Concentration Camp System 1932-1945) wrote in note 2 on page 541, in the midst of a chapter significantly entitled, "The Problem of the Gas Chambers," that the Oranienburg "gas chamber" appeared to her to be "on the order of myth."

In *Sachso*, which is presented as a collective work, the authors reproduce for us two photos of Soviet origin tending to support the existence of a homicidal gas chamber. One does not see in them the least bit of the alleged "gas chamber." The first caption reads as follows:

One of the butchers of the camp, Paul Sakowski, in the presence of an officer of the Soviet Commission of Inquiry, repeats in 1945 the movements which released death into the gas chamber.

The second caption reads as follows:

To the left of the heavy, armored, and air-tight door to the execution room he activates the lever which seals all the ventilation openings. Then, with a slap of his palm on a hammer, he breaks the ampule of Zyklon B, the deadly vapors of which spread throughout the interior.

But it is interesting to know that Zyklon B, invented in 1917 (the license dates from 1922) and still currently in use today throughout the world, never existed in ampules. Zyklon B is hydrocyanic acid absorbed into an inert porous base—diatomaceous earth, for example. The funny thing about the plan of the camp which they have drawn is that it very clearly says "Industrie Hof (*sic*)/Crematory/Gas Chamber/Execution Chamber," but all that is accompanied by an arrow pointing toward the open, so that it is impossible to distinguish the shape, the proportions, or the location of the "gas chamber."

I would likewise hope that Vidal-Naquet will tell us his feelings about the "Exhibition on the Deportation, 1933-1945" which took place in late April and early May of 1982 on the Place du Trocadéro in Paris. On 30 April, in a "Supplement to the Quarterly Review *Les Amis de Paul Rassinier*, No. 1, June, 1982," I wrote an article about it which ends as follows:

In a general way, the 1982 exhibition marks an interesting evolution of the myth of the homicidal gas chambers. The fragments they show us of the alleged homicidal gas chambers are smaller and smaller. They are tending toward the infinitesimal, toward zero, toward nothing. Many gas chambers are no longer shown at all! They content themselves with showing us the building which is supposed to have contained them.

I add, under the heading "N.B.," the book by Georges Wellers, entitled *Les Chambres à gaz ont existé* (Gallimard, 1981), containing 12 photographs; not one shows a homicidal gas chamber.

I know several academic historians who no longer believe in the Nazi "gas chambers." They have confided that to me but dare not state it publicly. They feel the time has come to abandon the pious lie, but they don't know how to go about it.

To them I suggest a trick devised by one of my lawyers, who, after having believed firmly in the academic dogma, suddenly realized that he had been deceived. The means he devised in order not to appear to have changed his mind too much is as follows:

He described the "gas chambers" as "metaphorical." No doubt those horrors had not really taken place, but they conveyed very well all the real horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, and all in all they were a faithful image of the sufferings of the deportees and a moving representation of what some suffering minds really believed they knew. After all, the figure of 6 million Jews dead has become a "symbolic number," *eine symbolische Zahl*, since 3 May 1979 in a court in Frankfurt (case 50 Js 12 828/78 919 Ls, against Erwin Schönborn) where Dr. Broszat, once again, testified as an expert witness, based on his position as director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich. The alleged gas chambers are "metaphorical," the alleged number of 6 million dead "symbolic."

All that remains is to find an adjective of the same kind for the alleged "genocide."

55. On page 288, Vidal-Naquet assures us that my "freedom of expression, subject to existing laws, has never been threatened."

Response: His "subject to" is something to be relished. Vidal-Naquet has respect for law—for the law, for example, which, as a result of my having stood up for my idea about the "gas chambers" and the "genocide," led to my being condemned to a suspended sentence of three months in prison and to 360 million old francs in various fines plus the expenses of publicizing the decision. I have against me a pack of organizations and a mob of lawyers. I have been crushed by the debts from all those trials. I no longer have the right to teach. I have been attacked and physically beaten on several occasions. I have been the object of real lynching attempts. My health has become such that I had to be hospitalized three times in one year, for one month each time. My family life is completely upset. One of my children has had to give up his studies because of the name he bears. I am insulted in the French and international press as no one else, to the best of my knowledge, has ever been. The right to reply is almost systematically refused to me since a judge declared that to put "gas chamber" in quotes is to cast a slur upon some kind of holy thing. The Council of State has declared that there is nothing "materially inexact" in declaring me to be an academic who has never published anything in his life! The administrative court of the *département* of the Seine has never investigated a complaint I made in January 1975. I have encountered serious problems when I've had to find a lawyer. All of them have avoided the job. One of them was expelled from the MRAP [Movement against Racism and for Peace between Peoples] for having had

the audacity to defend not my ideas, but my right to freedom of expression. A portion of my books was destroyed in the warehouse. A unit of the Jewish Defense Organization called for an attack against us in a hall of "La Libre Pensée" ("Free Thought") and smashed 12,000 francs worth of property.

One night at 9:30 p.m. a sheriff's officer came on behalf of the MRAP to seize a video-cassette which the Jewish Defense Organization had just seized. We are the objects of never-ending threats. The vigilantes flourish in Paris, as in the provinces. Because of all this my wife has been sick for four years and lives in constant fear.

We have had some of our furniture repossessed while awaiting the possible seizure of a house that I have not yet completed paying for (purchased for 105,000 francs in 1968); our car has been seized, and most of my salary (my sole source of income) taken.

I have paid for all my research, and related travel expenses, out of my own pocket. When, for once, I won a court case (against *Le Matin de Paris*, which had written that I had received a reprimand for anti-Semitic remarks at the lycée in Clermont-Ferrand), the judge—Mme. Simone Rozès—did not want to publicize the decision because of the "special character of the case."

Dr. Marc Aron, the president of the consultative committee of the Jewish organizations in Lyon, declared one day that I would never again teach in Lyon, and organized demonstrations on the premises of my university by persons from outside the university. My case was the subject of administrative inquiry. The rector concluded it as follows: "Professor Faurisson is unassailable; he has not committed any professional error." That meant nothing, nor did the moving support of my students, nor the qualities which I seem to have shown up to that time ("Very brilliant professor; very original researcher; exceptional personality"). Not one of my colleagues came to my defense. Some of them went so far as to write to the president (socialist) of my university to assure him of their support against the black sheep. I have the letters. There are 25 of them.

I was warned by the Disciplinary Council to disappear from circulation. They assured me that, since the Council was constituted as it was, the opinion of the rector was of no importance. As a result of this pressure, I asked for a position teaching in the correspondence division. There they told me that they would have nothing to do with me, and that anyway my belonging to Group A of Higher Education prevented me from being used.

As regards my union, the SNESup (a leftist union) did not delay in showing me the door without letting me be heard in any way. I belonged to the SNES and to the SNESup for more than 20 years.

I won't mention the threatening letters, the anonymous telephone calls, the times that I was spat upon, the minor problems. I must admit that I feel like a hunted animal, and that I have often wanted to be done with my life. I do not know whether I will survive much longer

what is happening to me and to my loved ones. But I feel myself torn by the duty to struggle against such horrible lies and so much cowardice.

If I must struggle in this way, with the bit between my teeth, it is also for all those who have supported me up to now. First, those of the Vieille Taupe publishing house, and then all those strangers in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, Australia, and other places as well, who collect protests and manifestos.

56. On page 288, Vidal-Naquet writes:

Noam Chomsky, in a letter of 6 December 1980 to Jean-Pierre Faye, retracted, if not his text (appearing as a preface to my *Mémoire en défense*), then at least the use which had been made of it, without his agreement, as the preface to a book by Robert Faurisson.

Response: That is quite simply false.

That letter was written, but its content has been seriously misrepresented.

One comment by way of conclusion:

Vidal-Naquet spreads the idea, even in court, that he is convinced that I am an anti-Semite.

I will share a secret with you. When I hear talk about the Jewish question, I fall asleep. I understand that such indifference on this matter might offend the people who see anti-Semites everywhere, as others see Jews everywhere—but I demand the right to be indifferent on that point and on several others.

NOTES

1. In section 10 I wrote: "(. . .) concentration camps are a modern invention that we owe not to the British in their war against the Boers, but to the Americans during their Civil War" and I went on to mention "the horrors of Andersonville." Recently Mr. Mitchell A. Abidor (from Brooklyn, NY), reading the French version, noticed my mistake and reminded me that Andersonville had not been a "concentration camp" but a camp for prisoners of war. He is right. I should have mentioned instead Mark Weber's article: "The Civil War Concentration Camps," *Journal of Historical Review*, Summer 1981, p. 137-153 in which we read *inter alia*:

In addition to camps for captured soldiers, the North also established concentration camps for civilian populations considered hostile to the Federal government. Union General Thomas Ewing issued his infamous Order Number 11 in August 1863, whereby large numbers of civilians in Missouri were relocated into what were called "posts."

In *Plain Speaking*, "An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman," the former president tells what happened:

Everybody, almost the entire population of Jackson County and Vernon and Cass and Bates counties, all of them were depopulated, and the people had to stay in posts.

They called them posts, but what they were, they were concentration camps. And most of the people were moved in such a hurry that they had to leave all their goods and their chattels in their houses. Then the Federal soldiers came in and took everything that was left and set fire to the houses.

That didn't go down very well with the people in these parts; putting people in concentration camps in particular didn't. (pp. 78-79)

President Truman's grandmother loaded what belongings she could into an oxcart and, with six of her children, among them the President's mother, made the journey to a "post" in Kansas City. Martha Ellen Truman vividly remembered that trek until she died at the age of 94 [p. 143].

2. In my introduction and in Section 13 of my "Response . . .," I mentioned Ms. Nadine Fresco and her attempt to answer the Revisionists' arguments. Recently, in December 1985, she was quoted by Michael May in an article against the Revisionists: "Denying the holocaust/The background, methods and motives of the 'revisionists,'" *Index on Censorship* (London), December, 1985, p. 29-33. Below is what Michael May said against me and what I answered him.

Nadine Fresco in her admirable article "The Denial of the Dead" (*Dissent*, Fall, 1981) relates the following discovery about perhaps the most meticulous and dedicated of the 'revisionists', Robert Faurisson, in his treatment of the diary of the Auschwitz doctor Kremer, an important document.

"In his letter to *Le Monde* on January 16, 1979, Faurisson cites the diary that Johann-Paul Kremer, SS doctor, kept during his tenure at Auschwitz. Kremer recounts, on October 18, 1942 that, for the eleventh time, he was present at a "special action" (*Sonderaktion*). Faurisson, who can't be had and who, like no one else, knows how to decipher a text, decides that this "special action", which the exterminationists [the deniers' name for the established historians] insist on taking for a mass gassing, refers very simply to the executions of those condemned to death. He writes, "Among those condemned are three women who arrived in a convoy from Holland; they are shot". This sentence is accompanied by a very impressive note that indicates the seriousness of Faurisson's work. The note consists of a biographical reference: "'Auschwitz as Seen by the SS', published by the Museum of Oswiecim [the Polish name for Auschwitz], 1974, p. 238, note 85".

"Can one imagine a more scrupulous concern for reference, precision, and scientific rigor? But then perhaps Faurisson thinks it would be rather surprising if readers of *Le Monde* had access to such a book, published so far from France and

behind the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately for Faurisson, I have the book. And note 85 on page 238, which reports the official transcript of Kremer's testimony in 1947, indeed indicates that three Dutch women were shot on that day. But the text of the note to which Faurisson refers reads: "At the time of the special action which I described in my diary on October 18, 1942, three Dutch women *refused to enter the gas chamber* [emphasis mine] and pleaded for their lives. They were young women, in good health, but despite this their prayer was not granted and the SS who participated in the action shot them on the spot.'"

So there were gas chambers and people were put in them—and Faurisson relies on the very testimony which shows this. But he conceals all mention of gas chambers. The truth is not his goal . . .

At the time of the Faurisson affair, thirty-four of France's leading historians issued a declaration in *Le Monde* attesting to the historical truth of the Holocaust and protesting the Nazi attempt to erase the past. They concluded:

'Everyone is free to interpret a phenomenon like the Hitlerite genocide according to his own philosophy. Everyone is free to compare it with other enterprises of murder committed earlier, at the same time, later. Everyone is free to offer such or such kind of explanation; everyone is free, to the limit, to imagine or to dream that these monstrous deeds did not take place. Unfortunately they did take place and no one can deny their existence without committing an outrage on the truth. It is not necessary to ask how *technically* such a mass murder was possible. It was technically possible, seeing that it took place. That is the required point of departure of every historical inquiry on this subject. This truth it behooves us to remember in simple terms: there is not and there cannot be a debate about the existence of the gas chambers.' (*Le Monde*, Feb 21, 1979)

Letter to the Editor, *Index on Censorship* (for publication)

Subject: Michael May, "Denying the Holocaust" (*Index on Censorship*, December 1985, pp. 29-33)

My name is Robert Faurisson. I am a professor at the University of Lyon-2, in France. I have said and I still maintain that there was never a single homicidal gas chamber in the German concentration camps prior to or during World War II. I have arrived at that conclusion, as have many Revisionists, at the end of a very long investigation and I have expressed that conclusion in books, articles, and one videotape presentation. In my response to Michael May's article, I will refer only to two books: Serge Thion, *Vérité historique ou vérité politique?* (Le dossier de l'Af-faire Faurisson, La question des chambres à gaz), Paris, La Vieille Taupe Publishing Co., April 1980, 352 pages; Robert Faurisson, *Mémoire en défense contre ceux qui m'accusent de falsifier l'Histoire* (La question des chambres à gaz), with a

preface by Noam Chomsky, same publisher, November 1980, xx-iv + 280 pages.

Michael May, on the other hand, believes that the gas chambers did exist. In his article he mentions a French woman, Madame Nadine Fresco, who has fought vigorously against the Revisionist thesis and, in particular, against my own publications in *Le Monde* ("Le problème des chambres à gaz/La rumeur d'Auschwitz," 29 December 1978, p. 8, and "Une lettre de M. Faurisson," 16 January 1979, p. 13) as well as against Serge Thion's book.

Nadine Fresco criticized us in a fierce and mocking way in a long article in *Les Temps Modernes* (the magazine of Jean-Paul Sartre and of Claude Lanzmann, famous later as the director of the film *Shoah*). Her article was entitled: "Les redresseurs de morts/Chambres à gaz: la bonne nouvelle/Comment on révisé l'histoire" (*Les Temps Modernes*, June 1980, pp. 2150-2211).

Michael May does not refer to that article but rather to an English text: "The Denial of the Dead" (*Dissent*, Fall 1981), which, judging from the excerpt that he has cited, could be either a translation or an adaptation of the *Temps Modernes* article. He describes that article as "admirable," especially since Ms. Fresco supposedly shows what kind of trick I used to hide from *Le Monde's* readers the existence of an "important document": the testimony of Professor Johann-Paul Kremer about the gassings at Auschwitz.

Unfortunately for Nadine Fresco and Michael May, I, far from having hidden that testimony from anyone, have often mentioned it and, noting the interest that has been shown in it by those who sued me for "falsification of history," have devoted numerous pages to it for some time. Here I will limit myself to listing only the five occasions on which I talked about that testimony, a date approximately one year before Nadine Fresco in *Dissent*, in spite of so many warnings, went on to repeat and to persist in her initial serious mistake.

Here are the five dates on which I talked about the testimony that Johann-Paul Kremer made to his Polish Communist jailers:

- (1) On 16 January 1979, in the same letter to *Le Monde* in which Ms. Fresco said that I had concealed Kremer's testimony from my readers, I expressly mentioned "'the testimony' (in quotes) after the war by J.-P. Kremer" and the context clearly shows that it was testimony about the alleged gassings (that letter is reproduced in my *Mémoire*, pp. 84-88);
- (2) On 26 February 1979, in a text sent to *Le Monde* in connection with my "right to reply" to Georges Wellers, I referred to the testimony and its content (that text is reproduced in my *Mémoire*, pp. 96-100);

- (3) In April of 1980 Serge Thion announced on page 338 of his book that I was soon going to publish a *Mémoire* in which I would deal, among other items, with the question of Kremer's testimony;
- (4) In June of 1980 Nadine Fresco published her article in *Les Temps Modernes*; it mentioned me 150 times. In accordance with my legal "right of reply," I sent a response to her article. In it I pointed out, among other items, that it was wrong for Ms. Fresco, repeating Georges Wellers's error, to reproach me for having been silent about the testimony of J.-P. Kremer; I told her that *Le Monde* had refused to publish my response to Wellers and I made it clear that I was soon going to publish a *Mémoire* in which I would once more talk about J.-P. Kremer (a photograph of *Le Monde's* refusal letter is included in my *Mémoire*, p. 101);
- (5) In November of 1980 the *Mémoire* that had twice been announced to Ms. Fresco appeared; in it I reproduced in facsimile 20 pages of the Communist publication in whose footnotes are found fragments of Kremer's confession. And I had no trouble in showing the vagueness and the absurdity of that testimony, which is also quite typical of Stalinist trials.

I will therefore make the following remarks about that whole affair and about Michael May's article:

- (1) It is astonishing that I have been accused in this way of hiding something that I had myself taken the initiative to point out. Georges Wellers was the first one to make this false accusation. The others have only repeated what he said. They have been, first of all, the group of nine organizations which sued me; then Nadine Fresco, and today Michael May. They have not been able to respond to the scholarly arguments of the revisionists and instead have leaped at the first accusation that occurred to them. And, lacking anything better to say, they have persisted in their error;
- (2) Those who defend the thesis about the existence of the gas chambers are amateurish. We have an example of that amateurishness in Nadine Fresco: in my letter to *Le Monde* I said that three women coming from the Netherlands had been shot rather than gassed at Auschwitz; as my source I gave a classic book, a special issue of the *Hefte von Auschwitz* (*Auschwitz Notebooks*) published by the very official State Museum of Auschwitz; this special issue was also in French, and I gave the exact citation in the French version. What did Ms. Fresco do about that? She deduced from it that this was a trick on my part and that, having

done that, I counted on the fact that no reader of *Le Monde* would take the trouble to verify the reference to a work "published so far from France and behind the Iron Curtain." Could Ms. Fresco find anyone who, writing as a specialist about Auschwitz, would be unaware of the existence of the *Hefte von Auschwitz*?

- (3) Do we know of very many Communist-conducted trials that have *not* had confessions by the accused?
- (4) Michael May wrote his article in a publication called *Index on Censorship*. I therefore supposed that he is opposed to censorship. In this whole affair there have been two examples of censorship: first by *Le Monde*, then by *Les Temps Modernes*. In both cases they prevented me from reminding the public that I had indeed mentioned the Kremer testimony and that I even knew the subject very well. The result was that Nadine Fresco thought she could repeat a baseless accusation that is today coming back to haunt her. Therefore, it seems that it is, at least sometimes, unwise to censor things.
- (5) Michael May ends his article with the final excerpt from the declaration by 34 French historians who, in February 1979, published a text protesting against my denial of the existence of the gas chambers. He talks about "thirty-four of France's leading historians." He fails to mention that not one of those historians, except Léon Poliakov, was a specialist in the period under consideration; they included Egyptologists, Hellenists, specialists in the 16th or the 18th centuries, specialists in the study of customs or of societies, etc. In France today people still laugh at that declaration which seems to please Michael May; here is how it concluded:

"It is not necessary to ask how *technically* such a mass murder was possible. It was technically possible, seeing that it took place. That is the required point of departure of every inquiry on this subject. This truth it behooves us to remember in simple terms: there is not and there cannot be a debate about the existence of the gas chambers" (*Le Monde*, 21 February 1979, p. 23).

This kind of reasoning is an example of a rhetorical construction known as "tautology." And it raises three questions: Apart from the alleged mass murder of Jews by the Nazis, what other mass murder in history could a historian research without having to ask himself how "technically" it was carried out?

You say that there *cannot* be any debate about the existence of the gas chambers; does that mean that if there is actually such a debate it is necessary to forbid it—for example, by means of censorship or law suits?

Supposing for a moment that the gas chambers were actually nothing more than a wartime rumor turned into an historic lie. Should we call it that or cover it up? In this case what, in your opinion, should a scholar do?

3. In section 28 I wrote: "A thesis is presently being prepared which will expose the Gerstein 'confessions' and what Léon Poliakov has made of them." The viva voce of this thesis was on 15 June 1985. Its author, Mr. Henri Roques, received his Ph.D. (*doctorat d'Université*) with distinction from the University of Nantes. This long and very technical thesis will be mimeographed in February, 1986. The conclusions are humiliating for Léon Poliakov. Quite recently, in November 1985, Carlo Mattogno published *Il Rapporto Gerstein: Anatomia di un Falso/Il "campo di sterminio" di Belzec* (*The Gerstein Report: Anatomy of a Fraud/The Extermination Camp at Belzec*), ed. Sentinella d'Italia (Via Buonarroti 4, Monfalcone, Italy), 243 p., 15,000 lire. His findings are the same as Dr. Roques' findings.*

*See Robert Hall's review in this month's *Journal*.

The German Delousing Chambers

FRIEDRICH PAUL BERG

Today at the former German concentration camp at Dachau, it is no longer claimed that Jews or anyone else were ever killed in the gas chamber there. In the room that is supposedly a gas chamber, one can clearly read a sign written by the museum authorities in five languages which says, "THE GAS CHAMBER disguised as a 'shower room'—never used as a gas chamber."¹ Although the room was completed in 1942, it was never used for its intended purpose—presumably, it was used for other purposes; perhaps it was used as a shower room after all.

At the western end of the crematorium building which houses the so-called gas chamber "disguised as a shower room," one can today see and walk through four delousing chambers which were used to fumigate clothing.² The only explanation regarding these chambers is a sign above them, also in five languages, which simply says "Fumigation cubicles" in English and *Desinfektionskammern* in German. There is no mention anywhere within the camp of the important fact that these chambers used Zyklon-B to fumigate clothing as well as other articles placed within the chambers.

The "shower room" is not a gas chamber at all, but the so-called "fumigation cubicles" are gas chambers. Moreover, the "fumigation cubicles" are extremely well-designed gas chambers which represented, and may still represent, the state of the art in gas chamber design. They were the product of more than 20 years of research and development into the application of hydrocyanic acid (often referred




Figure 1: One of the four delousing chambers as it can be seen today in Dachau. (Note the heater, wire-mesh basket and other equipment visible through the open doorway.)

to simply as cyanide) for the extermination of vermin. This is clearly shown by the extensive German technical literature from the end of World War I through World War II on this subject.³

The delousing chambers at Dachau were far superior in design to the gas chambers which are still used in this country for the execution of criminals. As a consequence of their design, the operating procedures for the delousing chambers at Dachau were quite simple; for example, although gas masks had to be available, the operators were only required to use them in emergencies or in special situations. By

contrast, the American gas chambers for executions still require the use of gas masks during the normal post-execution procedures. Compared to the American gas chambers, the German delousing chambers at Dachau were also safer to operate and far less expensive to construct.⁴

At the end of this article I have added a translation of one of the many articles that can be found in the German wartime technical and medical literature discussing the proper use of Zyklon-B for the control of typhus through the extermination of its principal carrier, the body louse. (See appendix.) The article by Emil Wüstinger is especially important because of the numbers it gives to show the extent to which the Zyklon-B delousing technology was actually used by the Germans to save people from the ravages of typhus. According to Wüstinger, 25 million people had already had their clothing and personal belongings fumigated from the start of the war until the beginning of 1944. This number is, interestingly enough, the same as the one which appears in the Gerstein statement as the number of people who had been "killed" in gas chambers.

The delousing chamber represented by the drawing in Wüstinger's article is the standard ten-cubic-meter model which seems to have been used most often. It is essentially identical to the four chambers—"fumigation cubicles"—that one can still see today in the Dachau crematorium building. Even the interior dimensions are the same: The interior length is four meters, the interior height is 1.9 meters and the interior width is 1.35 meters, which gives a total interior volume of about ten cubic meters. The only significant difference between the delousing chamber portrayed in the drawing and the four chambers that one can still see in Dachau is that the cutouts in the walls containing some of the circulatory system apparatus are in the upper left corners of the chambers instead of in the lower left corners. The blowers above each chamber, a separate blower for each chamber, are no longer present although most of the piping, including the vent piping, remains.

The blowers, in effect, drove the entire fumigation process. Initially, each blower would accelerate the evaporation of hydrocyanic acid out of the porous Zyklon-B granules placed inside the chamber by forcing warm air through the granules and then circulating the resulting air and hydrocyanic acid gas mixture throughout all of the clothing and articles within the chamber. Finally, each blower forced the lethal gas mixture out of the chamber up a vent pipe through the roof to atmosphere and replaced the lethal gas with fresh air so that the chamber doors could be opened without endangering the operator.

Each chamber was designed so that it would normally be operated without the operator having to wear a gas mask except in an emergency. According to Dr. Gerhard Peters, writing in 1940 about the recently perfected gas chamber design:

Last but not least, it is an essential requirement that the operating personnel not come into direct contact with the hydrocyanic acid and also not be hindered unnecessarily with gas masks. The new design therefore provides that the entire process and even the venting occur behind closed doors; the equipment can be controlled from outside *without anti-gas protection (ohne Gasschutz)* since the hydrocyanic acid container is opened automatically only within the chamber. (Gas masks need only be available for special situations.) [emphasis as in the original]⁵

The most significant feature of these designs is that a chamber so equipped for generating the gas and for controlling circulation can be operated *without anti-gas protection. Thanks to the special arrangement of the equipment, one can ventilate with the doors closed*, which can be regarded as an especially great advantage . . . [emphasis as in the original]

Without doubt this design has had the greatest significance on the mass application of hydrocyanic acid fumigation facilities for mass delousing since it is only with such installations that dependable results can be achieved in unusually short periods (1 hour treatment).⁶

An accurate explanation of the role of the delousing chambers with their blowers would, no doubt, have caused many visitors to wonder why the Germans never used these devices for mass-murder. Each of the four delousing chambers had an interior floor space of 5.4 square meters and certainly could have been used to kill several dozen people at a time. And yet such an application for these chambers has never been alleged. One problem would have been that some of the circulatory system apparatus—including the four-way valve, the can-opener and the heater—is exposed to the interior and could have been damaged quite easily by anyone trapped inside. This apparatus could, however, have been shielded by some kind of metal grill—but there is no evidence that any such shielding was ever present.

The four delousing chambers could have been adapted for mass-extermination in another way which would have been obvious to many visitors. Instead of blowing the hydrocyanic acid vapors to atmosphere through the vent pipe at the end of a typical fumigation cycle, the same gas could have been blown through another pipe into the “shower room” located approximately in the middle of the same building about 60 feet away. As soon as a sufficiently lethal concentration of cyanide vapors had been attained inside the “shower room,” the blowers could have been shut down for as long as needed, several minutes would probably have been enough, to allow the gas to kill its victims. Afterwards, the blowers could have been restarted to ventilate the shower room by blowing fresh air into the room. Such a method would have worked, although for reasons which will be given later on, the arrangement would have been far more effective if it included some piping or ductwork to circulate the air-gas mixture. Ideally, some vent piping should have also been provided for the shower room so as to cause the potentially lethal gas to be discharged above

the roof of the building instead of into the surroundings near ground level.

Wüstinger's article also discusses the advantages of hydrocyanic acid gas chambers over delousing chambers which used hot air. The hot air method and a steam method (not discussed in the article) both relied on high temperature to kill lice and other vermin. Both methods were somewhat safer since they did not involve the use of a poisonous substance. However, both of these alternatives had other problems. If a high enough temperature was not maintained long enough, particularly in the center of the chamber, which would have been insulated somewhat by the presence of a load of clothing, the delousing procedure would not have been effective. In addition, maintaining a high temperature within a chamber meant that the chamber had to be far better insulated and for this reason required a heavier, more expensive structure. A great deal of precious fuel also had to be consumed in order to generate the necessary heat. High temperatures tended to damage leather goods, foods, and some types of equipment which required fumigation from time to time.

The high temperature approach, whether it involved steam or hot air, was used more often in Eastern regions occupied by the Germans. This was because of the shortage of the trained specialists which were needed whenever one worked with Zyklon-B. The Zyklon method was generally employed within the Reich itself.

Zyklon-B

Until the introduction of DDT by the Americans and by the Germans in 1944, the delousing of not only clothing but also living quarters, especially barracks, and railroad trains in order to kill body lice was the only effective means of controlling the spread of typhus. Until the arrival of DDT, the most effective pesticide for killing body lice, i.e., for delousing, was Zyklon-B.

When Exterminationists claim, as Raul Hilberg did in *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961 edition, pp. 565-67) that Zyklon-B was simply the commercial name for prussic acid (hydrocyanic acid is the chemical term generally used for prussic acid), or that it was hydrogen cyanide solidified in pellets which passed "immediately" into the gaseous state upon being dropped into a gas chamber, they merely show that they have no idea as to what their great murder weapon really was.

Zyklon-B was, and still is, essentially a porous material with liquid hydrocyanic acid absorbed into it with a small amount of chemical stabilizer and warning ingredient added.⁷ The absorbent material was generally diatomaceous earth but paper discs were also used, especially in the United States. After the hydrocyanic acid had completely evaporated, the porous material—now completely harmless—could be returned to a Zyklon dealer and refilled.

The speed with which hydrocyanic acid evaporates out of the Zyklon granules or paper discs is not instantaneous. Although the

hydrocyanic acid does immediately begin to leave the porous material as soon as a can of Zyklon-B is opened, that does not mean it leaves all at once. On the contrary, it still takes about half an hour for most of the cyanide to leave under normal conditions and under normal room temperature, about 68° F. Even more time is needed for all the cyanide to leave the granules.

According to Dr. Gerhard Peters, who was the managing director of DEGESCH and who from the early 1930's through World War II was probably the most prolific advocate of Zyklon-B:⁸

... As a general rule, the material is spread out in a layer which is ½ to 1 cm thick, after which most of the hydrocyanic acid has already evolved after half an hour.⁹

Although the process begins immediately, it is nonetheless a gradual process. It can be speeded up by dispersing the granules in thinner layers or by using smaller granules to begin with or—what is most important in order to understand how the standard delousing chambers worked—by forcing air through the granules and/or by the addition of heat.

The importance of heat not only to prevent condensation during the venting of a cyanide gas chamber but also during the gassing phase itself is evident from the very title of a German patent which was granted to DEGESCH in 1940. The title of patent no. 700469 which took effect retroactively on July 26, 1934 reads:

Method for generating the *necessary heat* for the vaporization of poisonous substances for gases used for pest control [emphasis added]

The text of the patent explains at some length the need for heating in order to accelerate the release of fumigating gases such as hydrocyanic acid. The patent includes a schematic drawing showing the same circulatory equipment arrangement which was probably used in all of the standard DEGESCH gas chambers.

The importance of heat to the venting process is spelled out in the following text from Peters and Wüstinger.

... As a consequence of the extensive preheating of the fresh air entering at D, the venting of the chamber is completed in 10 to 15 minutes. The carts can then be driven out and the articles of clothing can be immediately returned to their owners who in the meantime have had their bodies deloused.¹⁰

The Fumigation Cycle in the German Delousing Chambers

The fumigation cycle consisted of two phases: (1) a circulation (*Kreislauf*) phase, known in non-technical jargon simply as the "gassing" phase, and (2) a venting (*Lüftung*) phase.¹¹ Switching from one phase to the other was accomplished by simply turning a crank handle 180 degrees on the outside of the chamber. The crank handle was

linked to a special four-way valve located on the inside of the chamber (see figure 1 in the translation of the article by Emil Wüstinger).

The circulation phase lasted about an hour and the ventilation phase lasted at least fifteen minutes. In practice, however, it seems to have taken longer. There is, for example, a well-known photograph of an American soldier in Dachau looking at one of the delousing chamber doors upon which there is a notice in German which says that the fumigation time (*Gaszeit*) was from 7:30 until at least 10.¹²

To start the delousing process, a can of Zyklon-B inside the chamber was opened from outside the chamber by means of the specially designed can-opener with the chamber doors shut. Once the can was opened, the next step was to turn the crank handle on the outside of the chamber 180 degrees to the "Kreislauf" (circulation) position which in turn caused the Zyklon-B can inside the chamber to be turned upside down, thereby dumping the Zyklon-B granules through a chute into a wire-mesh basket. Meanwhile, air was circulated by the blower through a closed loop which consisted of the chamber itself as well as the four-way valve, the basket and a heater. The air was heated before it passed through the granules in the basket. The heated air drove the hydrocyanic acid out of the granules so that the circulating air became mixed with an increasingly lethal dosage of cyanide. The resulting lethal gas mixture was circulated throughout the chamber—hence the name: "circulatory gas chamber"—to insure thorough penetration into all possible hiding places within the clothing and articles being fumigated.

After at least an hour, the operator could begin the venting phase by turning the crank handle 180 degrees to the "Lüftung" (venting) position. The blower continued to operate as before. The four-way valve would now allow fresh air to be drawn into the chamber from the opening surrounding the crank handle stem in the outside wall of the chamber. As the fresh air passed through the valve and then the heater, it was heated above the boiling point of hydrocyanic acid, which is 78.6° F.¹³ The warm air then continued on through the Zyklon-B granules in the basket and drove any remaining traces of hydrocyanic acid out of the granules. The air then entered the chamber as a whole and eventually left the chamber from an opening at the extreme end of the opposite side of the chamber, returned to the blower, and then went down into the four-way valve once again, but this time instead of going around again in a closed loop, the gas mixture was directed up the vent pipe by the four-way valve and discharged into the atmosphere. The gas mixture was discharged high enough so that the otherwise lethal gas was so diluted by fresh air that people in the vicinity were not affected. In the process, the temperature of the entire chamber, including the chamber walls, was raised above the boiling point of hydrocyanic acid in order to prevent any subsequent condensation of the cyanide vapors either in the clothing, in any other articles, or on the walls. The walls, floor and ceiling were specially coated to minimize absorption of cyanide into the structure itself.

One final step which was sometimes stressed in the German technical literature was that the articles that had been fumigated still should be aired in the open for at least five minutes before they were returned to their owners.

The Circulation Principle (*Kreislaufprinzip*)

The importance of good circulation to the proper operation of the German delousing chambers cannot be overemphasized. In the German literature, especially the material from the DEGESCH company itself, circulation of the air-cyanide mixture was always and still is emphasized as a major feature of all of the standardized gas chambers and of good gas chamber design in general.

As recently as 1979, the DEGESCH company was still promoting its own design of fumigation chambers for Zyklon-B with the following information in English:

Whether the fumigation chamber is a permanent installation or mobile, a *DEGESCH* circulatory device makes it possible to operate safely and quickly, and ensures success. [emphasis added]

Mobile fumigation chambers are of great advantage: As they can be attached to any tractor or lorry, their possibilities for use are almost unlimited. They are economical in price and running. The standard sizes are 2 m³, and 20 m³, other sizes can be constructed according to special requirements.

Stationary chambers are made from steel, bricks or concrete. If constructed from bricks or concrete they must be sealed by applying a suitable coating.

Neither service personnel nor unauthorized persons come into contact with the gas; one person alone can operate the fumigation chamber; a gas-mask need not be worn. *The gas-air-mixture is circulated, thus accelerating penetration and reducing exposure time.* [emphasis added] After treatment, the gas can be cleared quickly and safely.¹⁴

The terminology "DEGESCH circulatory device" was used to identify the mechanical equipment such as the four-way valve, heater, can-opener and blower which DEGESCH sold.¹⁵ The structure—walls, floor and ceiling—without the mechanical equipment seems to have generally been built by the customer himself or by an independent contractor.

Zyklon-B and cyanide do not have magic properties. The cyanide does not hunt down living creatures "like radar" as has been advertised for at least one currently popular insecticide. On the contrary, cyanide must obey the same laws of nature that steam or hot air have to obey in a similar situation. The advantage cyanide has as far as its distribution is concerned is due primarily to its low boiling point and its small molecular size. Although cyanide does indeed have great penetrating power, the penetrating rate is severely reduced by obstructions such as clothing unless those obstructions are overcome by some




Figure 2: Development and distribution of the gas concentration in a filled gas chamber with and without circulation

- a. with circulation, i.e., with exchange of the air-gas mixture,
 b. without circulation, the gas must find its own path.

(the heavy lines represent concentrations in the center of the chamber while the other lines represent concentrations in various corners of the chamber.) (original source: DEGESCH)¹⁶

means such as forced circulation through a well-designed chamber with good flow patterns for the gas.

Figure 2 shows just how essential good circulation is to the design of an effective gas chamber. It was apparently based upon careful tests in which cyanide concentrations in various parts of a standard gas chamber were measured over at least two separate, three hour periods. One group of tests was made with the blower operating and with the four-way valve in the "circulation" position. The second group of tests was made with the blower idle.

The test results in figure 2 are not at all surprising. They are generally just about what common sense would tell us to expect. It is a pleasant surprise, however, to be able to see the importance of proper circulation illustrated so clearly. The test results were obviously published first by DEGESCH and then by others in order to re-emphasize the importance of circulation as clearly as possible.

With circulation, the cyanide levels are relatively high and uniform throughout the chamber within about one hour. Without circulation, the cyanide levels are relatively high after one hour in only one corner, presumably the corner nearest to the basket with the Zyklon-B granules. Without circulation, comparable cyanide levels are achieved in the center of the filled chamber only after three hours; after only one hour, the gas hardly penetrated at all to the center of the chamber.

The emphasis upon circulation or *Kreislauf*, not only in the DEGESCH literature but also in countless articles in the German war-

time literature on Zyklon-B and delousing, is apparent even in the terminology: *Kreislaufkammer*, *Kreislaufanordnung*, *Kreislaufapparatur*, *Kreislaufleitung*, *Kreislaufgeräte*, *Kreislaufanlagen*, *Kreislaufprinzip*, etc. But even more than that, the front of each DEGESCH circulatory chamber was usually marked with the word *Kreislauf* to identify one of the two positions of the four-way valve. The operating phase during which cyanide was applied during the two-phase fumigation cycle was known as the *Kreislauf* phase. The point is that it would have been impossible to have any expertise at all in the use of cyanide and/or Zyklon-B without being well aware of the advantages of proper circulation for any application of this technology. How then could any would-be mass murderers have possibly been unaware of the need for circulation in their cyanide gas chambers for mass-murder? How could they have been oblivious to the significance of *Kreislauf*? And yet, they must have been oblivious—that is precisely what must have happened if one is to take the “Holocaust” literature at all seriously.

In any event, the would-be mass murderers—even if they had been totally illiterate amateurs, wholly ignorant of the importance of circulation—would have seen that something was seriously wrong with their method after one or more botched attempts at exterminating people with cyanide in chambers without circulation.

Hydrocyanic Acid Gas Chambers for Mass-Murder?

Although the murder weapon is the focus of a great deal of investigation and analysis in any ordinary murder case, alas, when one is dealing with the “Holocaust” story one finds nothing comparable regarding what were supposedly the greatest murder weapons in history.

In the main camp of the Auschwitz concentration camp complex, a gas chamber was supposedly used until the end of 1942 to murder about 76,000 people. That room can be visited today in its “reconstructed state.” In design and appearance it is nothing more than a dreary cellar, just like most cellars, except for some holes in the ceiling.¹⁷ Zyklon-B granules were supposedly dumped through these holes into the chamber where they would have fallen upon the heads and among the feet of the intended victims. The room is separated only by a door from another room containing crematorium ovens and has no ventilating equipment at all. For these reasons as well as for others which are beyond the scope of this article, many of which have however been given in the past by Dr. Robert Faurisson and Ditlieb Felderer, the claim that this room was a gas chamber for mass murder is pure rubbish.

Probably the most plausible description of a gas chamber using cyanide for mass murder is the following description from Filip Müller of the cellar in Krematorium 2 in Auschwitz-Birkenau in which 3,000 people were supposedly killed at a time:

We left the mortuary and came to a huge iron-mounted wooden door; it was not locked. We entered a place which was in total darkness. As we switched on the light, the room was lit by bulbs enclosed in a protective wire cage. We were standing in a large oblong room measuring about 250 square meters. Its unusually low ceiling and walls were white-washed. Down the length of the room concrete pillars supported the ceiling. However, not all the pillars served this purpose: for there were others, too. The Zyklon B gas crystals [sic] were inserted through openings into hollow pillars made of sheet metal. They were perforated at regular intervals and inside them a spiral ran from top to bottom in order to ensure as even a distribution of the granular crystals as possible. Mounted on the ceiling was a large number of dummy showers made of metal. These were intended to delude the suspicious on entering the gas chamber into believing that they were in a shower-room. A ventilating plant was installed in the wall; this was switched on immediately after each gassing to disperse the gas and expedite the removal of corpses.¹⁸

Although a "ventilation plant" is mentioned by Müller, that does not mean there was anything even remotely comparable to the kind of ventilation and circulation which would have been needed.

According to Müller, the "Zyklon B gas crystals"¹⁹ were dropped, presumably from the outside of the chamber, into hollow perforated pillars with spirals. The Zyklon granules (not crystals at all) would have slid down the spirals to the bottom of the pillars.

The ventilation plant was supposedly "switched on immediately after each gassing." [emphasis added] In other words, during the gassing itself, the ventilation plant must have been off; there could have been no circulation of the air-gas mixture through the gas chamber during the gassing itself.


Although cyanide vapors would have gradually left the granules, their path would have been obstructed first by the "perforated" sheet metal pillars and then by those intended victims who were crammed into the spaces around the pillars. If one takes at all seriously the accounts of three thousand victims being killed at a time, the perforated pillars would have been surrounded rather tightly by the intended victims. Those who were in the immediate vicinity of the pillars would have probably been affected by the cyanide in just a few minutes but—on the basis of figure 2—many, if not most, of the others would have been unaffected by the cyanide until hours later.

But let us give the benefit of doubt to the Exterminationists for the sake of this analysis. Perhaps Müller was somewhat mistaken and perhaps the "ventilation plant" had been switched on during the actual gassing. What then?

Even if the ventilation plant had been switched on during the gassing phase, there is no evidence that the necessary piping or ductwork was present to permit proper circulation. On the contrary, the bottom of each "perforated" pillar would have been, in effect, a *cul-de-sac* through which there could not possibly have been the kind of air or gas flow which circulated through the wire-mesh baskets in the stan-



circulation and venting
arrangement of a 400 cubic meter
railroad disinfestation chamber



railroad fumigation chamber of the
state railways in Budapest

(at the far end one can see the equipment room
for the circulation and ventilation apparatus)

Figure 3: Railroad delousing tunnels.²²

dard delousing chambers even if there had been some provision for returning the ventilation plant discharge back to the gas chamber through some kind of closed loop arrangement. Any conceivable closed loop could not possibly have included the Zyklon granules themselves since they would have been isolated at the bottoms of the perforated pillars. The evaporation of the cyanide out of the Zyklon-B granules would have taken hours rather than minutes. And yet, according to the so-called confession of Rudolf Höss, the former camp commandant of Auschwitz, the gassing process was so short that after only half an hour the gas chamber doors were opened, the ventilating machinery was turned on, and workers without gas masks immediately began to remove the bodies.

Obviously, the Müller account and the Höss “confession” are nothing more than badly contrived horror stories. The mechanics, reminiscent of Rube Goldberg inventions, may seem plausible at first glance but simply do not stand up to critical examination.

The Railroad Delousing Tunnels

The abundance of Zyklon-B delousing chambers, even within concentration camps, is in itself a major problem for the accepted “Holocaust” story because here were well-designed pilot plants for committing mass-murder on a relatively small scale before attempting to kill on a massive scale; here were the ideal models to follow in order

to construct scaled-up versions for mass-murder. Here was the proper technology for mass-murder with cyanide—but this technology, the delousing chamber technology, was supposedly never used for such a purpose.

More surprising is the fact that large, scaled-up versions of the small delousing chambers actually did exist in locations which were far more accessible than any of the so-called extermination camps. Those chambers employed the same circulatory principle and used Zyklon-B to fumigate railroad trains—but, those chambers were never used for mass-murder either.

Larger chambers for fumigating entire railroad trains existed throughout German-occupied Europe in about a dozen different locations including Cologne, Poznan (*Posen*), Potsdam, and Budapest.²⁰ They had become a standard feature of the railroad network in order to prevent the spread of typhus, particularly from Eastern Europe, where typhus had always been endemic.

The would-be murderers could have simply brought railroad cars filled with Jews into these large chambers, one or two cars at a time, killed the intended victims and then ventilated the cars within just a few hours. Each gassing, including venting of one or two railroad cars, would have still taken at least one-and-a-half hours—far longer than the half-hour which is all that was supposedly needed at Auschwitz according to Höss and others.²¹

By using the railroad delousing tunnels, which ranged in size from about 400 cubic meters to as much as 1700 cubic meters, the mass-murderers would not have had to transport their intended victims halfway across Europe in the midst of a war in which Germany was desperately trying to conserve meager resources such as railroads and fuel.

Typhus

Throughout World War II severe outbreaks of typhus occurred in the German-occupied East. Especially in the last year of the war, with disaster falling upon Europe and with millions of people fleeing to the West from parts of Europe where typhus had always been endemic, Zyklon-B became the great life-saver. Although DDT and some other substances such as the IG Farben product "Lauseto" had become available, the quantities were severely limited by the bombing of German chemical and pharmaceutical plants. Without Zyklon-B carrying on in the role it had established for itself in the early years of the war, the horrible scenes in isolated places such as Bergen-Belsen in the spring of 1945 would have certainly been repeated on a far more spectacular scale. What actually happened was bad enough.

There could have been a repeat of what had happened during and after World War I in Eastern Europe. The situation in Russia during that period had been described by the eminent American medical historian Hans Zinsser as follows:

... Will historians of this period remember that, throughout the struggles which led to the establishment of the Soviet Republic, Russia suffered—in addition to war and armed revolution—from two cholera epidemics, from a famine unequaled since the Thirty Years War, from typhus, malaria, typhoid, dysentery, tuberculosis, and syphilis to an extent unimaginable except to those who were helpless spectators? Tarassewitch estimated (statistics of accuracy were impossible) that between 1917 and 1923 there were 30,000,000 cases of typhus with 3,000,000 deaths in European Russia alone.²³

The losses in the Ukraine, the Balkans and Poland were probably comparable to those suffered in Russia but the historians have forgotten.

During World War II, the losses in Eastern Europe may have been even worse than those indicated by Zinsser and Tarassewitch for the earlier period. However, the true statistics would not serve the interests of the Soviet Union and for this reason they will probably never be available.

In the West the true statistics are also kept quiet but for a different reason: they would diminish the sense that Jews had been the victims of an extermination policy. The proof of this statement is in the speeches of President Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl and in the news coverage in 1985 regarding Reagan's visit to Bitburg and Bergen-Belsen. At that time, the truth as to what had happened in Bergen-Belsen at the end of the war should have been made public as part of the media coverage which began several months before the visit—but it was not. Although it has long been conceded that the true horrors of Bergen-Belsen had nothing whatever to do with an extermination policy, the President, the media and even the chancellor of West Germany did their best to portray Bergen-Belsen to the general public as proof of an extermination program against the Jews.

There is a substantial body of statistical evidence which shows that during the first two years of the war more than three-fourths of all cases of typhus in Poland occurred among Jews and that the remaining cases arose in large part from contact with Jews.²⁴ It was on the basis of this evidence that special regulations were introduced to restrict the movement of Jews. The wall around the Jewish Warsaw ghetto was one such measure. A thorough discussion of this subject is, however, beyond the scope of this article. In any event, Jews in concentration camps after 1941 certainly benefited from the presence of the delousing chambers in the camps.

Rather than having been the victims of Zyklon-B in murderous gas chambers, the Jews were probably the principal beneficiaries of Zyklon-B and its proper, life-saving application in well-designed German delousing chambers such as the ones which can still be seen in Dachau.

Conclusions

We have been blinded by our tears of sympathy for the supposed victims. We have been blinded by our tears of shame for deeds which people just like ourselves might have committed. But if we dare to wipe those tears away and look at the "Holocaust" evidence critically with sober heads, we find that there are no grounds for any such tears at all.

The mass-murder technology that was supposedly used to kill millions of people would not have worked. However, a mass-murder technology based upon the hydrocyanic acid delousing chambers would have worked quite well indeed. The SS certainly had an abundance of expertise in this technology since they were employing it themselves, daily, with their own specially trained personnel—and even had their own school for pesticide specialists.²⁵

Surely Adolf Eichmann and some of the people around him must have had considerable expertise in railroad transportation. How could they have been unaware of the existence of the railroad delousing tunnels and their potential for mass-murder?

The purpose of the delousing chambers was to save lives—and that is not denied except by the most passionate Exterminationist. No doubt, many hundreds of thousands of people, possibly millions, including countless Jews, owe their lives to these chambers and the German technology based upon Zyklon-B.

How could the same Germans—particularly, the SS and the people from DEGESCH—who used a highly developed technology to kill lice in order to save countless human lives have simultaneously tried to use a pathetically primitive technology, which could not have even worked in the manner alleged, to destroy millions of human lives? How could they have used well-designed gas chambers with circulation to try to save millions of people from typhus while at the same time trying to use badly designed chambers without circulation to kill millions of people? How could they have been using an advanced technology to save people who were in many cases the very same people, namely Jews, that they were simultaneously trying to kill but with the most primitive variations of the same technology?

There are no answers to these reasonable questions even after forty years nor are there ever likely to be any answers consistent with an extermination thesis. In the absence of any proof based upon forensic evidence of even one case of death by gassing with cyanide at the hands of the Germans or of any other reliable evidence—the "evidence," such as it is, consists almost exclusively of "confessions" and fantastic anecdotes of "survivors"—one should reject the "Holocaust" claims as self-serving propaganda. What is clear from any careful technical analysis of the supposed gas chambers for mass extermination is that the "Holocaust" story is absurd.

Appendix

Increased Use of Hydrocyanic Acid Delousing Chambers

Paper given at the Hydrocyanic Acid Conference
of the Labor Committee for Room Disinfestation and
Contagious Disease Prevention of January 27/28, 1944.

by

Emil Wüstinger, engineer
Frankfurt am Main

translated by F.P. Berg and E. Kniepkamp
from *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*,
Vol. 67 (1944) pp. 179-80.

In delousing chambers, for reasons which are easily understood because of their special function, one expects maximum performance with minimum gas concentration and penetration time. A penetration period of only one hour should have the same effect as a 16-, 20-, or 24-hour period during a room disinfestation. This is demanded because of the pressing need to process massive quantities.

Such requirements can only be met successfully, even with the highly effective hydrocyanic acid, when all of the conditions for fumigation are ideal, in other words when the following conditions exist: quickest possible release and distribution of the gas, sufficient airtightness of the room, good room temperature and proper arrangement of the articles to be fumigated within the chamber. On the basis of its collected experiences with its own fumigation chambers, the German Company for Pest Control, G.m.b.H. [DEGESCH] had already developed years ago special vaporizers (*Vergasergeräte*) and circulatory systems (*Kreislaufanordnungen*) which take into consideration all the requisites: fastest gas generation, best gas penetration and sufficient heating with simultaneous improvement in the ventilation piping.

After the first year of the war, during which a string of hydrocyanic acid facilities had been built in several regions and equipped with DEGESCH circulatory systems for Zyklon hydrocyanic acid [*Zyklon-Blausäure* or, as it is generally abbreviated, Zyklon-B]²⁶, some of which have already been used to delouse hundreds of thousands of pieces of clothing, there arose a significant increase in demand as even government bodies and industrial factories began to take stringent measures to control lice.

The motivation for the increased use of hydrocyanic acid delousing chambers arose primarily from an official government requirement that the large numbers of foreign workers who were being used had to be deloused periodically at prescribed intervals and, therefore, the factories which employed the largest numbers of foreign workers had to build their own delousing facilities.




Figure 1: Elevation drawing of a delousing chamber with a DEGESCH circulatory system (*DEGESCH-Kreislaufanordnung*).

This requirement was expanded by the official camp regulation from the Reich Minister of Labor which came into effect in the summer of 1943 regarding camp accommodations for workers for the duration of the war. Article 9 stipulates: "All rooms must be cleaned daily. The rooms and their inhabitants must be regularly examined for instances of vermin. Proper installations for the extermination of vermin must be available." [emphasis added]

Recently there have even been an increasing number of instances where hot air chambers were rebuilt in order to be adapted with hydrocyanic acid circulatory systems. Many other large disinfestation facilities in which only hot air has been used until now are being expanded with hydrocyanic acid chambers in order to fumigate equipment and clothing which could easily be damaged in hot-air chambers—for example, fur and leather goods.

One result of these measures and the favorable judgments about hydrocyanic acid chamber delousing is that there is a steady increase in demand for hydrocyanic acid installations so that in just the last year alone as many installations went into operation as in the first three years of the war put together.

For the entire war until now, at 226 different sites, a total of 552 chambers with hydrocyanic acid circulatory fumigation systems and an additional 100 or so chambers without such equipment, but using hydrocyanic acid nonetheless, are either completed or under construction almost exclusively for the purpose of delousing. 300 of these

chambers at 131 different facilities have been completed or are still under construction just since January of the past year alone. Almost one-fourth of these, i.e., 131 chambers, are distributed among government and administrative district labor offices, especially in the Alpine and Danube countries, as well as among city administrations and health departments. 249 hydrocyanic acid delousing chambers are either completed or under construction for the armaments industry.

And so, it becomes ever more apparent that the generally incorrect reservations which had been previously held against the use of highly toxic gases in delousing chambers have been thoroughly dispelled. This is illustrated by the fact that in just the last year alone as much hydrocyanic acid has been expended exclusively for the disinfection of articles in delousing chambers as had been used in all of Germany for large area disinfections in 1939. During the war the clothing and equipment of *approximately 25 million people* have already been fumigated with hydrocyanic acid. [emphasis added] Fortunately, there have been no reported accidents of a serious nature while working with Zyklon hydrocyanic acid [Zyklon-B] in the chambers equipped with circulatory systems.

Facilities employing circulatory systems are now being built so that they are suitable not just for the use of hydrocyanic acid but primarily for other evaporable liquids as well. Fortunately, these changes can be achieved without extensive modifications in the apparatus so that there is no increase in the already difficult procurement problems; although the DEGESCH circulatory systems could be delivered with relative ease during the first years of the war and, most important of all, could be delivered on short notice, increasing demands have also led to more and more procurement problems because of the fact that the increasing demands have to be surmounted by an ever decreasing number of workers. One should note at this point that hydrocyanic acid delousing chambers have the advantage over hot air chambers of reduced construction costs and, most important of all, require less iron and metal. Consequently, far fewer man-hours are needed for fabrication and so it should not be too surprising that the hydrocyanic acid chamber equipment which has already been installed has been built despite great difficulties by only a few companies with only a small number of workers. Of the manufacturers, one is specialized in the delivery of the blowers, air heaters, and piping and even installs the equipment. The other supplier manufactures the special appliance, the so-called four-way valve with a built-in can opener, which is the centerpiece of the entire system. This second factory usually had only two or three skilled workers available for these tasks who were not at all times capable of working because of physical disabilities.

Thanks to the many delousing facilities which are already in operation and to the other stringent preventive measures, it has been possible, fortunately, to reduce dramatically the number of cases of typhus and the mortality in stark contrast to the earlier years. Nonetheless, a

great many new facilities with fumigation chambers will be necessary just for delousing because the use of foreign workers and the crowding of these workers into common barracks is still increasing and, especially in the East, the number of hydrocyanic acid delousing chambers that are available is still far from sufficient.

The increasingly widespread, harmless application of hydrocyanic acid, in itself highly toxic, in delousing chambers equipped with DEGESCH circulatory systems is a good indication of the dependability of this method, which is generally regarded as one of the most effective delousing methods. This is also spelled out in a decree from the Reich Minister of the Interior.

Notes

1. A useful source of information about Dachau as it exists today and some of its post-war history is: Andrew Mollo, "Dachau," *After the Battle* (London: Battle of Britain Prints Ltd., 1980), Number 27, pp. 1-29.
2. Although the four delousing chambers are in the crematorium building and share a common roof and foundation, they are separated from the rest of the building by an open breezeway, i.e., a passageway extending from one side of the building through to the opposite side without any doors. The breezeway is a logical safety feature. If doors had been installed, an accidental accumulation of cyanide gas could have developed in the passageway since it was also adjacent to the hydrocyanic acid delousing chambers and could have eventually penetrated into other parts of the building injuring anyone present. This well thought-out arrangement contrasts sharply with the arrangement of the supposed gas chambers for mass-murder in Auschwitz which were far larger than the four delousing chambers at Dachau but, amazingly enough, had no comparable protection for the occupants of the buildings housing those chambers.
3. One excellent official source on the development of hydrocyanic acid, with many technical design details about the gas chambers themselves, is: Puntigam, Breymesser, and Bernfus, *Blausäuregaskammern zur Fleckfieberabwehr* [Hydrocyanic Acid Gas Chambers for the Prevention of Typhus] (Berlin: *Sonderveröffentlichung des Reichsarbeitsblattes*, 1943). There is nothing even remotely comparable in the English language to this classic work or to many other German works on this subject, many of which are listed in the extensive bibliography. That almost certainly applies to all other languages as well.
4. Thanks to the research of Dr. Robert Faurisson, a great deal of information about the chambers used in this country for the execution of criminals with cyanide and the detailed and complex procedures for such executions is available—some of which will be published shortly by this journal. The gas chambers for executing criminals in the USA still used, long after World War II, the so-called "pot" or "barrel" method to generate cyanide gas by dropping cyanide salt tablets into a pot of sulfuric acid. This method had generally been abandoned for industrial uses throughout most of the world, including the U.S.A., as soon as Zyklon-B became available in the early 1920's. A major drawback of the "pot" method, aside from the problem of disposing of a pot of sulfuric acid con-

taining cyanide, is that a significant amount of cyanide gas is absorbed by the liquid in the pot itself and then released, but only gradually, even after the rest of the chamber has been thoroughly vented. This is probably one of the main reasons why gas masks have to be worn in the gas chamber as part of the complex procedure for removing the body of an executed prisoner.

5. Dr. Gerhard Peters and Emil Wüstinger, "Sach-Entlausung in Blausäure-Kammern," *Zeitschrift für hygienische Zoologie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1940) Heft 10/11, p. 194.
6. Dr. Gerhard Peters, "Die hochwirksamen Gase und Dämpfe in der Schädlingsbekämpfung [The Highly Effective Gases and Vapors in the Field of Pest Control]," *Sammlung chemischer und chemisch-technischer Vorträge* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1942), Neue Folge: Heft 47a, p. 40.
7. By 1944 Zyklon was being supplied to Auschwitz without the warning ingredient but the reason for this exceptional practice was a supply shortage rather than any desire, as alleged by Exterminationists, to deceive potential murder victims. One cause of considerable concern to some of the German technicians at the time was that since the warning ingredient also contributed to the chemical stability of the Zyklon-B, its removal could present a serious hazard to the end-user. One result of the removal of the warning ingredient seems to have been the shortening of the shelf-life of even properly sealed cans of Zyklon-B.
8. Peters was put on trial in 1949 for complicity in the extermination of the Jews but was given only a five-year jail sentence. After a second retrial he was found not guilty in 1955. His colleague Dr. Bruno Tesch, who had shared the distribution rights for Zyklon-B, was put on trial earlier and executed by the British. Throughout the 1930's and until the end of the war, Peters probably wrote more articles than anyone else on the effectiveness of Zyklon-B for the prevention of disease, especially typhus.
9. Dr. Gerhard Peters, "Blausäure zur Schädlingsbekämpfung [Hydrocyanic Acid for Pest Control]," *Sammlung chemischer und chemisch-technischer Vorträge* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1933), Neue Folge—Heft 20, p. 64. Although this work contains no discussion of the delousing chambers—patents for the standard versions were granted in Germany only after 1938—the article does contain an artist's rendering of a railroad fumigation tunnel for hydrocyanic acid on page 41.
10. Peters and Wüstinger, "Sach-Entlausung in Blausäure-Kammern," p. 196. The term "D" refers to the fresh-air inlet just as in the diagram referred to by Wüstinger in "Increased Use of Hydrocyanic Acid."
11. Peters, "Die hochwirksamen Gase," pp. 36-41.
12. A.R. Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century* (Torrance: Institute for Historical Review, 1976) p. 191 or Andrew Mollo, p. 17.
13. It was sometimes recommended that the air-gas mixture be heated to at least ten degrees above the boiling point of hydrocyanic acid in order to compensate for the cooling through evaporation of the liquid hydrocyanic acid. Heating was especially critical for the venting phase when large amounts of cold air were drawn into the chambers. In hot summer months this heating process was not always essential but of course during the rest of the year, especially during a Polish or German winter, when typhus was generally most prevalent, it was essential. The absence of any provision for heating of the air-gas mixture in the alleged gas chambers for mass-murder is further evidence that the claim is a lie.

14. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung m.b.H., *Zyklon for Pest Control* (Frankfurt a. M.: DEGESCH, undated), p. 21.
15. From the context, it is quite clear that the expression "circulatory device" is a translation of *Kreislaufanordnung* which I prefer to translate as "circulatory system" just as it was translated for Wüstinger's article.
16. Puntigam, Breymesser & Bernfus, p. 33.
17. According to the present-day Auschwitz authorities, this gas chamber had supposedly been disguised as a mortuary (*Leichenkeller*) until late 1942 but was rebuilt subsequently to serve as a bomb shelter by subdividing the room with interior walls. After the war, the room was "restored" by removing the interior walls except for a portion needed to retain an anteroom next to a door to the outside. In a similar manner, the supposed gas chambers in Krematoria 2 and 3 at Birkenau were supposedly disguised as mortuaries when they were built in 1943. Although they were intended originally to serve as mortuaries, they seem to have been modified to serve as bomb shelters also. This is consistent with a surprising passage in Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, *Auschwitz* (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett, 1960), p. 97 in which the author describes a brief stay, probably during August or September of 1944, in the "gas chamber" when it was serving, at least temporarily, as a bomb shelter during an Allied bombing raid. In other words, at least one of the four gas chambers at Birkenau supposedly did double-duty; on the one hand, it served as a gas chamber to kill 3,000 people every day while at the same time being available as a bomb shelter—fantastico!
18. Filip Müller, *Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers* (New York: Stein & Day, 1979), pp. 60-1.
19. This remark about "gas crystals" already shows that Müller has no idea as to what he is writing about even though he supposedly worked in the gas chambers for three years. He seems to be confusing Zyklon-B granules with mothballs which do sublimate to a gas directly from the solid state. Zyklon is quite different.
20. Dr. Ludwig Gassner, "Verkehrshygiene und Schädlingsbekämpfung [Transportation Hygiene and Disinfestation]," *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*, Vol. 66 (1943) Heft 15, pp. 174-76.
21. To those readers who believe it would have been far more difficult to ventilate a freight car filled with dead bodies as compared with a passenger car containing upholstery and intricate paneling and cabinet work, I suggest that anyone using the railroad delousing tunnels for mass-murder would have been able to provide additional ventilation time simply by pulling out any railroad car filled with dead bodies and parking it somewhere on a railroad siding. Furthermore, the movement of such a railroad car, perhaps to a site some distance away for the disposal of the corpses, would in itself have provided additional ventilation in fresh air before anyone would have had to come into direct contact with corpses containing potentially hazardous amounts of cyanide.
22. Peters, "Die hochwirksamen Gase und Dämpfe in der Schädlingsbekämpfung," p. 52. One can also see on pp. 51-4 photographs of some of the other large fumigation chambers, also known as "tunnels," for disinfesting railroad trains which also used the circulatory (*Kreislauf*) principal with powerful blowers and heaters. In Romania there was at least one railroad disinfesting chamber with an internal volume of 1500 cubic meters—see p. 54.

23. Hans Zinsser, *Rats, Lice and History* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 213.
24. Only one of many articles from the German literature is: Dr. Joseph Rupert, "Gesundheitsverhältnisse und Seuchenbekämpfung im Generalgouvernement [Sanitary Conditions and Contagious Disease Control in the Generalgouvernement]," *Der praktische Desinfektor*, Vol. 33 (Berlin: Hygiene Verlag Erich Deleiter, July 1941) Heft 7, pp. 72-3.
25. R. Queisner, "Erfahrungen mit Blausäure bei Grossraumentwesungen [Experiences with Hydrocyanic Acid in the Fumigation of Large Areas]," *Zeitschrift für hygienische Zoologie und Schädlingsbekämpfung*, Vol. 36 (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1944), pp. 130-37. The title of the article is preceded by the note that the article was taken from the exterminator school (*Desinfektorenschule*) of the Waffen-SS in Oranienburg, near Berlin, with the name of the director: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. H. Grundlach. Grundlach is identified in the Gerstein statement as the man who made murderous experiments on women in Ravensbrueck.
26. Some readers may object to the claim that Zyklon-B was an abbreviation for Zyklon-Blausäure. Although the "B" may have originally been intended merely to reflect a sequential numbering of another "Zyklon" product since there had been a Zyklon-A until about 1920 and even a Zyklon-C for a brief period, by at least the beginning of World War II the German literature used the terms "Zyklon," "Zyklon-B" and "Zyklon-Blausäure" interchangeably. The longest form was used least often and generally only at the beginning of a piece of text in order to identify clearly the principle ingredient. The fact that Zyklon-B and Zyklon-Blausäure are synonymous is also shown by the fact that in German both terms are almost always hyphenated.

The Origins of the Second World War

GEORG FRANZ-WILLING

[Paper Presented to the Seventh International Revisionist Conference]

I. Historical Development from the Nineteenth Century to the First World War

In 1955, the Indian diplomat and historian K. M. Panikkar, a longtime friend and collaborator of Pandit Nehru, the Indian prime minister, published a book entitled *Asia and Western Dominance 1498-1945*. He shows Western dominance of Asia as beginning with the Portuguese Vasco da Gama's discovery of the maritime route to India, and ending with the Second World War. The two world wars of the first half of the 20th century he justly describes as a European civil war. By this self-mutilation, Europe lost its position in the world, its hegemony, and caused itself to be divided into two spheres of influence: one American, and one Russian.¹

One can only understand the origins, progress, and results of the Second World War if, like Panikkar, one considers both world wars as constituting one homogeneous, inwardly coherent era.

The immediate roots of the Second World War lie in the termination of the First World War by the so-called "suburban treaties" of Paris in 1919.

The deeper causes of both world wars have to be sought in the industrialization of our mode of life, and in the capitalistic imperialism of the second half of the 19th century. The upheaval in economy and society caused by new technology, modern means of communication and transport, and the rapid growth of the European population led to the development of the modern capitalist economy.

Great Britain was the birthplace and starting point of the process of industrialization. It became the world's department store. The British imported raw materials from their colonies and delivered the finished products all over the world.

India, the main competitor to Britain's textile industry, was forcibly reduced to a colony producing only raw materials. France, the most dangerous enemy of British colonialism, had been weakened during the coalition wars against Napoleon, until finally England's naval hegemony was secured by Nelson's victory over the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1805.

The British Empire was undoubtedly the leading power of the world throughout the 19th century. Up to the outbreak of the First World War, it was the leading industrial nation and the most important financial, as well as maritime and naval power.² The European balance of power, the foundation of British rule around the world, had been re-established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This system of peace following the Napoleonic Wars broke down with the Crimean War (1853-1856).³ At that time Great Britain and France declared war on tsarist Russia because of its attack on the decrepit Turkish Empire and defeated the Russians soundly. Then, with the national unification of Italy and the foundation of the Second German Reich after the victorious war against France in 1870-71, a new system of states suddenly developed in Europe. By uniting the south and central German states with Prussia, Bismarck shaped the Second German Reich.

Between 1850 and 1870, the European continent, as well as North America, completed the transition to an industrial mode of living. The United States carried out the process of industrialization at the same rate as the leading industrial nations of Europe, which were at that time Great Britain and France. The Civil War of 1861-1865, with the defeat of the Confederate States, saved the large American Union and secured its way to becoming an industrial world power—a portentous event for the development of Europe and the world.⁴ It was at this same time that East Asia was forcibly opened up by the two Anglo-Saxon world powers and France. After the bloody suppression of the Sepoy revolt from 1857 to 1859, the English made India into a crown colony and made it the heart of the British Empire.⁵ By Admiral Perry's 1853 expedition, the Americans forced Japan to abandon its policy of isolation,⁶ and with the beginning of the Meiji period in 1868, Japan's adoption of the new industrial economy took hold with ever-increasing speed. In the same way, China, the country with the world's largest population, was forcibly joined to the Anglo-Saxon economic system by the peace treaty of Peking in 1860, which had been preceded by the British Opium Wars (1840-1860). France had been involved in these wars too. The Chinese Empire was thus degraded to a semi-colony.⁷

In the seventies, capitalist imperialism set in, starting from England, as a competition of powers now borne on the wings of tech-

nology. World economy, as it was developed radiating from Great Britain, involved, and still involves, the drive to world hegemony through the struggle to dominate resources and markets. In this competition for global rule, the British Empire was to a great extent in the lead. From this largest commonwealth in human history, stretching over five continents, capitalist imperialism ever widened its orbit of power.

Runners-up were the United States and (especially on the European mainland) the German Reich. Germany's industry took off at a breath-taking rate. Between 1870 and 1890, German inventive genius, German organization, diligence, and competence shaped the newly unified German Reich into the leading industrial power of the European continent, and in English eyes, made it a bothersome competitor. In 1887, the British government enacted the Trade Marks Act, requiring any German product coming onto the British world market to bear the mark "Made in Germany." This measure soon boomeranged, however. For the consumer, "Made in Germany" became the sign of the better, while at the same time the less costly, product.

German competition grew irresistibly. In the fields of iron and steel production and in the chemical industries, Germany outdistanced its British competitor by the turn of the century. To this were added the growth of merchant shipping, and later, the navy. In the eighties, the German Reich acquired protectorates or colonies in Africa. In the nineties, a number of islands in the Pacific were added. On the coast of China, Germany acquired Kiaochow with its capital Tsingtao by a lease treaty in 1897.

As Germany's industrial and financial power as well as its trade increased, a growing antagonism between Germany and the British Empire arose. Everywhere the ambitious German industry confronted a British competitor avidly observing the growing danger to his monopolistic trade relations, jealously guarded until then. A 1910 conversation between Lord Balfour, leader of the British Conservative Party, and Henry White, then United States Ambassador in London, shows the contrast between the two European industrial powers, and the attitude of the British leadership:⁸

Balfour: We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our trade.

White: You are a very high-minded man in private life. How can you possibly contemplate anything so politically immoral as provoking a war against a harmless nation which has as good a right to a navy as you have? If you wish to compete with German trade, work harder.

Balfour: That would mean lowering our standard of living. Perhaps it would be simpler for us to have a war.

White: I am shocked that you of all men should enunciate such principles.

Balfour: Is it a question of right or wrong? Maybe it is just a question of keeping our supremacy.

In connection with this conversation, General Wedemeyer calls attention to a statement by the British military historian, General J. F.C. Fuller:⁹

Fuller remarks with reference to this recorded conversation that its interest does not lie simply in the evidence it affords of Balfour's unprincipled cynicism. Its significance lies in the fact that 'the Industrial Revolution has led to the establishment of an economic struggle for existence in which self-preservation dictated a return to the ways of the jungle. The primeval struggle between nation and nation in which all competitors were beasts.'

Naturally, the rapid growth of Germany's population, economy, and its military potential was a thorn in the sides of its neighbors on the continent. France had never overcome the defeat of 1870 and thirsted for revenge. Russia, the largest land power and main enemy of the British Empire throughout the 19th century (especially in Asia), had lost the Crimean War in 1856, and had to withdraw in the face of British power after a second, victorious war against the Turkish Empire, for fear of another military confrontation with England.

The Berlin Congress of 1878, which was dominated by Bismarck, rearranged affairs in the Balkans. By his supreme statesmanship, the chancellor managed to avoid another war between Russia, the largest land power, and England, the largest sea power. From then on, however, the relationship between Russia and Germany deteriorated. Inspired by the pan-slavic tendencies then prevailing in the tsar's empire, a sinister watch-word came to the fore: "On to Vienna through Berlin!" In the same way as it tried to divide up the Turkish Empire, Russian imperialist policy sought to dismember the Habsburg Monarchy, which included a number of different peoples. Russia wanted to place them all under the religious rule of the tsar as protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. Diplomatically speaking, that meant nothing less than the integration of Bulgaria and Serbia into the Russian monarchy, as well as that of all the West and South Slavic peoples. After Japan defeated Russia in Asia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which ended with a peace brought about by the American President Theodore Roosevelt, the Russian expansionist policy then changed its aim and turned again to the Balkans.

In 1914, Serbia unleashed the fury of war, as the Austrian heir apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife were both murdered by Serbian terrorists. The murders had been organized by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrevic, chief of the intelligence department of the Serbian General Staff, while the Russian military attaché in Belgrade, Colonel Artamanov, financed them.¹⁰ In addition, the Serbian government had received an assurance of support from the Russian government in case of an Austrian attack on Serbia. Thus tsarist Russia bears the main responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. Russia encouraged Serbia to war, and on July 25 the Russian Privy Council decided on a partial mobilization of the Western provinces adjacent to Austria-Hungary and Germany.¹¹

Russia had been allied with France since 1892; France had connected herself with England in 1904 by the "Entente Cordiale," and Russia had made an agreement with England in 1907. The encirclement of the two Central Powers—Germany and Austria—was complete. Italy was an unreliable ally of the Central Powers; but it was only the British declaration of war against Germany on August 4, 1914, that enlarged the European conflict into a world war. Following the 27th of July, the British navy was the first force to fully mobilize.¹²

Two years before the outbreak of that war, convinced of the inevitability of war between England and Germany, the American author Homer Lea (1876-1912) wrote in his book *The Day of the Saxon*:¹³

The German Empire is less in area than the single state of Texas, while the Saxon race claims political dominion over half of the landed surface of the earth and over all its ocean wastes. Yet the German Empire possesses a greater revenue than the American Republic, is the richest nation in productivity and possesses a population 50 percent greater than the United Kingdom. Its actual military power is manifoldly greater than that of the entire Saxon race. Germany is so tightly encircled by the Saxon race that it cannot make even a tentative extension of its territory or political sovereignty over non-Saxon states without endangering the integrity of the Saxon world. Germany cannot move against France without involving or including in its downfall that of the British Empire. It cannot move against Denmark on the North, Belgium and the Netherlands on the West or Austria-Hungary on the South without involving the British nation in a final struggle for Saxon political existence. Any extension of German sovereignty over these non-British states predetermines the political dissolution of the British Empire. In a like manner any extension of Teutonic sovereignty in the western hemisphere, though against a non-Saxon race and remote from the territorial integrity of the American Republic, can only succeed in the destruction of American power in the western hemisphere.

The founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, said about the causes of the First World War: "We know that three robbers (the bourgeoisie and the governments of England, tsarist Russia and France) prepared to plunder Germany."¹⁴

Germany faced the Triple Entente of the British Empire, France, and Russia, while its own allies—Austria-Hungary, the Turkish Empire, and, since 1915, Bulgaria, were all weak and in need of support. Italy, which had originally been allied with the two Central Powers, remained at first neutral and then entered the war on the side of the Entente.

Despite the unequal distribution of forces, the military ability and economic competence of Germany, as well as the spirit of sacrifice and endurance shown by its people, proved so strong that Germany's eastern enemy, Russia, collapsed in the spring of 1917. In March 1918, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Empire had to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk dictated by the victorious Central Powers.

Fate seemed to have decided in favor of the Central Powers. The Western allies were facing the necessity of a compromise settlement of peace. In order to avoid that, England then entangled the United States in the war.

After the outbreak of war in 1914, the U.S.A. provided the Entente with ammunition, arms, and other war material, thus committing an open breach of its neutrality. Most of this traffic in arms was conducted by the Morgan banking company. To secure its arms manufacturers' profits, the U.S.A. had to enter the war as an active participant, thereby losing its position as a neutral mediator.

The decisive influence in winning the Wilson Administration over to war was that of the Zionists. England had won their help by promising to establish a national home for Jews in Palestine if Jews exercised their influence in Washington in favor of an active American military intervention in the European war. The decision was facilitated by the fact that their kinsmen were able to seize power in Russia in 1917 by the Bolshevik revolution after the downfall of the anti-semitic tsarist regime. The United States declared war upon the Central Powers on April 6, 1917; on November 2, 1917 the British Foreign Secretary handed over to Baron Rothschild a government statement concerning the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine.¹⁵

II. The "Suburban Treaties" of Paris

It was the intervention of the United States which decided the war in favor of the Entente, because of America's immense military potential and its fresh troops. In October 1918 the last Imperial government of the German Reich asked Wilson, the American president, to mediate talks regarding an armistice and eventually a peace treaty, based on the "Fourteen Points" he had proclaimed earlier. The Western Allies, however, did not adhere to these "Fourteen Points." Thus, they broke the preliminary contract, whose validity was emphasized by American politicians and presidential advisors like Bernard Baruch and John Foster Dulles. According to Baruch, the President had refused "to accept measures which clearly do not respond to the motions we had persuaded the enemy to agree to and of which we may not change anything, just because we are powerful enough to do that."¹⁶ At Versailles, Baruch was Wilson's advisor in financial affairs. Similarly, the South African prime minister, General Smuts, in his letter to the American president dated May 30, 1919, pointed out the obligations the Western Allies accepted in the preliminary treaty, which they did not honor. President Wilson, however, was not able to defend his point of view against the Western Powers, since he was severely ill.¹⁷

Wilson had induced the German people to capitulate and overthrow the monarchy by the promise, soon to be broken, of a peace without annexations and indemnities. Capitulation and revolution delivered

the German Empire to the mercy of the vengeful victors. Germany was not allowed to take part in the peace negotiations; the victors alone decided the conditions of peace, in a procedure without precedent in European history. On May 7, 1919, the peace conditions were handed over to the German peace delegation. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, foreign secretary and leader of the delegation, pointed out in his speech before the delegates of the Western Allies and their associates:¹⁸

. . . We know the impact of the hate we are encountering here, and we have heard the passionate demand of the victors, who require us, the defeated, to pay the bill and plan to punish us as the guilty party. We are asked to confess ourselves the sole culprits; in my view, such a confession would be a lie . . .

By these words the foreign secretary refused to accept article 231 of the peace treaty, the so-called war-guilt article, the lie which claimed that Germany was solely responsible for the war and could therefore be made responsible for all the havoc wrought by the war. The victors threatened that if the German government didn't sign the treaty, they would invade Germany proper. Indignation in the Weimar National Assembly was general, and the climate of opinion favored rejection. The Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann, who had proclaimed the German Republic on 9 November 1918, and was prime minister of the first republican government elected by the National Assembly, declared: "I ask you, who as an honest man—not even as a German, simply as an honest man feeling himself bound by contracts, is able to accept such conditions? Which hand would not wither, should it be bound in such chains? In the government's view, this treaty is unacceptable."¹⁹ Scheidemann, as well as Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, resigned under protest. Important German-Jewish economic leaders, namely Walther Rathenau and the Hamburg banker Max Warburg, took a firm stand against accepting the dictate of the victors and called for a refusal, even against the odds of an enemy invasion of Germany.²⁰ The National Assembly, however, did not have the courage to maintain such a position, and under protest, voted acceptance of the Versailles dictate. It was on June 28, 1919, the date fixed by the victorious powers, that the National Assembly's plenipotentiaries had to sign that treaty. The date had been chosen as a reminder of the murder at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

Connected with the "war guilt article" were the punitive regulations of sections 227-231, referring to the surrender of "war criminals" to the victors, the most prominent "criminal" on the lists being the German emperor, who had fled to the Netherlands. Since the Dutch government declined to extradite the emperor, the planned trial did not take place. The German government refused to hand over other prominent German leaders to the victors, and passed an act concerning prosecution of war crimes.

One of the inhuman conditions of capitulation was the hunger blockade against Germany, which was continued by French demand until the Versailles Treaty came into force in January 1920.

Because of its long-term effects, the hunger blockade imposed by the British was more decisive in defeating the Central Powers than was wartime military pressure. The number of deaths due to hunger and malnutrition is estimated at 800,000 for 1919 alone. A committee of American women traveling through Germany by order of Herbert Hoover, chief of war relief and later president, reported in July 1919, "If the conditions continue which we have seen in Germany, a generation will grow up in Central Europe which will be physically and psychologically disabled, so that it will become a danger for the whole of the world."²¹

Adolf Hitler, then an unknown soldier, experienced the famine which lasted throughout the war and in those early postwar years. His political program was born of those experiences, particularly his idea of conquering Ukraine for the German people. Conquering the fertile regions of southern Russia could provide not only living space for the German people; it could ban forever the possibility of another hunger blockade.

Hitler experienced the Revolution of November 1918 lying wounded in a military hospital. He became a passionate enemy of the November Revolution and of the "Soviet Republic" in the Bavarian capital of Munich during April 1919, a political coup staged chiefly by Jews and directed by Lenin's radio commands from Moscow. Hitler became a member of the then totally unimportant "Deutsche Arbeiterpartei" (German Worker's Party) founded in January of that same year, and he soon proved to be a brilliant orator. His main topic was the Versailles dictate, which he saw as closely connected with the November revolution and the mischievous revolutionary activities of the Jews. As a German of the late Habsburg Monarchy, he was a fanatic supporter of a union of the Austrian Germans with the German Reich. The main focuses of his political activity were the fight against the peace dictate, the Marxist-Communist threat with the leading role of the Jews in the revolt, and the fight for self-determination and equality of rights for the German people.²²

The overthrow of the monarchy, the change from an empire to a republic, as well as the capitulation, had been sparked by President Wilson's third note, dated October 23, 1918. The National Assembly, which began sitting in January 1919, was determined to shape the new state and government according to the Western example, as the victors had wished. By the peace dictate, however, the Allies had sentenced the Weimar Republic to death even before the new constitution had been ratified by the National Assembly. On June 28, 1919, the German government signed the Versailles dictate; the new constitution came into force on the 11th of August, burdened with the curse of the Versailles treaty and its unrealizable demands. The miserable end of

the Weimar Republic, "the freest democracy of the world," and its result, Hitler's dictatorship, were consequences of the Versailles dictate. The victors had won the war but lost the peace by their treaty.

The most important stipulations of the dictate of Versailles were as follows: The German Reich had to cede 73,485 square kilometers, inhabited by 7,325,000 persons, to neighboring states. Before the war it had possessed 540,787 square kilometers and 67,892,000 inhabitants; after the war, 467,301 square kilometers and 59,036,000 inhabitants remained. Germany lost 75% of its yearly production of zinc ore, 74.8% of iron ore, 7.7% of lead ore, 28.7% of coal, and 4% of potash. Of its yearly agricultural production, Germany lost 19.7% in potatoes, 18.2% in rye, 17.2% in barley, 12.6% in wheat, and 9.6% in oats.

The Saar territory and other regions to the west of the Rhine were occupied by foreign troops and were to remain so for fifteen years, with Cologne, Mainz, and Coblenz as bridgeheads. The costs of the occupation, 3,640,000,000 gold marks, had to be paid by the German Reich. Germany was not allowed to station troops or build fortifications to the west of the Rhine and in a fifty-kilometer zone to the east.

Germany was forced to disarm almost completely, the conditions calling for: abolition of the general draft, prohibition of all heavy arms (artillery and tanks), a volunteer army of only 100,000 troops and officers restricted to long-term enlistments; reduction of the navy to six capital ships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, twelve torpedo-boats, 15,000 men and 500 officers. An air force was absolutely prohibited. The process of disarmament was overseen by an international military committee until 1927. Additionally, all German rivers had to be internationalized and overseas cables ceded to the victors.

The economic conditions of the Versailles treaty were as follows: After the delivery of the navy, the merchant ships had to be handed over as well, with only a few exceptions. Germany was deprived of all her foreign accounts—private ones too—and lost her colonies. For a period of ten years, Germany had to supply France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy with 40 million tons of coal per year, and had to deliver machines, factory furnishings, tools and other materials for the restoration of devastated areas in Belgium and the North of France. In regard to the hunger blockade, which continued until January 1920, a special hardship on the German people was the forced delivery of German cattle to the victors for breeding and slaughtering purposes.

The Versailles Treaty did not contain any limitation on the victors' financial demands, in order to facilitate additional demands. In 1920, the Western allies fixed the amount of reparations first at a sum of 269 billions of gold marks; then, in 1921, at 132 billions—both unrealistic demands. France made use of this opportunity by occupying additional German cities. This policy of blackmail culminated in the inva-

sion of the Ruhr territory by French and Belgian military units in January, 1923. In this way, France hoped to accomplish the disintegration of the German Reich, and to establish the Rhine as France's eastern frontier. Thereafter, the French occupation forces accelerated inflation in the occupied zones by confiscating the presses for printing bank notes, and produced money in unprecedented amounts. It was thus that France promoted high inflation until the breakdown of German currency.²³

The French government, however, did not achieve its goal. Even its British and Italian allies condemned the French attack on the Ruhr as an open breach of the Versailles treaty. The paralysis of the German economy resulting from inflation, combined with passive resistance, forced the United States to abandon its policy of isolation and to concentrate on regulation of the war debts.

The Habsburg Empire, the second strongest of the Central Powers, was destroyed and divided up by the victors. Serbia and Romania were amply rewarded with substantial enlargements of territory, since they had sided with the Western Allies. Serbia swallowed its Croatian, Slovenian, and Montenegrin neighbors to become the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and Romania received the eastern part of the former Hungarian Monarchy. The victors established another new state, especially favored by President Wilson, and which up to then had been unknown in European history, namely, Czechoslovakia. This new Czechoslovakia became the heir of the monarchy of Bohemia-Moravia, formerly belonging to the western half of the Habsburg monarchy, and of old Slovakia, then part of Hungary. Because the Czech leaders Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, had given false data to the victors, the Czechs, forming only 44% of the population of the new state, were allowed to rule over the other 56% of the population, consisting of 23% Germans, 18% Slovaks, 5% Magyars, 3.8% Ukrainians, 1.3% Jews and 0.6% Poles. The Sudeten Germans were the largest minority, numbering 3.5 million persons, followed by the Slovaks, numbering 2.5 million, who had only agreed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak state after they had been promised full autonomy. This promise was broken. Also, Italy was ceded the German South Tyrol.²⁴

At their national assembly in Vienna in November 1918, the Germans of the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire had decided to join themselves to the German Reich. The Weimar National Assembly had agreed to annex the 10 million Germans of the western half of the Danube Empire. The victors, however, denied the German people their right of self-determination, forcing 3.5 million Sudeten Germans under Czech rule, and compelling the Austrian Germans to establish an "independent" republic with Vienna as its capital. The truncated Austrian state was burdened with the peace dictate of St. Germain,²⁵ a treaty as hard and humiliating as that of Versailles. Hungary, the Eastern part of the Habsburg Monarchy, reduced to one-third of its

former territory due to its losses in favor of Romania, Serbia, and Czechoslovakia, was forced to sign an equally harsh treaty at Trianon.

Poland, newly founded as a monarchy in 1916 after its liberation from Russia rule by German troops, became a republic and was greatly enlarged at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary. From the Habsburg Empire, Poland received Galicia and Cracow; Germany had to renounce her rights to West Prussia, Posen, and the eastern part of Upper Silesia. The German city of Danzig was separated from the Reich and put under the administration of the League of Nations as a so-called "free city." The "Polish Corridor" separated East Prussia from the rest of the Reich so that this Prussian province was inaccessible to officials except by sea.

This sadistic fixing of frontiers was due mainly to French influence. The French commander-in-chief, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, declared that in twenty years a new war was inevitable. To hold Germany down permanently, France devised a system of treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Britain's Prime Minister David Lloyd George disapproved of the imposition of the new German-Polish frontiers,²⁶ but the British government did nothing to prevent it. General Henry Allen, the commander-in-chief of the American occupation forces of the Rhine, also spoke strongly against such "wrong policy."²⁷

When seen from a global point of view, the most imminent result of the First World War was the victory of the United States of America. The first stage of the European civil war had resulted in a decrease of European power and brought about America's rise to the world's leading power, as well as the determining factor in the fate of Europe. Certainly the two Western colonial powers of Great Britain and France had reached their greatest territorial extension overseas as well as their climax of power in Europe with the defeat of Germany, the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the division of the Turkish Empire; but they had been able to win only by the help of an extra-European power, and they had thereby become America's debtors. The British Empire, which up to then had been the main representative of European power overseas, as well as the main financial and naval power, had by war's end become dependent on its North American "junior partner." By the agreement reached at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, London had to share its naval rule with the U.S.A. and grant America equality of rights on the seas.

Because he was afflicted with paralysis, President Wilson was not able in 1918 and 1919 to realize the ideals based on his "Fourteen Points." The peace treaties were thus distorted by French and English hatred and vengeance, endangering the peace after they had won the war with American help.²⁸ The American president was able to effect the creation of the League of Nations, envisioned as a world government peacefully regulating disputes among peoples, but an

isolationist majority in Congress prevented American membership in the League, as well as rejecting ratification of the Versailles treaty. In 1921, the U.S.A. and Germany signed a separate peace agreement securing all the advantages of the Versailles treaty for the U.S.A. However, the attempt to withdraw into isolation was a grave mistake, as well as an evasion of responsibility, for Europe had neither been able to end the war on its own or to reach a compromise peace. Thus the main responsibility for the subsequent development of European history falls on the United States.

Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, Papal Secretary of State, declared that the forced peace of Versailles was unacceptable. The name of God had been excluded from it, and from it not only one, but ten wars would originate.²⁹ Lenin, the atheist founder of the Soviet Union, said about the dictate of Versailles:³⁰

An atrocious peace, making slaves out of millions of highly civilized people. That is no peace; those are conditions dictated to a helpless victim by robbers with knives in their hands.

George Kennan, the well-known American diplomat and historian, judged:³¹

In this way, the pattern of the events that led the Western world to new disaster in 1939 was laid down in its entirety by the Allied governments in 1918-19. What we shall have to observe from here on, in the relations between Russia, Germany and the West, follows a logic as inexorable as that of any Greek tragedy.

III. The Period between the Wars

Since the Allied powers depended upon Germany's reparation payments to repay their debts to the U.S.A., the American government in 1924 regulated the reparations problem with a payment plan named for the American financier Charles Dawes. The Dawes Plan was based on the principle of changing political guilt into commercial debt. Accordingly, American loans, mainly short-term ones, poured into the German economy. Germany could only meet the victors' reparation claims by a surplus resulting from increased exports. Since many states pursued a policy of enacting protective tariffs to restrict German competition, a new payment plan had to be arranged in 1928, the so-called Young Plan, named after the American banker Owen Young.

According to the Young Plan, the German Reich would pay reparations until 1988, while at the same time having to pay interest on and amortize the mainly short-term private loans. However, the shattering 1929 Wall Street crash and the ensuing crisis of world economy rendered the Young Plan absurd before it came into force. By 1931 mass employment and a decrease in the gross national product stemming from the Wall Street crash led to German insolvency and moved

Hindenburg, then president of the German Reich, to write to President Hoover asking for a moratorium. In July 1932 the Conference of Lausanne ended German reparation payments by fixing a final payment of three billion gold marks. The German Reich had altogether paid 53.155 billion gold marks in reparations, including contributions in kind.

The German economy had still to meet interest obligations deriving from Germany's enormous foreign debt. In the spring of 1933, after political leadership had changed simultaneously in the U.S.A. and in Germany, the influence of Jewish and Socialist emigrants from Germany caused relations between the two countries to deteriorate. At first, both President Roosevelt and the Hitler government countered identical domestic problems of economic depression and mass unemployment by state work programs: the New Deal in the USA; the Four Year Plan in Germany. Shortly after his inauguration in 1933, Roosevelt announced a large-scale naval rearmament program and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the hope of fostering trade relations which could boost American industry.³² One year later, the Soviet Union was accepted as a member of the League of Nations, another augury of the anti-German coalition of the Second World War.

After the nationalist parties' seizure of power in Germany, resulting after one-and-a-half years in Hitler's autocratic rule, based on a mass-movement, all the victor states of the First World War talked of a future war. It was not Hitler who wanted the war, but rather his internal and external enemies. Shortly after Hitler's rise to power, the Polish government suggested a preventive war against Germany to its French ally.³³ In March 1933, the international Jewish leadership decreed a propaganda and economic war on Germany, linked to a boycott of German products. During his journey to America in May 1933, Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank, found the atmosphere hostile. When his talks with President Roosevelt concerning regulation of German debts took a friendly turn, Schacht explained to Roosevelt that Germany could meet its obligations to American private creditors only if Germany were given the opportunity to increase its exports. This, however, did not jibe with the international boycott movement organized by the Jews, which sought a speedy overthrow of the Hitler government. During his stay in America, Schacht was also told that Paris nursed exceedingly anti-German sentiments and that people were saying that Germany should be divided up in order to accomplish what had been neglected in Versailles.³⁴

Schacht managed to render the boycott useless, however, and he made Germany economically independent by signing the clearing agreements. The Four-Year Plan proved to be a success, and the Hitler government managed to get nearly all the jobless into some kind of employment by the end of 1937. At the same time, the American New Deal failed. After that, Roosevelt changed his policy

to one favoring intervention. He introduced it by his "Quarantine" speech dating from October 1937, directed against Japan but also against Germany and Italy.³⁵

For the ambitious Roosevelt, a large-scale war could help in solving his domestic problems by absorbing the unemployed through an armament boom, as well as subsequently bringing to pass the "American Century" through his leadership of a world government. He favored turmoil in Europe, and through his Ambassador, Anthony Biddle, he influenced the Polish government not to enter into negotiations with Germany.³⁶ When, in 1938, the German people realized the right of self-determination by merging Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich according to the decisions of the Munich conference of September 1938, Roosevelt protested against the Western powers' acceptance of Germany's rightful claims. The Munich agreement, involving Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy, was the *last independent decision* in Europe, uninfluenced by either America or Russia. Therefore, President Roosevelt declared it a capitulation to Hitler, and brought pressure on the Western powers and Poland to offer stiff resistance to Germany.³⁷ Roosevelt and Stalin had equal interests in the outbreak of a war in Europe, each of them nursing his own dream of a world domination; Roosevelt as president of a world government in the form of the United Nations, Stalin as dictator of a Communist world empire.³⁸

IV. The Outbreak of the Second World War

The problem of inducing the enemy to fire the first shot in order to be able to brand him the aggressor was easier in the German-Polish confrontation than it was to be two years later in the conflict between Japan and the U.S.A. The Polish, influenced by the American administration and relying on their alliance with Great Britain and France, reacted to the last German peace proposal with a general mobilization. Thus they forced the German government's hand. According to Frederick the Great of Prussia, "The attacker is the one who forces his adversary to attack." Thanks to the treason of Herwarth von Bittenfeld, then secretary to the German embassy in Moscow, President Roosevelt knew of the German-Russian secret treaty of August 23, 1939 even before Hitler could inform his ally. Roosevelt, however, did not inform the Polish government of this intelligence, since he, like Stalin, wanted war.³⁹

The Soviet dictator signed the treaty with Hitler in order to cause war between the capitalist states. It was his aim to intervene after the capitalist powers were exhausted. In this way he intended to emerge as victor of the war. In order to effect the Bolshevik world revolution, with the ultimate aim of establishing Moscow's rule over the world, the conquest of Germany was essential.⁴⁰ Bolshevik attempts at seizing power in Germany between 1918 and 1923 had failed because of

the Freikorps (Volunteer Corps) and the Reichswehr.⁴¹ By means of the Second World War and with the help of President Roosevelt, Stalin would conquer half of Europe, including half of Germany, and integrate it into the Communist block. Roosevelt's dream of becoming president of the world was not to come to pass, however; he died on April 12, 1945, eighteen days before Hitler's suicide.

On September 3, 1939, the British government declared war on Germany and thus forced France to take the same disastrous step, hypocritically claiming they were doing so to protect Polish independence. Exactly twenty-five years earlier, on August 4, 1914, the British government had declared war on the German Reich, proclaiming its support for Belgian neutrality. Within a quarter of a century, the British Empire thus started two unprovoked wars in order to destroy Germany.⁴² To be sure, in 1939 the British government did not act independently, but was pressured intensely by the American President. Joseph Kennedy, from 1938 to 1940 the United States Ambassador in London, later replied to a question of James Forrestal, the U.S. secretary of defense, on just how it was that war had broken out:

Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's [William Bullitt, then Ambassador to France] urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it hadn't been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans would not fight, Kennedy said that they would and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939, the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside . . .⁴³

The 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union was a preventive war to avoid the Soviet Russian attack then being prepared. At that time the Soviet Union proved the most heavily armed state, underestimated not only by the German, but also by the Allied general staffs.⁴⁴

Roosevelt's diplomacy contributed to the failure of German attack plans for the spring of 1941. Since he had engineered the Yugoslavian *coup d'état* of March 27, 1941,⁴⁵ the German command saw the necessity of a Balkan campaign, thus delaying the attack on the Soviet Union by five weeks. For President Roosevelt, America's entry into the European war was complicated by the Neutrality Act, and by the German government's silence over the growing breaches of neutrality committed by the U.S.A. on behalf of the Western Allies throughout the years 1939-1941.⁴⁶ Eventually, Roosevelt found the "backdoor to war" by provoking war with Japan.⁴⁷ His economic sanctions and political demands had been devised with the purpose of driving Japan into war, forcing it to fire the first shot and thus appear to the world as the aggressor. He attained this objective through his ultimatum of

November 26, 1941, which he had issued without informing the American Congress. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941 was thereby artificially provoked.⁴⁸

By his demand for unconditional surrender Roosevelt made impossible any attempt at a political solution of the war problems. For him and his British friend Winston Churchill the complete destruction of the German Reich and the extermination of the German people were the main objective of the war. Military force, only a means for attaining an end in the view of Clausewitz, became an end in itself. Anti-German propaganda, directed by the American administration itself, grew to an infernal extent.

In the spring of 1941, when the U.S.A. was still officially neutral, the Jewish author, Theodore Kaufman, published the book *Germany Must Perish*. In it he outlined a plan for the biological eradication of the German people through the forced sterilization of the whole adult population.⁴⁹

Charles Lindbergh, the famous American pilot, recorded these extermination plans in his diary.⁵⁰ The sterilization plans could not be put into effect due to the developing discord within the anti-Hitler coalition. In 1943, Roosevelt disclosed to Cardinal Spellman that he intended to leave Europe to the Russians as a sphere of influence.⁵¹ One year later, when the Red Army conquered Poland, disagreements arose between Great Britain and the USA on one side, and Stalin on the other, terminating with Poland's complete integration into the Communist sphere of influence. That was just one of the results of a world war unleashed by Great Britain in order to defend Poland.

After being elected four times, contrary to the American tradition, President Roosevelt was in such bad physical shape after his fourth inauguration that he was unable to fulfill his duties. Similar to President Wilson at Versailles in 1919, Roosevelt at Yalta in 1945 showed alarming signs of exhaustion and dementia. At times he was not able to follow Stalin's line of thought during his talks with the Soviet dictator. Thus the Russian autocrat had an easy game at ramming through his plans regarding Europe and Asia. In Europe the Soviet Union reached the Elbe-Saale Line, dividing Germany, as well as the Occident, into two parts. As to East Asia, Stalin had the Portsmouth Treaty between Russia and Japan revised as a reward for Russian help in the defeat of Japan. Four years later, in 1949, China turned Communist, Communism's greatest triumph after its success in Europe.

My lecture is now drawing to a close and I shall summarize. In the course of the 19th Century, a capitalist world economy had led to the growing importance and intensification of economic ties and interests on the international stage; on the one hand bringing the nations together and establishing an interconnection of all peoples by modern means of transport and communication; on the other hand, aggravating old conflicts and creating new ones. The possibility of mutual and international involvement in other people's affairs, and of

unending conflicts, was particularly increased. It was characteristic of the pre-industrial age that man could only reach limited aims, by limited means; the sign of the Machine Age and its mode of living was the enabling of man to strive for unlimited aims by seemingly unlimited means.

The conflicts resulting from a capitalistic world economy culminated at the turn of the century in the international rivalry between Germany and the British Empire. This tension, which had never existed before between these two nations, was rooted in trade competition, and overshadowed all the old conflicts between the Continental powers. A local conflict ignited by the small Balkan state of Serbia in 1914, and expanded to a war of European scale by Russia's meddling on Serbia's side, developed into a world war with the British declaration of war on Germany. Werner Sombart, the well-known German historian of capitalism, describes the nature of this development:⁵²

. . . [the] common characteristic of all developments of the capitalist era is a pressure toward infinity, a boundlessness of aims, a force striving beyond all organic measure. Here we have one of those inner contradictions pervading modern culture: that life, in its highest and strongest action, overreaches and . . . destroys itself.

The American intervention in the European civil war in 1917, brought about by British policy and ensuring the Allied victory, ushered in the climax of Anglo-Saxon world rule. At that time, after overthrowing two of the most powerful continental powers, Russia and Germany, the two Anglo-Saxon powers were rulers of the globe. They won the war, but they lost the peace because of their own incapability to shape a just order of peace. Britain and America bear the main responsibility for the further course of international history in the American Century.

The Second World War was a necessary consequence of the First World War's termination in the peace dictates of Versailles and St. Germain. The immediate origins of the Second World War were the Allied Powers' breaking of the preliminary agreement based on Wilson's Fourteen Points; the refusal of the right of self-determination and of equality of rights for the German people; the creation of the eastern frontier and the "Polish Corridor"; the treaties' paragraphs on war guilt and war criminals, and impossible financial and economic claims.

The outbreak of the war of 1939 was caused directly by the conflict between Poland and Germany over the "Corridor" and Danzig problems. Great Britain and the USA did not grant Germany fulfillment of her rights to self-determination: unification of Austria and the Sudeten region with the German Reich in 1938 had shifted the relations between the powers on the continent in favor of Germany—an event unacceptable for England's traditional policy of a "Balance of Powers." Equally unacceptable for America was the Europeans' in-

dependent decision at the Munich conference, excluding the United States and the Soviet Union.

By means of a European war, both Roosevelt and Stalin intended to realize their dream of world rule according to totally different views and totally different aims. Thus Washington and Moscow staged a new European war, enabling both *colossi* to destroy and displace a Europe engaged in self-mutilation. The European order of the world was replaced by two "super powers," leading to a balance of terror. Thus, America lost her position as *arbiter mundi** which she had attempted to exercise in 1919, and was forced on the defensive against an aggressive and expansionist Communism striving for exclusive world domination.

Notes

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4. Georg Franz-Willing, *Der weltgeschichtliche Aufstieg der Vereinigten Staaten durch die Entscheidung des Bürgerkrieges 1861-1865* (Osnabrück, 1979).
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8. Allan Nevins, *Henry White. Thirty Years of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1930) p. 257 f. Albert Wedemeyer, *Reports* (New York, 1958), p. 13f.
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10. Georg Franz-Willing, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der Habsburger Monarchie* (Munich, 1943), passim.
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16. Baruch, *The Public Years*, p. 97ff. Baruch, *The Making of Reparations and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (New York, 1920), passim.

*"world arbiter" — Ed.

17. Fritz Berber, *Das Versailler Diktat*, 2 vols. (Essen, 1939), Vol. I, p. 8ff., p. 35f., p. 94f. Ulrich Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, *Dokumente und Gedanken um Versailles* (Berlin, 1925), p. 175ff. Ray S. T. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (London, 1923), Vol. 3, p. 458ff.
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Book Reviews

IL RAPPORTO GERSTEIN: ANATOMIA DI UN FALSO [THE GERSTEIN REPORT: THE ANATOMY OF A FRAUD], by Carlo Mattogno. Sentinella d'Italia (Via Buonarroti, 4, Monfalcone, Italy), 1985; 243 pp.

Reviewed by Robert A. Hall, Jr.

Italians have a special reason for being sensitive with regard to the allegations contained in the report made in 1945 by the SS officer Kurt Gerstein in his account of his observations at Belzec and other alleged "extermination-camps" in July, 1942. The German dramatist Rolf Hochhuth, in his "historical drama" *Der Stellvertreter* (Eng. "The Deputy"; It. "Il Vicario"; 1963), introduced Gerstein as a major character. In Act I, Hochhuth has Gerstein rush into the presence of the Papal Nuncio Count Césare Orsenigo in the latter's palace in Berlin in 1942 and tell him excitedly of the massacre of Jews which he has witnessed at Belzec. Orsenigo conveys this information to Pope Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli). The Pope does not question its accuracy, but considers the fate of millions of Jews as secondary to the safeguarding of the Vatican's financial investments in Germany. Hochhuth has the Pope spill ink on his hands, call for a basin of water, and (with obvious symbolism) wash his hands of the whole matter.

Der Stellvertreter has been translated into many languages and performed—normally, because of its length, in abbreviated versions—in many countries. (Your reviewer saw it in Uruguay in 1966.) As so often happens with works of fiction, Hochhuth's version of history has been widely accepted outside of Italy as truthful. In Italy, on the other hand, Pius XII is considered to have been not only anti-Nazi (as far as was possible in the situation), but eager to do all he could to save as many Jews as possible. Hence the concern of many Italians over what they consider Hochhuth's unjustified slander against the posthumous reputation of Pope Pius, and over the truthfulness of the real Kurt Gerstein's depositions made in 1945. Mattogno's book is a thorough re-examination, from both a general and a specifically Italian point of view, of the authenticity of the story as presented in the actual documents attributed to Gerstein, and hence of his credibility with regard to the situation at Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka.

Italian *falso*, in Mattogno's title, can mean either "forgery" or "fraud." In this instance, it clearly means the latter. In his Chapter I (pp. 15-31), Mattogno lists and describes the texts of the various depositions, hand-written and type-written, attributed to Gerstein. Of the two chief versions, one (numbered PS-1553) is in French and the

other (no. PS-2170) is in German. Two Americans who took Gerstein's depositions swore under oath that they were actually made by him, and his widow recognized his hand-writing as authentic. Concerning their authenticity, purely as documents, therefore, Mattogno has no doubt, as he says in his brief second chapter (pp. 33-35).

Their truthfulness, however, is a totally different question. Mattogno denies (Ch. III: pp. 37-85), on the basis of a detailed study and comparison of the various texts, that they correspond to anything resembling historical truth. He lists no less than 103 internal and external contradictions, falsifications of history (as it can be determined from other sources), disagreement with official Exterminationist history, errors of fact, exaggerations, and unrealistic statements (listed on pp. 80-85). Some of these are minor discrepancies, e.g., in the measurements of rooms or the age of a child whom Gerstein saw distributing shoe-laces to prisoners. Others of these inaccuracies, however, range from major contradictions to real "whoppers," such as the assertions that 15,000 persons were killed per day at Belzec, or 20,000 at Sobibor. The biggest of all is the figure of 25 million Jews executed. (Contrast this with the official Zionist figure of 16.6 million Jews in the entire world at the beginning of the Second World War, cited by W. Sanning, *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry* [Los Angeles, Institute for Historical Review, 1983], p. 14.)

Those who support Gerstein's claims to truthfulness cite various sources of information contained in statements dating from 1942 to 1947. Mattogno devotes six chapters to these sources, in their approximate chronological order. In the first of these (Ch. IV: pp. 87-97), he discusses the Swedish Baron von Otter, whom Gerstein claimed to have informed of the situation when they travelled together on a train returning from Poland. Although von Otter claimed in July, 1945, that he made an oral report to his superiors in Stockholm, Mattogno states that there is no surviving documentary evidence of such a report. A document in Dutch, dating from 1943, with the title in German (why?) "Tötungsanstalten in Polen" ("Killing-Establishments in Poland"), Mattogno dismisses (Ch. V: pp. 92-107) as containing too many inaccuracies and contradictions to be trustworthy.

The reports which reached the Vatican during the 1942-1945 period concerning alleged mass-executions of Jews in occupied Poland involve a rather broader spectrum of presumed support for Gerstein's allegations. To these reports, Mattogno devotes a longer chapter (VI: pp. 109-123) than to the other "supporting evidence." Of the interview which Hochhuth imagines as having taken place between Count Orsenigo and Gerstein, there is naturally no record in the Vatican archives, since Gerstein was, according to his own statement, not even allowed to enter the Nuncio's palace in 1942. (For a fuller discussion of Hochhuth's fabrications, see Paul Rassiniér, *L'Opération "Vicaire"* [Paris, La Table Ronde, 1965].) Gerstein claimed to have told hundreds of persons (including a certain Dr. Hochstrasser and

Bishop Dibelius) of the atrocities he had witnessed. After 1945, these two stated that they had forwarded this information to intermediate levels of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Switzerland and Sweden, respectively. Yet, Mattogno says (pp. 110-111), there is no trace of these reports in the Vatican. In the rest of the chapter, Mattogno reviews the various stories of atrocities against Jews and East Europeans which did reach the Vatican from 1942 onwards. He emphasizes what is already fairly well known, that these stories were vague and lacking in specific information, and did not arouse intense preoccupations because of their lack of confirmation.

Gerstein claimed that a certain Wilhelm Pfannenstiel accompanied him on his visits to the various "death-camps"; but, in his short chapter on Pfannenstiel (VII: pp. 123-138), Mattogno finds that the former's statements, made between 1947 and 1970, are (like so many of the others) vague and self-contradictory. A Pole named Rudolf Reder, in 1947, published an account (in Polish) of the "death-camp" at Belzec. For several reasons, Mattogno considers, in his Chapter VIII (pp. 129-137), that Reder's story is a mere vulgar plagiarism from Gerstein's depositions, which had by then been published. Mattogno then takes up, in the final chapter of this group (IX: pp. 139-147), the depositions made by Rudolf Höss and Konrad Morgen in 1946, which have already been analysed and found untrustworthy by other Revisionist scholars.

Mattogno's next three chapters deal with the relation of Gerstein's documents to the broader historical context. What actually happened to Gerstein himself? Nobody knows, except that it is fairly certain that he died in 1945, in a French prison. In Chapter X (pp. 149-156), Mattogno discusses the mystery surrounding Gerstein's death after he was imprisoned by the French in 1945 and found hanged in his cell on July 25 of that year. The official verdict was suicide, but the details and the actual cause (possibly murder, either by fellow inmates or the French authorities) are, Mattogno tells us, open to question. Interestingly, the file on Gerstein has also disappeared from the archives (as happens all too often in such instances). "Only one fact is certain: Kurt Gerstein's corpse disappeared, as did also his file," says Mattogno (p. 156).

The existence of "gas-chambers" at Belzec and of "steam chambers" at Treblinka is a pure myth, according to Mattogno's next two chapters. His Chapter XI (pp. 157-165) is devoted to the various alleged methods of execution at Belzec, pointing out the absurdities, impossibilities, and contradictions inherent in Gerstein's and others' accounts. In some stories, we are told of electrocutions by means of metal floors on which victims were forced to stand in large numbers, all squashed together, with electric currents being passed through the mass of naked bodies. (What about the grounding of the current, or the very high tension required to overcome the electrical resistance of such a mass?) Other accounts involve such methods of execution as metal floors which were made (how?) to sink into water through

which an electric current was passed (!), or freight-trains on the floors of whose cars quick-lime was spread so as to torture and kill the victims crowded in them and dissolve the corpses (!). Mattogno's twelfth chapter (pp. 167-173) deals with the 1942 report issued by the Polish government-in-exile in London, according to which the victims at Treblinka were executed in "steam-chambers"—a most inefficient procedure, which was later changed, in official Exterminationist history, to gas-chambers, through clumsy adaptations of Gerstein's assertions.

In his two final chapters, Mattogno examines the treatment of the Gerstein material by later historians. His Chapter XIII (pp. 175-185) is a discussion of Revisionists' presentation of the matter. In examining the work of such scholars as Rassinier, Aretz, Butz, Walendy, Faurisson, and others, Mattogno engages in some "cross-bench" criticism, pointing out various errors (mostly minor) in their work, but is, on the whole, favorable to them. In the course of this chapter, he refutes Georges Wellers's criticisms of Rassinier, and the assertions of the Italian Exterminationist Luciano Sterpellone.

Mattogno reserves his strongest denunciations, however, for the French Exterminationist Léon Poliakov, in the second longest chapter of the book (XIV: pp. 187-227). First Mattogno reproduces (pp. 187-207) Gerstein's own texts (in German, French, and English) with an Italian translation for each. Then he prints (pp. 187-207) the versions of each^o which Poliakov gives in successive editions of his *Bréviaire de la haine* (1951; revised 1974). Mattogno indicates, by means of bold-face type and numbered end-notes, all the places (398 in all) in which Poliakov altered the original, by additions, omissions, substitutions, or insertions. From this discussion, Poliakov emerges as an untrustworthy, unscrupulous deceptionist.

Mattogno needs only one page (231) for his "Conclusion," in which he points out that Gerstein's "eye-witness" account is only a mass of absurdities, contradictions, and errors of all kinds, unsupported by trustworthy confirmation, whose falsity even Poliakov implicitly recognized by manipulating the material so as to make it seem credible. It is well known that Gerstein must have been mentally unbalanced, in his attempts at reconciling his alleged faith in Christian principles with his equally strongly asserted devotion to the National Socialist cause. If Gerstein's depositions are genuine (which Mattogno considers they are), the origin of his assertions is to be sought in his "schizoid personality" (a phrase which Mattogno quotes from the Exterminationist Saul Friedländer).

The book is well organized and Mattogno's discussion is clear, concise, and to the point, with relatively little emotionalism. The translations from French, German, English, and Dutch into Italian are all faithful to their originals. (Your reviewer knows no Polish and hence cannot judge the translations from that language.) Unfortunately, there are a number of misprints, not only in foreign languages, but also in the ordinary Italian prose.

In the light of Mattogno's extensive discussion, Gerstein's "eyewitness" accounts, and further argumentation based thereon, appear very untrustworthy indeed. One does not have to be a fanatical supporter of Nazism or Fascism (your reviewer, when a student in Italy in the 1930's, was strongly anti-Fascist, and still is) to recognize the extent to which, all unsuspecting, we have been tricked into believing Gerstein's assertions, especially through the deceit practised on us by Rolf Hochhuth in *Der Stellvertreter*.

ROOM 40: BRITISH NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1914-1918 by Patrick Beesly. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982, U.S. edition 1983, xiii + 338pp with maps, photographs, index, \$15.95, ISBN 0-15-178634-8.

Reviewed by Arthur S. Ward

In this book, Patrick Beesly, a veteran of the Naval Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty, tells the story of Room 40—the office of British Naval Intelligence during World War I. Drawing upon hitherto unpublished material, he sheds new light on such events as the abortive Dardanelles campaign, the Battle of Jutland, the Irish Easter Rising of 1916, the Zimmerman Telegram affair, and the defeat of the German U-boats. The American edition includes an important revision from the first edition published in the UK: Beesly amended his views of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, concluding that a conspiracy lay behind the tragedy.

Before the end of 1914, the British captured all the German naval codes. At the head of British Naval Intelligence was the legendary Admiral "Blinker" Hall, described by U.S. Ambassador Walter Hines Page as the "one genius that the war has developed . . . all other secret-service men are amateurs by comparison." After the war broke out in August 1914, an extraordinary band of amateurs was assembled—clergymen, stockbrokers, bankers, naval-school masters, university professors—who managed to read the early German naval codes and their replacements over the course of the war.

While the German Navy was smaller than the Royal Navy, the *Hochseeflotte* had the advantage of being able to choose its moment for a sudden raid and could have inflicted some sharp defeats on isolated British forces if plans had worked out as intended. Thanks to the work of Room 40, however, the Germans were never able to achieve the element of surprise, upon which their naval strategy depended. Indeed, after Admiral Scheer launched an ineffective sortie east of the Dogger Bank on October 18, 1916 (during which operation one of his cruisers was torpedoed), the High Seas Fleet did not attempt to put to sea again until April 1918.

Many readers will find Chapter Seven, "Lusitania: Foul-up or Conspiracy?" of particular interest. Beesly was able to consult a number

of files relating to the sinking of the famous Cunard Line passenger steamer released to the Public Record Office after 1976. Yet the British government continues to withhold pertinent records from the public view. As the author points out, "The very unsatisfactory nature of the official enquiry held in June 1915 and the refusal then, and for the next sixty-six years, of the British authorities to disclose all the information in their possession, has only succeeded in fueling suspicions . . . German and American records are also remarkable for the absence of certain papers which once existed but which can no longer, apparently, be produced."

From what Beesly has been able to discover, Room 40 was aware that a German submarine was in the area through which the *Lusitania* was to sail on the last leg of her journey from New York. She was carrying a supply of munitions, "in common with other fast Cunard liners . . . ordered principally from the Bethlehem Steel Corporation." The munitions were stowed on the lower orlop deck below the bridge and just forward of the foremost bulkhead of the four boiler rooms. This was the exact point where U-20's single torpedo struck and where a terrific second explosion tore apart the ship, with such appalling loss of life. The *Lusitania* carried a cargo of dangerous munitions, contraband according to the rules of war then in effect. Even after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the British continued to ship ammunition aboard passenger liners.

What concerns the author is that the British, knowing a U-boat was prowling in the area where the *Lusitania* was sailing, failed to divert the ship to another, safer route, or failed to provide a destroyer escort for the passenger liner, as they could have easily done: "Nothing, *absolutely nothing* was done to ensure the liner's safe arrival," Beesly notes. On the basis of the evidence available to him by the early 1980s, Beesly was "reluctantly driven to the conclusion that there was a conspiracy deliberately to put the *Lusitania* at risk in the hopes that even an abortive attack on her would bring the United States into the war. Such a conspiracy could not have been put into effect without Winston Churchill's [at the time Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty — ed.] express permission and approval." Beesly's research thus supports the conclusions reached by Colin Simpson in his earlier revisionist work on the topic, *The Lusitania*.

Room 40's decrypts enabled the Royal Navy to intercept the German blockade runner, *Libau* (disguised as the Norwegian vessel *Aud*), on April 20, 1916, at Tralee Bay on the west coast of Ireland. *Libau* carried rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and explosives intended for the Sinn Feiners. Had the Irish received the weapons, the success of the Easter Rising would still have been in doubt, but the fighting could have been more serious than, in the event, it was.

The author explains the role that Room 40 had in the defeat of the U-boats. With the establishment of the convoy system, it was possible to alert ships to the presence of U-boats, and either reroute them or

send destroyers out to ward off enemy submarines. As Beesly remarks, "neither in World War I nor in World War II did British intelligence win the U-boat war, but in both cases it certainly shortened it."

Room 40 is a well written narrative, containing information of interest to Revisionists. Still available in hardcover in bookstores, readers' may be able to find copies on sale tables, as this reviewer did recently.

SPECIAL TREATMENT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HITLER'S THIRD RACE by Alan Abrams. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1985, 261pp, ISBN 0-8184-0364-0.

Reviewed by Theodore J. O'Keefe

This book may have the most ironic title of any work dealing with the Jews of Europe in the 1930's and 40's. Its author, Alan Abrams, is a convinced Exterminationist, but the "special treatment" he describes was that accorded the children of marriages between Jews and Gentiles—the *Mischlinge*—and their Jewish parents. As Abrams relates, the *Mischlinge* and their Jewish parents were rarely deported to the East from the Reich and the areas under German occupation or influence, nor were they subjected to personal harassment or economic discrimination. At the war's end there were at least 28,000 registered Jews living openly throughout the Reich, and tens of thousands more across Europe, in addition to hundreds of thousands of half- and quarter-Jews (in the "racial" sense), many of whom had been eligible for service in the Wehrmacht and even certain National Socialist organizations.

Abrams, though no "Holocaust" Revisionist, is well aware of his book's potential for embarrassing the orthodox. Indeed, *Special Treatment* is prefaced by the adage of Prussian historian Heinrich Leo, "Better to cause a scandal than to be less than truthful," as well as by George Sokolsky's evocation of the traditional Jewish wariness of *Shande fur die Goyim* (giving scandal to the Gentiles).

While Abrams has somewhat exaggerated the neglect of the *Mischlinge* and their Jewish parents (as he well knows, Gerald Reitlinger, Raoul Hilberg, and Nora Levin have all grudgingly acknowledged the special status of the *Mischlinge* in their accounts of the "Holocaust"), for the most part he is quite justified in the stress he lays on their relegation to obscurity, particularly in more popular works dealing with the wartime lot of the Jews. Leonard Gross, for example, in *The Last Jews of Berlin*, which deals with Jews who spent the war in hiding or under false identities, writes that "nothing could be more miraculous than the survival of a Jew in Berlin during the last years of World War II." He says nothing of the many Jews in mixed marriages who dwelt there openly, in complete legality, to the end of the war.

Special Treatment has its flaws, of course. Abrams is no scholar, and his book is stronger on anecdote than analysis. The author tends to wander afield, as when he deals with alleged Jewish "collaboration" in France or with Jewish organizational activity in Germany, a subject dealt with far more effectively by Lenni Brenner in his *Zionism in the Age of the Dictators*. Abrams's belief that the National Socialist leadership attempted to exterminate the Jews of Europe leads him to imply strongly that the drafting of the Nuremberg Laws, which established the special status of the *Mischlinge*, enabled the survival of European Jewry. In this strange notion, as well as in such formulations as "the Nazi exemptions for Jews crossed European frontiers with the first wave of goose-stepping shock troops," he will find little company from either Exterminationists or Revisionists.

The implications for the Exterminationist thesis of the decision to create a special legal status for the *Mischlinge* and to treat their Jewish parents as privileged are worth considering, but naturally Abrams doesn't focus on them. Raoul Hilberg, in the first edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews* (pp. 268-277), claims that these policies were necessary to camouflage the extermination: Had the Jews in mixed marriages been deported, their Aryan spouses would not only have raised a public furor, but would have created further grave problems for law and public morale by flocking to obtain death certificates, thereby fatally compromising the secrecy of the "Final Solution." The reader may make of this explanation what he will, particularly in light of the insistence of Hilberg and other Exterminationists that the machinery of the "Final Solution" was initially revved up by killing tens of thousands of *Germans* in a state-mandated euthanasia program.

Of further interest in the German policy toward this special category of Jews and part-Jews is the implicit contradiction it provides to the common assertion that the alleged slaughter of the European Jews by the National Socialists was rooted in a sort of psychosexual pathology, shared by Hitler and his followers, triggered by the idea of sexual relations between Jews and Aryans. Even those with a casual acquaintance with "Holocaust" literature are aware of photographs, dating from the early days of Hitler's rise of power, showing Aryan-Jewish couples being hazed by members of the *Sturmabteilung* and other rowdies. How odd that, if sexual envy were the driving force of the "Holocaust," precisely those Jews married to Aryans, the progenitors of "mongrel" offspring, should be exempt from the treatment meted out to the rest of their brethren!

All Denials of Free Speech Undercut A Democratic Society

NOAM CHOMSKY

The following essay first appeared in the Camera, Boulder, Colorado, in September, 1985. It is a rejoinder to a reply by Henry Smokler to a nationally syndicated article by Village Voice writer Nat Hentoff protesting the cancellation of a Cornell Medical School commencement speech by Professor Chomsky. The cancellation was the work of Zionists fearful that Chomsky, a forthright critic of Israel, would mar their happy occasion.

Chomsky has been the target of increasingly vicious invective from Zionist and Left-“Liberal” quarters for his principled stand on behalf of free speech for Revisionists. Chomsky is in fact a confirmed Exterminationist who subscribes to the orthodox history of the “Holocaust.” The difference is that the renowned professor of linguistics from M.I.T. really is a civil libertarian, upholding the Enlightenment Rights of Man not merely so that his own Leftist views will be given a hearing, but from a commitment to an ideal which, far from being a selectively-applied tool of ideological opportunism, is a minimum prerequisite for a humane society and discourse.

Prof. Chomsky’s essay gives important testimony about repression of Revisionists which the vast majority of Leftist intellectuals choose to ignore or even suppress. It deserves an audience far greater than that reached by the Boulder Camera. It also constitutes a tribute to both Chomsky and Faurisson—men who typify that endangered species of thinkers who actually practice what they preach.

In Faurisson’s case, it is the practice of untrammelled intellectual curiosity and historical inquiry. In Chomsky’s, it is the protection of the right to dissent, even when such dissent entails a radical questioning of the fundamental tenets of the most sacred dogma of the era.

—Michael A. Hoffman II

In the *Daily Camera* (Aug. 25), Professor Howard Smokler, responding to a column by Nat Hentoff (June 30), writes that I have “hurt and offended” him by two actions concerning Robert Faurisson, who in 1980 published a book entitled *Memoir in Defense Against Those Who Accuse Me of Falsifying History* in which, according to Smokler, “he charged that ‘the myth of the gas chambers’ originated in certain American Zionist circles around 1942 . . .” The two actions are: 1) that I “defended Faurisson’s right to publish these

falsehoods," and 2) that "in a letter to the historian Lucy Dawidowicz, (I) expressed complete agnosticism on the subject of whether Faurisson's views were 'horrendous.'"

I will return to the first point. As for the second, it is not clear on what grounds Professor Smokler might be hurt or offended by a personal letter, which I presume he has never seen, written to a third party, but the question is academic, since he has grossly misinterpreted its contents.

The relevant facts are as follows. Faurisson was a professor of French literature at the University of Lyon. After he published some items in which he denied the existence of gas chambers, he was suspended from teaching on the grounds that the university could not protect him from violence. He was then brought to trial for "falsification of history," and condemned—the first time in the West, to my knowledge, that the courts have affirmed the familiar Stalinist-fascist doctrine that the State has the right to determine historical truth and to punish deviation from it. I was one of 500 foreign signers of a petition urging that Faurisson's civil rights be respected. Shortly after, in a letter of Sept. 10, 1980, Ms. Dawidowicz wrote me asking whether I "had signed a statement defending Robert Faurisson's right to speak his views," and if so, "what reason compelled me to sign it." On Sept. 18, I wrote her that I had indeed signed a statement defending Faurisson's right to speak his views. As for my reasons, I wrote that "I signed the appeal because I believe that people have the right of freedom and expression whatever their views, that the importance of defending these rights is all the greater when the person expresses views that are abhorrent to virtually everyone (as in this case), and that this becomes particularly important when the person in question is thrown out of his academic position," and subjected to other ill-treatment. I did not know then about the "falsification of history" trial, and had never heard of Faurisson's book, which appeared three months later; this book, as the title indicates, was a defense against the scandalous charges for which he was later sentenced, dealing specifically with the charge that he had falsified the diaries of Nazi doctor Johann Paul Kremer.*

I also wrote to Ms. Dawidowicz that I was shocked by her query as to why one should defend freedom of speech. I remain shocked today. I might add that no question has ever been raised on the innumerable occasions when I have signed similar petitions for people with all sorts of views, often views of which I know nothing or which I know to be horrendous, or when I have taken far stronger and more controversial stands in support of civil liberties, for example, when I supported the right of American war criminals not only to speak and teach but also

*Faurisson was not convicted of falsifying history; the Paris Court of Appeals upheld a guilty verdict based on "personal damages" likely to arise from "passionately aggressive actions against all those . . . implicitly accused of lying and deception" by the results of Faurisson's research. (Ed. note)

to conduct their research, on grounds of academic freedom, at a time when their work was being used to murder and destroy (no one accuses Faurisson of being a war criminal or claims that his work is contributing to massive ongoing crimes). I might note that the utter hypocrisy of Smokler, Dawidowicz and their circles more generally is very clearly demonstrated by the fact that they are "hurt and offended" by my defense of the right of free expression in the Faurisson case, but not by far more controversial and extreme actions of mine in defense of the same rights for people they find more congenial.

I went on to inform Ms. Dawidowicz that I knew very little about Faurisson's work, so that while it may be "horrendous," as claimed by his critics, I obviously could not comment. This is what Smokler reports as an expression of "complete agnosticism." Apparently, he is willing to pass judgment on matters of which he knows nothing, but I am not, and the fact that a person is universally denounced does not suffice for me to join in the parade without at least looking at what he has to say, which I had not done in this case and had no particular interest in doing: I am willing to wager that Smokler has never read a word by Faurisson, nor is there any reason why he should. Furthermore, as I wrote to Ms. Dawidowicz, the nature of his views is, plainly, completely irrelevant to the issue of his right to express them, a truism among civil libertarians that those of a Stalinist-fascist persuasion find quite shocking.

I have discussed Smokler's second charge, based on his distortion of the personal letter to Dawidowicz to which he alludes. Let us consider the first charge. Here he is correct. I do defend the right of Faurisson to publish falsehoods, as I defend the right of anyone else to do so, including Professor Smokler. As I wrote to Ms. Dawidowicz in the letter that Smokler misrepresents, "I thought that all of this had been settled in the 18th century, but apparently others do not agree," including Professor Smokler. He states that my support for familiar Enlightenment principles and my rejection of the Stalinist-fascist doctrine that he advocates hurts and offends him. I am afraid I have no apologies to offer about that.

Smokler goes on to deny at length a claim that was never made, either by me or by Nat Hentoff: namely, that my "political rights," including the right of freedom of speech, were denied in the three incidents mentioned by Hentoff: namely, 1) a request by students at Cornell Medical School that I withdraw as commencement speaker (as I did) because my views on Zionism so offended them that the occasion would be spoiled for them no matter what I spoke on; 2) the withdrawal of an invitation by the Middle East Center at the University of Michigan after pressure by faculty members who demanded that I not be permitted to speak on the Middle East at the Cleveland City Club, evidently under some form of pressure. Smokler is quite right to say that there is no issue of freedom of speech in these cases, nor has anyone so alleged.

The issue, as Hentoff clearly stated, is an entirely different one. It is as stated in my letter to the Cornell Medical students, which Hentoff quoted: "As you may know, Israeli doves have bitterly deplored the chauvinist fanaticism among sectors of the American Jewish community that they consider — rightly in my view — to be driving their country to disaster." I have taken many highly controversial positions on many matters, but incidents of the kind Hentoff describes have never occurred except on this issue, and then only in the United States; my only comparable experience is in the Soviet sphere, where not a word of mine on any political topic is allowed expression. Many others have had the same experience, including prominent Israelis: for example, (General) Mattityahu Peled, who bitterly denounced the American Jewish community, after a visit here when he was subjected to the kind of abuse familiar among those who do not toe the Party Line with sufficient precision, for their "state of near hysteria" and their "blindly chauvinistic and narrow-minded" support for the most reactionary policies within Israel, which poses "the danger of prodding Israel once more toward a posture of calloused intransigence." Other well-known Israeli doves have condemned what they correctly describe as the "Stalinist" practices in these circles. The issue is a serious one, but it is not one of freedom of speech in the technical sense that Smokler irrelevantly debates with no opponent.

Smokler states that it is my responsibility to "make publicly available the evidence which leads (me) to assert that (I am) systematically excluded from the expression of (my) ideas." The assertion is his, not mine, but apart from that, I do not accept such responsibility. The ridiculous antics of Smokler's friends and associates are not my concern. If Nat Hentoff or others ask me for information about these matters, I will provide it, but I recognize no duty beyond that. The Michigan affair was discussed extensively in the University and Ann Arbor press, and by Michigan historian Alan Wald in several articles. It was regarded as scandalous quite rightly, but I have never mentioned it except in response to queries. The same is true of the other two incidents, and of many others.

Suppression of critical comment on Israel of a sort that is easily expressed in Israel itself is readily demonstrable. To mention only one case, my book *Fateful Triangle* (1983) was reviewed in major (and minor) newspapers and news weeklies in Canada, Britain, Australia (even on national TV), and in exactly two local newspapers in the United States (and in the *New York Review of Books*, after a long review had appeared in its sister journal in London, which is widely read here), though its contents are far more relevant to U.S. concerns. This is quite typical, for others as well. While I am asked to write regularly on the Middle East in major journals in Israel, Europe and elsewhere, that is virtually inconceivable here. My experience is not all that unusual in this regard. It should be noted that the U.S. is a highly ideological society in which dissenting opinion is effectively

marginalized as compared with other industrial democracies, but nevertheless, the case of the Middle East is unique. As has been observed in press commentary in Israel — a more democratic society than ours, at least for its Jewish majority — this is a serious danger for American democracy, for the Middle East, and indeed for world peace.

Again let me stress that no one is raising an issue of the “political rights” of critics of Israeli policies. To take another case, my “political rights” are not violated when the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith keeps a 150-page file on my activities, including surveillance of my talks and grossly falsified accounts of these talks and other matters, which the League then circulates to people with whom I am to have debates (e.g., Harvard Law Professor Alan Der-showitz) or to groups in universities where I am to speak so that they can extract defamatory and slanderous lies from this material. The issues, rather, are quite different. I have agreed to provide these files (leaked to me from the ADL office) to the people who find the Stalinist-style mentality and behavior of the ADL scandalous, and who question whether a tax-exempt organization should devote itself to surveillance and defamation of critics of the state it serves, but I accept no further responsibility to concern myself with the matter, contrary to Smokler’s absurd claim, any more than I waste time over the behavior of Communist Party hacks. For those who may be interested in the disreputable and dangerous activities of these groups, there is ample evidence in Paul Findley’s recent book, *They Dare to Speak Out*, Naseer Aruri’s “The Middle East on the U.S. Campus,” (*Link*, published by Americans for Middle East Understanding), and other works.

Smokler also presents his private version of my views, claiming that I have given no evidence for them and that an unnamed Africanist interprets the facts differently. No comment appears necessary. Those who may be interested in what my views actually are and whether I have given evidence for them can easily consult available literature, for example, *Fateful Triangle*. To my knowledge, only one competent Zionist historian has reviewed this book, Dr. Noah Lucas, in the *Jewish Quarterly*, London, Nos. 3-4, 1984. I will simply quote his concluding words: “Good luck to the reader who may succeed in refuting any of the facts or assumptions or conclusions presented by Chomsky. It will not be accomplished by anyone who approaches the matter as an issue of propaganda or public relations for Israel, but only by the student who matches research with research.” Not by Professor Smokler, plainly.

(Noam Chomsky is an author and a professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

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How the British Obtained the Confessions of Rudolf Höss

ROBERT FAURISSON

Rudolf Höss was the first of three successive commandants of the Auschwitz concentration camp. He is often called "the Commandant of Auschwitz," and the general public knows of him from a book published under the title *Commandant in Auschwitz*. He appeared before the International Military Tribunal as a witness on 15 April 1946, where his deposition caused a sensation. To the amazement of the defendants and in the presence of journalists from around the world, he confessed to the most frightful crimes that history had ever known. He said that he had personally received an order from Himmler to exterminate the Jews. He estimated that at Auschwitz 3,000,000 people had been exterminated, 2,500,000 of them by means of gas chambers. His confessions were false. They had been extorted from Höss by torture, but it took until 1983 to learn the identity of the torturers and the nature of the tortures they inflicted upon him.

The confessions of Rudolf Höss supply the keystone to the theory which maintains that the systematic extermination of the Jews, especially by means of homicidal gas chambers, was a historical reality. These confessions consist essentially of four documents which, in chronological order, are the following:

1. A written deposition signed on 14 March (or 15 March?) 1946 at 2:30 in the morning; it is an 8-page typed text written in German; I do not think, under normal circumstances, a court in any democracy would agree to take into consideration those pages, lacking as they did any heading and any printed administrative reference; and crawling with various corrections, whether typed or handwritten, uninitialled and without a notation at the end of the total number of words corrected or deleted. Höss signed it for the

first time after having written: "14.3.46 2³⁰." He signed again after two lines which are supposed to have been handwritten but which were typed, and which say:

I have read the above account and confirm that it is corresponding to my own statement and that it was the pure truth. [Official translation.]

The names and the signatures of the two witnesses, British sergeants, follow. One did not note the date, while the other indicated 15 March. The last signature is that of a captain of the 92nd Field Security Section, who certifies that the two sergeants were present throughout the entire proceedings, during which the prisoner Rudolf Höss made his statement voluntarily. The date indicated is 14 March 1946. Nothing indicates the place!

The Allies numbered this document NO-1210.

2. An affidavit signed 22 days later on 5 April 1946. It is a typed text, 2¹/₄ pages long, written in English. That is surprising: thereby Höss signed a declaration under oath, not in his own language but in that of his guards. His signature appeared three times: at the bottom of the first two pages, then on the third and last page, after a text of four lines, still in English, still typed, which reads:

I understand English as it is written above. The above statements are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement, I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, Germany, on the fifth day of April 1946.

There follows the signature of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith W. Brookhart after the statement: "Subscribed and sworn before me this 5th day of April, 1946, at Nurnberg, Germany."

In its form, this text is, if possible, even less acceptable than the preceding one. In particular, entire lines have been added in capital letters in the English style, while others are crossed out with a stroke of the pen. There is no initialling in the margin next to these corrections, and no summary at the end of the document of the number of words struck out. The Allies assigned this document the number PS-3868.

In order to hide the fact that Höss had signed an affidavit that was in English when it ought to have been in his own language, German, and in order to make the crossed-out words and the additions and corrections disappear, the following trick was used at Nuremberg: the original text was recast and presented as a "Translation," meaning from German into English! But the person responsible for this deception did his work too quickly. He thought

that a handwritten addition to paragraph 10 (done in an English handwriting style) was an addition to the end of paragraph 9. The result of that misunderstanding is that the end of paragraph 9 is rendered totally incomprehensible. There are, therefore, two different documents that bear the same file number, PS-3868: the document signed by Höss and the "remake." It is the "remake," really a glaring forgery, that was used before the Nuremberg tribunal. One historical work that claimed to reproduce document PS-3868 by Höss in fact reproduced the "remake" but omitted (without saying so) the end of paragraph 9 as well as all of paragraph 10: see Henri Monneray, *La Persécution des Juifs dans les pays de l'Est présentée à Nuremberg*, Paris, Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation, 1949, pp. 159–162.

3. The spectacular oral deposition, which I have already mentioned, made before the IMT on 15 April 1946, ten days after the writing of document PS-3868. Paradoxically, it was a lawyer for the defense, Kurt Kauffmann, Ernst Kaltenbrunner's attorney, who had asked for Höss's appearance. His obvious intention was to show that the person responsible for the presumed extermination was Himmler and not Kaltenbrunner. When it came time for the representative of the prosecution (at that point the American assistant prosecutor, Col. Harlan Amen) to question Höss, he seemed to be reading from the affidavit signed by the latter but, in fact, he was reading excerpts from the "remake." Col. Amen gave an excuse for not reading paragraph 9 (and, at the same time, paragraph 8). Stopping after reading each excerpt, he asked Höss if that was in fact what he had stated. He received the following responses: "Jawohl," "Jawohl," "Jawohl" "Ja, es stimmt," a two sentence response (containing an obvious error about the Hungarian Jews supposedly having been killed at Auschwitz as early as 1943 even though the first convoy of them did not arrive at Auschwitz until May 2 of 1944), "Jawohl," "Jawohl," "Jawohl," a one-sentence response, "Jawohl," and "Jawohl." [IMG, XI, pp. 457–461].*

In a normal murder case there would have been a hundred questions to ask about the extermination and the gas chambers (that is to say about a crime and an instrument of the crime which were without precedent in history), but no one asked those questions. In particular, Colonel Amen did not ask for a single detail nor for any additional information about the frightening text which he had read in the presence of journalists whose stories would make the

*Höss is quoted according to the text of the German-language edition of the IMT series.

headlines in newspapers around the world the next day.

4. The texts generally collected under the title *Commandant in Auschwitz*. Höss is alleged to have written these texts in pencil under the watchful eye of his Polish-Communist jailers, while in a prison at Cracow awaiting his trial. He was condemned to death on 2 April 1947 and hanged at the Auschwitz concentration camp fourteen days later. The world had to wait 11 years, until 1958, for the publication in German of his alleged memoirs. They were edited by the German historian Martin Broszat without regard for scholarly method. Broszat went so far as to suppress several fragments which would have too clearly made it appear that Höss (or his Polish jailers) had offered outrageous statements which would have called into question the reliability of his writings *in toto*.

The four documents that I have just enumerated are closely connected in their origin. Looking at them more closely, there are contradictions among their respective contents, but, for the most part, they are internally consistent. The eight pages of NO-1210 are in a sense summed up in the 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ pages of PS-3868; that latter document served as the central document in the oral testimony before the IMT; and, finally, the memoirs written at Cracow crown the whole. The base and the matrix are thus document NO-1210. It was in the Cracow memoirs, written under the supervision of Polish examining magistrate Jan Sehn, that Höss was to give particulars about how the British had obtained that very first confession.

Höss's Revelations about His First Confession (Document NO-1210 of 14 or 15 March 1946)

The war ended in Germany on 8 May 1945. Höss fell into the hands of the British, who imprisoned him in a camp for SS men. As a trained agronomist, he obtained an early release. His guards were unaware of the importance of their prey. A work office found him employment as an agricultural work at a farm near Flensburg, not far from the Danish border. He remained there for eight months. The military police looked for him. His family, with whom he succeeded in making contact, was closely watched and subjected to frequent searches.

In his memoirs Höss recounts the circumstances of his arrest and what followed. The treatment that he underwent was particularly brutal. At first sight it is surprising that the Poles allowed Höss to make the revelations he did about the British military police. On reflection, we discover that they might have done so out of one or

more of the following motives:

- to give the confession an appearance of sincerity and veracity;
- to cause the reader to make a comparison, flattering for the Polish Communists, between the British and Polish methods. Indeed Höss later said that during the first part of his detention at Cracow, his jailers came very close to finishing him off physically and above all morally, but that later they treated him with "such decent and considerate treatment" that he consented to write his memoirs;

- to furnish an explanation for certain absurdities contained in the text (NO-1210) that the British police had had Höss sign, one of these absurdities being the invention of an "extermination camp" in a place which never existed on any Polish map: "Wolzek near Lublin"; confusion with Belzec is not possible since Höss talks about three camps: "Belzek (sic), Tublinka (sic) and Wolzek near Lublin." Farther on, the spelling of Treblinka will be corrected. Let us note in passing that the camps of Belzec and Treblinka did not yet exist at the time (June 1941) when Himmler, according to Höss, told him that they were already functioning as "extermination camps."

Here are the words Höss uses to describe, in succession, his arrest by the British; his signing of the document that would become NO-1210; his transfer to Minden-on-the-Weser, where the treatment that he underwent was worse yet; his stay at the Nuremberg tribunal's prison; and, finally, his extradition to Poland.

I was arrested on 11 March 1946 [at 11 pm].

My phial of poison had been broken two days before.

When I was aroused from sleep, I thought at first I was being attacked by robbers, for many robberies were taking place at that time. That was how they managed to arrest me. I was maltreated by the Field Security Police.

I was taken to Heide where I was put in those very barracks from which I had been released by the British eight months earlier.

At my first interrogation, evidence was obtained by beating me. I do not know what is in the record, although I signed it. Alcohol and the whip were too much for me. The whip was my own, which by chance had got into my wife's luggage. It had hardly ever touched my horse, far less the prisoners. Nevertheless, one of my interrogators was convinced that I had perpetually used it for flogging the prisoners.

After some days I was taken to Minden-on-the-Weser, the main interrogation centre in the British Zone. There I received further rough treatment at the hands of the English public prosecutor, a major.

The conditions in the prison accorded with this behaviour.

After three weeks, to my surprise, I was shaved and had my hair cut and I was allowed to wash. My handcuffs had not previously been removed since my arrest.

On the next day I was taken by lorry to Nuremberg, together with a prisoner of war who had been brought over from London as a witness in Fritzsche's defence. My imprisonment by the International Military Tribunal was a rest-cure compared to what I had been through before. I was accommodated in the same building as the principal accused, and was able to see them daily as they were taken to the court. Almost every day we were visited by representatives for all the Allied nations. I was always pointed out as an especially interesting animal.

I was in Nuremberg because Kaltenbrunner's counsel had demanded me as a witness for his defence. I have never been able to grasp, and it is still not clear to me, how I of all people could have helped to exonerate Kaltenbrunner. Although the conditions in prison were, in every respect, good — I read whenever I had the time, and there was a well stocked library available — the interrogations were extremely unpleasant, not so much physically, but far more because of their strong psychological effect. I cannot really blame the interrogators — they were all Jews.

Psychologically I was almost cut in pieces. They wanted to know all about everything, and this was also done by Jews. They left me in no doubt whatever as to the fate that was in store for me.

On 25 May, my wedding anniversary as it happened, I was driven with von Burgsdorff and Bühler to the aerodrome and there handed over to Polish officers. We flew in an American plane via Berlin to Warsaw. Although we were treated very politely during our journey, I feared the worst when I remembered my experiences in the British Zone and the tales I had heard about the way people were being treated in the East. (*Commandant in Auschwitz*, Introduction by Lord Russell of Liverpool, English translation, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959, p. 173-175.)

Revelations in 1983 About the British Torturers of Rudolf Höss

The Revisionists proved a long time ago that the various confessions of Rudolf Höss contained so many gross errors, non-sensical elements, and impossibilities of all kinds, that it is no longer possible to believe them, as did the judges at Nuremberg and Cracow, as well as certain self-styled historians, without any prior analysis of their content and of the circumstances in which they were obtained.

In all likelihood, Höss was tortured by the British soldiers of the 92nd Field Security Section, but a confirmation of that hypothesis was necessary. Confirmation has come with the publication in England of a book containing the name of the principal torturer (a British sergeant of Jewish origin) and a description of the circumstances of Höss's arrest, as well as his third-degree interrogation.

The book is by Rupert Butler. It was published in 1983 (Hamlyn Paperbacks). Butler is the author of three other works: *The Black Angels*, *Hand of Steel* and *Gestapo*, all published by Hamlyn. The book that interests us is entitled *Legions of Death*. Its inspiration is anti-Nazi. Butler says that he researched this book at the Imperial War Museum in London, the Institute for Contemporary History and Wiener Library, and other such prestigious institutions. At the beginning of his book, he expresses his gratitude to these institutions and, among others, to two persons, one of whom is Bernard Clarke ("who captured Auschwitz Commandant Rudolf Höss"). The author quotes several fragments of what are either written or recorded statements by Clarke.

Bernard Clarke shows no remorse. On the contrary, he exhibits a certain pride in having tortured a "Nazi." Rupert Butler, likewise, finds nothing to criticize in that. Neither of them understands the importance of their revelations. They say that Höss was arrested on 11 March, 1946, and that it took three days of torture to obtain "a coherent statement." They do not realize that the alleged "coherent statement" is nothing other than the lunatic confession, signed by their quivering victim on the 14th or 15th of March 1946, at 2:30 in the morning, which was to seal Höss's fate definitely, a confession which would also give definitive shape to the myth. The confession would also shape decisively the myth of Auschwitz, the supposed high-point of the extermination of the Jews, above all due to the alleged use of homicidal gas chambers.

On 11 March 1946, a Captain Cross, Bernard Clarke and four other intelligence specialists in British uniforms, most of them tall and menacing, entered the home of Frau Höss and her children. The six men, we are told, were all "practised in the more sophisticated techniques of sustained and merciless investigation" (p. 235). Clarke began to shout:

If you don't tell us [where your husband is] we'll turn you over to the Russians and they'll put you before a firing-squad. Your son will go to Siberia.

Frau Höss broke down and revealed, says Clarke, the location of the farm where her husband was in hiding, as well as his assumed name: Franz Lang. And Bernard Clarke added:

Suitable intimidation of the son and daughter produced precisely identical information.

The Jewish sergeant and the five other specialists in third degree interrogation then left to seek out Höss, whom they surprised in the middle of the night, sleeping in an alcove of the room used to slaughter cattle on the farm.

Höss screamed in terror at the mere sight of British uniforms.

Clarke yelled: "What is your name?"

With each answer of "Franz Lang," Clarke's hand crashed into the face of his prisoner. The fourth time that happened, Höss broke and admitted who he was.

The admission suddenly unleashed the loathing of the Jewish sergeants in the arresting party whose parents had died in Auschwitz following an order signed by Höss.

The prisoner was torn from the top bunk, the pyjamas ripped from his body. He was then dragged naked to one of the slaughter tables, where it seemed to Clarke the blows and screams were endless.

Eventually, the Medical Officer urged the Captain: "Call them off, unless you want to take back a corpse."

A blanket was thrown over Höss and he was dragged to Clarke's car, where the sergeant poured a substantial slug of whisky down his throat. Then Höss tried to sleep.

Clarke thrust his service stick under the man's eyelids and ordered in German: "Keep your pig eyes open, you swine."

For the first time Höss trotted out his oft-repeated justification: "I took my orders from Himmler. I am a soldier in the same way as you are a soldier and we had to obey orders."

The party arrived back at Heide around three in the morning. The snow was swirling still, but the blanket was torn from Höss and he was made to walk completely nude through the prison yard to his cell. (p. 237)

So it is that Bernard Clarke reveals: "It took three days to get a coherent statement out of [Höss]" (*ibid.*). This admission was corroborated by Mr. Ken Jones in an article in the *Wrexham Leader* (October 17, 1986):

Mr. Ken Jones was then a private with the Fifth Royal Horse Artillery stationed at Heid[e] in Schleswig-Holstein. "They brought him to us when he refused to cooperate over questioning about his activities during the war. He came in the winter of 1945/6 and was put in a small jail cell in the barracks," recalls Mr. Jones. Two other soldiers were detailed with Mr. Jones to join Höss in his cell to help break him down for interrogation. "We sat in the cell with him, night and day, armed with axe handles. Our job was to prod him every time he fell asleep to help break down his resistance," said Mr. Jones. When Höss was taken out for exercise, he was made to wear only jeans and a thin cotton shirt in the bitter cold. After three days and nights without sleep, Höss finally broke down and made a full confession to the authorities.

Clarke's statement, obtained under the conditions just described by bullies of British Military Security under the brutal inspiration of sergeant-interpreter Bernard Clarke, became Höss's first confession, the original confession indexed under the number NO-1210. Once the tortured prisoner had begun to talk, according to Clarke, it was impossible to stop him. Clarke, no more conscious in 1982 or 1983 than in 1946 of the enormity of what he forced Höss to confess, goes on to describe a series of fictitious horrors presented here as the truth: Höss went on to tell how, after the bodies had been ignited, the fat oozing from them was poured over the other bodies(!). He estimated the number of dead during just the period when he was at Auschwitz at two million (!); the killings reached 10,000 victims per day (!).

It was Clarke's duty to censor the letters sent by Höss to his wife and children. Every policeman knows that the power to grant or withhold permission to a prisoner to write to his family constitutes a psychological weapon. To make a prisoner "sing" it is sometimes sufficient to merely suspend or cancel that authorization. Clarke makes an interesting remark about the content of Höss's letters; he confides to us:

Sometimes a lump came to my throat. There were two different men in that one man. One was brutal with no regard for human life. The other was soft and affectionate. (p. 238)

Rupert Butler ends his narrative by saying that Höss sought neither to deny nor to escape his responsibilities. In effect, at the Nuremberg tribunal Höss conducted himself with a "schizoid apathy." The expression is that of the American prison psychologist, G.M. Gilbert, who was in charge of the psychological surveillance of the prisoners and whose eavesdropping aided the American prosecution. We can certainly believe that Höss was "split in two"! He had the appearance of a rag because they had turned him into a rag. "Apathetic," writes Gilbert on page 229 of his book; "apathetic," he repeats on the following page; "schizoid apathy," he writes on page 239 (*Nuremberg Diary*, 1947, Signet Book: 1961).

At the end of his trial at Cracow, Höss greeted his death sentence with apparent indifference. Rupert Butler comments as follows:

[Höss] reasoned that Allies had their orders and that there could be absolutely no question of these not being carried out. (*ibid.*)

One could not say it any better. It seems that Rudolf Höss, like thousands of accused Germans turned over to the mercy of

conquerors who were totally convinced of their own goodness, had quickly grasped that he had no other choice but to suffer the will of his judges, whether they came from the West or from the East.

Butler then quickly evokes the case of Hans Frank, the former Governor of Poland. With the same tone of moral satisfaction he recounts the circumstances of Frank's capture and subsequent treatment:

Celebrity status of any kind singularly failed to impress the two coloured GIs who arrested him and made sure he was transported to the municipal prison in Miesbach only after he had been savagely beaten up and flung into a lorry.

A tarpaulin had been thrown over him to hide the more obvious signs of ill-treatment; Frank found the cover useful when he attempted to slash an artery in his left arm.

Clearly, no such easy way out could be permitted; a US army medical officer saved his life and he stood trial at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. (p. 238-239)

Rudolf Höss and Hans Frank were not the only ones to undergo treatment of that kind. Among the most celebrated cases, we know of Julius Streicher, Hans Fritzsche, Oswald Pohl, Franz Ziereis, and Josef Kramer.

But the case of Rudolf Höss is by far the most serious in its consequences. There is no document that proves that the Germans had a policy of exterminating the Jews. Léon Poliakov agreed with this in 1951:

As regards the conception properly called of the plan for a total extermination, the three or four principal actors committed suicide in May of 1945. No document has survived or perhaps has ever existed. (*Bréviaire de la haine: Le IIIe Reich et les Juifs*, Calmann-Levy, 1951, Livre de Poche, 1974, p. 171)

In the absence of any document, historians *à la* Poliakov have repeatedly returned, primarily, to doubtful confessions like those of Kurt Gerstein or of Rudolf Höss, sometimes modifying the texts to suit their convenience.

Bernard Clarke is "today a successful businessman working in the south of England" (*Legions of Death*, 1983, p. 235). One can in fact say that it is *his* voice that was heard at Nuremberg on 15 April 1946, when Assistant Prosecutor Amen read, piece by piece, to an astonished and overwhelmed audience, the supposed confession of Rudolf Höss. On that day was launched a lie of world-wide dimensions: the lie of Auschwitz. At the origins of that prodigious

media event: several Jewish sergeants of British Military Security, including Bernard Clarke, "today a successful businessman working in the south of England."

The Testimony of Moritz von Schirmeister

During the war, Moritz von Schirmeister had been the personal press attaché of Joseph Goebbels. On 29 June 1946, he was interrogated before the IMT as a defense witness for Hans Fritzsche. His deposition was particularly interesting regarding the actual personality of Dr. Goebbels and the attitude of the official German news services toward the flood of atrocity stories about the concentration camps spread during the war by the Allies.

At the end of the war, Moritz von Schirmeister had been arrested by the British and interned in a camp in England, where he was given the task of politically "re-educating" his fellow prisoners. Before testifying at Nuremberg, he was transferred by plane from London to Germany. At first he was kept at Minden-on-the-Weser, which was the principal interrogation center for the British Military Police. From there he was taken by car (31 March–1 April 1946) to the prison at Nuremberg. In the same car rode Rudolf Höss. Moritz von Schirmeister is precisely that "prisoner of war who had been brought over from London as a witness in Fritzsche's defence" about whom Höss speaks in his "memoirs" (see above, p. 393). Thanks to a document that I obtained from American researcher Mark Weber, who gave me a copy of it in Washington in September of 1983 (a document whose exact source I am not yet authorized to indicate), we know that the two Germans were able to talk freely in the car that took them to Nuremberg. In that document, slightly more than two pages long, Moritz von Schirmeister reports, as regarding the charges hanging over Höss, that Höss confided to him:

Gewiss, ich habe unterschrieben, dass ich 2½ Millionen Juden umgebracht habe. Aber ich hätte genausogut unterschrieben, dass es 5 Millionen Juden gewesen sind. Es gibt eben Methoden, mit denen man jedes Geständnis erreichen kann — ob es nun wahr ist oder nicht.

"Certainly, I signed a statement that I killed two and a half million Jews. But I could just as well have said that it was five million Jews. There are certain methods by which any confession can be obtained, whether it is true or not."

Another Confession Signed by Rudolf Höss

The British torturers of Rudolf Höss had no reason to exercise any restraint. After making him sign document NO-1210 at 2:30 in the morning of the 14th or 15th of March 1946, they obtained a new signature from him on March 16, this time at the bottom of a text in English, written in an English handwriting style, with a blank in the space where the name of the place ought to have been given. His guards made him sign a simple note written in English:

Statement made voluntarily at _____ Gaol by Rudolf Höss, former Commandant of Auschwitz Concentration Camp on 16th day of March 1946.

I personally arranged on orders received from Himmler in May 1941 the gassing of two million persons between June/July 1941 and the end of 1943 during which time I was commandant of Auschwitz.

signed.
Rudolf Höss,
SS-Stubhr.
Eh. (?) Kdt. v. Auschwitz-Birkenau

(even the word "signed" was written in an English hand).

The Auschwitz Myth

We have known for some time that the Auschwitz myth is of an exclusively Jewish origin. Arthur R. Butz has related the facts in his book, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, as has Wilhelm Stäglich in *The Auschwitz Myth*. The principal authors of the creation and the peddling of the "rumor of Auschwitz" have been, successively, two Slovaks, Alfred Wetzler (or Weczler) and Rudolf Vrba (or Rosenberg or Rosenthal); then a Hungarian, Rabbi Michael Dov Ber Weissmandel (or Weissmandl); then, in Switzerland, representatives of the World Jewish Congress like Gerhard Riegner, who were in touch with London and Washington; and finally Americans like Harry Dexter White, Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Rabbi Stephen Samuel Wise. Thus was born the famous World Refugee Board Report on Auschwitz and Birkenau, published in Washington in November 1944. Copies of this report were included in the files of the judges advocate general in charge of prosecuting the Germans involved in the Auschwitz camp. It constituted the official version of the story of the alleged gassing of the Jews in that camp. Most probably it was used as a reference

work by the inquirers-interrogators-torturers of "the Commandant of Auschwitz. All the names here mentioned are those of Jews. Moreover we now see that Bernard Clarke, the first British torturer, was a Jew. The second British torturer, Major Draper (?), may also have been a Jew. The same for the two Americans: psychologist G.M. (Gustave Mahler) Gilbert and Colonel Harlan Amen. Finally, in Poland, Höss was faced with Polish Jews who treated him more or less the same way. When he wrote his "memoirs" it was under the supervision of instructing magistrate Jan Sehn, who was also probably a Jew.

Establishment historians dispute that Höss had been tortured and had confessed under duress. Since the publication of Rupert Butler's book in 1983, however, it is no longer possible for them to contest that. The Revisionists were right.

Since 1985 it is even less possible. In January-March 1985, the trial of Ernst Zündel, who was accused by a Jewish association and by the Crown of spreading Revisionist literature, took place in Toronto (Canada). Rudolf Vrba testified as a Crown witness. (He lives now in British Columbia). Affirmative and self-assured as long as he answered the questions of the Crown, he suffered a spectacular rout when cross-examined by Ernst Zündel's lawyer, Doug Christie. For the first time since 1945 a Jewish witness to the alleged gassings in Auschwitz was asked to explain his affirmations and his figures. The result was so terrible for R. Vrba that finally the Crown itself gave a kind of coup de grace to its key witness. That unexpected event and some others (like the leading specialist of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg, being caught red-handed in his lies) really made of the "Toronto Trial" the "Trial of the Nuremberg Trial."

The unintentional revelations of Rupert Butler in 1983 and the unexpected revelations of the "Toronto Trial" in 1985 have succeeded at last in showing entirely and clearly how the Auschwitz myth was fabricated from 1944 to 1947, to be exact from April 1944, when Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler are supposed to have escaped from Auschwitz to tell their story to the world up until April 1947, when Rudolf Höss was hanged after having supposedly told the same world his own story about Auschwitz.

It is remarkable that from beginning to end that story comes from essentially or perhaps even exclusively Jewish sources. Two Jewish liars (Vrba and Wetzler) from Slovakia convinced or seem to have convinced other Jews from Hungary, Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, and Poland. This is not a conspiracy or a plot; it is the story of the birth of a religious belief: the myth of Auschwitz, center of the religion of the Holocaust.

Das Geständnis von Rudolf Höß

Statement made voluntarily at *gaol*
by Rudolf Höß, former Commandant of
Auschwitz Concentration Camp, in the City of March 1946

I personally arranged on orders received from Himmler
in May 1941 the gassing of two million persons between
June/July 1941 and the end of 1943 during which
time I was Commandant of Auschwitz.

signed.
Rudolf Höß
1st Officer
L. Art. Auschwitz-Gefängnis

This photograph was published after p. 161 of Lord Russell of Liverpool's *Geißel der Menschheit*, Berlin, Verlag Volk und Welt, 1960. The title of the original book in English is *The Scourge of the Swastika*. The caption of the photo says: "The Confession of Rudolf Höß." It is not NO-1210 or PS-3868 but only a very short text of 16 March 1946. You will note the difference between the handwriting of the text of the confession and Höß's own handwriting. In his introduction to the English edition of *Commandant in Auschwitz* Lord Russell claims to furnish some information on the conditions in which Höß had to sign that note, but, since he commits errors in the chronology of the events in that regard, his information is to be received with reservations. (See *Commandant in Auschwitz*, p. 18.)



The second photo was published as photo #22 in Tom Bower, *Blind Eye to Murder* (Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany — A Pledge Betrayed), Granada: London, Toronto, Sydney, New York, 1981. The caption of the photo says: "Colonel Gerald Draper of the British War Crimes Group photographed as he finally secured the confession of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, to the murder of three million people." As one remembers, Höss said in his "memoirs": "I received further rough treatment at the hands of the English public prosecutor, a major" (*Commandant in Auschwitz*, p. 174). Did this major become a colonel and was his name "Draper"?

Adolf Galland



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Buchenwald: Legend and Reality

MARK WEBER

Buchenwald is widely regarded as one of wartime Germany's most notorious "death camps." In fact, though, this carefully cultivated image bears little resemblance to reality. Today, more than forty years after the end of the Second World War, the camp deserves another, more objective look.

History and Function

The Buchenwald concentration camp was located on a wooded hill outside of Weimar, in what is now East Germany. It was opened in July 1937. Until the war years, almost all the inmates were either professional criminals or political prisoners (most of them ardent Communists). Some 2,300 Buchenwald inmates were pardoned in 1939 in honor of Hitler's 50th birthday.

At the outbreak of war in September 1939 the camp population was 5,300. This grew slowly to 12,000 in early 1943, and then increased rapidly as many foreign workers, especially Poles, Ukrainians and Russians, were brought for employment in war production.¹

During the war years Buchenwald was expanded into a vast complex of more than a hundred satellite factories, mines and work shops spread across a large portion of Germany. The most important of these was probably the Dora underground plant, which

produced V-2 missiles. In October 1944 it became the independent Nordhausen (Mittelbau) camp.²

Many thousands of Jews arrived at Buchenwald from Hungary and various eastern camps in 1944 and 1945. Most had been evacuated by railroad from Auschwitz and other camps threatened by the advancing Red Army.³

The number of inmates increased enormously during the final months of the war: 34,000 in November 1943, 44,000 in April 1944, and 80,000 in August 1944. A monthly peak was reached at the end of February 1945, when 86,000 inmates were crammed into the severely overcrowded camp. Almost 30,000 inmates were evacuated from Buchenwald during the week before the U.S. Army takeover on 11 April 1945. Altogether a total of 239,000 persons were interned in the camp between 1937 and April 1945.⁴

The Commandant and His Wife

The first Commandant, Karl Koch, ran Buchenwald from 1937 until early 1942, when he was transferred to Majdanek. He proved a notoriously brutal and corrupt administrator who enriched himself with valuables stolen from numerous inmates, whom he then had killed to cover up his thefts. The camp physician, Dr. Waldemar Hoven, murdered many inmates in cooperation with Koch and the Communist underground camp organization. Koch was eventually charged by an SS court with murder and corruption, found guilty and executed.⁵

His wife, Ilse Koch, was involved in many of her husband's crimes, but the fantastic charge that she had lamp shades and other items manufactured from the skins of murdered inmates is not true. This allegation was made by the United States prosecution team at the main Nuremberg trial.⁶

General Lucius D. Clay, Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany, 1947-49, carefully reviewed the Ilse Koch case in 1948 and found that, whatever her other misdeeds, the lampshade charge was baseless. He commuted her sentence from life imprisonment to four years and informed the Army Department in Washington: "There is no convincing evidence that she [Ilse Koch] selected inmates for extermination in order to secure tattooed skins or that she possessed any articles made of human skin."⁷ During a 1976 interview Clay recalled the case:

We tried Ilse Koch. ...She was sentenced to life imprisonment, and I commuted it to three [four] years. And our press really didn't like that.

She had been destroyed by the fact that an enterprising reporter who first went into her house had given her the beautiful name, the "Bitch of Buchenwald," and he had found some white lampshades in there which he wrote up as being made out of human flesh.

Well, it turned out actually that it was goat flesh. But at the trial it was still human flesh. It was almost impossible for her to have gotten a fair trial.

...The Germans picked her up and gave her 12 years for her treatment of her own people. But it wasn't really a war crime in the strict sense of the word.

And those are the kinds of things that we had to deal with all the time.⁸

The Inmates: Life and Death

There is no question that many atrocities were committed against Buchenwald inmates. However, at least a very large portion of them were committed, not by the German SS guards, but by the underground Communist camp organization that gained almost total internal control after 1943. This remarkable situation was confirmed in a detailed U.S. Army intelligence document of 24 April 1945 entitled *Buchenwald: A Preliminary Report*.⁹ This confidential analysis remained classified until 1972.

In a short preface, Army intelligence chief Alfred Toombs called this secret report "one of the most significant accounts yet written on an aspect of life in Nazi Germany" because it "tells how the [Buchenwald] prisoners themselves organized a deadly terror within the Nazi terror." The general accuracy of the report had been independently confirmed, Toombs added.

As large numbers of foreigners began arriving at the camp during the war years, the confidential report noted, the understaffed SS found it necessary to turn over an ever larger share of camp administration to the inmates themselves. In practice this meant that by 1943 the well-organized and disciplined Communist inmate organization had taken virtually total control of the camp's internal operation. As the report explained:

The trustees had wide powers over their fellow inmates. At first they were drawn almost exclusively from the German criminals. This period lasted until 1942. But gradually the Communists began to gain control of this organization. They were the oldest residents, with records of 10-12 years in the concentration camps... They clung together with remarkable tenacity, whereas the criminal elements were simply out for their own individual welfare and had little group cohesiveness. The Communists maintained excellent discipline and received a certain amount of direction from outside the camp. They had brains and technical qualifications for running the various industries

established at the camp.

Their advances were not made without resistance from the criminals, but gradually the criminals were eliminated from power, partly by intimidation, partly with the aid of the SS. Numbers of the criminals were killed by beatings, hangings, or injections of phenol into the heart or of air or milk into the veins. The injections were a specialty of the camp doctor [Hoven], who became a partisan of the Communist faction.

Besides the top positions in the trusty organization, there were a number of key Communist strongholds in the administration of the camp. One was the food supply organization, through which favored groups received reasonable rations while others were brought to the starvation level. A second was the hospital, staffed almost exclusively by Communists. Its facilities were largely devoted to caring for members of their party... Another Communist stronghold was the Property Room... Each German trusty obtained good clothing and numerous other valuables. The Communists of Buchenwald, after ten or twelve years in concentration camps, are dressed like prosperous business men. Some affect leather jackets and little round caps reminiscent of the German navy, apparently the uniform of revolution.

As a result of all this:

...Instead of a heap of corpses or a disorderly mob of starving, leaderless men, the Americans [who captured the camp] found a disciplined and efficient organization in Buchenwald. Credit is undoubtedly due to the self-appointed Camp Committee, an almost purely Communist group under the domination of the German political leaders.

...The trusties, who in time became almost exclusively Communist Germans, had the power of life and death over all other inmates. They could sentence a man or a group to almost certain death... The Communist trusties were directly responsible for a large part of the brutalities committed at Buchenwald.

Communist block chiefs, the report stated, would personally beat their charges and "sometimes forced whole blocks to stand barefoot in the snow for hours, apparently on their own initiative." The Communists killed "large numbers" of Polish inmates who refused to submit to their rule. They forced French inmates to give up thousands of Red Cross parcels. The report mentioned several particularly brutal Communist camp leaders by name.

It confirmed that the camp physician, Dr. Hoven, had been an important Communist ally who killed numerous criminal and anti-Communist political prisoners with lethal injections. An SS investigation team uncovered his activities during the war and sentenced him to death for murder. However, because of the critical wartime shortage of doctors, he was reprieved after 18 months in jail. After the war the Communists tried to protect their ally, but

Hoven was sentenced to death for a second time by a U.S. military tribunal and executed in 1948.

Camp Communists maintained close relations with the well-organized underground Communist party on the outside. "From Buchenwald an inmate went out regularly to establish contact with a Communist courier bringing news and instructions. Bound by his loyalty to the Party, the contact man never made use of his opportunity to escape personally." The Communist camp military organization had three machine guns, fifty rifles and a number of hand grenades. The German Communists lived better than any other group. "Even now," the report noted, "they may be distinguished from the rest of the inmates by their rosy cheeks and robust health, though they have been in concentration camps for much longer than the others."

Finally, the report's authors warned against the simplistic and naive notion that former inmates should be trusted and helped just because they had been interned in German camps. "Some are in fact 'bandits,' criminals from all Europe or foreign workers in Germany who were caught stealing... They are brutalized, unpleasant to look on. It is easy to adopt the Nazi theory that they are subhuman."

A book published in 1961 by the Communist-run "International Buchenwald Committee" of East Berlin proudly describes the wartime activities of the camp's Communist underground. It ran an underground camp newspaper, an illegal radio transmitter, an inmate orchestra (which played Communist songs), a large library and even a military organization. It held Communist ceremonies and political meetings, and carried out extensive sabotage of German war production.¹⁰

Former Buchenwald inmate Ernst Federn, a Jew, explained after the war how the Communist camp organization cooperated with the SS to increase its own power and eliminate opponents and undesirables. He recalled that the leader of the Jewish section of the Communist camp organization, Emil Carlebach, "declared quite frankly that for him only his [Communist] friends counted, that everybody else might as well perish." Federn reported that he personally witnessed two acts of brutality by Carlebach, who was a Block Senior from 1942 until 1945. In one case he ordered the death of a fellow Jewish inmate for allegedly mistreating inmates at another camp. On another occasion Carlebach personally beat an elderly Jewish inmate from Turkey to death because he had unavoidably relieved himself in the barracks.¹¹

Similarly, an Englishman who spent 15 months in Buchenwald reported after the war that the Communist camp organization did not

consider the Jewish inmates particularly worth trying to keep alive.¹²

In recent years some homosexual organizations have claimed that thousands of homosexuals were "systematically exterminated" in the German concentration camps. While it is true that many were interned as criminals, no homosexual was ever killed by the Germans for that reason alone. It is also worth recalling that during the 1930s and 1940s, homosexual behavior was considered an odious crime in most of the world, including the United States.

A former Buchenwald inmate recalled in 1981: "...Homosexuals were oppressed by the Nazis because of their social mores... In Buchenwald, a great number of them were not killed by the Nazis, but by political prisoners [Communists], because of the homosexuals' aggressive and offensive behavior."¹³

Day-to-day conditions were much better than most portrayals would suggest. Inmates could both receive and send two letters or postcards monthly. They could receive money from the outside. Inmates were also paid for their labor with special camp currency which they could use to purchase a wide variety of items in the camp canteen. They played soccer, handball and volleyball in their spare time. Soccer matches were held on Saturdays and Sundays on the camp playing field. A large camp library offered a wide range of books. A motion picture theater was very popular. There were also variety shows, and musical groups put on regular concerts in the central square. A camp brothel, which employed 15 prostitutes when the Americans arrived, was available to many inmates.¹⁴

Extermination Factory?

The Americans who arrived at Buchenwald in April 1945 found hundreds of sick inmates and many unburied corpses in the camp. Horrific photos of these gruesome scenes were immediately circulated throughout the world and have been widely reproduced ever since, giving the impression that Buchenwald was a diabolical mass killing center.

The American government encouraged this impression. A U.S. Army report about Buchenwald prepared for the Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe and made public at the end of April 1945 declared that the "mission of the camp" was "an extermination factory."¹⁵ And two weeks later a U.S. Congressional report on German camps, later used as a Nuremberg trial document, was issued which likewise described Buchenwald as an "extermination factory."¹⁶

This superficially plausible description is, however, completely wrong. The great majority of those who died at Buchenwald perished during the chaotic final months of the war. They succumbed to disease, often aggravated by malnutrition, in spite of woefully inadequate efforts to keep them alive. They were victims, not of an "extermination" program, but rather of the terrible overcrowding and severe lack of food and medical supplies due to a general collapse of order in Germany during the tumultuous final phase of the war.

Along with these indirect victims of the war were many healthy inmates. B.M. McKelway inspected Buchenwald shortly after the U.S. takeover as one of a group of American newspaper editors and publishers. He reported that "many of the hundreds of inmates we saw appeared to be healthy while others suffering from dysentery, typhus, tuberculosis and other diseases were living skeletons."¹⁷

One striking indication that Buchenwald was not an "extermination" camp is the fact that some of the internees were children too young to work. An estimated one thousand boys, aged two to 16, were housed in two special children's barracks. Train transports of Jewish children arrived from 1942 to 1945. Some arrived from Auschwitz in 1943. Other Jewish children came from Hungary and Poland.¹⁸ The confidential U.S. Army report of 24 April 1945 noted the "most remarkable sight of the children" who "rush about, shrieking and playing."¹⁹

Thirty years after the war, even famed "Nazi hunter" Simon Wiesenthal conceded that "there were no extermination camps on German soil."²⁰

The Gas Chamber Lie

Perhaps the most vicious lie circulated after the war about Buchenwald is the charge that the Germans exterminated inmates there in gas chambers. An official French government report submitted to the Nuremberg tribunal as a prosecution exhibit imaginatively stated: "Everything had been provided for down to the smallest detail. In 1944, at Buchenwald, they had even lengthened a railway line so that the deportees might be led directly to the gas chamber. Certain [of the gas chambers] had a floor that tipped and immediately directed the bodies into the room with the crematory oven."²¹ The chief British prosecutor at the main Nuremberg trial, Sir Hartley Shawcross, declared in his closing address that "murder [was] conducted like some mass production

industry in the gas chambers and the ovens" of Buchenwald and other camps.²²

In a book published in 1947, French priest Georges Henocque, former chaplain of the Saint-Cyr Military Academy, claimed to have visited the inside of a Buchenwald gas chamber, which he described in detail. This particular story has been cited as a good example of the kind of Holocaust lies which even prominent personalities are capable of inventing.²³

Another French priest and former inmate, Jean-Paul Renard, made a similar claim about the camp in his own book published shortly after the war: "I saw thousands and thousands of persons going into the showers. Instead of liquid, asphyxiating gases poured out over them." When fellow Frenchman and former Buchenwald inmate Paul Rassinier pointed out to the priest that there was no gas chamber in the camp, Renard replied: "Right, but that's only a figure of speech...and since those things existed somewhere, it's not important."²⁴

In a book published in 1948, Hungarian Jewish writer Eugene Levai charged that the Germans killed tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews at Buchenwald in gas chambers.²⁵

A widely distributed booklet issued by the Jewish Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith also spread the tale that people were gassed at Buchenwald.²⁶

In 1960 the Buchenwald gassing story was officially declared a fable. In that year, Martin Broszat of the anti-Hitler Institute for Contemporary History in Munich specifically stated that no one was ever gassed at Buchenwald.²⁷ Professor A.S. Balachowsky, a member of the Institut de France, likewise declared in November 1971: "I would like to confirm to you that no gas chamber as such existed at Buchenwald...."²⁸ Holocaust writer Konnilyn Feig conceded in her book, *Hitler's Death Camps*, that Buchenwald did not have a gas chamber.²⁹ Today no serious historian still claims gassings there.

How Many Perished?

The numbers of persons estimated to have perished at Buchenwald while it was under German control vary tremendously. According to former inmate Elie Wiesel, the prolific Jewish writer and 1986 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, "In Buchenwald they sent 10,000 to their deaths every day."³⁰ This wildly irresponsible statement is, unfortunately, all too typical of the glib rhetoric of the man who was also chosen to head the U.S. government's official

Holocaust Memorial Council.

The 1980 edition of the *World Book Encyclopedia* claimed that "more than 100,000" died in the camp.³¹ The *Encyclopaedia Judaica* put the number at 56,549.³² Raul Hilberg, writing in the 1982 edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, stated that "more than 50,000 died in the Buchenwald complex."³³

The U.S. Army intelligence report of 24 April 1945 (cited above) noted that the total number of certified deaths was 32,705.³⁴ A detailed June 1945 U.S. government report about Buchenwald put the total at 33,462, of whom more than 20,000 died in the chaotic final months of the war.³⁵

The authoritative International Tracing Service of Arolsen, an affiliate of the International Red Cross, stated in 1984 that the number of documented deaths (of both Jews and non-Jews) at Buchenwald was 20,671, with another 7,463 for Dora (Mittelbau).³⁶

While even these lower figures are regrettably high, it is important to realize that the great majority of those who died at Buchenwald were unfortunate victims of a catastrophic war, not Germany policy. Most of the rest were murdered by order of the Communist underground camp organization. Several hundred were also killed in Allied bombing attacks.

In one air raid against a large munitions factory near the main camp, British bombers killed 750 persons, including 400 inmates.³⁷

American and Soviet Atrocities

Following the American takeover of Buchenwald in April 1945, about 80 remaining German guards and camp functionaries were summarily murdered. Inmates brutally beat the Germans to death, sometimes with the aid and encouragement of American soldiers.³⁸ Between 20 and 30 GIs took turns gleefully beating six young Germans to death.³⁹ Inmates also commandeered American jeeps and drove to nearby Weimar, where they looted and randomly killed German civilians.⁴⁰

After the war the Soviet secret police operated Buchenwald as a concentration camp for "potential class enemies" and other "possibly dangerous" German civilians. In September 1949, more than four years after the end of the war, there were still 14,300 inmates in the "special camp." (While Buchenwald was under German control, the number of inmates did not reach 14,000 until May 1943.) Conditions were horrible. Even the Soviet official in charge of the concentration camps in Germany, General Merkulov, acknowledged the severe lack of order and cleanliness, particularly

at Buchenwald. At least 13,000 and as many as 21,000 persons died in Soviet-run Buchenwald, but no one has ever been punished for the deaths and mistreatment in this notorious postwar camp.⁴¹

One former inmate described his "five years of horrible seclusion, humiliations, interrogations and annihilation" in the Soviet-run camp in these words:

People were mere numbers. Their dignity was consciously trampled upon. They were starved without mercy and consumed by tuberculosis until they were skeletons. The annihilation process, which had been well tested over decades, was systematic. The cries and groans of those in pain still echo in my ears whenever the past comes back to me in sleepless nights. We had to watch helplessly as people perished according to plan — like creatures sacrificed to annihilation.

Many nameless people were caught up in the annihilation machinery of the NKVD [Soviet secret police] after the collapse of 1945. They were herded together like cattle after the so-called liberation and vegetated in the many concentration camps. Many were systematically tortured to death. A memorial was built for the dead of the Buchenwald concentration camp. A figure of death victims was chosen based on fantasy. Intentionally, only the dead of the 1937–1945 period were honored. Why is there no memorial honoring the dead of 1945 to 1950? Countless mass graves were dug around the camp in the postwar period.⁴²

In an act of stunning hypocrisy, the Communist rulers of the post-war "German Democratic Republic" have turned the Buchenwald camp area into a kind of secular shrine. Every year, hundreds of thousands visit the site, complete with museums, bell tower, monumental sculpture and memorials dedicated, ironically enough, to the "victims of fascism."⁴³ There is nothing to remind visitors of the thousands of forgotten Germans who perished miserably during the years after the war when the camp was run by the Soviets.

The story of Buchenwald, like the story of virtually every German wartime concentration camp, is a microcosm of the entire Holocaust tale. The widely-accepted portrayal of Buchenwald, like those of the other German camps, contrasts sharply with the little-known reality.

Notes

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THE **BLOND KNIGHT OF GERMANY**



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The Great Brown Scare: The Amerika-Deutscher Bund in the Thirties and the Hounding of Fritz Julius Kuhn

PETER H. PEEL

A note on the title: Liberal-Establishment historians have an all too effective propaganda device to promote approved ideologies. They invent labels which, in due course, are thoughtlessly parroted and tend to set the desired concepts in concrete, obviating any further need for argument. Thus the raids carried out by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on subversive and revolutionary Communist groups, mostly on New York's Lower East Side, in 1919 and 1920, have been derisively labeled "The Great Red Scare." This neatly glosses over the very real threat such groups constituted in the early days of Bolshevik euphoria and proselytizing and the horrors taking place concurrently not only in Russia but in Bavaria, Hungary, and elsewhere under Communist regimes. The potent label "McCarthyism" is a later example of the use of this tactic to deflect any expression of concern about subversive conspiracies. The "Bund," however, which is the subject of this paper, was never, as I will show, a danger or in any way unpatriotic or subversive. Its enthusiasm for the recovery of German pride, self-confidence, economy, and independence after 1933 was a natural enough emotion in an ethnic and cultural minority, especially one which had suffered great humiliation and persecution during the recent war. But there were many and powerful special interest swchich sought, with considerable success, to create the image of a frightful menace in the Bund. I have therefore chosen to call this paper by the title above. Besides, even the color "brown" seems a more appropriate modifier for the noun "scare."

In the feverish eight years of world history immediately preceding the entry of the United States into World War II, there streaked across the American political firmament a rather noisy meteor officially called Das Amerikadeutscher Bund, more generally referred to as the German-American Bund or simply as the Bund. In its brief lifetime, the Bund was the object of much hostility, suspicion and fear. It had an almost universally "bad press" and wild exaggerations concerning its aims, its size and its resources were uttered with patent self-interest and *arrières pensées* by a number of politicians, journalists and assorted public figures. Yet post-war historians usually dismiss the Bund in a sentence or two when writing general histories of the American thirties. For example:

The Bund appeared to be more powerful than it was. It attracted so few members and aroused so much antagonism that the Third Reich severed its ties with this stupid and noisy organization which it recognized to be a liability.¹

The tone is still hostile and derogatory but one should recall this when reading the wild accusations by influential politicians and others (*vide infra*) that its funds and its programs were provided directly from Berlin. The same writer just cited offers an apparently contradictory assessment of the Bund's strength, however, when he tells us that in February, 1939, "22,000 members and sympathizers of the German-American Bund packed Madison Square Garden."²

When I first became interested in the history of the Bund about twenty years ago, there was not only no scholarly study of it or of Fritz Kuhn but not even a popular account.³ Not until 1974 does any such appear and inevitably it is polemical and hostile in tone.⁴

The Bund itself maintained few records. Its newspaper, *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*, is virtually unobtainable, and former members are now dead or elderly and fearful and unwilling to identify themselves or to be interviewed or quoted. Nevertheless, contemporary magazines and newspapers provide us with a great deal of information from which it is relatively easy to filter out mere invective and diatribe.

The questions to be addressed in this paper are as follows: What were the ideological, emotional and historical roots of the Bund and how did its enemies encompass its destruction and wreak vengeance upon its leadership? The Bund was, after all, itself a reaction. It was certainly not a "Goethe Society." And it did not spring into existence fully grown like Pallas Athene from the head of Zeus. In its final form was it a tactless, overly vocal, overly demonstrative reaction of largely unsophisticated elements to a painful and

humiliating ethnic experience? Or was it, as its enemies alleged, a sinister and subversive alien conspiracy and a nest of treason?

Richard O'Connor, discussing Sinclair Lewis's contemporary cautionary novel, *It Can't Happen Here*, tells us:

"It" never did happen here, or even come close to happening. Fascism...was *opera bouffe*. Its promoters were clowns and its followers slightly demented sheep. A Nuremberg-type rally in Madison Square Garden, with all its sweating solemnity and raucous appeals to unreason, was an hilarious spectacle when looked back upon.⁵

The passage just cited was published nearly thirty years after the demise of the Bund and the reader may consider it to be evidence of the persistence of unmitigated dislike for the Bund even among authors who, like O'Connor, are generally admiring of *Deutschtum* and the German record in the United States since colonial times.

Arthur Smith (*vide supra*, n.2) remarked to this writer that the Bund was "largely playacting."⁶ Is this consistent with a sinister menace, one must ask. *Time* describes the *Bundesleiter* thus: "No great shakes as a chemist was *simple, earnest* Fritz Kuhn" [emphasis added].⁷ On the other hand, O'Connor says:

But appearances were deceiving in Kuhn's case. Actually he was a well-educated man, if not an intellectual. After the war he had attended the University of Munich and received a master's degree in science.⁸

Contradictions abound. On the one hand, we have an entirely undocumented assertion by Harold Lavine of the Institute of Propaganda Analysis that Dr. Goebbels had "created" the Bund;⁹ on the other hand, we have the utter failure of successive official investigations to demonstrate any connection between the Bund and the Reich government bureaux beyond a natural and unconcealed exchange of literature. A feature article in the *New York Times* as late as February, 1939, concludes: "There has been no evidence of any active support of nazism [sic] in America on the part of the Nazi [sic] diplomatic force in this country."¹⁰ Even Alton Frye, a virulently hostile commentator, says:

Since it employed the appurtenances of a Nazi organization, the general conclusion was that the Bund received its directions ultimately from the Reich. This was not strictly true, but the Bund readily adapted itself to the will of the Nazi Party without the need of specific instructions. Shortly after the founding of the Bund, Kuhn led a delegation to Berlin for the 1936 Olympics, where he was received

briefly by Hitler. This is the only known meeting between Kuhn and the Führer and there is no evidence that Hitler attached any special significance to it.¹¹

According to Frye, Kuhn nevertheless claimed to Bund members that he had concluded a secret agreement with Hitler, which Frye clearly disbelieves. As we shall see, Kuhn's tendency to brag a little became a source of some embarrassment to Germany and a cache, *gratis*, of all kinds of ammunition for his enemies. One of the most energetic and implacable of those enemies was Congressman Samuel Dickstein. Dickstein, testifying at one of the interminable investigations, claimed to have knowledge of the details of secret discussions between Kuhn and Hitler. As history has shown to the present day, Dickstein's is an imaginative race. We may, perhaps, warm to Kuhn a little for his reply to Dickstein's charge. Quoting a contemporary radio comic, Kuhn said, "Vas you dere, Sharley?"

The Historical Experience of Germans in America

It is necessary in the course of explaining the roots of the Bund to offer at least a synoptic sketch of the role of the German element in this history of the United States. Construed as a minority ethnic group, Germans constitute probably the largest single element, exceeding even the Irish, with whom they have intermarried considerably. Estimates for those of German or part-German descent range up to 52 million, far exceeding the Blacks and, at least for a while, the "Hispanic" hordes pouring across the Rio Grande.

The usual date given for the arrival of the first Germans in the colonies is 1683, but one writer has asserted that the "damned Dutch" in Jamestown in 1607 were actually the first.¹² The "Dutch" governor of New Amsterdam, Peter Minuit, was born in Wesel on the Rhine, and about 1664, Johann Prinz arrived in New Sweden (now Delaware) with fifty-four German families from Pomerania.¹³ The story of Jacob Leisler, the second governor of New York in the confused period of the English "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, is well known.

The first permanent and wholly German settlement did indeed take place in 1683, when Germantown, Pennsylvania was founded. The German immigrants of 1683 were Protestants of various fundamentalist sects. Francis Daniel Pastorius, their leader, was an educated man, but German immigrants, in 1683 and thereafter, were tradesmen, skilled artisans and farmers. Huebner lists carpenters, locksmiths, shoemakers and tailors.¹⁴

During the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713), large numbers of poor refugees began arriving from the Rhineland, devastated by the aggressive designs of Louis XIV. In the single year of 1709, more than 600 families were shipped to the Carolinas. After the large influx of Hessians, many of whom stayed on after the Revolutionary War, German immigration continued at a fairly modest level. It began to increase again in the period 1830-1850 and positively exploded after 1852, amounting to perhaps a half a million in a very few years.¹⁵ Again the preponderance seems to have been workmen, small tradesmen and peasants, although there was a fairly sizeable contingent of liberal intellectuals — refugees from the failed revolutions of 1848.

In the sunnier days before Europe began its suicidal "Peloponnesian Wars," Germans in America had no doubts about their successful integration into American life. Germans played a major role in the Federal Army during the War between the States. The XI Corps of the Union Army contained two entirely German divisions and the name of Carl Schurz is prominent in the history of the period. Germans also played an important part in the Westward Movement.

Wine flowed from German vineyards, gold from German-discovered mines, wheat from virgin prairies broken by diligent and skillful German farmers, and blood from Indians who fought the cavalry regiments with their large proportion of German troopers.¹⁶

During the epoch between the Gilded Age and the outbreak of World War I, a number of German families moved up socially and were assimilated into the then Anglo-Saxon Establishment. Chief among them were the big brewing families of St. Louis and Milwaukee and the meat barons of Chicago. But for the Swabian and Bavarian peasants, the Austrian and German waiters and beer-garden proprietors, a certain, sentimental *Heimweh* (homesickness) was always present. The Songfest at the local Turnverein Halle (gym) was at least as natural and *gemütlich* (innocently cheerful) as a *Cinco de Mayo* parade in Los Angeles or St. Patrick's Day in New York.

The unification of Germany under Bismarck, though incomplete without German Austria, was by 1871 a source of great and justifiable pride for persons of German ancestry everywhere. So was the seemingly miraculous victory over erstwhile mighty France in six short months. Germans had no longer to smart under a somewhat patronizing view of them as rather quaint peasants and pedagogues with a medieval social structure.

In the late nineteenth century there reigned an era of great good will between the United States and Germany. German universities attracted many American students and the American university system itself was modeled after that of Germany and not, as one might have expected, after Oxford and Cambridge. German immigrants were encouraged and welcomed because of their enterprise, hard work, and respect for the law.

Not very long after the outbreak of World War I in 1914, this affection and admiration was to undergo an almost total *volte face* from which it never recovered. It is not necessary here to dissertate upon the causes of this change of heart. It was essentially due to the extremely effective and one-sided propaganda to which the American public was exposed. The effect, however, was that even before the entry of the United States into the war, public sentiment in the United States had become virulently anti-German. And the understandable reaction of German publications in the United States to defend their ancestral land only succeeded in exacerbating the hostility.

Huebner and O'Connor are both very graphic on the subject of the German-American reaction to Allied propaganda and the enormous advantage that the propaganda had in English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon dominated America.

When eminent Americans of German ancestry defended the Central Powers with the same passion which innumerable other Americans were bringing to the support of the *Entente*, they were dismayed to find that in their case such efforts were held to be akin to treason. Their response — as human as it was unwise — was to speak with only greater anger and violence.¹⁷

Referring to the last months of 1916, O'Connor points out that "German-Americans" were now "only a few months away from the most traumatic moment in their history as part of American life."¹⁸ Huebner writes that at this critical period, the inability of the Central Powers to present their case fairly and the incessant denunciation of everything German caused many German-Americans to become even more pro-German than they might otherwise have been. They bitterly resented the epithet "Hun" applied to themselves and to their kin in Europe as well as President Wilson's contemptuous remarks about "hyphenated Americans" and his doubts as to their loyalty.¹⁹

In describing H.L. Mencken's biting attack in 1920 on those "who had fought the war with their mouths" — the bullying of elderly German waiters for example — O'Connor has the following very interesting sentence for those of us who have witnessed the

same propaganda warmed over for use in the Second World War.

Nor did Mr. Mencken believe that posterity should overlook the *New York Tribune* liar who invented the story about the German plant for converting the corpses of the slain to soap.²⁰

The teaching of the German language was forbidden by statute in twenty-six states.²¹ Even Hermann Hagedorn, a great friend of Theodore Roosevelt, was suspected because of his German name and the fact that his water-tower "commanded" the arms factory at Bridgeport, six miles away.²²

The venomous hysteria even extended to the animal world and the lives of dachshunds, schnauzers, weimaraners and German shepherds (temporarily renamed Alsatians) were made miserable by small boys aping their super-patriot fathers.²³

The end of it all, of course, was what John Maynard Keynes called "the Carthaginian Peace": the *Diktat* of Versailles. Not only Germans but even among Germany's former enemies there was a growing number of those who felt a great revulsion at the spectacle of the victorious democracies exulting in their unbridled orgy of revenge, and who perceived in the vicious spite of the victors the seedbed of another war. Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation at Versailles, wrote:

We came to Paris confident that the new order was about to be established; we left it convinced that the new order had merely fouled up the old... conscious that the treaties imposed on our enemies were neither just nor wise... that seldom in the history of man has such vindictiveness cloaked itself in such unctuous sophistry.²⁴

If Englishmen could harbor such sentiments, it is hardly to be wondered at that the shock and horror at the *Diktat* and the real or apparent cynical betrayal of the promise of a just peace implicit in Wilson's "Fourteen Points" were infinitely more acute among Germans and German-Americans. It is also pertinent to note that despite the starvation and misery of the immediate post-war period in Germany, the moral *stigma* which was forced upon Germany by the "war guilt" clause (Article 231) burned as a deeper humiliation and injustice in the German soul than the physical deprivation of food, territory, armaments or money. O'Connor writes of the lingering resentment of German-Americans for their treatment and their suspicion in the thirties that "F.D.R. was heading towards another

intervention in Europe."²⁵ It was undoubtedly this sense of injustice and persecution which accounts for a certain degree of stridency in the public utterances of the Bund and its leaders.

I have quoted O'Connor at some length precisely because his hostility towards the Bund and his description of it as a small minority "infected" with the "Nazi virus" and as a "lunatic fringe" tends, I believe, to lend all the greater verisimilitude to his sympathetic description of the role of Germans in American history. Unencumbered by either love or loathing, we may now approach the study of the Bund itself and its enemies without recourse to the kind of epithets and disclaimers which O'Connor appears to find necessary. That the Bund acted rashly, and sometimes lacked the sensitivity and Levantine subtlety which might better have served the interests it sought to defend, may well be true. But it was surely a very human and natural reaction to the humiliations of World War I and to the Versailles *Diktat* as well as glory and pride in the post-1933 German renaissance. And if, despite its best and most earnest efforts, *Deutschtum* was fated never again to win the affection of pre-war days, it could at least win respect. German-Americans and Germans of the Reich alike could derive a thrill of pride at the new mood of hope, the achievement of full employment, and the general transformation in so short a time from pariah Germany into a Germany which spake with such confidence in the councils of World Powers. This writer as a teenager was a personal witness to that extraordinary and ubiquitous mood of joy and uplift, having spent a vacation in Germany from his native England, at that time plunged in the all-pervading gloom of the Great Depression.

Such was the historical milieu into which the Bund was born.

The Bund and its Enemies

The German-American Bund was, in fact, the third generation of successive organizations in the United States which were sympathetic to Germany and to National Socialism. The first of these was the Nationalsozialistische Vereinigung Teutonia.

[A] number of Hitler's followers fled abroad after the abortive Hitler-Ludendorff *Putsch* of November, 1923, and it would have provided a logical motivation for the formation of a National Socialist organization elsewhere. The founder..., Friedrich Gissibl, had come to the United States in 1923 and probably founded the organization in October, 1924, in Detroit, later moving to Chicago. The life of the *Teutonia* was about seven years.²⁶

The Teutonia was dissolved in March, 1932, and after a confused period during which several insignificant and short-lived groups came and went, was effectually replaced in the summer of 1933 by the Friends of the New Germany.²⁷

In January, 1934, Democratic Congressman Samuel Dickstein of New York obtained Congressional consent for the establishment of a committee to investigate "Nazi activities" in the United States. "It was thought that the Nazis would be sure to exploit the fact that a Jew, Samuel Dickstein, headed a committee investigating Nazi activities...therefore [Congressman John] McCormack was selected as chairman."²⁸ The work of the committee was "to create the image of a widespread conspiracy with truly giant proportions."²⁹ The German Foreign Office was besieged with complaints about the Friends' activities and began to disassociate the government of the Reich from any connection with the organization or with its successor, the Bund.³⁰ Prior to late 1935, these organizations had included in their membership American citizens, both native-born and naturalized, as well as some Reich citizens who were legal resident aliens or temporary residents such as students or businessmen. It is interesting to note that among the native-born American members were some with unimpeachably Anglo-Saxon names. Sympathy for Germany has never been wholly restricted to those of German descent.

In the interests of appeasing the increasingly inflamed teutonophobia in the United States, Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, in October 1935, acting through the Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, issued the *Oktober Direktiv*. This was an order which forbade the participation of Reich citizens in the United States in domestic organizations or societies. Fritz Gissibl, on learning of the *Direktiv*, went to Germany in November where he attempted to persuade the Foreign Ministry to permit those who had taken out their "first papers" (that is, had made the initial application for American citizenship) to remain members of the Friends. He was unsuccessful in this endeavor.³¹

In March, 1936, as a result of both of the *Oktober Direktiv* and of the hostile publicity emanating from the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, a final convention of the Friends was held in Buffalo and the German-American Bund was created, phoenix-like, from the ashes of its predecessor. Fritz Julius Kuhn was elected *Bundesführer* or *Bundesleiter*. Kuhn had been an American citizen since 1934. He was born in Munich on May 15, 1896. He had served in World War I as a lieutenant in the Bavarian army and had been decorated with the Iron Cross. In 1923, he went to Mexico

where he worked as a chemist. Subsequently, he entered the United States as an immigrant and obtained work as an industrial chemist at the Ford plant in Detroit. He became a naturalized citizen on December 3, 1934. While in Mexico, he had married a fellow student whom he had first met at the University of Munich. In due course, his wife, Elsa, presented him with a son and daughter (Walter and Waltraut).

During most of Kuhn's period of leadership in the Bund, he was on unpaid leave-of-absence from the Ford plant, which gave rise to the widespread but unsubstantiated allegation that "certain wealthy industrialists" had financed the Bund. It would appear that "certain interested parties" which had already evinced extreme hostility to Henry Ford saw in the allegations about the Bund's finances an opportunity to fire two salvos for the price of one.

From June 1936 until its dissolution, the characteristic activities of the Bund and those of its implacable enemies take center stage. In default of the Bund's own publications, insights may be — with the greatest caution — achieved from newspaper and magazine articles of the period despite their polemical nature. An article, "Star Spangled Fascists" which appeared in the May 1939 *Saturday Evening Post* seems minimally fairer than most. Thus the "thriving state of our current Fascist crop does not mean that [they] receive cash from the Nazis." The article suggests that the links to the Fatherland are rather "a fraternal source of inspiration." It offers an estimate of "8000 to 10,000 uniformed, strong-arm storm-troopers." From the same article we learn that the Bund publishes a youth magazine and four local issues of the *Deutsche Weckruf* in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Los Angeles. Some twenty other German newspapers are alleged to give it "aggressive backing." The Bund's customary activities involve:

a never ending round of meetings, the largest and most successful of which was the recent mass celebration of Washington's birthday in Madison Square Garden. That meeting was attended by some 22,000 Bundsmen and their sympathizers. These activities and the propaganda which they spread all appear to be within the law.

Describing the Bund's "folder of purposes," the writer says that it begins with the "embrace of the Constitution, Flag and Institutions of the United States" and then lists its enemies as (*inter alia*):

all abuse of the pulpits designed to undermine the Morals, Ethics or patriotism of Americans; all Racial Intermixture between Aryans (White Gentiles) and Asiatics, Africans or other non-Aryans; all

Subversive Internationalism; the liberal-pacifistic forces undermining the morale of Youth; Alien-controlled, international so-called Labor Movements; the Rackets of International Finance....

The Bund urges, the article continues, an American movement of liberation in order that "the dictatorship of a small racially and ethnically alien Jewish minority to which the mind of the entire nation is being rapidly subjected, may be broken."

When *der Tag* comes, the Bund's young men will probably be the first on the barricades. But there is nothing in its program, either of venom or of violence, that cannot be matched in the propaganda of more authentically American groups.³²

It is well to keep constantly in mind the wild variations in estimates of the Bund's numerical strength and by extrapolation to consider that all other conjectures, for example as to its treasonable or subversive nature, may be equally wide of the mark. We have just quoted one estimate of from 8,000 to 10,000 members. Here are a few other guesses: an article in the *Christian Science Monitor* suggests that while a press estimate of from 200,000 to 250,000 may be too high, 70,000 would be a reasonable figure.³³ On January 18, 1938, a Justice Department report which stated that no violations of Federal law were involved in the Bund's activities estimated the Bund's strength at the rather precise figure of 8,299.³⁴ In 1939, the Dies Committee — otherwise known as the House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, or HUAC, and chaired by Martin Dies — produced a witness using the alias "Ralph Metcalfe" who testified to a figure of 500,000.³⁵

At a somewhat earlier date, Dickstein charged that the figure was 200,000 and a "war chest" of \$20,000,000 existed (about a quarter of a billion in today's terms). To this, Congressman Thomas riposted that "Mr. Dickstein has more Communists in his own district than there are Nazis in the whole United States."³⁶ In retrospect, most authorities appear to have agreed that the larger figures for Bund membership were sheer fantasy, dreamed up by people with an enduring penchant for vast numerical exaggerations, no doubt; but Kuhn's own tendency to exaggerate a little added fuel to the all-too-willing fires. He mentioned a figure of 200,000 in 1938.³⁷

In the same way, hints dropped by Kuhn of secret agreements he had made with the Reichskanzler himself in connection with the 1936 presidential election were acutely embarrassing to Germany. It was in 1936 that Kuhn and some fellow Bundists attended the Olympic Games in Berlin where Hitler received him briefly and

accepted from Kuhn a donation of about \$3000 for the *Winterhilfe* (Winter help) fund. Kuhn then implied that his support for Alf Landon had been arranged with the Führer. The German embassy in Washington immediately denied that there was any truth to the story or any attempt to influence American domestic politics.

In March, 1936, the Bund held a protest meeting against the proposal of New York's falsetto-voiced, half-Jewish mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, to install a bust of Hitler in the Chamber of Horrors at the New York World's Fair. Meanwhile the indefatigable Congressman Dickstein demanded that the House conduct a Congressional investigation of Kuhn's purported \$20,000,000 fund. He contended that "thousands" of Bundists drilled every Sunday at Camp Upton; that Henry Ford had not destroyed the plates of his "anti-Jewish book." Kuhn merely answered that Dickstein was a Jew and a Soviet sympathizer.³⁸

A certain Julius Hochfelder, head of an "anti-Nazi" organization, now entered the lists. He demanded that Attorney-General Cummings bar the Bund's newspaper from the mails, claiming that it was German-subsidized and under the direct control of Dr. Goebbels.³⁹

A *New York Times* feature article of March, 1937, reported Bund membership at about 10,000 and ridiculed Dickstein's "200,000 army of stormtroopers." It admitted the Nazi ideology but said that there was no coercion, only education, in the activities.⁴⁰ The secretary of something called "The Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League" petitioned Congressmen Dickstein and Citrone to investigate a "new Nazi Camp Nordland" at Andover, New Jersey, claiming that it was the seventeenth camp for boys and girls operating illegally on American soil.⁴¹

The Bund Camps, Camp Siegfried on Long Island and Camp Nordland in New Jersey, appear to have been the sites for somewhat bucolic gatherings of Bundist families for picknicking, beer drinking, singing and some pro-German and so-called "right-wing Americanism" speeches as well as some calisthenics and marching about by uniformed children. They were, however, increasingly portrayed by their enemies as sinister, para-military training facilities. The reader may care to recall Mr. Hagedorn's water tower (*vide supra*). In a lighter vein, we find a Bund leader, August Klapprott, protesting that the *New York Times* had falsely reported that mainly German beer was drunk at Bund rallies whereas in fact it was mostly American beer that was consumed.⁴²

On July 21, 1937, Representative Martin Dies of Texas asked for a Congressional investigation of the "un-American activities of Nazis, Fascists, Communists and White Russians." Dickstein urged the

adoption of Dies' resolution and warned that "twenty-one Nazi camps" were close to "big munitions factories."⁴³

You remember what happened in 1916... If you want to fix it so that *when we get into trouble again* [emphasis added] we will have to fight our enemies from within as well as from without, well, just let this thing keep going on like it is going.⁴⁴

Kuhn answered Dickstein's charges by demanding, as he was repeatedly to do in the next two years, a Congressional investigation "to stop the nonsense...once and for all, I demand as an American citizen, an investigation of our organization and our camps."⁴⁵

In August, Dickstein, for the second time, inserted into the Congressional Record a list of names of "persons spreading un-American propaganda." One smeared individual by the name of Dietrich Wortmann, not a Bundist, was the president of an amateur athletic association. Wortmann complained that under the law he had no redress for Dickstein's slanders and demanded that a committee of inquiry be set up to clear himself of them. Also in August, Julius Hochfelder asked the Immigration and Naturalization Department to revoke Kuhn's citizenship. Kuhn wrote to the Speaker of the House, Bankhead, again demanding an investigation.

But all reaction to the Bund was not hostile. Charles Masterbrook, Vice-Commander of the New Jersey American Legion, said that he could find no more fault with German-American gatherings than with St. Patrick's Day parades. Major-General George Van Horn Moseley, retired former Second-in-Command of the Army, said, "Nazis in America have only one mission...to see to it that the Communists shall not take possession of this nation."⁴⁶

But teutonophobia was being extended even to sporting events. The Anti-Nazi League of Congressman Samuel Untermyer (the gentleman who personally declared war on Germany in 1933 on behalf of World Jewry) proclaimed a boycott of the Max Schmeling-Joe Louis fight at the Garden. Bundists in Southbury, Connecticut, were arrested under a dusted-off blue law forbidding work on the Sabbath — they had been cleaning up their camp on a Sunday. Bundist meetings were increasingly subjected to violent attacks by organized mobs or else their proposed meetings were banned in advance by local authorities.

In May, 1938, the House approved the setting-up of the Dies Committee, which we have already encountered in these pages. Representative Maverick of Texas, however, said:

It is time this House quit four-flushing and ballyhooing. You know this resolution is aimed particularly at the Nazi movement. It is not the Dies resolution. It is the Dickstein resolution... [and] will cause race-hatred and may prove the entering wedge for persecutions.⁴⁷

Kuhn said later before the Dies Committee that "Jews are Jews first before they are Americans" and quoted the famous Rabbi Stephen Wise as telling a body of the American Jewish Congress (AJC) that he was not an American but a Jew and had been 4,000 years a Jew.

On July 12, 1938, a Suffolk County (N.Y.) court found six officials of Camp Siegfried guilty of belonging to an oath-bound organization and fined them \$13,000 under what the *Times* called "a rarely evoked statute." Numerous witnesses denied any oath-taking but Judge Hill ruled that the evidence of the solitary State witness had equal weight with one hundred contrary testimonies.⁴⁸

HUAC labored mightily and in August brought forth this mouse: "A close relationship exists between the German-American Bund and the Nazi government in Germany." This certainly did not satisfy Dickstein who complained that the Committee had failed to expose Nazi activities and had instead become a "Red-baiting excursion." A month or so later, Kuhn sent a notarized statement to Congress reiterating that the Bund had no political, financial or other ties with the German government. The only ties were those of sympathy for Germany's emancipation from the oppressions of the Versailles Treaty.

Typical of the quality of testimony presented to the Dies Committee is that of Mr. Arnold Gingrich, editor of *Ken, Esquire*, and *Coronet*. Mr. Gingrich declared that he had personally seen German Foreign Office documents which proved that the "job" of the Bund was not merely propaganda but to constitute a military organization for sabotage and espionage.⁴⁹

The apogee of the Bund's career came with the great Madison Square Garden rally of 1939. The *Times*, reporting about it on the following day, said that 22,000 had attended with 1,700 police present to prevent violence. Nevertheless, desultory street brawls erupted over several adjacent blocks. As the audience left the Garden, reported the *Times*, "the most violent anti-Nazis began assaults on individuals."

The meeting had opened, the report continues, with the singing of the national anthem. There were cheers for Herbert Hoover, Senators Nye, Hiram Johnson, and William E. Borah; and jeers for President Roosevelt. G(erhard) W(ilhelm) Kunze said, "When a Henry Morgenthau takes the place of a Washington, the country is

in a deplorable state." The audience roared a mass response when called upon to give the pledge of allegiance to the flag.

A man named Isadore Greenbaum tried to scale the platform and seize the microphone but was prevented from doing so by uniformed stewards. A former magistrate, Joseph Goldstein, was also prevented by the police from serving a writ for criminal libel on Kuhn. An anti-Bund Negro, Peter Saunders, was charged with cruelty to animals after he injured a policeman's horse.⁵⁰

Injuries to people were minimal, however, and the violence was not remotely comparable to the violence in London which was a constant feature of the meetings of Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists at the hands of the Left, or, in recent years, that directed against the National Front and the British National Party. To the bloody prewar violence this writer can bear personal testimony. What does appear incontrovertible from the reports in the *New York Times* and other major newspapers during the years of the Bund's existence, and that parallels events in London where ideologically similar organizations were, and are, concerned, is that violence was never initiated by the Bund but always by hooligans of the far Left. Conservatives know this pattern to be true for their own meetings. Rightist speakers in Britain, in Germany before 1933, and in the United States have frequently been subject in certain "red" areas to violent attacks and had their meetings broken up. This writer has never heard of a Conservative mob, armed with razors, broken bottles and coshes, breaking up a Leftist meeting. It is about as plausible a scenario as stabbings, gang rapes and drugs at a symphony concert. The *New York Times*, for example, reported on a group of young lady canvassers for Alf Landon being pelted with garbage and rotten vegetables in New York.⁵¹

The Hounding of Fritz Julius Kuhn

If the great Madison Square Garden rally of February 20, 1939, was the zenith of the Bund's activities, its nadir was soon to follow. The Bund simply dissolved but Orestes was not pursued by the Erinyes with more malignancy than the hapless Kuhn by his triumphant enemies for the next ten years.

On May 25, 1939, Fritz Kuhn was indicted on a charge of having stolen \$14,548 of the Bund's funds and was arrested near Allentown, Pennsylvania. With Kuhn were three other high-ranking Bundists, Thomas Dixon, Gustav Elmer and Gerhard Wilhelm Kunze. No complaint had been lodged by any Bund member against Kuhn and the latter protested that he was not, as alleged, in flight

but headed for speech-making commitments in Chicago and Milwaukee. The New York District Attorney, Thomas Dewey, claimed, however, that Kuhn was fleeing and was "just a common thief."⁵² There were twelve charges in the indictment representing a possible fifty-year sentence for grand larceny and forgery. Kuhn's office was raided on May 2 and books and papers seized. Kuhn alleged that \$1,380 had been stolen from his desk during the raid.

Kuhn was released on \$5,000 bail after pleading not guilty. The following day he told a cheering audience of about 1,100 local Bundists in Milwaukee, "I have never taken a nickel of the Bund's money. Dewey is just fishing to line up the Jewish vote."⁵³

The *Bund* itself regarded the charges as without substance or foundation as was made very clear early in July. "Kuhn vindicated by Bund membership" headlined the *New York Times*.

At a 3-day annual convention of 330 Bund delegates from all parts of the U.S. which terminated July 3, Fritz Kuhn was re-elected unanimously Bund leader with full power of attorney over all Bund finances.⁵⁴

On July 26, Judge Morris Koenig denied a motion on behalf of Kuhn for the return of documents seized by Dewey's men in the raid on Bund headquarters and on the private home of the Bund treasurer. On August 29 the Dies Committee requested New York authorities to prevent Kuhn from leaving the country. Kuhn denied that he had any such intention. The Dies Committee interim report stated that the Bund, William Pelley's Silver Shirts, and some other groups were "potent organizations for espionage and sabotage if war breaks out even though this country does not participate."⁵⁵ One can only marvel at this language and what it reveals even before war had broken out in Europe and more than two years before Pearl Harbor.

While on bail awaiting trial, Kuhn's public utterances were like those of a man either bent on his own destruction or still unaware of the hideous power of the forces now intent on destroying him. On September 3, the day that Britain and France declared war on Germany in defense of Poland (though evidently only in defense of its western half), Kuhn told a Bund rally that the Bund stood for absolute neutrality and no aid to any belligerent. "We shall see how far the Jewish war-mongers go; how far our youth will be driven into war." And G.W. Kunze, speaking at the same meeting, said, "When F.D. Rosenfeld is thrown out of the White House next year an American will be elected." Poles in the U.S., said Kunze, were collecting funds for the Polish army and he wondered what would happen if German-Americans behaved similarly.⁵⁶

On September 5, Max and Louis Levant, publishers of the *Wichita Beacon*, telegraphed Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, asking that Fritz Kuhn be deported along with other Bund leaders as threats to peace and the neutrality (*sic*) of the country. Kuhn, on 26 September, ridiculed the Dies Committee's decision to seek his indictment for perjury and said that allegations of espionage and of being an unregistered agent of a foreign government should be investigated by the F.B.I. and a U.S. attorney and passed on by a court of law not by a committee. Dies replied that Kuhn was afraid to appear before the Committee because "he knows we've got him."⁵⁷

Parenthetically, Dies, on 28 September, launched an attack on the Ukrainian Independence Movement, which he called Fascist and Nazi. A few days earlier, he had charged that precisely 2,850 Communists held positions in the U.S. government.

Two items in the *New York Times* are interesting in juxtaposition. On the front page appeared an article which stated that Thomas Dewey had demanded and obtained the raising of Kuhn's bail from \$5,000 to \$50,000. This being allowed and the money not being immediately available, Kuhn was jailed. The second item, on page seven, reported that William Z. Foster, chairman of the Communist Party of the United States, told the Dies Committee that he would not support the United States in the event of a war with Russia.

An appeal for the reduction of Kuhn's bail was rejected but by October 7, the Bund raised the extra money and Kuhn was released. He was immediately driven to Bund headquarters where he was surrounded and cheered by a small crowd.

On October 13, Kuhn issued a protest against what he termed malicious rumors deliberately disseminated by the D.A.'s office and widely reported in the Press that the bail money was comprised, in part, of the ransom money from the Lindbergh baby kidnapping and murder of March, 1932, more than seven years earlier. Kuhn said that no effort was being spared to poison the minds of the prospective jurors in advance of his trial.

Captain Fritz Wiedermann, German Consul-General in San Francisco, was reported as saying that he did not approve of the Bund which could only cause trouble because its members were American citizens and his advice was that they be good American citizens.⁵⁸

On 6 December, Kuhn was sentenced to 2½ to 5 years in the penitentiary. He promptly designated G.W. Kunze as his successor in Bund leadership. Kunze and G.J. Elmer were, however, arrested a few months later on "undisclosed charges." They were not held,

however, and Kunze took over a rapidly disintegrating Bund after Kuhn's incarceration. There is some reason to believe that Kunze really did misappropriate considerable Bund funds, including monies that had been raised to provide for appeals on behalf of Kuhn. At all events, there was considerable infighting and the Bund simply fell apart. Kunze himself disappeared but was apprehended in Mexico and sent back to the United States where he was eventually tried for espionage and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. By the time America entered the war, the activities of the Bund had diminished to the vanishing point.

On the subject of Kuhn's trial, however, some comments of *Time* magazine seem worth quoting. Said *Time*:

The defense scored heavily; the prosecution auditor admitted an error of calculation of the alleged thefts, all but five charges against Kuhn were dismissed.⁵⁹

Bund members, reported *Time*, testified that under the leadership principle, Kuhn could, in fact, spend the Bund's funds as he saw fit. After some titillating revelations about Kuhn's private amours — presumably for want of anything more serious — *Time*'s three-column article concludes:

Introduced as evidence were two notes by Mayor La Guardia and Tom Dewey written before Kuhn's arrest —

La Guardia: "Dear Tom: You can have him."

Dewey: "I don't want him either. I guess the ashcan is the best place for him."⁶⁰

Kuhn entered Sing-Sing on December 7, 1939. The penultimate mention of him in the files of the *New York Times* is almost ten years later, in June 1949, but that is a passing reference in an extensive article, cited and quoted below. For Kuhn's personal ordeal in the intervening years, we are largely dependent on that journal. On the day that Kuhn entered Sing-Sing, the *Times* reported without explanation that he would be barred from most of the prison's recreational diversions such as movies, football and baseball games, the gymnasium and the fellowship of the prison yard.⁶¹ A later story reported that Kuhn was allowed no gifts or other packages.⁶²

In May 1940, the House passed a \$1,111,754,916 relief Bill for the next fiscal year, with \$975,650,000 allocated to the W.P.A. from which Bund members were specifically to be denied benefits. No explanation was offered for this selective discrimination.

In the same month, Representative Leland Ford of California asked the House to revoke Kuhn's citizenship on the grounds that he had "mental reservations" when pledging his allegiance in his naturalization proceedings in December 1934. In October, 1940, Kunze, Klapprott and two other Bundists were indicted in Newton, New Jersey for "promoting hatred and hostility against people of the Jewish religion contrary to a 1935 New Jersey statute."⁶³ In December, an annual convention of 600 delegates of the American-Jewish Youth passed a resolution calling upon Congress to declare the Bund outlawed. It should be borne in mind that outlawry permits anyone to kill the outlaw without penalty and one might reflect on certain events half a century later.

In June, 1941, with Pearl Harbor still six months in the future, the New York State Parole Board turned down Kuhn's parole appeal on the grounds that he was a "hazard to public peace and security." The warden of Sing Sing is quoted as testifying to Kuhn's good behavior.⁶⁴

In the following year, a small item in the *Times* reports leniency (a suspended six-month sentence for illicit possession of narcotics) for Mrs. Virginia Cogswell "whose testimony helped send Fritz Kuhn to State prison...."⁶⁵ In March, 1942, the Justice Department announced that it would deprive Kuhn of his citizenship and that as soon as he was released from Sing Sing he would immediately be interned in a camp for enemy aliens for the duration of the war. In June, 1943, therefore, Kuhn was taken directly from prison to an internment camp in Texas.

An item, peripheral to our subject perhaps but worth noting as casting light on contemporary attitudes, appeared in the *Times* in 1944. It concerned a complaint by the "chief investigator of the Dies Committee" that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau was impeding investigations of subversive by refusing to release information about their tax returns. Referring to such suspects (clearly *not* of the "Right") Morgenthau denied that many of them could be considered subversive or "un-American."⁶⁶

In April, 1945, Kuhn's wife Elsa and his teenage daughter Waltraut were arrested by American army authorities near Nuremberg, where they had been living quietly since before the war. On September 17, Kuhn was deported from New York to Germany along with "500 undesirable Germans."⁶⁷

But Kuhn's ordeal was far from over. A photograph of Kuhn in the *Times* in November is captioned: "Learning About Internment Camps: Fritz Kuhn, former German-American Bund Leader sitting it out in the internment camp at Augsburg, Germany, where he is

confined.”⁶⁸ The next story is datelined February 1946. A Lieutenant Roselinsky (*sic*) from Brooklyn, in charge of the internees in the cells of the Heidelberg *Schloss*, describes Kuhn as “a beaten, broken man” who “walks with his head bowed, eyes downcast and murmurs ‘I beg your pardon’ every few seconds.” Kuhn is reported as hoping some day to return the United States. He is said to feel guiltless. He claims to have established the Bund to promote German-American friendship but admits that he failed. He says he would have undoubtedly dissolved the Bund the moment that America went to war.⁶⁹ Two days later as reported in the *Times* a U.S. army spokesman said that there was no plan to release Kuhn as:

He is one of the greatest security threats in the American zone. We can’t possibly release Kuhn as long as there are occupation forces in Germany, for he might gather together his henchmen and threaten our security.⁷⁰

Anyone who has any concept of the condition of Germany in *Jahr Null* (Year Zero) or has comprehended the mental and physical condition of Kuhn from what has been said above, may be excused for wondering if the “spokesman” quoted was afflicted with a very unpleasant sense of humor or was mentally deranged.

Nevertheless, Kuhn was released on April 25, 1946 and entrained for Munich where Elsa, Walter and Waltraut were then living. A *Times* reporter noted with unconcealed satisfaction that “he will now, like other Germans, have to live on 1,275 calories per day.”⁷¹ On November 29, a small item reports that Kuhn is living “drably” with his wife and children and two other families in a sparsely furnished Munich house. The item, referring to Thanksgiving Day, is headed “No Turkey for Fritz Kuhn.” The gloating tone is unmistakable.⁷²

In the following Spring, Kuhn was again jailed. This time he was to be tried before a Bavarian “denazification” court. The *Times* published a photograph of an emaciated Kuhn talking to a guard in the German prison.⁷³ In February, 1948, eight months later, while still awaiting trial, Kuhn escaped from Dachau by simply merging with a crowd of visitors and walking out. The prison director was promptly dismissed. In April a Munich “denazification” court sentenced Kuhn, *in absentia*, to ten years imprisonment and forfeiture of all his property except a small sum of money. The evidence presented against him by the public prosecutor, one Julius Herf, consisted of 23 orders from Kuhn to Bund members concerning uniforms to be worn or American political candidates,

such as Alf Landon, to be supported. In Kuhn's absence, no defense was offered, nor could be.

Kuhn was recaptured on June 16, 1948, in the French zone where he had filed a permit to open a chemical laboratory. He was returned to Munich in custody. The *Times*, reporting this, said, "He wept as he was escorted back to a cell here."⁷⁴

Kuhn finally obtained a hearing before a German appellate court on February 14, 1949. He continued to maintain that the Bund had never been affiliated with the Third Reich. Except for two brief interludes, he had now been incarcerated since 1939. The court reduced his sentence from ten years to two years and he was released for the last time on February 22, 1949. When news of his release reached the United States, the insatiable sadism of certain elements was once more aroused. The "Non-Sectarian" Anti-Nazi League petitioned the United States Senate to make "comprehensive investigations of army and civilian authorities in the government [they meant "governance"] of Germany."⁷⁵

The penultimate reference to Kuhn in the columns of the *New York Times* is in a feature article quoted *in extenso* below.

Ambassador Dieckhoff sent a series of messages during 1938 pointing out the harm done to German-American relations by the activities of the German-American Bund.... His warnings seem to have been largely instrumental in the ultimate disavowal of Kuhn and the Bund by the German government.... Speaking of the possibilities of revolutionary activist conspiracies of U.S. Nazis, Dieckhoff, who exempts Kuhn from such charges, continues that such ideas are ludicrous in the United States and reminiscent of Balkan intrigues in which latter they might be mildly efficacious. In the U.S., says Dieckhoff, the undercover men of the Justice Department would have complete lists of names almost immediately such a conspiracy was formed.⁷⁵

Those diplomatic reports would seem once and for all to put into proper perspective the "deadly menace" of this "monster" with his "250,000 or 500,000 highly trained stormtroopers and his \$20,000,000 war chest" and the necessity of imprisoning and persecuting him for ten years. And our last mention of Kuhn is a belated obituary notice in the *Times* in 1953 which reports that Fritz Julius Kuhn died on December 14, 1951. The information was given to the press by Kuhn's former lawyer, Otto Gritschneider. No mention was made of Waltraut, but Gritschneider also revealed that Kuhn's widow, Elsa, and son, Walter, were in Mexico where Walter was serving in the Mexican army.

To round out this brief study, I beg to submit a few personal conclusions.

Fritz Kuhn, *Magister Artium* and winner of the Iron Cross, may well have been typical of the Bund itself. If so, what emerges is a story of a provocative minor movement but not a treasonable one, which made enemies far beyond its strength to defy. Its members rejoiced in their ethnic and cultural roots and dreaded what they foresaw as another war against Germany in the near future which would be brought about by the machinations of her implacable enemies (a representative of whom had already "declared war" on Germany as early as 1933).

The Bundists nurtured the hope — which at times one senses was even to them a forlorn one — that through propaganda or enlightenment (whichever way it is seen) disaster might be averted.

In the *Bundesleiter* we find a man, stubborn, courageous, sincere — even at times witty — more than a little rash in his actions and somewhat lacking in charm. Kuhn is a German — *deutsch* and *deutlich* — without guile. No "fine Italian hand" for Kuhn. In some ways, he and his followers may have been, as Dieckhoff and others feared, more dangerous to the very causes they espoused than to their enemies. Kuhn is the Sorcerer's Apprentice, mercilessly destroyed by the forces he evoked. But if we cannot quite elevate him to the rank of tragic hero, we can at least scorn the obvious chicanery and perversion of justice which not only led to his initial imprisonment but to the ten years of hounding and persecution and prolonged sadistic cruelty which followed. What was Fritz Kuhn's crime? I cannot discern one. His own organization absolved him from the patently trumped up charge of stealing its funds. No other charges were ever substantiated against him, or indeed, levied. Unless a certain lack of discretion be a crime, I am forced to say that "I find no fault with this man."

Bibliographic Note

This study has dealt, after the dissolution of the Bund and Kuhn's incarceration in Sing-Sing, with the subsequent fate of Kuhn himself. Other senior members of the Bund were also subjected to various forms of persecution. This has been covered, though somewhat sketchily, in a book published in 1974 by Cornell University Press. The author is, as expected, hostile to the Bund and its members. However, the dearth of published material on the subject makes even polemical works useful when treated with caution. The author of this particular book is Sander A. Diamond, the title, *The Nazi Movement in the United States: 1924-1941. Caveat lector.*

Notes

1. William E. Leuchtenberg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932-1950* (New York, 1963) p. 276 & 276n.
2. *loc. cit.*
3. Arthur L. Smith, Jr., *The Deutschtum of Nazi Germany in the United States* (The Hague, 1965) p. 92n.
4. See Bibliographical Note.
5. Richard O'Connor, *The German-Americans: An Informal History* (Boston & Toronto, 1968) p. 441.
6. Professor Arthur L. Smith in a conversation with the author at Los Angeles, May 19.
7. *Time*, December 4, 1939, p. 18.
8. O'Connor, *German-Americans*, p. 441.
9. Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, *War Propaganda and the United States* (New Haven, 1940) p. 35.
10. *New York Times*, February 26, 1939, IV, 6.
11. Alton Frye, *Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere* (New Haven & London, 1967) p. 82.
12. Theodore Huebner, *The Germans in America* (Philadelphia & New York, 1962) p. 2ff.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
14. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 61. In default of confirmatory statistics, this figure should, perhaps, be taken *cum grano salis*.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 405.
19. Huebner, *Germans in America*, p. 149.
20. O'Connor, *German-Americans*, p. 415. Now where have we heard about human soap before? *Déjà vu*, perhaps?
21. *Ibid.*, p. 411-12.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 413-14.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (New York, 1965) p. 187.
25. O'Connor, *German-Americans*, p. 434.
26. Smith, *Deutschtum*, pp. 61-62.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 81n.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 82-84.
30. Frye, *Nazi Germany*, p. 63.
31. Smith, *Deutschtum*, p. 81n.
32. Stanley High, "Star Spangled Fascists," *Saturday Evening Post*, May 30, 1939, p. 6.
33. George W. Pate, "How The Nazis Penetrated America," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 31, 1942.
34. *New York Times*, January 13, 1938, p. 4.
35. This individual is referred to in later documents as John Metcalfe. Either name, in fact, appears to have been a *nom de guerre* for a Mid-European immigrant who had been "planted" in the Bund by a Chicago tabloid.

36. *New York Times*, May 4, 1939, p. 2.
37. *Ibid.*, March 16, 1937, p. 3.
38. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1938, p. 3.
39. *Ibid.*, March 12, 1937, p. 15.
40. *Ibid.*, March 19, 1937, p. 11.
41. *Ibid.*, March 21, 1937, p. 1.
42. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1937, p. 13.
43. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1937, p. 10.
44. *Ibid.*, July 22, 1937, p. 27.
45. *Ibid.*, July 28, 1937, p. 4.
46. O. John Rogge, *The Official German Report* (New York, 1961) p. 285.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *New York Times*, July 13, 1938, pp. 1, 16.
49. *Ibid.*, October 7, 1938, p. 1.
50. *Ibid.*, February 21, 1939, p. 5.
51. *Ibid.*, October 16, 1936, p. 20.
52. *Ibid.*, May 26, 1939, p. 1.
53. *Ibid.*, May 28, 1939, p. 1.
54. *Ibid.*, July 4, 1939, p. 4.
55. *Ibid.*, August 30, 1939, p. 11.
56. *Ibid.*, September 4, 1939, p. 17.
57. *Ibid.*, September 27, 1939, pp. 1, 9.
58. *Ibid.*, November 26, 1939, p. 32.
59. *Time*, December 4, 1939, p. 18 (see note 5).
60. *Ibid.*
61. *New York Times*, December 7, 1939, p. 23.
62. *Ibid.*, January 29, 1940, p. 32.
63. *Ibid.*, October 11, 1940, p. 12.
64. *Ibid.*, June 19, 1941, p. 10.
65. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1942, p. 10.
66. *Ibid.*, September 19, 1944, p. 11.
67. *Ibid.*, September 17, 1945, p. 7.
68. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1945, p. 8.
69. *Ibid.*, February 19, 1946, p. 8.
70. *Ibid.*, February 21, 1946, p. 27.
71. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1946, p. 6. The calorific figure given was the official entitlement. Few Germans, in fact, were able to obtain it and in any case it was mostly carbohydrates.
72. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1946, p. 32.
73. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1947, p. 5.
74. *Ibid.*, June 18, 1948, p. 11.
75. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1949, p. 24.
76. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1949, p. 24.

Death and Rebirth: European Political Observations

DR. ANDREAS WESSERLE

Concerning constitutions, Montesquieu wrote in volume IX of his work *Esprit des lois*: "Some...have as their purpose...the glorification of the State (*"la gloire de l'état"*), others the political freedom of the citizen." If an unbiased observer studies those nations of the world which have succeeded in retaining their political sovereignty to this day, he will find that the majority of them have honored the universally acclaimed human rights mainly in the breach, exploiting them only when expedient, and then chiefly for the deeper entrenchment of their power or for the expansion of their territorial domain. The battle-cry of the mobilization of the masses did not die with bygone epochs.

Montesquieu, however, ignores a small, third group which appears destined to perpetual subjection to the freedom and the glory of others. Recent events place this observation in proper perspective. As early as 1976 the Bonn correspondent of a Tyrolean newspaper neatly summarized a notion that has been held for decades, even centuries, to the effect that in regard to the Common Enemy — Germany — the Western and Eastern powers are of one accord. Even in 1986 it often appeared as though the only solid connecting link between the two power blocs, drifting ever further apart, was their animosity toward Germany. Of course this includes their continuing effort to infuse in the political and cultural void in the heart of Europe, the core of the most dynamic continent in history, their own ideologies.

Current trends may be summarized under the following headings:

- I. Excerpts from contemporary nationalism.
- II. The phenomenon of Russia.
- III. The phenomenon of America.
- IV. America and Germany.
- V. A new Counter-Reformation?

I. Excerpts from Contemporary Nationalism

Despite widely divergent interpretations, the festivities which in 1984/85 commemorated the invasion of Normandy, France, as well as the end of the Second World War, were embarrassingly archaic in nature. Once again, they showed that the Western powers have learned nothing new from their campaign of 1944/45, a struggle which was one-sidedly military on their part, and short-sighted both politically and strategically. At the time, they overwhelmed Europe, presided over the division of the world at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and turned half of Europe over to the marauding Red Army. To this day Germany, Europe and the world remain divided.¹

If anything, 1986 turned out even worse than the preceding year. President Reagan's initially wise decision to "let bygones be bygones" and to visit a German military cemetery at Bitburg — made at the prompting of then White House advisor Deaver — was twisted into a farce by Zionists on both sides of the Atlantic in 1985. In 1986 — last year — and apparently onward into an indefinite future — in Austria, the "third German state," a campaign of political defamation was waged with characteristic factual as well as emotional imbalance by the American media against Dr. Kurt Waldheim, a conservative candidate for the largely ceremonial office of the presidency of the Republic of Austria. Why the theatrics? No one knows for sure. But informed Washington observers remembered that, as Secretary General of the United Nations, Waldheim had been sympathetic to the plight of certain Third World nations, even evincing a kind of tolerance toward the representatives of the Palestinians and their spokesmen among the Arab and Islamic states. Austrian voters indignant at outside interference elected Dr. Waldheim president, an outcome somewhat surprising after the innumerable "brainwashing" campaigns foisted on them during the past four decades.

Austrian-Italian relations, on the other hand, continue to be affected by the second-class status of the Germans of the South Tyrol, an Austrian province annexed by Italy at the end of the First World War with the blessings of President Woodrow Wilson.

Recently, continuing a venerable tradition of self-aggrandizement, Italy's Christian Democratic foreign minister, Andreotti, drew a characteristic conclusion before an assembly of Communists: "The reunification of Germany equals 'pan-Germanism.' It must be prevented."² Andreotti conveniently overlooked exactly those "pan-movements" which, from the middle of the 19th century to this day, have repeatedly proved their magnetic force and their power of impact: pan-Slavism in neighboring Yugoslavia and in much of eastern Europe being one of the most successful. Apparently, Signore Andreotti's conscience is troubled over the treatment of the German South Tyrolers, whose rights of self-determination, laid down in writing, have for the most part remained an unfulfilled dream. As an example of the officially induced Italianization under the aegis of *sacro egoismo* ("sacred egoism"), the overwhelmingly German city of Bozen (Bolzano) still boasts a Fascist "Victory Monument" erected under Mussolini, as well as a military compound named in honor of General Luigi Cadorna, the Italian commander of the blood-drenched Alpine and Isonzo fronts of the First World War. Never mind the other, numerous transgressions against the Tyrolers' sensibilities. But let it be remembered that South Tyrol's 1400 illustrious years as part and parcel of Germany and Austria, as a brilliant contributor to its culture and civilization, cannot be wiped out with the stroke of a pen. All the same, it is remarkable to what extent Italy, as one of the losers of the Second World War, has managed to capitalize on its strategically important location and its otherwise slender resources.

Even more surprising is the fact that in recent years a *German* political entity has rediscovered the greatness of its national past: the German Democratic Republic.

The exhibition entitled: "Baroque and Classicism — 18th-Century Centers of Art in the German Democratic Republic," which was concluded at Schallaburg Castle in Lower Austria in October 1984, represented one of the best instances of this process of "finding one's self again." Exhibits from Dresden, Potsdam, Wörlitz and Weimar convey insight into the spirit of this German renaissance. The political implications cannot be overlooked: the works shown date back as it does to the era of August the Strong of Saxony, King of Poland and occasional ally of Tsar Peter the Great of Russia, then on in time to Schiller and Goethe, the luminaries of a brilliant age prior to the dark triumph of the Industrial Revolution.

It is politics *pur sang* that is being conducted by Willi Stoph, Prime Minister of the GDR (German Democratic Republic), however. In "*Einheit*," the SED ("Socialist Unity Party of

Germany": the Muscovite German Communists) party journal, he accuses the Federal Republic of Germany of "...ratifying the establishment of the West German separate state on September 7, 1949 [and thereby] national treason was officially sanctioned." In view of this divisive policy the establishment of the GDR had allegedly "...become a necessary consequence."³ West German politicians disturbed by the revived national tone of the "workers' and farmers' state" are hit with the added charges of "revanchism" and "imperialism," no doubt to the relief of the Kremlin, which is observing developments in Germany with attention. At the same time, however, the West German foe is being discomfited, dislocated mentally and demoralized by the maneuvers of other SED functionaries, such as the President of the People's Chamber, Horst Sindermann, who appeal to "all powers" conscious of their responsibilities for the destinies of their nations and of mankind, and who desire a "dialogue." The GDR is in support of all "opportunities for a negotiated end to the arms race..."⁴ An unmistakable invitation to the "Greens," who are making inroads into the political life of the Federal Republic, for their sympathizers in the SPD (Social Democratic Party) which at its party convention in Essen experienced a move to the left, as well as for the numerous adherents of disarmament in the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain and other Western nations.

SED leaders seem to be batting .500. Party Secretary Honecker's proposed visit to West Germany — sincerely, if naively, welcomed by West Germans desperate for a dialogue on unification — was squelched by Moscow for the time being. On the other hand, during the January, 1987, parliamentary elections in the Federal Republic, the Greens increased their overall representation significantly: from 5.6 percent and 27 seats in the Bundestag in 1983 to 8.3 percent and 42 seats in 1987 — at the expense of the SPD which fell from 38.2 percent and 193 seats in 1983 to 37 percent and 186 seats this election, the worst SPD showing since 1961. The combined, conservative, ruling "union," the CDU/CSU, fared even worse, however. They recorded a total of but 44.3 percent and 223 seats — their very worst result since 1949, the year of inception of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1983 they had won 48.8 percent and 244 seats in parliament. Who picked up the missing votes this time? It was the FDP, their government coalition partner, the party of Foreign Minister Genscher, well known for his policies of *détente* and *rapprochement* with the demands of the Warsaw Pact states. (The FDP improved its standing from 7 percent and 34 seats at the last elections to 9.1 percent and 46 seats in 1987.)

Any lessons to be gained from this election with a low voter turnout, for Germany, of 84.4 percent, also the lowest since 1949?⁵

Just this: the slight, but steady and ominous gain of the anti-establishment Greens and the solid recovery of the pro-appeasement FDP at the expense of the CDU/CSU in a sense parallel the shift away from the classical "establishment" parties of the early Weimar Republic, the then moderate SPD and the smaller parties of the bourgeois center (the German Party, the German People's Party, etc.), away from the responsible, national parties toward the more radical "Independent Social Democratic Party," the Communists and other revolutionary splinter groups. The best that can be said about the 1987 elections is that a good number of disenchanting conservative and patriotic voters stayed home. The alienation may spread. The Federal Republic of Germany, the epitome of timidity, had better be on guard lest she be one-upped by her smaller "*nouveau-German*" neighbor to the east with its powerful demands for national-proletarian legitimization. *Preussens Gloria* yet lives.

II. The Phenomenon of Soviet Russia

Too late, much too late to recover vital positions that were lost, former U.S. President Nixon conceded in his book *The Real War* that on the stage of world events it had been Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Japan who had held in check and contained Great Russia's historical expansion. These powers were destroyed or driven to the brink of collapse during the First and Second World Wars. The role of global counterweight fell to an unprepared America. Though this description may represent an oversimplification of the facts as concerns the United States, Nixon's main thesis still stands on solid ground.⁶

The Soviets are masters at exploiting the weaknesses of their opponents. In the course of the deteriorating relations between the two world powers it has been the goal of the USSR to damage, by means of Soviet *agitprop* which often enlists the American news media as its prime handmaiden, the most important and vulnerable ally of the United States: the Federal Republic of Germany. Concurrently, every opportunity is exploited to encourage the widening of any divergent currents into unbridgeable differences.

With cosmopolitan sophistication Soviet foreign policy pursues a dual goal: (1) The maintenance and the increase of her territorial, political and ideological (*i.e.*, quasi-religious) conquests. Here Moscow has accumulated five centuries of experience. In the foot-

steps of the Tsar's tenacious forward drive, which converted the 14th-century vassal state of the Tatars into the world's largest territorial empire, Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries appropriated the political dynamism of Panslavism and Slavophilism (a dynamism directed toward the goals of establishing hegemony over both the Near East and Central Europe) and, while exploiting earth-shaking crises, continued her push on toward Königsberg, Berlin and the gates of Lübeck, only a hair's breadth away from the key ports of the North Sea. (At the close of the Second World War, unsupported by American officialdom, Churchill and Eden engaged in a desperate race with the Red Army to deny it those very ports and the jutting peninsula of Jutland.)

(2) In keeping with the world-revolutionary tenets of Marxism-Leninism Soviet Russia has gained a foothold on the shores of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the ascent to superpower status, her time-tested perseverance as well as the brief attention-span of her bourgeois adversaries have been to her advantage.

Despite the impressive gains of this first-rate but landlocked power, Soviet Russia has also inherited the less advantageous attributes of her ancestors, a Godsend to others. These include (aside from her unfavorable geopolitical location as compared to the United States): (1) the ethnically varied composition of the populations within her sphere of power and in the USSR herself; (2) the critical state of the military balance with China; and as a pivot point, (3) the perennial "problem of succession" to the helm of state.

The Germans of the Soviet Zone, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Czechs and, prior to these, the Serbs and Croatians have openly manifested their discontent with Soviet rule since before 1953. This weakness remains critical to this day when, due to the diminishing birth rate, the *Staatsvolk*, the Russians, will constitute less than half of the total Soviet population a few years hence. The non-Russian majority — particularly the prolific Islamic peoples of Central Asia — will want to increase their autonomy but encounter official resistance, possibly due to an armaments-related economic crisis. In such a situation, the Soviet leadership might be unable to cope with its military involvements, *e.g.* in Central Asia or the Far East. For in the rear of the Soviet anti-NATO front, China and Japan are recovering their vitality. In stark contrast to Western Europe's and West Germany's official policy of *détente* the powers of the Far East are by no means willing to concede to their powerful neighbor the territories lost to Russia in the course of the 19th and 20th

centuries, concessions which would impugn their sovereignty or forfeit it altogether.

If the Soviet leadership does not come to grips with these problems — and it is making energetic efforts to do so under Gorbachev, foreign policy advisor Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze — their empire will disintegrate into chaos. In order to avoid this they will be amenable to far-reaching compromise with Germany and Europe — compromise they are in the process of reaching with China and Japan — particularly prior to an unstable period of internal power struggles or rather, to avoid such a period altogether. This scenario does not exclude a period of adventurism in foreign policy. More likely, the Soviet leaders — and, particularly, certain circles in the United States — may consider the possibility of a strategic withdrawal from parts of East Central Europe the function of which as a *cordon sanitaire* was rendered obsolete with the stationing of U.S. intermediate-range missiles, accompanied by the neutralization of Central Europe and the withdrawal of the United States from Western Europe north of the Pyrenees. Should the political-economic isolation of the United States from her allies increase as a result both of further “Reykjavik-style sell-outs” to the Soviets and of more rigid American tariff walls against the perception of an ever-more vicious competition exercised by Western Europe and Japan/Korea/Taiwan, etc. (the “Devil theory” of foreign policy familiar to students of American politics), this possibility would become a probability.

Note that the first steps toward removing both U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from “Europe” were taken in February/March 1987 against the resistance of West European governments which had incurred grave risks from their domestic nuclear opposition by stationing the rockets in the first place. Other steps will follow. Much depends on how the Reagan administration will weather the current “Iran-Contra” crisis (which a few wags have dubbed “Israel-Contra-America”), and whether subsequent administrations will be able to avoid the type of media-hyped imbroglios which have lamed the past four or five presidencies. Slyly, First Secretary Gorbachev insures the USSR against a future American backlash by his every-more insistent courting, since the Geneva “summit,” of world Jewry. The more American alienates herself from her “client states,” and the more precarious her economic health becomes, the more productive will be Gorbachev’s overtures.⁷

III. The Phenomenon of America

In opposition — though not necessarily in lasting hostility — to the Great Russian drive for self-fulfillment in the world arena stands the faith of the American in *his* mission to improve the universe. Both movements have their origins in historically deeply rooted motives, formerly religious. To some extent the two empires are rather similar. Apart from its favorable geopolitical location, however, great assets to the United States are: the regularity of its mechanism of leadership change; secondly, the solid cohesion of U.S. political culture, up to the present; and thirdly, arising from the former, the art of political mythologizing, which Americans have internalized to a well-nigh somnambulistic degree — an art essential for global propaganda.

All the same, a set of circumstances is foreseeable which casts shadows over the seemingly auspicious start of 1987. The prediction of strong economic growth (4 percent per annum for the rest of the decade) made by the White House seems doubtful. Negative factors are on the increase: an astronomical budget deficit; a disturbing imbalance of payments; the danger of proletarianization of large segments of the middle class by a process of enforced wage-and-benefits reductions of white-and-blue-collar workers (encouraged by the administration); the massive indebtedness of the great banks, and the farm sector and others. The volatile stock market promises to turn from bull to bear, if the fears voiced by economic pundits of such divergent schools as Galbraith and Greenspan come true. Military involvements in Central America or the Near East would strain the social fabric even more perilously. Already, the gloomy nightmare of outbreaks of violence and of race riots, a frequent experience in America's short history, looms again. In this empire, too, diversionary tactics in foreign policy are the stock of the political arsenal, though the lack of social discipline gives rise to the prospect of inadequate or overly hasty decisions. Still, it's an ill wind that blows no one any good; the restoration of the Saar region to Germany in 1954, a result that came about through the application of German pressure during and after the Korean War, reminds us that in times of tension the "Anglo-Saxons" may be amenable to real concessions, even to their allies, *if* these minor entities only exert their own will power — a point often made by Charles de Gaulle.

It is evident in any case that, for reasons of economic and political stability, the Reagan administration — or its successors — will implement an arms reduction to an unprecedented degree and will

usher in relations with the Soviet Union which reflect U.S.-American self-interest exclusively. Global "understandings" with the USSR, considered the only adversary to be taken seriously, are at stake. Common interests such as the prevention of nuclear proliferation — Israel being the exception to the rule — had brought the two powers together on "non-proliferation" at the end of 1984. Then, prior to the meeting at Geneva, President Reagan addressed soothing words to First Secretary Gorbachev to the effect that "our two countries" should get together to cooperate and work for peace around the world. A near calamity followed these vague but ominous pronouncements when the "two most powerful men of the world" met again, at Reykjavik, in October, 1986. There the common Western and United States defense front against the Warsaw Pact nearly collapsed due to President Reagan's eagerness to denude Western Europe of its nuclear shield of intermediate-range missiles (IRBM's) — then being installed at considerable political cost to the NATO states of Europe — leaving these states to face on their own an overwhelming Eastern superiority in numbers and equipment. Reagan apparently also fell for Gorbachev's quick suggestion of a radical reduction, and the final elimination, of *all* ICBM's. He balked only when invited to scrap the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), just in the nick of time, one might add, for he and his administration had not troubled to consult either the so-called European Allies, their political and physical survival at stake, or the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Viewed in this light, the German parliamentary elections of January, 1987 represent merely a very slight reaction against the obvious powerlessness of the German Federal Republic. Of course, future events may deal a delayed, but a far more powerful, blow to the tottering regime.

Why the dissarray? Gorbachev — ably seconded by Dobrynin and Arbatov and others — handled the entire Administration's hunger for a sudden, global public relations coup with such skill and a near-perfect sense of timing — in which the bait of exchanging the American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, arrested in Moscow, for the so-called Soviet spy Gennadiy Zakharov, spiced with the added promise of the release of Soviet human-rights leader Yuri Orlov from a labor camp and from the Soviet Union, was used to hurry up American preparations — that, despite Reagan's previous warnings that there should be no hasty "summit," particularly not in the midst of a U.S. election campaign, his closest advisors either were shunted aside or suffused with euphoria. Typical of the Administration's hasty planning and unprofessional mentality are the effusions of a

key aide entrusted with drafting the documents considered by Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik: Richard N. Perle, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Questioned by the influential chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis.), on November 21, 1986, Perle had this to say: "[The President] could have walked out of there with an agreement that millions would have cheered and won the Nobel prize."⁸ Verily, Hollywood at its worst.

The imperious contempt for what are termed, tongue in cheek, "America's European allies" is clad in raiments of contradictory hue. The remarks of former Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, which caused distress in Brussels and Bonn, provide food for thought: namely, that in case the West Europeans continue to dawdle on rearmament—as seen from America—the United States would have to look for more satisfactory solutions.⁹ Not that the United States would be content with the role of "Fortress America" for long. By no means. But seen from its geopolitical perspective America might for the time being settle for a *cordon sanitaire* which would extend from Greenland to Britain and the North Sea, encompass the Mediterranean, Africa and South Asia, and from there stretch to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, which casts its ponderous shadow upon a half-hearted Europe. Such a philosophy, some of which harks back to well-work Republican patterns of foreign policy, and strongly smacks of the Anglophilia of Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, is implied both in the new edition of the Monroe Doctrine, the "Reagan Doctrine," and in the accelerated expansion of the United States Navy. Small wonder that a recently launched super-carrier was named in honor of Theodore Roosevelt, the alert and over-active president whose charisma emanated an imperial force felt from Latin America to East Asia, Africa and Europe. The name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Theodore's even more ambitious cousin and Stalin's most loyal ally, is frequently invoked by President Reagan, probably not just for reasons of campaign rhetoric. Should a Democrat enter the White House in 1988 no changes will be needed in this "pragmatic" combination of ideology and global strategy.

Surprising sympathy for the problems of Soviet leaders is occasionally expressed by high-ranking politicians generally not suspected of harboring Russophile emotions. On the eve of the 1984 elections, Defense Secretary Weinberger gave a dissertation on U.S. foreign and defense policies before the World Affairs Institute of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Apparently, he felt constrained to bow to the trend of pacifism in the public opinion of his own

camp—the United States and Europe — and rhetorically offered the palm of peace to the then Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. On this occasion the corporate leader and friend of Big Business reiterated the weary thesis that since Russia's neighbors, such as the Tatars, the Poles, the Swedes, Napoleon and Hitler, had attacked her repeatedly the Russian nation is living in a constant psychosis of fear.¹⁰ All is sweetness and light in the relations between the two World Powers: such is the conclusion that the pugnacious "Defense" Secretary allows us to draw for ourselves.

IV. America and Germany

During the presidential election campaign of 1972, on the other hand, Paul Warnke, a leader of the U.S. Defense Department under the Democrats and later director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Carter, and head of the U.S. delegation to the SALT II negotiations, drew a much less complimentary picture of the Common Enemy. On October 5, 1972, during a debate on defense policy before an academic audience in Boston, Mr. Warnke — then an advocate of extensive U.S. arms limitations in Europe (an idea that has suddenly gained fresh favor) — shooed the cat out of the bag:

Question by the moderator, Mr. Dukakis (governor of Massachusetts in 1987): "Does the prospect of Germany substantially rearming its forces trouble you at all?"

Reply by Mr. Warnke: "It would, Mr. Dukakis, which is why I favor maintaining a substantial American presence in Europe. I regard 130,000 American troops as being a very substantial presence. And I see no necessity for the Europeans increasing their own force deployment under those circumstances."¹¹

Not at all a personal gaffe; nor is this position a "leftist deviation" concerning Germany by the Democrats. Similar positions had been publicly expressed by Republican President Nixon prior to 1974. Notions such as these are *irrational*, i.e., they have their origin in a pseudo-conflict with ideologically conjured-up entities. They manifest, *inter alia*, a bloodless, strategic victory of the Soviet Union and, in the final analysis, will mortally injure the vital interests of America herself, no matter what her politicians may believe at present.

During the sixties and seventies defamatory statements similar to those cited — indeed, often more offensive — were poured out by the bushel and accomplished the intended purpose of demoralizing

the legitimate representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany. Simultaneously, they contributed to the strengthening of the leftist protest movements, of the radical adherents of disarmament, of the believers in violence and revolution, in West Germany and in western Europe. One might trace America's bipartisan resentment back to Chancellor Brandt's and special envoy Egon Bahr's intensively pursued *Ostpolitik*: an appeasement policy of the East which, according to Bahr's thinking decades ago, included the (very theoretical) possibility of the unification of Germany, accompanied by the neutralization of parts of Central Europe, possibly on the model of Austria. Such a rationalization after the fact ignores the official and unofficial American advice "encouraging" West Germany to enter into negotiations with Moscow and her satellites; it ignores also the rock-like "given" of American foreign policy which, following the low of the Cold War, after 1960 strove to reach global "understandings" with the Soviets. Remember that the very preconditions for the unsatisfactory state of *Ostpolitik* affairs were created by the United States which in 1945 abandoned globally important Central Europe without a struggle, from Wismar in the north to Magdeburg, Leipzig and Pilsen, and who by surrendering the crown cities of Berlin, Vienna and Prague to the Red Army also deserted the heart and mind of Europe. In the portentous years of 1953, 1955, 1956, 1961, 1968 and onward, America's active hands-off policy concerning affairs in the Soviet Occupation zone and East Central Europe was instrumental in bringing about the continued and unbearable oppression of Central Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Today, four decades after Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam the spirit of those conferences under the chairmanship of United States presidents bears much of the blame for the *status quo transAlbiam*.¹²

As an aside, even as early as 1964, the political sociologist Amitai Etzioni alluded to the fact that, in a shrinking world in which the two powers with their nuclear arsenals are "facing each other down," their fears of diminished power will drive them to handle their client-states more roughly or will even deliver them up to the blackmail tactics of the great adversary in order to lasso them and rein them in more easily afterwards. With regard to Germany, the much feared statute on "enemy states" of the United Nations Charter provides a convenient handle for unlimited interpretation by the Powers.¹³

The worm has turned now. The cautious rise of a healthy sense of patriotism is being observed in the Federal Republic. It seems amazing that after decades in which German politics, and the

politics for Germany, had been officially debased in every manner and to every degree imaginable, some West German politicians dare to set new sails in the freshening breeze. During the short campaign for the 1987 elections even the Social Democrats (the SPD), the party of former Chancellor Brandt, then the chief executor of the post-1969 SPD/FDP coalition *Ostpolitik*, saw fit not to ignore the new conditions totally. Note that its party manager ("*Bundesgeschäftsführer*") Peter Glotz, during the 1986 SPD convention at Nuremberg, called upon the Germans to reactivate the idea of "*Mittleuropa*" (Central Europe) publicized seventy years previously by the great National Liberal, Friedrich Naumann. So far so good. But will the renewed force of the idea succeed in welding together, effectively, its sympathizers east and west of the Iron Curtain?

Franz Josef Strauss, the old political warhorse from Bavaria, boss of its CSU, has also jumped on the slowly accelerating bandwagon. That was no surprise since he tried similar tactics, unsuccessfully, both before the Great Ice Age of 1969 and in his run for the federal chancellorship in the 1970's when Brandt's and Schmidt's governments began to unravel. Will he succeed now? His considerable talents include a penchant for opportunistic temporizing and good connections to Israel dating from his time as Defense Minister. Perhaps his turn *will* come.

Some time ago, on September 14, 1984, another spokesman, Dr. Rainer Barzel, then President of the German Bundestag, found words on patriotism which bear repeating:

The German issue...remains, above all, a challenge. He who believes the solution to be simple is no realist; he who gives up, is no patriot.¹⁴

We add, inevitably: he who gives up is no realist but the gravedigger of Germany and of Europe.

Lo and behold: this time, the sentiments of Big Brother point in the right direction. Shortly upon his return from state visits to Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia, none less than U.S. Vice President Bush declared, in 1983, that the Yalta conference did not have the division of Europe as its goal. On the contrary, the Vice President appealed to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to throw off the alien yoke of Soviet rule, to form a united central Europe with their brother nations united in Western Civilization, and to find refuge in the arms of the Free World. Fine words, indeed — and they did find a responsive echo east and west of the

Iron Curtain. But the Vice President has yet to clarify exactly how those nations are to accomplish this revolution, after the blood revolts and uprisings from 1953 through 1983, profound events for which the United States stirred not a finger to help. Will the insecure euphoria of 1986/87, which already celebrates the dismantling of IRBM's in communist and capitalist Europe, succeed in re-uniting those great peoples, finally, for the first time since 1945, 1939, 1918? Great events do cast their shadows ahead but only great deeds will bring them about.

The noteworthy signal of the Vice President was seconded by U.S. Secretary of State Shultz repeatedly, particularly during the Stockholm conference on "confidence building, security and arms control in Europe," January 1985. The division of Germany and of Europe is an injustice perpetrated by the Soviet Union, Shultz declared. It must be redressed thoroughly.¹⁵ We may doubt that, steeped in an atmosphere worsened by the near-fiasco of Reykjavik and finding himself immured in a political system which has had little use for Secretaries of State since 1916 at least, any future United States Secretary of State will waste more than a few soothing words on East Central Europe.

As for the Europeans, the shock of Reykjavik has brought West Germany, Britain and France together more effectively than any stirring declaration could have done. The governments of Thatcher, Mitterand and Kohl are starting to coordinate and unify their arms control policies — a singular turnabout particularly for Kohl and Thatcher who had been very closely attuned to Washington's wishes and whims. We wish them Godspeed faced, as they are, by the double jeopardy of an America seemingly bent on transforming economic troubles into a permanent, global, political-economic crisis (*à la* 1929 to 1941, thus lending substance to the questionable prophecies of Marxism-Leninism), and, on the other front, of a Soviet continental colossus suddenly turned more flexible in its methods and more dynamic in its ways.¹⁶

V. A New Counter-Reformation?

A pacesetter of quite a different caliber than the secular and secularly fickle politicians is the head of the Roman Catholic Church. John Paul II, son of his Polish nation, deeply rooted in the church, pursues far-reaching plans, the implementation of which might well influence the course of the future for centuries to come. An ever accelerating spiritual counter-revolution is to accomplish the cooperation, possibly even the amalgamation of Catholics,

Orthodox Christians and Lutherans in Eastern Europe, roll back the tide of Russian Communism, and at the same time bring about the revitalization of Western Europe, which at present has been indulging in a morally degenerate, as well as politically sterile, alien addiction to vulgar materialism. The goal of the constantly repeated papal initiatives, which go beyond mere regeneration — *i.e.* the revitalization of the human judgmental capability of the individual — is also the renaissance of occidental culture, and, founded thereupon, the reconstruction and new formation of the political integrity of “classical Europe.” After the glorious imperial and royal era of the *regnum et sacerdotum* of the Carolingians, the dynasties of Otto the Great and the Saliers, this integrity was lost to us.

Germany, situated in the heart of Europe and on the strategic turntable of the Old World, encompassing Eurasia and Africa, must of necessity be accorded a culturally, politically and territorially central role, if this grandiose world project is to succeed. Will her politicians develop the strength, vision and perseverance necessary to master this role? Will Germany be allowed to make genuine and significant decisions?

There are many arguments against this. Is so romantic an idea as the Pope's powerful enough to gain control of the workings of modern technology — *e.g.* the communications media — without being corrupted by it? Will it be possible for this idea to prevail in this culturally as well as politically torpid *post bellum* period after 1945 without triggering unforeseen chain reactions or catastrophic events?

The answer to these questions is that self-determination for the Occident must be reattained. Europe must be allowed to be the architect of its own destiny. The alternative will be an accelerated decline, ending in extinction.

Practical politicians may — quite apart from any religious considerations — mistrust the veiled objectives of the church. The day may come, however, when the two world powers will realize that their power is overextended and that for economic, domestic, as well as military reasons it would be to their advantage to welcome openly Europe — and East Asia — into the club of world powers. Once before, an American president (Nixon) decided in the name of his country to renounce the disastrous role of “world policeman” — seven decades after former President Theodore Roosevelt with his “Corollary” (supplement to the Monroe Doctrine) and foreign policy had boldly seized upon it.

At least three prerequisites are necessary to bring about a new balance of power: (1) Never again will the — desirable —

"*L'Europe des Patries*" (General de Gaulle) be in a position to afford the luxury of bloody internal wars. Most of all, the longer Germany sees herself hemmed in by the iron pincers of ambitious expansionists, the stronger her need for extra-European solutions will grow. (2) As an intuitive creator of public opinion the Pope recognizes that only an organic ideology, deeply rooted in the people, will be able to neutralize the claims advanced by the eschatologies of dialectical, as well as Manchester-Liberal, materialism, and be of benefit to all mankind, of benefit to Russia and to America as well. The question of whether this praiseworthy idea has not come three hundred years too late is moot; for it was from the Europe of the past *two* centuries that the most unfruitful ideologies have sprung — parasites on the vitality of the most brilliant edifices of civilized thought. It is imperative that this innermost alienation be overcome, and posthaste. (3) It is also imperative that, along with the vitally essential cultural, economic and ethnic-political apparatus, a common military-political morale be established if Europe is to survive. Practical politicians of the Third World such as General Mustapha Tlas, Defense Minister of the Republic of Syria, are looking forward to see the establishment of Europe as a third force, with a revitalized Germany as its core. Should this *realm of the middle* — facing the Powers — fail to recover its national health, Europe will be without the vital backbone of a common military defense system.

One can well understand the instinctive desire of those nations which are in the direct firing line of the most horrendous weapons of mass destruction and propaganda broadsides of all kinds from both fronts to "get out of history." However, it will not be granted to them to leave the roaring express train of modern times. Quite the opposite! In contrast to the situation of the Swedish nation in the course of the sometimes glorious and sometimes ignominious military campaigns of King Charles XII, Central and Western Europe constitute an essential piece of the world's prime real estate: a prize the lasting attainment of which will crown the one or the other side as ruler of the world. It is imperative that it be restored to trustworthy hands. The exertion of will, effort and power is well worth it:

So girt by danger shall youth, manhood and age
 Pass kindly here their buys pilgrimage
 Such swarming multitudes I fain would see!
 Free people standing on a soil as free.*

Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Faust II*

*Und so verbringt, umrungen von Gefahr,
 Hier Kindheit, Mann, und Greis sein tüchtig Jahr.
 Solch ein Gewimmel möcht' ich sehen!
 Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volke stehn!

Notes

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4. *Ibid.*
5. *The German Tribune*, Hamburg, 1 February 1987, p. 1. *The Week in Germany*, January 30, 1987, German Information Center, New York.
6. Richard M. Nixon, *The Real War*, Warner Books, New York, New York; pp. 72-77.
7. Rainer Barzel, "Ursachen und Stand der deutschen Frage," *Bulletin*, No. 105, 18 September 1984; Presse und Informationsamt der Deutschen Bundesregierung, Bonn. Lajos Lederer, Report, *The Observer*, 31 July 1983. "Worldgram," *U.S. News & World Report*, March 9, 1987. "Newest Soviet Threat," *U.S. News & World Report*, March 16, 1987.
8. "Iceland Pact Would Have Meant Impeaching Reagan, Aspin Says," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, November 22, 1986. "Aspin Blasts Linking of Daniloff to Summit," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, November 25, 1986; *U.S. News & World Report*, October 20, 1986.
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10. "The Inaugural Clement J. Zablocki Memorial Lecture on U.S. Foreign Policy by the Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger," October 24, 1984. A group of about 7 women was present in silent protest against Secretary Weinberger's alleged re-armament policy. Their leaflet proclaimed: "He will continue, and intensify, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy...leading us farther down the road toward a global war...a war no nation can win": *Women for Peace*.
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12. Wesserle, *loc. cit.*
13. Amitai Etzioni, "Strategic Models for a De-Polarizing World," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2: 136-150, 1965. *Charter of the United Nations*, Articles 53, 107, etc.

14. Rainer Barzel, *loc. cit.*
15. Lajos Lederer, *The Observer*, 31 July 1983; William Pfaff, *The Los Angeles Times*, June 27, 1983; "Bonn Pins Hopes for Détente on Stockholm Conference," *The Week in Germany*, Vol. XV, No. 2, January 19, 1984, German Information Center, New York; "Genscher und Shultz sehen gute Ausgangspositionen in Stockholm," *Deutschland Nachrichten*, No. 2, 18 January 1984; German Information Center, New York; "Ruehe sieht Möglichkeiten für neuen 'Dialog'," *ibid.* "Genscher: Stockholm Offers Fresh Start for East-West Relations," *The Week in Germany*, No. 3, January 20, 1984.
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Book Reviews

WARSCHAU UNTER DEUTSCHER HERRSCHAFT
[WARSAW UNDER GERMAN RULE] by Friedrich
Gollert. Warsaw: Berg Verlag GmbH., 1942, 302 pp.

Reviewed by R. Clarence Lang, Ph.D.

On the occasion of the two years' existence of the General Government (GG), I was commissioned to render an account concerning the District of Warsaw. At that time (1941) I wrote *Zwei Jahre Wiederaufbau im Distrikt Warschau* (Two Years Rebuilding Work in the District of Warsaw). In weeks the 3000 copies were sold out, so numerous orders from Germany remained unfilled.

This great interest in the GG prompted me to write a vastly expanded and greatly revised edition. [All translations are by the reviewer.]

These are the opening paragraphs of the foreword to *Warschau unter Deutscher Herrschaft* (Warsaw under German Rule) by the Governor of Warsaw, Dr. Ludwig Fischer, who commissioned Dr. Friederich Gollert to expand the 1941 edition with access to official records and documents.

This new edition is to be a standard work about the German work of rebuilding the District of Warsaw and will document historically the accomplishment of German men and women sent to work here since the founding of the GG. It is to instill confidence in them that their work, which frequently has to be performed under the most stringent circumstances, and which by its very nature has found little recognition on the outside, will not remain unnoticed.

Furthermore, this is to introduce readers to the East, with the manifold problems associated with this newly won soil.

It is the duty of all politically-minded Germans to become acquainted with these problems, of which the GG is most characteristic. In it, the reshaping of the Eastern Areas is being pursued with great success in the midst of the greatest war in history.

English-speaking readers may recall that the Republic of Poland, established after World War I, was partitioned in the fall of 1939. The northwestern part, which already included numerous Germans, was incorporated in Germany. The eastern part, which included

many non-Poles and Jews, became part of the Soviet Union. The central part was made semi-independent, became the General Government, and was divided into four districts: Warsaw, Radom, Lublin and Cracow. The capital and administrative center was Cracow. When the Russian Communists took over Bessarabia (Romania) and the Baltic States, ethnic Germans were permitted to leave and many were resettled in Poland.

Gollert gives the population of the GG as 17,607,500, with 11,300,000 Poles, 4,029,000 Ukrainians, 2,092,000 Jews, 90,000 Gorals, 75,000 ethnic Germans, 15,000 Ruthenians, 6,500 Russians and small groups of Georgians, Tatars and Armenians. Accordingly, the District of Warsaw had 2,800,000 Poles, 600,000 Jews and a small number of other groups.

Since Warsaw had a large Jewish population (according to *The New Concise Pictorial Encyclopedia*, Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1938, the Jewish population of Warsaw was 309,000), naturally Gollert devotes 7 of his 302 pages to the Jewish District of Warsaw, with 12 pictures of the Jewish District.

Under the subtitle "The Necessity of Establishing the Jewish District," one is told that the Jewish District was surrounded by a wall in the summer of 1940 to protect both Jews and non-Jews from epidemics potentially emanating from it. This action then became the model for establishing Jewish districts in the rest of Poland. Or as Gollert put it, "So it happened that in 1940, earlier than in any other district of the GG, a Jewish District was established."

Since one is generally led to believe that this decision was racially motivated — the natural outgrowth of the National Socialist plan to exterminate all Jews — this raises the crucial question: Was the threat of epidemic real, or was it, as the exterminationists claim, only a German pretense to mask their alleged goals of exterminating non-German human beings?

In 1987, 47 years after the Ghetto was walled in, and 44 years after DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) powder eradicated epidemic typhus forever, it is difficult to realize that typhus was indeed the number-one killer in Eastern Europe. However, medical books and journals of the time leave no doubt that this was the case. To take just one example, *The Textbook of Bacteriology* (1945) by Edwin O. Jordan, under "Typhus Fever" and "European Typhus Fever," one reads that the disease is caused by the *Rickettsia prowazeki* germ and is transmitted by the human body louse *Pediculus vestimenti*. This louse-borne typhus persists in endemic foci in Russia and Poland, where it has occasionally broken out in

major epidemics during periods of stress. Furthermore, and this approximated the conditions of the Jewish District, "The disease is associated with overcrowding and filth and has been termed 'camp' and 'jail fever.' Epidemics are not infrequent in both civil and military populations during time of war and may be extensive. It is estimated that 315,000 persons died of typhus in Serbia in 1915, and about 25,000,000 cases occurred in Russia in 1917-21." The *Textbook* claims that the sole vector of the disease under natural conditions is the louse, and thus takes for granted that the only approach in battling the disease is by instituting rigorous delousing programs.

The pre-DDT danger of typhus found expression in such books as *A Five-Year Peace Plan* by Edward J. Byng, published in 1943. Byng took for granted that the United Nations would win, but that there would continue to be a grave typhus problem after the war. He thus insisted: "The occupation troops of the United Nations should immediately install 'de-lousing' stations in Poland, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and, in close cooperation with Russia, along the Finnish-German-Hungarian-Romanian-Russian border." This because the border would be crossed by homeward-bound Axis soldiers and civilians. The writer claimed that between 1914-20 more people died in Europe from that louse-borne scourge, spotted fever (or exanthematic typhus), than in the actual fighting.

There can be no doubt that typhus was a deadly reality before DDT.

The first large-scale, effective use of DDT delousing powder was in Naples in December 1943. According to *The American Year Book: A Record of Events and Progress for the Year 1944*, on page 23, "Demonstrations of DDT's efficacy against epidemic louse-borne typhus in Naples were dramatic and complete." Supposedly, typhus had broken out when Italian troops returned from the louse-infested Balkans. As many as 50,000 persons were deloused in one day, and by mid-March 1944, 2,250,000 had been treated with DDT. By the summer of 1944 the Allies had sufficient DDT to protect 50,000,000 troops in one month.

Two years after the war, *The Textbook of Bacteriology* (1947), by Thurman B. Rice, could triumphantly claim: "The American troops protected by vaccination and armed with DDT for the destruction of lice were able to go into Naples and Buchenwald (concentration camp) with impunity even when the epidemic was raging." The writer puts the story of the DDT gun "among the classic stories of epidemiological methods."

1943, however, was four years after the Germans quarantined the

Jewish District of Warsaw, and three years after the decision was made to build walls around the Jewish Ghetto. Thus, the Germans still had to follow the delousing procedures spoken of by Byng and illustrated in *The Cyclopedia of Medicine Surgery and Specialties* (1941) by George M. Piersol, Editor. On page 534 one finds:

No specific therapy has yet been developed for typhus. Since endemic typhus is carried by rats and transmitted by rat fleas, the obvious means for prophylaxis is disinfection of the premises of rats or avoidance of the vicinity where they exist. Without lice (carried by rats or infested humans and clothing) epidemic typhus could not exist, therefore, all measures focus on methods of keeping louse-free or delousing. Carrying out these procedures on a large scale may be difficult during war and pestilence, but they should be rigidly enforced.

The *Textbook* states that elaborate baths and delousing stations may be erected, but simpler methods may be exposing clothing to disinfection by chemicals or heat or to burn the clothes while the individual is bathed and completely shaven. These have proven satisfactory.

Indeed the Germans learned how difficult it was to "carry out these procedures on a large scale." These methods needed the co-operation of men, women and children to be deloused. Some were hostile to the Germans, and even inspired and ordered by the Underground to sabotage. On the other hand, DDT powder could readily be blown, even unsuspectingly, down the neck or up the sleeves of fully dressed individuals. Within an hour or two the lice were dead, according to *The Science Yearbook of 1945*.

The German method meant herding people together, undressing, taking a bath, shaving, changing and washing of clothing. Clothing had to be kept apart and sorted out, and worn-out clothing destroyed in incinerators. Since heat was involved in the delousing and the incinerators using coal or gas were generally close to crematoria, the most hygienic way of disposing of the dead, this method became the target of a vicious anti-German radio and underground whispering campaign. It was easy for gullible people to believe and pass on the story that the Germans had extermination instead of delousing on their minds.

That the Jewish District presented formidable health problems can be learned from the description of the Ghetto (a term not used by Gollert in *Warschau unter Deutscher Herrschaft*) in the *Autobiography* of the American Rabbi Stephen Wise. He visited the Ghetto three years before the war and in 1949 wrote that he had seen "crowded, poverty-stricken ghettos in the large cities of other lands" but that nothing could compare with the Ghetto in Warsaw

with its "poorest denizens," "subcellar homes and unimaginable darkest underground hovels." "Many were tenanted in their day and night occupancy; families were crowded together."

A similar description is to be found in *Europe behind the Iron Curtain*, in which the Protestant preacher Martha L. Moennich, on page 74, recalled:

"I well remember my first visit to the Warsaw Ghetto in 1939 when I preached to many of these God's ancient people.... Their plight was already a sorrowful one at the time. These unemancipated people — wrapped in their ancient traditions, struggling to eke out an existence by means of a pushcart, crowded into one-room apartments with large families, with no privacy, comforts or common facilities to encourage decency — certainly touched my heart."

To these normal unsanitary conditions, Gollert had to factor in the havoc and disarray caused by the siege of Warsaw in September 1939. The city and much of the surrounding area, according to Gollert, had been heavily destroyed, with town, villages and farms burned to the ground. Thousands of refugees from Warsaw and other cities had been uprooted and roamed about aimlessly. Businesses were closed; markets deserted. Many falsely believed that the Germans had come only to plunder and destroy. There was panic and shock. Famine threatened, for farmers were not inclined to sell their products. Half of the crop was lost. The number of cattle, sheep, pigs and horses had been greatly reduced. There was a shortage of machinery, and Poles were reluctant to work with the Germans, even though streets, roads, railroads, telecommunications systems and sewage systems urgently needed repair. Murder and robberies were commonplace. Pure water was rare, as were suitable eating places. Former officials had fled, taking with them valuable records and documents and destroying the rest in order to sabotage the effectiveness of future German administrations.

The Germans met this head-on. Even before the fighting ceased, German soldiers began cleaning up. Military booty was collected; tens of thousands of prisoners of war were put into temporary camps; roads, streets, bridges and railroads were repaired. Although in the beginning there was little Polish cooperation, Gollert spoke positively of the Polish officials and people, who were responsible and prepared to cooperate effectively in the rebuilding.

In writing about the Jews, the writer reflected the thought-world and emotions of National Socialism. One is told that the Jews in pre-war Poland, as in Central and Western Europe, understood how to gain key decision-making posts in the cultural, the industrial, the

commercial and financial areas. Nevertheless, Poland was different, since the majority of Jews were neither businessmen nor intellectuals, but workers and artisans. Thus the Germans, besides having to break up the overall national Jewish influence, had also to govern an exceptionally large Jewish population concentrated in compact areas.

Contrary to common conceptions, the Germans had no pre-conceived plan to deal with the Jewish District, except that, for hygienic reasons, the Jewish District was put off limits to German troops. But this did not solve the epidemic problem, so it was decided to quarantine certain areas. This did not envision "an actual moving of men, women and children." But the epidemic danger persisted as the Jews paid little attention to the quarantine, but went about unhindered. (It seems even the wearing of the Star of David did not help.) Enforcement was difficult, since "the back streets, yards and dwellings in the District were pictures of disarray, filth and dirt." The danger of spreading "typhus fever, stomach typhus (typhoid), diarrhea and other contagious diseases" to other areas continued, as Jews were found in the inner city. Thus in May 1940, the Germans, in consultation with Polish representatives, decided to wall in the District and, as much as possible, to put the Jews themselves in charge of the health of the District. At one time two districts were considered, but in the last analysis only one was established. This was a relatively easy operation, since the District had been quarantined already and the percentage of Jews living there was between 80% to 90%.

This action involved moving out about 700 ethnic Germans and 113,000 Poles, and moving in about 138,000 Jews. About 11,500 Aryan (non-Jewish) homes and dwellings were evacuated in the city, and about 13,000 Jewish homes in the eastern part of the Warsaw District were not included, but continued to live in Jewish enclaves, as in Siedlce and Sokolow. A relatively large number did not even live in any areas designated as Jewish. (Note: the word Aryan encompassed all non-Jewish ethnic groups in Poland, not just Germans.)

How separate was the Jewish District? One learns that there was a wall and a fence around it. Special permission was needed to enter and to leave. Administratively, the Jews continued to have their own 24-member council with a spokesman, comparable to the mayor of a city. The Germans appointed a German Commissar for the District who was directly under the German Governor of the GG in Cracow. This Commissar established a Central Transfer Office, which took care of the economic needs of the District.

Within this framework, the District was autonomous. It had its own Department of Health, its Office of Housing, its Office for the Registration of the Population, and its Office for Taxation and Finance. There were about 2000 Jewish orderlies (some are pictured in the book), which worked together with the Polish and German authorities. These orderlies were entrusted with the necessary authority to enforce the health rules and to provide the postal service. Gollert was quite explicit regarding the mail service, explaining that the German Mail East delivered the mail to the District, who handed it to the Jewish Postal Administration, who in turn gave their mail to the German Mail East. The Jews were in charge of the traffic and transit system.

Engaged in a life-and-death struggle, the Germans naturally implemented measures to utilize the workshops of the District for war contracts. These contracts were mutually agreed upon with representatives from the Jews. The necessities of life, as stated, were handled through the Central Transfer Office under the German Commissar, who, so it seems, allowed the Jewish authorities to distribute them as they saw fit.

Was this decision of May 1940 a wise one? Gollert defends it, arguing that with "great clarity" the wall was needed to prevent the outbreaks of epidemics in Warsaw and the surrounding areas. In doing so, the writer cited statistics showing that despite the closeness of the District to the rest of Warsaw (it was practically downtown) and despite some laxity in enforcing the separation, only 10% of all reported typhus cases occurred outside the Jewish District. Economically and militarily, it was also the best policy under the circumstances, since it utilized the Jewish workers for the war effort, while requiring a minimum of German supervision, thus partially alleviating the great German manpower shortage. (Jews were exempted from military service.)

Gollert claims that the organizational talent of the Jews did not match their intellectual abilities, so despite numerous officials, commissions, organizations and committees, the inhabitants seldom succeeded in a coordinated effort. Although Gollert spoke of Jewish self-centeredness and strong individualism, he also struck a positive note, in writing that "generally the actions of the representatives of the Jewish Districts were satisfactory."

Concluding the chapter on the Jewish District, Gollert wrote that the arrangement was self-evidently a temporary solution until a permanent solution to the Jewish problem could be found. Essentially, the German decision was Jewish, since Jews oppose intermarriages, and insist on their own built-in laws. The Germans

also had to fear Polish inspired pogroms against the Jews. The wall prevented that as well.

Seven months later, in April 1943, the Jews, taking advantage of their autonomous situation, staged an uprising, which the Germans put down. This uprising should not be confused with the one in August 1944, when the London-based, Polish Government-in-exile staged another abortive uprising in Warsaw, so as to capture Warsaw for the so-called Western democracies, hoping thereby to guarantee the independence of postwar Poland. Promised help from the Russian forces, who were already in the eastern part of the city, just across the Vistula, did not materialize, as the Russians passively allowed the Germans to eliminate the Polish "Home Army" in this 65-day long battle.

When General Dwight D. Eisenhower visited the city after the war, he called it the most destroyed city of World War II. He failed to mention that by September 1942, when Gollert wrote his *Warsaw under German Rule*, Warsaw had been rebuilt under German supervision after the destruction of the Warsaw siege of September 1939.

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THE SURVIVOR, by Jack Eisner. New York: Wm. Morrow, 1980, 320 pp., ISBN 0-688-03741-0. **WAR AND LOVE**, directed by Moshe Mizrahi, screenplay by Abby Mann, produced by Jack Eisner, released by Cannon Group, 1985. Running time 112 min.

Reviewed by Arthur R. Butz

In late 1980 I was contacted by a Chicago TV station with a proposal that I appear to discuss a newly published book with its author, New York businessman Jack Eisner. Accordingly the station sent me a copy of the book, *The Survivor*, a vanity publication (though issued by a regular New York publisher), which ostensibly gives an account of Eisner's activities as an adolescent smuggler and black marketer in the wartime Warsaw ghetto, his arrest and incarceration at the Majdanek concentration camp, his transfer to Flossenbürg, and his liberation at the end of the war. I read the book and was generally agreeable to appearing on the TV show, but that event never materialized. I have a hunch on the reasons why the appearance was proposed in the first place, which I shall get to.

The book turned out to be a more crudely constructed opus than I expected. Consider Eisner's account of his arrival at the "reception depot" for Majdanek:

Suddenly, as though a fairy tale had come to life, a beautiful white horse and rider appeared in the distance. I couldn't believe my eyes as I watched the animal gallop closer and closer. In the saddle was a majestic, monocled figure in an SS general's uniform decorated with red velvet lapels, topped by a striped SS cap. A long white cape lined with red satin floated behind him. Several SS officers, using their whips and guns, cleared a path for the "emperor." Standing in the stirrups, he rode through the masses of "rubbish," assessing the scene.

The text then identifies the general as Odilo Globocnik, described as "Himmler's chief executioner in Southern Poland" (Globocnik was SS and Police Leader in the Lublin district).

In the book it is typical that SS officers appear on the scene wearing monocles, supplemented with white gloves and miscellaneous fancy vestments. For me this evoked images from some of the horrid movies I saw as a child during the war, in which German officers often wore monocles. Those Hollywood gimmicks were, in turn, throwbacks to the anti-militarist, anti-Prussian reaction in the Weimar Republic, in which a monocle was associated with Prussian militarists.

I wonder why Eisner adorned his text with monocles, but in any case they are ludicrous on several grounds. First, the monocle had become in Germany a symbol of a reactionary attitude and the Nazis and the SS represented themselves as revolutionaries; no SS officer would have been caught dead wearing a monocle. Second, Globocnik was no Prussian but an Austrian of Croatian ancestry. His wearing a monocle would have been preposterous on ethnic grounds — something like a Brooklyn Italian affecting a Southern colonel. Third, Globocnik didn't wear a monocle.

That Globocnik scene is typical of the book. Much more comparable fantasy is to be found there and the above quotation would have been much funnier if I had included a few more paragraphs. I had to stop somewhere. Caroline Latham, a freelance editor Eisner hired to help him with his book, commented that "A number of us who read the early manuscript felt that believability was one of its greatest problems... Jack had performed so many heroic deeds and had so many close brushes with death that he tended to stretch his credibility."¹

After such admissions, what is left for the critic to say? I shall only add that the Globocnik scene is followed by some exterminations in gas chambers that "were long wooden structures with too many windows...sealed and taped," with a monocled SS doctor presiding. Wooden gas chambers with windows are features of the legend that we encounter now and then, but what seems particularly odd in Eisner's account is that this gassing scene is followed by an enigmatic reference to "the camp where the real gas chambers, the concrete ones, are." There is no elaboration or attempt to answer the questions begged. Of course both wood and concrete, on account of their ventilatory and absorptive properties, are unsuitable as walls for gas chambers.

The TV appearance did not materialize. After I read the book and communicated my agreeability to appear with Eisner as originally proposed, preferably live, the station representative said that there would be an additional guest to support Eisner. Sensing a move to take the focus off the book, I rejected such an arrangement. I now believe that there was never a serious intention to have Eisner confront me on TV. Eisner is unpopular in some Jewish circles and I suspect that the whole episode was put on only to teach Eisner that his book was a piece of junk that a Revisionist would have no trouble handling.

Eisner's next project was the funding of the "American-Jewish Commission on the Holocaust," to study the behavior of "American Jewry during the Holocaust." Eisner got former Supreme Court

Associate Justice Arthur J. Goldberg to chair the Commission, and Seymour M. Finger, Professor of Political Science at CUNY (City University of New York), to serve as research director. The Commission became publicly active in 1981.

Many Jewish leaders did not like Eisner's Commission; see e.g. the 1983 article by Lucy Dawidowicz, *Commentary* magazine's most reliable hatchet person.² Eisner's intellectual sloppiness was probably one of the reasons for this hostility. The major reason however must have been that the Commission's subject was, shall we say, delicate. Whatever the general U.S. Jewish population thought of the atrocity and extermination tales, the wartime Jewish leaders certainly did not take claims of "extermination" seriously; that is completely clear from Yehuda Bauer's *American Jewry and the Holocaust*, Detroit, 1981 (see also my remarks on this subject in the Winter 1982 *Journal of Historical Review*, or in Supplement B in recent printings of *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*). The controversy over the Commission became so intense that early in 1983 it had even been declared dissolved, with Goldberg and Finger claiming that Eisner had welched on commitments of financial support, and Eisner claiming that Goldberg had bowed to pressure from Jewish groups.³ However, the Commission was eventually reassembled, and its report was issued in 1984.⁴

Eisner had more vanity productions in the works. In 1985 he appeared as producer of a film entitled *War and Love*, an adaptation of his book *The Survivor*. To provide the background music (Mahler) he hired the Israel Philharmonic, no less, and his director was the respected Moshe Mizrahi, thus proving again that money can buy almost anything. Most of the film was shot in Budapest (resulting in a last minute litigation by Hungary over the rights), with a side trip to Auschwitz in Poland.

As should be expected the movie resembles the book, but the most ludicrous scenes are dropped. No monocled SS officers, and no Globocnik scene as above. The principal difference between book and film is that the portion devoted to concentration camp experiences was greatly reduced. Indeed Eisner does not arrive at Majdanek but at Auschwitz, and the action of the film does not tarry there long. There are no great gassing or extermination scenes. The generally moderated tone of the film, in relation to the book, is to be expected. It is far harder to get away with absurdities when they are dramatized in visual form than when they are claimed in print.

Nevertheless the more influential critics received the film with contempt. Vincent Canby of the *New York Times* described it as "shockingly inept," while David Edelstein of the *Village Voice* was

more lucid: "Junk... How cheap."⁵ I wonder how the critics would have reacted to a faithful adaptation of the book!

It is worth pausing over the film's failure to dramatize the mass gassings, which are, after all, the kernel of the whole legend. It is now 42 years since World War II ended, and for about 10 years we have been on the Great Binge of "Holocaust remembrance." The Great Binge is probably a reaction to Revisionism, but that is beside the present point. Commissions have been organized, conferences and symposia have been held, massively publicized TV spectacles have been shown, the most politically tainted of the Nobel Prizes has been given to a raving novelist, special investigating and prosecuting units have been formed in several countries to pursue alleged "Nazis," and a journal of scholarly format has been launched (*Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Pergamon Press). I could go on.

We seem to have actually gotten accustomed to getting these half-century-old atrocity tales for breakfast, lunch and dinner, so it may seem paradoxical that to date the number of attempts to actually dramatize the mass gassings of the legend could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand. All such attempts have been in technically poor productions. For example, NBC's "Holocaust" series of 1978, though courteously plugged everywhere, was not well received by serious critics and was quickly forgotten.

As I wrote at the time, "the extermination legend entails dramatic impossibilities." That resistance to transport was rare, and that there were no riots by transports of Jews on arriving at camps, are very evident historical data. Thus the legend claims, as it must, that the Jews did not resist being gassed. The problem is that while a reader of a book might be persuaded to believe that, for a period of two or three years, at some place in Poland, thousands of Jews were delivered every day by railway trains and marched quietly and peacefully (for they are supposed to have thought they were getting showers) to their deaths in gas chambers, the belief would vanish if that reader saw a serious effort to depict such events on film. Surely some of the victims would had to have known, through general rumor, or through taunting by guards. But then one would have the situation of NBC's "Holocaust," in which some are presented as knowing, thus making the peaceful submission of the mass to death quite incredible, and even in that NBC production only the initial events, in only one instance of an imagined mass gassing, were depicted. Something like this was probably comprehended by Mizrahi, and he edited Eisner's vanity movie accordingly. As for the ridiculous title, perhaps it was Mizrahi's revenge.

At this writing Eisner seems to have no further projects of interest to us, although the "Jack Eisner Center for Holocaust Research" that he established at CUNY is listed in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* as a "major research centre." His productions are not even bad history or bad autobiography, and it is understatement to designate them bad fiction. One may wonder why they are worth noting at all. I believe they are worth noting as a puzzling contemporary cultural phenomenon, specifically, that of normally inarticulate people from the world of business or finance attempting to participate prominently in the Great Binge.

It is at least simplistic, and probably erroneous, to explain Eisner's activities in terms of pure financial motivation. Not only am I confident that Eisner lost a good deal of money on his stinkers, I also suspect that he never expected to make money on them, at least not in the sense of direct profit from the specific productions. If that seems implausible, consider the example of the super-crook Ivan F. Boesky, former member of the U.S. Holocaust Commission, and generous contributor to Jewish philanthropy. Associated with the American Ballet Theater, Boesky sought to "finance a production of a ballet on the Holocaust."⁶ Fine arts performances are notoriously unprofitable, and could not exist without infusions from generous benefactors. Boesky could not have made any money on the ballet. The motivations for such enterprises are no doubt political, but certainly in Eisner's case the politics are not those of the Jewish community as a whole; Eisner's unpopularity there proves that.

My guess is that intra-Jewish politics underlie such projects, and that consequently they are impenetrable to me in fundamental respects. I will have to leave the subject there, as an unresolved and probably unresolvable puzzle. What is certain, however, is that there is a calculation, in the minds of people who have proved their considerable business acumen, that the decade-long Great Binge invites them, for specific reasons I can only guess at, to participate.

Notes

1. *Publishers Weekly*, September 12, 1980, p. 48.
2. *Commentary*, June 1983, p. 36.
3. *New York Times*, January 4, 1983, p. 1.
4. Seymour M. Finger, ed. *American Jewry during the Holocaust*, American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust, New York, 1984.
5. *New York Times*, September 13, 1985, p. C6. *Village Voice*, September 24, 1985, p. 64.
6. *New York Times*, November 21, 1986, business section. *Jewish Chronicle*, November 28, 1986, p. 3.

SELLING HITLER by Robert Harris. New York: Pantheon Books. First American edition, 1986, 402 pp., \$18.95, ISBN 0-394-55336-5.

Reviewed by H. Keith Thompson

The quantities of Third-Reich-related forgeries in circulation can generally be divided into two categories. First, there are the forgeries made by the World War II Allies, and by various international pressure groups, for propaganda purposes, such as the masses of faked material introduced by the Allies at their various postwar "trials" of defeated Axis adherents, e.g., the Russian "evidence" concerning the Katyn Massacre. Most forgeries in the second category (documents, uniforms, medals, weapons and other memorabilia) are merely attempts to make money.

Selling Hitler tells the story of one of the most flagrant, crassly commercial attempts to cash in on the still intense memory of the Third Reich and its leaders. An important and highly entertaining work by a BBC television journalist, it deals not only with the controversy surrounding the forged purported "diaries" of Adolf Hitler, but also touches on the murky world of dealing in and collecting of so-called "Nazi memorabilia," much of which is currently being faked on a considerable scale in England, Germany and the U.S.

A special issue of the *IHR Newsletter*, No. 18, April 1983, dealt with the then breaking story of the Hitler "diaries," revealing the facts and the assertions as they then stood and very intelligently advising that, "Ordinary prudence, as well as academic skepticism, would dictate that no opinion be given until the evidence is fully examined by experts and specialists of impeccable credentials." It is a pity that historians of some stature, Establishment as well as Revisionist, did not heed that sage advice but instead jumped into the controversy, giving off-the-cuff opinions to please those sharks of the publishing world who were prepared to pay very well for such opinions when favorable to them. The "anything for a buck" mentality gripped the historians involved when they knew full well that only forensic scientists, with knowledge of papers, inks, glues, bindings and the interaction of time on those elements, were qualified to rule in the matter. It is far more difficult to launch a fraud among scientists, for their work is physical, finite, and can be double-checked by other qualified scientists.

Easily the most costly and most publicity-ridden fraud in modern times, 60 purported volumes of Hitler "diaries" brought — temporarily — over \$2,000,000, only to be conclusively identified as forgeries within less than three weeks. *Selling Hitler* tells the whole story.

The chief villain in the affair was Gerd Heidemann, a reporter for the German publication, *Stern*, who worked with the forger himself, Konrad Kujau alias "Connie" Fischer, a dealer and middleman in Nazi memorabilia, some genuine and some fake. Aside from his work on the "diaries," Kujau also forged more than 300 drawings and paintings attributed to Hitler, many of which ended up reproduced as genuine in a beautiful multi-colored edition of *Adolf Hitler As Painter and Draftsman*, published by Texas millionaire Billy F. Price. Printed in German, it was banned in West Germany but, in 1984, appeared in the U.S. as *Adolf Hitler: The Unknown Artist*. Robert Harris relates,

A large section of it was the work of Konrad Kujau, but it would have cost a fortune to rip out the fakes and reprint the book. The Kujaus therefore were left sprinkled amongst the Hitlers, and nobody, apparently, cared. "Even the suspect pictures," claimed a limp note of explanation in the book's introduction, "generally reflect Hitler's known style." That remark echoes that made by *Newsweek* about the Hitler diaries: "Genuine or not, it almost doesn't matter in the end."

Frankly, the Kujau Hitlers were not very good. Some of them might be said to reflect Hitler's style, but most of them did not. Hitler was a skilled but very conservative artist. He was not good at human figures, and he preferred to do landscapes. The market is glutted with forgeries and any prospective buyer of Hitler art had best be on guard, particularly since one of the "art experts" involved is ready to authenticate anything as a Hitler for an appropriate fee. The same is true of much other "Nazi memorabilia." A village in West Germany thrives on the cottage industry of reproducing Hitler silverware, knives, forks, spoons, dishes, etc. It is impossible to determine the age of an element like silver and all that is needed is a good set of engraving dies for the simple monogrammed design of the silver used in Hitler's various residences and many officers' messes. Another popular item is SS silverware, even simpler to reproduce, adorned as it is with merely the SS runes. And in Brooklyn, N.Y. a metalworking firm is busily making modern reproductions of copper busts and statuary. A special formula has even been developed to produce a convincing age patina.

The group of so-called handwriting experts and historians

summoned — for large fees — by the management of *Stern* for the purpose of authenticating the Hitler diaries proved to be a pitiful lot. The first was Ordway Hilton of South Carolina, a name not widely known in the field of handwriting analysis. As author Harris writes, "Hilton's report, couched in five pages of professional gobbledygook, was conclusive. But, based as it was on the assumption that all the documents he had been given for comparison were authentic, it was also completely wrong...they were all forged by Kujau." The West German police were similarly tricked, as was another handwriting expert, one Frei-Sulzer of West Germany. Their "comparison examples" came from the Heidemann archive and were Kujau forgeries. But it provided sufficient "evidence" for the "*Stern* gang" to begin the international marketing of publication rights. Never before in publishing have such greed and double-dealing been witnessed. Bidding and counter-offers, the repudiation of agreements by the West Germans involved, and the aggressive attitude of Rupert Murdoch combined to skyrocket prices. The American editors of *Newsweek*, and the London *Sunday Times* typified the essentially mercenary role of the press. "Genuine or not, let's publish the diaries and make money." That became the order of the day.

Among the historians who had rejected the diaries from the outset were the West Germans Dr. Eberhard Jäckel and Dr. Werner Maser. The American historian Dr. Gerhard Weinberg, of the University of North Carolina, was on the wrong side. After a quick flight (between classes) to Germany, he found certain passages in the diary which coincided with his "own theories," and he endorsed the authenticity of the manuscripts.

The historian who causes the most trouble was Trevor-Roper (now Lord Dacre), an Englishman who had built a career on his opportunistic book, *The Last Days of Hitler*, but who was in fact a specialist in the 16th and 17th centuries. Harris notes:

He was not a German scholar. He was not fluent in the language and had admitted as much in a review of *Mein Kampf* published a decade earlier: "I do not read German," he confessed, "with great ease or pleasure." Written in an archaic script, impenetrable to most Germans, the diaries might as well have been composed of Egyptian hieroglyphics for all the sense Trevor-Roper could make of them. He had to rely on the *Stern* men for translation. The conversation was entirely in English...

Trevor-Roper and Murdoch were not friends. Murdoch regarded him as a "typical English establishment waxwork... Harold Evans

described the historian at board meetings of Times Newspapers, sitting with 'eyes screwed up behind pebble glasses...permanently sniffing the air for *non sequiturs*...' " For his part, Trevor-Roper considered Murdoch, "an awful cad." But Trevor-Roper did Murdoch's work and endorsed the Hitler forgeries, creating the biggest stir of all, only to begin within a few days to backtrack and try to wiggle out. What kind of "historians" are these? They had ventured into a field for which they possessed no qualifications.

The forged diaries were, remarkably, rather poor productions. The initials on the binders, taken by Germans to be "AH" but in fact "FH" (for *Führerhauptquartier*), were made of Hong Kong plastic, bought by Kujau in a department store. The "text" was in large measure copied directly from a 1962 work by Max Domarus, *Hitler's Speeches and Proclamations*, and Kujau meticulously copied the dated entries, even transcribing errors made by Domarus in dates and acts. Harris notes, "One such mistake was an entry by 'Hitler' recording that he had received a telegram from General Ritter von Epp congratulating him on the fiftieth anniversary of his joining the army; in reality, the telegram was *from* Hitler to von Epp. Kujau had copied the error word-for-word into the diary."

If there were any heroes in the whole sordid business, who were they? Above all, they were the circle of surviving old Nazis, particularly Hitler's adjutants, staff, and secretaries. Many of these people had literally lived with Hitler and knew his every movement. He was not a diarist. Heidemann made every effort to infiltrate this group of elderly "keepers of the flame." He tried to buy his way into their confidence for motives of his own, certainly not political but exclusively financial. SS General Wilhelm Mohnke, a Bunker survivor who led one of the escape groups after Hitler's death in 1945, notes that at a social occasion in his home, with two of Hitler's adjutants present, Heidemann announced that a set of Hitler's diaries had survived. "...the three old SS men were skeptical. 'That was thought by the people there to be impossible,' declared Mohnke." On another occasion, Mohnke informed Heidemann,

Several things in these diaries were simply not true. First, the SS *Standarte* never had their barracks in Lichterfeld. I belonged to that troop and in March and April 1933 we were in the Friesenstraße... Secondly, at that time this troop of men did not have the name *Leibstandarte*. Thirdly, the entry for 18 March 1933 was false: Adolf Hitler never visited this troop in the Friesenstraße...

Another major hero was the *Bundesarchiv* and its forensic

scientists. The paper was found to be a type that had not existed before 1955. The bindings contained viscose and polyester, not in use at the time alleged. "And by measuring the evaporation of chloride from the ink, the scientists established that the Hess volume had been written within the last two years, whilst the writing in the 1943 diary was less than twelve months old."

Still another hero was Kenneth Rendell, an autograph dealer and handwriting expert from Massachusetts. He was retained by *Newsweek* to evaluate the diaries. He used forensic methods and a valid system of analysis, quickly reaching the conclusion that the diaries were forgeries and not particularly good ones. He probably could have counted on a more generous honorarium had he endorsed the diaries. Another autograph dealer sought to interject himself into the controversy for publicity purposes, but ends up in *Selling Hitler* with an appropriately brief mention.

Robert Harris has written a definitive book on the Hitler diaries hoax. His research is detailed and impeccable. The style of writing, peppered with wit, holds the reader's attention. This is a book one cannot put down without reading to the last line. It is a valuable reference work and belongs in the library of Revisionists and others interested in the history of the Third Reich.

MAUS: A SURVIVOR'S TALE by Art Spiegelman. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, 160 pp., \$8.95

Reviewed by Janet Reilly

The publisher of *Maus* directs libraries to shelve the book under "Holocaust/Autobiography," and indeed, although it is a comic strip featuring white mice as Jews, pigs as Poles, cats as Nazis, and wartime Europe as a gigantic mousetrap, *Maus* is as restrained an exemplar of this garish genre as can be found nowadays. For several years the tale has been appearing as specially bound installments in the avant-garde art comic *Raw*, of which the artist-author Art Spiegelman is coeditor along with his wife Françoise Mouly. (A New York quarterly founded in 1980, *Raw* sports a different subtitle each quarter: "The Graphix Magazine — of Postponed Suicides," "for Damned Intellectuals," "that Lost its Faith in Nihilism," "for your Bomb Shelter's Coffee Table," "of Abstract Depressionism," and other equally jejune shock-schlock tags. Its folio-size pages, crawling with violent, absurdist, sick and stylish images, are a leading repository of Eurotrash chic, a fact

which ticks off American comic artists who feel unfairly left out.)

Maus is actually less another "survivor's tale" than it is another cruel anatomy of the legendary Jewish Family. We have all met this *Wunderfamilie*: it is uniquely warm, supportive, close and nonviolent. Its parents never hit. Its mother may be "pushy," but only out of bottomless maternal desire to see her precious offspring flourish. Its father is wise, gentle, intellectually stimulating, and never alcoholic. Since the war, the more heavily propagandized countries such as the U.S. have imbibed this myth with their mother's milk; similarly acquired lore includes "The Nazis tied pregnant women's legs together when they went into labor," "The Nazis swung Jewish babies against brick walls and dashed out their brains," and of course that old Christmas favorite, the Anne Frank Story. It is a measure of how much more potent a well-told (and oft-repeated) fable is than mere empirical observation that not until we encounter Revisionism, which dares to call a thing by its proper name, are most of us able to retroactively "conform" the actualities of Jewish behavior we ourselves have witnessed to a rather sounder theoretical framework.

Until recently Jews have tried to present a united front of perfect harmony before the rest of the world and keep the weird little pathologies strictly to themselves. Increasingly, however, emboldened by the "untouchable" status they have extorted from American society (if not from other cultures), Jews have been treating these inherent tensions more and more blatantly. That Jews have in fact even less difficulty than most people despising their own kin is clear from the dozens of recent novels, plays, biographies, autobiographies, pop psychology tomes, and films in the *Where's Poppa?* mode (the father in *Death of a Salesman* had already gotten pretty hard to forgive, for that matter...). The best way to obsess someone is to reject him, and parental rejection would seem to be the dynamic underlying these ferociously unsparing dissections now masquerading as "American literature." It is also the dynamic, of course, that plays such a large role in ensuring the reproduction of the peculiarly Jewish character structure.

To get back to Spiegelman's adventure, son Artie hopes to understand through his father Vladek's life history why the old man behaves as he does. Perhaps "the camps" are to blame? Perhaps the "Mauschwitz" experience is the solution to the riddle of unloved, unlovely, unlovable parents? At first it seems so, but by the end it has come to seem not.

Most of the rave reviews *Maus* has received tiptoe uneasily round this central contradiction: that it is one thing to portray one's parent

unsentimentally, the better to serve historical truth, but quite another thing to have no sentimentality to forego. None of the reviewers has mustered the feck to address *Maus* as an irruption of the Jewish repressed. They duly note its contents, from the opening quote — “The Jews are undoubtedly a race, but they are not human” (Adolf Hitler) — to the parting shot — Art muttering that *Vladek* is a “murderer” for having destroyed his dead first wife Anja’s wartime diaries — but keep mum as to meaning. “A quiet triumph... impossible to achieve in any medium but comics.” — *The Washington Post*. (Why?) “The tiny animal figures that move, dress, and speak like human beings become a metaphor for the Jewish experience.” — Susan T. Goodman, Chief Curator, the Jewish Museum. (How so, Susan? You don’t agree with Hitler, surely?) Spiegelman may well be getting flak from ADL public-image monitors or Mel Mermelstein-style hysterics of authenticity, but so far there’s been no public censure.

In the event, Spiegelman’s goal of rendering his father’s story *exactly*, warts and all, to make it more truthful, more recognizably human than many of the wildly idealized self-canonizations occasioned by the “Holocaust,” has the effect primarily of reinforcing and reconfirming the son’s aversion and resentment. As Art confesses to his stepmother, Mala (p. 131), “I used to think the war made him that way...”

“Fah!” blurts Mala. “I went through the camps... *All* our friends went through the camps. *Nobody* is like him!”

“It’s something that worries me about the book I’m doing about him...,” Art goes on. “In some ways he’s just like the racist caricature of the miserly old Jew.”

“Hah! You can say *that* again!”

“I mean, I’m just trying to portray my father *accurately!*...”

And *Maus* offers no reason to doubt that Spiegelman has accomplished just that. Vladek’s irritable, unremitting rejection of his son has driven the latter to become an artist in the first place: because “he thought it was impractical, just a waste of time... It was an area where I wouldn’t have to compete with him” (p. 97). In a move which adumbrates a far more serious betrayal at the end, Vladek furtively throws Art’s favorite jacket in the garbage, supposedly because it’s too “shabby.” Anja herself, possibly Vladek’s prime victim, has earlier committed suicide by taking pills and slashing her wrists; only a fluke prevents Artie from being the one who finds her lying dead in a bloody bathtub. In a previous strip, “Prisoner on the Hell Planet,” reproduced in *Maus*, Spiegelman described his reaction: “I remembered the last time I

saw her... She came into my room... It was late at night... 'Artie — you — still — love — me — don't you?' I turned away, resentful of the way she tightened the umbilical cord... Well, Mom, if you're listening... *Congratulations!*... You've committed the perfect crime... You *murdered* me, Mommy, and you left me here to take the rap!!!" — fade out on the vista of an endless cellblock (ellipses in original). The betrayal prefigured by the jacket incident is Vladek's wanton burning of Anja's memoirs, which throughout *Maus* Art has been eagerly agitating to read at last. And so it goes.

The Elie Wiesel school asserts that the "Holocaust" is so immense that its essence can be approached and grasped only through the most extreme fictionalization, in other words, that nonsense alone touches upon truth (the corollary of Wiesel's unfortunately ignored dictum that "silence alone can speak of such things" as Auschwitz). Spiegelman, on the other hand, writes down all his father tells him, periodically demanding more precise chronologies, dates, concrete details, names, followup. Baldly, the tale is this:

Jewish mouse Vladek Spiegelman — no Mighty Mouse, nor even Mickey Mouse — is an ambitious young textile merchant in Poland who coldly dumps his penniless long-time girlfriend to marry the homely but clever daughter of a millionaire hosiery-factory owner, Anja Zylberberg. They have a son, Richiev, and Vladek is soon enriched by the match. Having been drafted into the Polish army some years before — unlike the rest of his family, whose time-honored practice it has been to pull out their teeth or starve themselves in order to be rejected — Vladek is called up for service in 1939 and finds himself on the frontier facing the German army. He does not shoot ("Why should I kill anyone?" p. 48), but ends up killing one German soldier almost by accident.

Shortly, the Germans (the cats, that is, and poorly-drawn cats they are, too, for all that cats are hard to draw) overrun the pig and mouse position, and all are taken prisoner. Eventually the prisoners are given the alternative of volunteering to work at "a big German company." Here Vladek's lot improves, although the mice are compelled to wield "shovels and picks...things what we never held in our hands before" (p.55). Those who cannot do the work are left to "freeze and starve" — or so Vladek assumes; he cannot really tell us what becomes of them.

One day the captive mice are processed out of camp and shipped by train back to Poland. In Lublin the Nazi authorities fritter away yet *another* opportunity to exterminate them by permitting their release to Jewish "relatives" (for a fee). Vladek makes his way back to the family in Sosnowiec. From this point on much of the tale

revolves around the sufferings of rich mice forced to have recourse to the black market to maintain their standard of living. None of this suffering is unique to Jews, of course, but although *Maus* tends to obscure the universality of this fact of wartime, it also makes quite plain that hoarding, speculating, and black-market profiteering quickly became Jewish specialties; for example, Vladek describes half his relatives as *Kombinator*s — connivers.

While the extended Spiegelman family enjoys escape after miraculous escape from Nazi attempts to control the currency and regulate economic activity (see, for instance, pp. 79 and 85), rumors are flying thick and fast, and the cats take their sweet time ghettoizing the mice. Four are hanged “for dealing goods without coupons,” “to make an *example* of them!” (p. 83). In fact, these are the only authenticated executions in *Maus*; hearsay and assumption account for the rest (“This I didn’t see with my own eyes...”). With one exception: Art’s elder brother Richieu does not “come out from the war” with his supernaturally fortunate parents, for the simple reason that the aunt who is caring for him, in a moment of blind panic upon hearing that her town is to be evacuated to Auschwitz, poisons him, her own two children, and herself to death (p. 109).

Suffice it to say that the Final Solution was somewhat lacking in finality when it came to the Spiegelman clan — like so many others. Vladek even emerges from the war with valuables he now keeps in a Queens safe deposit box. One particularly schizophrenic image in *Maus* (p. 121) depicts the mice gaining access to a new “bunker” in the town of Srodula: the entrance, emanating from a shoe shop, is hidden by an enormous pile of shoes. One wonders if it was the same pile later photographed to represent “shoes taken from gas chamber victims”...

Steven Spielberg and crew seem to find the mouse an apt metaphor for Jewry, too. Their cartoon feature *An American Tail* is the heartwarming story of Mousekewitzes emigrating from Russia to the Golden Burrow of America — Ellis Islanders all the way. Released for the Christmas season — excuse me, in time for “the holidays,” the new Jewish jargon being employed to knock the traditional spiritual punch out of the gentile festival — the film will probably clean up at the box office, if only because it will be one of the few entertainments fit for children to watch.

Art Spiegelman is now at work on the sequel to *Maus*, subtitled “From Mauschwitz to the Catskills.” One supposes it will be of some clinical and even aesthetic interest to see how both elder Spiegelmans manage to evade the ceaseless efforts of the Nazi *Katzen* to trick them into taking that shower. Auschwitz Schmausch-

witz — *Maus* is the subliminal confession, by a cartoonist whose art is perhaps more honest than its creator can bring himself to be, that the "Holocaust" never happened the way we learned in school.

WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR by John W. Dower. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, xii, 399 pp., illustrated, \$22.50, ISBN 0-394-50030-X.

Reviewed by Jack Wikoff

Following the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American people reacted violently with fear and anger at the suddenly ominous power of the Japanese nation. The forms this rage took in the portrayal of the enemy in political cartoons, propaganda films, popular songs, and psychological studies often presented the Japanese variously as apes, bats, octopuses, vermin, giants, rapists, midgets and children. Paralleling this we find that the Japanese, in their crusade to drive the Anglo-Americans from the Pacific, portrayed the enemy as demons, cannibalistic ogres, gangsters, Napoleonic megalomaniacs, and even dandruff.

The changing perceptions of the Allied and Japanese protagonists of the Pacific theatre of World War II are the subject of John W. Dower's superbly researched and documented book. Divided equally into discussions of the propaganda methods and perceptions of both sides, *War Without Mercy* also contains a section of illustrations with fourteen American and British and fifteen Japanese political cartoons.

It is Dower's central premise that racial fear and hatred were major factors that determined how both sides, Japanese and Anglo-American, perceived and dealt with the respective enemy, the "inferior other." Dower makes this clear in a telling passage of the introductory section:

In this milieu of historical forgetfulness, selective reporting, centralized propaganda, and a truly savage war, atrocities and war crimes played a major role in the propagation of racial and cultural stereotypes. The stereotypes preceded the atrocities, however, and had an independent existence apart from any specific event. [p .73]

In the section entitled "The War in Western Eyes" the author surveys in great detail the development of stereotypical images of the Japanese, especially in American sources. The Japanese were often represented in a depersonalized manner as the "Jap hordes"

although the wartime population of Japan was only 73 million. Behind such a characterization was the nightmare fantasy of the "Yellow Peril" fostered in part by the "Fu Manchu" novels of Sax Rohmer. Real or not, the fear that the billion-strong masses of the Orient would pour into Australia, New Zealand and the western United States was foremost in Anglo-American minds. The Japanese propagandists themselves made use of this in a leaflet which depicted a teeter-totter with figures representing seven Asian nations weighing down one end while Roosevelt and Churchill are seen flying off the other end. The caption reads "Greater East Asian War: One Billion Asians against Anglo-Americans" (illustrated on p. 248 of *Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, by Anthony Rhodes, NY: Chelsea House, 1976).

Prior to Pearl Harbor and the extraordinary military successes of Japan in 1942, notably the seizure of Singapore from the complacent British, the Anglo-Americans had failed to take the Japanese seriously. They rated the Japanese as poor and unintelligent fighters, incapable of flying advanced aircraft, unable to build quality battleships, and incapable of the invention of new weapons or methods of battle. In the months following the outbreak of war, the Allies swung to the opposite view, exaggerating the fanaticism, willingness to die, and mysterious, "occult," Oriental qualities of the Japanese soldier. This shift can be seen through the large number of portrayals of Japanese as apes. In a January 1942 issue of *Punch*, monkeys with helmets and machine guns are drawn swinging through vines, underlined with a quotation from Kipling's *Jungle Book* (*War Without Mercy*, p. 183). By 1943 the Japanese were increasingly represented in cartoons as gigantic, savage gorillas (pp. 184, 187). Six months after the April 18, 1942 Doolittle-led B-25 raid on Tokyo, three captured airmen were tried and executed. The American people reacted in a paroxysm of anger and one especially graphic and now famous cartoon depicted an apelike subhuman labeled "Tojo" crouching with blood-dripping mouth and hands over a body labeled "Murdered American Airmen" (illustration on p. 45 of *Faces of the Enemy: Reflection of the Hostile Imagination*, by Sam Keen. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Pub., 1986.)

Yet another extraordinary representation of the enemy as an animal may be found on the December 12, 1942 cover of *Colliers*, painted by Arthur Szyk, which depicts a Japanese officer as a huge bat with fangs and pointed ears carrying a bomb inscribed with skull and crossbones. This creature wears a plumed cap and full dress uniform with swastika-emblazoned epaulets. The swastikas

no doubt were meant to reveal that the "Japs" were able students of the "Nazis."

The author of *War Without Mercy* devotes one chapter, "Primitives, Children, Madmen," to both popular and high-brow psychiatric analyses of the Japanese character. A study by Geoffrey Gorer, the English social anthropologist, entitled "Themes in Japanese Culture" was recapitulated in *Time* magazine under the title "Why are Japs Japs?" Other articles in American publications were given such titles as "Jap Cruelty Traced to Childhood," "Jap Bullies," and "How to Tell Japs from Chinese."

Popular American songs proclaimed "There'll Be No Adolf Hitler nor Yellow Japs to Fear," "Until That Rising Sun Is Down," and "We're Gonna Have to Slap the Dirty Little Jap."

Part III of *War Without Mercy* is titled "The War in Japanese Eyes" and begins:

During the war, the Japanese routinely referred to themselves as the leading race (shido minzoku) of the world. Like their American and Commonwealth adversaries, they called on a variety of metaphors, images, code phrases, and concepts to affirm their superiority — ranging from expressions that demeaned non-Japanese to elaborate affirmations of their own unique qualities. [p. 203]

Dower analyzes in great detail the Japanese view of themselves as a race and nation, more homogeneous, pure, and separate than others. That the "Rising Sun" was used as a symbol of a purifying force can be seen from a cartoon, reproduced in *War Without Mercy*, from the January 1942 issue of the Japanese periodical *Manga*. As described by Dower:

The purifying sun of Japanese glory dispels the "ABCD" powers. America and Britain are thugs (the crown of Jewish — "J" — plutocracy is falling from America's head). China is a sprawling figure with Chiang Kai-shek's face — and a stubby tail, a bestial mark often attached to the Nationalist Chinese. All that remains of the Dutch is a wooden shoe. (p. 192)

The alliance with Germany and Italy made a propaganda campaign of overt anti-white racism somewhat impractical. Furthermore, Japan's history of rapid and often enthusiastic Westernization while resisting colonialization by western powers largely precluded such a propaganda approach. Nevertheless, the Japanese were not above making comparisons of the Japanese and European races.

An argument was offered in another popular book on racial issues that was also published in Tokyo in 1944. Readers of *A History of Changing Theories about the Japanese* by Kiyono Kenji were again reminded of... physical features which on the contrary placed the Europeans closer to the monkeys and other animals than the Japanese; Kiyono offered this... list: "high" noses, hairiness, relatively long arms, lower brain-to-body-weight ratio, thick fingers, and strong body odor of the sort associated with the generative function in certain animals. (p. 219)

Although the Japanese leaders proclaimed a desire for the attainment of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere uniting the nations of the region, it was clear that Tokyo was to be the dominant economic and military center. A disparaging view of other Asians is seen in the portrayals of them as darker-skinned "natives," "half-naked and implicitly half-civilized."

The most common device used to portray Europeans in Japanese cartoons of the era is that of the demon. Thus we see the American president and British prime minister drawn with horns and claws. Another cartoon from *Manga* depicts a head of rice bristling with bayonet blades reminiscent of samurai swords, impaling three American flyers falling from a burning bomber. The flyers are drawn with long pointed noses, skinny bodies, and tails.

The Japanese people were urged by their leaders to work for the good of the group; the nation was more important than the selfish desires of the individual, a theme illustrated by a cartoon of a Japanese woman purging her head of "Anglo-Americanism," the dandruff "being combed out is identified as extravagance, selfishness, hedonism, liberalism, materialism, money worship, individualism, and Anglo-American ideas" (p. 191).

In 1981 the discovery of a volume of war-time documents in a used-book store in Tokyo led to the unearthing of the full six-volume, 3,127-page report, completed July 1, 1943, entitled *An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato [Japanese] Race As Nucleus*, in the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. This unusual and valuable document is the subject of one excellent chapter. Dower elucidates the Japanese equivalent of "blood and soil" and hierarchic patterns of thinking, but only lightly touches on the similarities between National Socialist and Japanese racial, economic, and political theories.

One of the few failings of *War Without Mercy* concerns the author's occasional superficial remarks about Japan's National Socialist ally. Dower is properly sceptical of the flood of atrocity stories which attributed nearly every conceivable brutality to the

Japanese, but accepts uncritically all the clichés and myths about alleged German atrocities that were the staples of Allied propaganda. Particularly telling is the following paragraph:

Apart from the genocide of the Jews, racism remains one of the great neglected subjects of World War Two. We can gain an impression of its importance, however, by asking a simple question: when and where did race play a significant role in the war? The query may seem to border on the simplistic, but it turns out to have no simple answer — not even for the Holocaust. As has become more widely acknowledged in recent years, the destruction of European Jewry itself was neither an isolated event nor a peculiarly Nazi atrocity. The German extermination campaign was not limited to Jews but extended to other “undesirable” peoples as well. At the same time, there occurred a “hidden Holocaust” — that is, a conveniently forgotten one — in which the annihilation of the Jews was actively supported by French and Dutch citizens, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Latvians. It is now also well documented that anti-Semitism in the United States and Great Britain prevented both countries from doing as much as they could have to publicize these genocidal policies or to mount a serious rescue campaign. (p. 4)

Dower acknowledges that the fighting in the Pacific was especially brutal with each side frequently killing captured enemy soldiers rather than taking prisoners, and that the collecting of body parts of enemy dead for mementos was commonplace. He also discusses the cruel Japanese treatment of whites and Asians in concentration camps and the United States’ internment of 110,000 Japanese/American citizens.

We are told in a footnote (page 357) that the above-mentioned *An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race As Nucleus* contains several hundred pages on Nazi racial policies and “the Jewish problem.” Yet, other than providing two illustrations (pages 192 and 194) of Japanese cartoons which include anti-Jewish caricatures, Dower does not touch on the Japanese attitude to the Jews. A discussion of Japanese anti-Jewish and pro-Muslim policies and a more even-handed comparison of the brutal Pacific battles and those of the Eastern Front would have been welcome.

Also, a somewhat larger sampling of political cartoons would have been helpful to convey the wide variety of images and metaphors used in propaganda of the era.

Overall, *War Without Mercy* is a thoroughly documented work and breaks much ground in the study of the propaganda of the war in the Pacific. It is to be hoped that in the future many of the World

War II Japanese writings about the West cited by Dower will be available in English translation. This can only assist in building greater understanding between East and West and may help to prevent future conflicts.

PROPHECY AND POLITICS: MILITANT EVANGELISTS ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR WAR by Grace Halsell. Lawrence Hill & Company, 1986, 210 pages, \$14.95, Hb., ISBN 0-88208-210-8.

Reviewed by Edward Johnson

In the coming maelstrom that lies ahead, in the coming judgement that's going to burst in cyclonic fury over this world, and this planet, America's only hope — listen to me, White House, listen to me, State Department, listen to me, Pentagon, listen to me, Mr. President — America's only hope is not GNP, it's not scientific achievement, it's not an education at Harvard or Yale, but it's America holding on to that little, tiny state of Israel and saying, "We will stand with you," because God said, "They that bless Israel I will bless, and they that curse Israel, I will curse."

— Rev. Jimmy Lee Swaggart
March, 1985 TV homily.

Elite intellectual opinion in the West continues to regard the electronic sermons of Rev. Swaggart and other fleecers of the telecitizenry (Falwell, Bakker, Robertson, etc.) as morally outrageous and politically idiotic. Interestingly, the intelligentsia have continued to connect the phenomenon of TV evangelism and its Scofield Dispensationalist dogma with the extreme right-wing and anti-Semitism. The unspoken assumption is that anything as stupid as a Jimmy Lee Swaggart sermon must be anti-Jewish.

The intelligentsia traffic in stereotypes which reinforce the liberal-Marxist view that history is essentially progressive and Zionism synonymous with progress; thus opposition to these hallowed forces arises from the camp of ignorant reaction, always atavistic and anti-Jewish.

Grace Halsell, whose liberal credentials as a former "Black like me" Southern civil rights worker (she once dyed her skin to experience the tribulations of minorities) are unassailable, has written a troubling book which neatly undercuts this stereotype. Contrary to the coverup, the most powerful movement of jingoists and "nuke 'em 'till they glow" fanatics is in Israel's camp.

The source of their zealotry lies in the *Scofield Reference Bible*, a heavily annotated King James Bible whose marginalia, penned by the 19th-century hermeneuticist C.I. Scofield, is often given the

weight of Scripture itself by enthusiasts. His disciples' view of the modern era (or dispensation) is apocalyptic: Armageddon is inevitable, Jews are God's *Herrenvolk*, Mesech (Moscow) and Gomer (Europe) are the enemy, and righteous Christians will be "raptured" off the planet before the final, radioactive curtain.

True believers in Scofield Dispensationalism regard the nuclear annihilation of the world as imminent. Thus all attempts at making peace with one's foes, or even balancing Reagan's leviathan-sized national budget, are futile.

As a result of their pious vision of Zionists as God's chosen realtors in the Middle East, the TV preachers have received a kind of *de facto* license to remain on the airwaves and promote a traditional, conservative, Christian social agenda. Hence the rift among Zionism's powers that be: such Jewish leaders as Norman Lear feel that influential Jews should quickly pull the plug on Swaggart and Company because of their anti-abortionist, homophobic, anti-feminist, media-bashing platforms.

Other powerful Jews, for instance the neo-conservative Norman Podhoretz, feel that the preachers' social prescriptions must be tolerated for the sake of preserving their high profile philo-Zionism. New York intellectual Irving Kristol has tallied up this balance sheet with considerable acuity. Halsell writes:

If one had informed American Jews 15 years ago that there was to be a powerful revival of Protestant fundamentalism as a political as well as a religious force, they would surely have been alarmed, since they would have assumed that any such revival might tend to be anti-Semitic and anti-Israel. But the Moral Majority is neither... Kristol urges Jews to ask themselves the question: How significant would it be for American Jews if the Moral Majority were anti-Israel? "The answer is easy and inescapable: it would be of major significance. Indeed, it would generally be regarded by Jews as a very alarming matter."

True, Kristol writes, the Moral Majority is committed to a set of social issues — school prayer, anti-abortion, the relation of church and state in general — that tend to evoke a hostile reaction among most (though not all) American Jews. To balance the pros and cons of the matter, Kristol says that "the social issues of the Moral Majority are meeting with practically no success, whereas anti-Israel sentiment has been distinctly on the rise, and the support of the Moral Majority could, in the near future, turn out to be decisive for the very existence of the Jewish state. This is the way that the Israeli government has struck its own balance vis-à-vis the Moral Majority, and it is hard to see why American Jews should come up with a different bottom line." (pp. 155-156)

In other words, for the government of Israel and its dual-loyalist followers in the United States, the "bottom line" is that no matter

how many pro-Zionist TV preachers have visions of a 900-foot Lassie instructing them to build a multi-million dollar crystal dog house, or engage in any of the other buck-hustling buffoonery Twain, Mencken and Bierce satirized with their devastating barbs, the fundamentalists will remain on the airwaves. That all-encompassing ecclesiastical fiat, "If it's good for Israel, it's good," applies as effectively to Christian fundamentalists as it does to grossly inflated American military budgets, senatorial candidates or any other facet of contemporary realpolitik.

Halsell's book moves quickly and reads easily because it combines scholarship with the author's anecdotes about her experiences as a member of a Jerry Falwell-sponsored tour of Israel. On her tour bus she conversed with mostly successful American businessmen and entrepreneurs like Marvin, who told her, "Every war the Jewish soldiers fight is a battle directed by God himself."

Marvin liked the biblical texts that quoted a God opting for extreme violence as divine policy. He once quoted to me Psalm 110 that speaks of Yahweh crushing the heads and filling the earth with the corpses of non-believers, and Psalm 137 that expresses the wish for vengeance by taking little Babylonian children and dashing them against the rocks. (p. 168)

Another Falwellite was Brad, a financial manager who resembled the "quintessential southern male." Brad told Halsell, "I just wish I had been born a Jew!," explaining that "when God made the universe, He gave His special blessing to the Jews." As a result, "Jews were 'different and better' than non-Jews."

Jews are in fact so far superior to their Christian admirers that the temples, battle sites, and ceremonies of Judaism and state Zionism are apparently the only attractions of interest to the folks on the Falwell tour. Halsell was astounded to discover that no one on her bus evinced the least interest in visiting Nazareth, the home of what's His name, but went wild in anticipation of a meeting with an Israeli general. Ironically, the Falwell tour did make a stop in Jesus's home town after all, when their bus driver decided it would be a convenient place for the Christian Zionists to use the restroom facilities.

Halsell hints that the Christian Zionists have a believer in the White House and that the President is not pursuing peace because:

"There'll be no peace until Jesus comes. Any preaching of peace prior to this return is heresy; it's against the word of God; it's Anti-Christ," says TV evangelist Jim Robison, who was invited by President Reagan to deliver the opening prayer at the 1984 Republican National Convention. (p. 16)

Politician and president-maker Jerry Falwell, a close confidant of Reagan, is the only non-Jew ever to have received the coveted Jabotinsky medal for services rendered to the state of Israel. The prize, named in honor of the arch-terrorist Vladimir Jabotinsky, was personally bestowed upon Rev. Falwell by Jabotinsky's most ardent disciple, Menachem Begin, at a gala 1980 dinner in New York.

According to Halsell, the view of the fundamentalists surrounding Reagan, as well as 1980 Presidential candidates Bush and Kemp, is that,

...one need not work to eliminate pollution in our cities, or starvation... One need not concern oneself with nuclear proliferation. One need not attempt to prevent an Arab-Israeli war. Rather — pray for it to explode and engulf the world, since this is part of the divine scheme. (p. 39)

At a 1971 dinner, Reagan told California legislator James Mills that "everything is in place for the battle of Armageddon and the Second Coming of Christ." The President has permitted Jerry Falwell to attend National Security Council briefings and author and Armageddon-advocate Hal Lindsey to give a talk on nuclear war with Russia to top Pentagon strategists.

If Mills, Halsell and other observers of the presidency are correct, Reagan's personal belief in the Dispensationalist scenario explains the mystery of the seeming fatalism of so many of his military, domestic and monetary policies. According to Mills, Reagan's attitude can be summed up as, "There's no reason to get wrought up about the national debt, if God is soon going to foreclose on the whole world."

Leading an electronic propaganda drive with some 60 million estimated adherents, an enthusiast in the White House, upcoming Republican presidential candidates influenced by, and in debt to, fundamentalism (and one candidate, Marion G. "Pat" Robertson, who sees himself as "an anointed prophet of God" and confirmed advocate of Israel and Armageddon), one would think some sort of alarm would be sweeping America.

One would expect that the "no nukes" ecology movement and the anti-racism groups, as well as anyone who gives a fig for the future of his children would, by now, have launched a sustained campaign to oppose the fundamentalists on the specific grounds of their seeking after nuclear war in the Middle East. Yet no such movement has come forth. Mesmerized by "Holocaust" propaganda centered on World War II, millions of Americans are oblivious to the hoped-

for atomic holocaust openly advocated by Christian Zionists who claim to have God on their side and who utilize the vast persuasion-power of television.

This recipe for World War III, the cowing of the collective conscience of Americans who know better, the resultant mass apathy, the vacant stares and smirking grins of clergymen who lead constituencies which regard their leaders as infallible mystics, has a final, perverse twist to its core-belief.

In the theology of the cult of Scofield Dispensationalism, the horrors these "Christians" actually pray for at 24-hour vigil sites in the nation's capital, attended by government officials and lawmakers, will not be shared by them or their children. Instead, a form of Star Trek-like "dematerialization" will occur. This event, called the "rapture," will waft Christian airline pilots out of their cockpits (leaving a planeload of the unsaved to tailspin to fiery destruction), Christian surgeons out of their operating rooms (while patients bleed to death), and tens of thousands of others directly to heaven, where they will observe from a cozy celestial cloud the flaming cinder of planet Earth.

This bizarre belief in a *deus-ex-machina* rescue from an atomic holocaust to be provoked by their blind support of state Zionism is most dramatically evoked by Jimmy Lee Swaggart, a spellbinding orator who has used television to showcase his speaking ability to maximum effect:

I'm not lookin' for a hole in the ground. I'm lookin' for a hole in the sky. I'm not lookin' for the undertaker, I'm lookin' for the Up Taker. I'm not lookin' for some missile. I'm lookin' for the coming king — Jesus Christ — to gather us and take us away! Rapture! Rapture! Rapture!... After the Rapture, the world will be plunged into tribulation. It will be a time so horrible and hideous that words cannot describe it. Jesus called it "Great Tribulation" such as the world has never seen before...a time of such agony, a time of such horrifying hell that will burst in cataclysmic destruction... And for the first time, in the Day of Grace, He (God) pulls off the gloves. He is going to pour out destruction onto this planet, upon evil and upon sin and upon wickedness and upon evil-doers such as minds cannot imagine, contemplate or comprehend...it will affect the whole world... (From a transcript of a Swaggart sermon of March 3, 1985.)

Rev. Swaggart's words would be no more than a colorful bit of gothic, Southern Americana were he delivering them in a dimly lit tent on a steamy August night in some backwater hamlet. But Swaggart's "tent" was a midwestern auditorium holding 20,000 people in a major metropolitan area. Moreover, he was nationally

televised to an audience in the millions.

When Swaggart poured forth his searing nihilistic hatred for all life on earth he was not laughed out of town, booed, or tarred and feathered. He was cheered wildly, with the frenzied abandon and uplifted arms not seen since the fabled days of Hitlerian Germany.

Odd, is it not, that amid the oceans of newsprint and months of broadcast time devoted to hammering home, with an unprecedented monotony, the perils of a fanatical demagogue and an irrational following which arose in National Socialist Germany, Swaggart, Robertson, Bakker and the rest proceed apace with little notice or protest?

What protest there is scrupulously skirts the taboo issue of the relationship between the likelihood of nuclear war and the preacher's idolatry of war-Zionism, delicately limiting the protests to concern over the fundamentalist's promotion of anti-abortion laws and censorship of pornography. These are interesting topics but their urgency pales in comparison to the atomic hell-fire the fundamentalists are promoting by every means available.

Perhaps these "men of God" are correct. Maybe America does have some weird death wish, having grown world-weary and full of resentment for life in the process Nietzsche accused Judeo-Christians of fomenting. If a thanatos cult as virulent as Scofield Dispensationalism can find allegiance among so many millions of our fellow citizens, while other millions idle away their hours in apathy, maybe the self-fulfilling prophecies are coming true.

Surely some culpability descends upon all of us for helping to create the throw-away fundamentalist world Halsell documents. Ultimately, the evangelists have given any who choose to follow them a license to escalate the industrial pollution and nuclear arms buildup threatening all life on earth.

In this current manifestation of a long-festered disease we have an eschatology of the extreme taken to its farthest and most unnatural conclusion. This is nowhere revealed, in all its bitterest consequences, more aptly than in the contrast between the traditional question asked by native peoples in the past — "How will any of our actions affect the next seven generations?" — and the mindset of Rev. Jerry Falwell, who, when confronted with the horrors his philosophy may produce, commented, "You know why I'm not worried? I ain't gonna be here."

PROPHECY AND POLITICS

*Militant Evangelists on
the Road to Nuclear War*

GRACE HALSELL

#711 Hb., 210 pp. — \$14.95

Deceptive Linguistic Structures in the Phrase "The Holocaust"

ROBERT A. HALL, JR.

At present, the phrase *the Holocaust* is almost universally used to refer to various aspects of the situation in which Jews found themselves under the National Socialist régime from 1933 to 1945, in Germany and occupied territories. In this usage, there are several features of linguistic, graphemic, and semantic structure which command the belief of the average hearer in the reality of "the Holocaust" (normally quite outside his or her awareness) and at the same time leave its reference confusingly unclear. These features include the meaning of the definite article (reality), the singular number and capitalization (uniqueness), and the effects (confusion and ambiguity) of the reference of this expression.

1. The definite article *the* is often thought of as an "itsy-bitsy" word, unstressed and of little or no importance in contrast to words which are fully stressed, such as nouns, adjectives, and verbs. Yet the English definite article has a specific meaning and semantic function of its own. It commands a hearer's or reader's belief in the reality of what is referred to by the noun it modifies, and sets up a tacit presupposition, for the rest of the discourse, that this reality has been established. Consider the following joke, in which someone says: "If the dog would only catch a rabbit, we could have rabbit-pie for dinner—if we had a dog." The humor of this utterance consists in the contradiction between what we are led to believe at the outset of the sentence—*i.e.* that the speaker has a really existing dog—and the information given at the end, namely that he does not have a dog.¹

In the case of "the Holocaust," the use of the definite article has a similar effect. Once we speak of "the Holocaust," the presupposition is set up that we are referring to a reality, so that

further discourse on the topic is perforce committed to acceptance of that reality. How could one even query the existence of whatever is referred to by that phrase? Hence "to deny the reality of the Holocaust" has come to be a stock slogan, used against anyone who questions any aspect of what is alleged concerning the experiences of Jews under Nazism, or even (as I know from personal experience) to report on what others have said. It is as if one were denying the reality of the sun or the moon or the earth.

2. The meaning of the singular number of a noun in English is, of course, that only one member of the phenomena referred to exists or is relevant to the situation. In writing, we emphasize the uniqueness of an object or phenomenon by capitalizing the noun, thus giving it somewhat of the status of a proper name. There are, for instance, a number of "water-gaps" in the Pennsylvania mountains, but around Stroudsburg one refers to the Delaware Water-Gap simply as *the Water-Gap*. Similarly with historical events, such as *the Crucifixion*. Many thousands of poor wretches died agonizing deaths on crosses, but for Christians, there was only one such object, *the Cross*, and one such event, *the Crucifixion*.

In the case of *the Holocaust*, likewise, use of the singular and capitalization of the noun serve to emphasize to any hearer (and even more so, to any reader) its uniqueness. Various commentators, such as Michael A. Hoffman and Joseph Sobran, have been in the vanguard in expressing a growing awareness that the Jewish experience under the Nazis was only one of many such — no matter how we define it — that many groups have undergone since ancient times.² Yet insistence on the uniqueness of "the Holocaust" has led even to such excesses as refusal to countenance the foundation of a Roman Catholic convent at Auschwitz (Oswiecim), because that place is regarded by some as exclusively sacred to the memory of the specifically Jewish victims of "the Holocaust."³ For the sake of the argument, let us assume for the moment that a given number of non-Jews were martyred there. Why is their suffering to be considered less important than that of whatever Jewish victims there may have been? Why should the non-Jews, also, not be commemorated there?

3. The English word *holocaust* is a borrowing from Late Latin *holocaustum* "a burnt offering," which was borrowed in its turn from Greek *holócauston* "something wholly burnt." In addition to these meanings, it has acquired in English the further senses of "complete consumption by fire; complete destruction, esp. of a large number of persons; a great slaughter, a massacre."⁴ It is in this last sense that it has come to be used in the phrase *the Holocaust*,

but it has undergone a further extension not justified by its previous history. Its use now covers a wide range of senses, from referring to the presumed mass-execution of Jews in gas chambers or other installations, to denoting the entire experience of all Jews in Germany and in territories occupied by German troops, from the accession of the National Socialist party to power in 1933 until the end of the war in 1945. It is thus possible for a person who even questions any given allegation concerning concentration-camps or gas-chambers to be accused of denying that Jews underwent any persecution or suffering at all. This type of unacknowledged shifting of meaning is known as *semantic wrenching*, and the taking over of a term for such special use is often called *word-shanghaiing* or *word-kidnapping*.⁵

Unscrupulous discussants have, by using these linguistic features, induced naïve, unsuspecting hearers and readers to believe in the reality and uniqueness of whatever is called *the Holocaust*, and have at the same time wrenched its meaning and made its reference vague and imprecise. They have thus eliminated objective discussion and replaced it by obfuscation and confusion. In this way, use of the phrase *the Holocaust*, without further qualification, prejudices the issue. Here, as in so many other instances of propagandistic "Newspeak," we must be on our guard whenever we hear, read, or use this phrase. We must be fully aware of its various and distorted uses, if we are to realize what is happening linguistically and thus avoid being duped.

Notes

1. Another instance which is often cited in this connection involves the first five lines of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poem *The Pleasure Dome of Kubla Khan*: "In Xanadu did Kubla Khan / A stately pleasure dome decree, / Where Alph, the sacred river, ran / through caverns measureless to man / down to a sunless sea." The most important word in these five lines is *the* in verse three, because it commands the reader's belief in the existence of Alph, and hence of the entire situation. (Try substituting *a* for *the* here, and see how flat the entire passage falls.)
2. Cf., most recently, Michael A. Hoffman III, "Psychology and Epistemology of Holocaust 'Newspeak'," *JHR* Vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 467-478, and Mark Weber's observations in "Joseph Sobran and Historical Revisionism," *JHR* Vol. 7, no. 3 (Winter 1986-87), pp. 373-374.
3. As widely reported in the news-media in late January, 1986, e.g. in the *New York Times*, January 31, I, p. 4, col. 1.
4. Cf. the *Oxford English Dictionary* 5.344, s.v. *holocaust*.
5. If I am not mistaken, I was the first to use the expressions *semantic wrench* and *word-shanghaiing*, in my review of Maurizio Dardano, *Il linguaggio dei giornali italiani*, in *Language* 31.211-215 (1975).

Irving on Churchill

THEODORE J. O'KEEFE

World-class historian David Irving is no stranger to readers of the *JHR*. His address to the 1983 International Revisionist Conference, which appeared in the Winter 1984 *Journal of Historical Review* ("On Contemporary History and Historiography"), was something of a primer on Irving's Revisionist historiographical method. It was spiced as well with tantalizing hints of new directions in Irving's research and new book possibilities arising from them.

Not the least among Irving's revelations were those that touched on Winston Churchill, descendant of one of England's greatest families and leader of his nation and its empire (as he still thought it) at what many of his countrymen and many abroad still regard as Britain's "finest hour." Readers will recall that Irving exposed several instances of Churchill's venality, cowardice, and hypocrisy, including Churchill's poltroonish posturing at the time of the German air raid against Coventry and the facts of Churchill and his cronies' secret subvention by the Czech government.

It will also be recalled that in his lecture Irving spoke of his projected book on Winston Churchill, which at the time was to be published in the U.S. by Doubleday and in Great Britain by MacMillan, two great firms entirely worthy of an author who has been churning out meticulously researched historical bestsellers for a quarter of a century. As has been pointed out in recent issues of the *IHR Newsletter*, Irving's challenges to the reigning orthodoxy have become so unbearable to the Establishment that both these major houses refused to print the books as written. The task has now been undertaken by a Revisionist operation in Australia. Nearing completion, the new Irving book, *Churchill's War*, is slated to be available from the IHR by the end of this year.

Last year David Irving made a world-wide speaking tour, visiting North America (the U.S. and Canada), Australia, South Africa, and Europe. He lectured on a wide range of topics pertaining to the troubled history of our century, with his customary flair for the pointed phrase and the telling anecdote. During one of his lectures, delivered at Vancouver, British Columbia on March 31, 1986, Irving offered a series of mordant new facts and insights on the life and career of Winston Churchill.

At the outset of his lecture, Irving remarked that the late Harold MacMillan (Lord Stockton), recently targeted by Nikolai Tolstoy (*The Minister and the Massacres*) for his role in the forcible deportation of tens of thousands of anti-Communist Cossacks, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and others to the U.S.S.R. after World War II, had stated that Irving's Churchill book would "not be published by his company, over his dead body." Clearly Lord Stockton's recent demise didn't alter things at MacMillan, however.

Then Irving let out an electrifying piece of information:

The details which I will tell you today, you will not find published in the Churchill biography. For example, you won't even find them published in Churchill's own biography because there were powers above him who were so powerful that they were able to prevent him publishing details that even he wanted to publish that he found dirty and unscrupulous about the origins of the Second World War.

For example, when I was writing my Churchill biography, I came across a lot of private papers in the files of the Time/Life organization in New York. In Columbia University, there are all the private papers of the chief editor of Time/Life, a man called Daniel Longwell. And in there, in those papers we find all the papers relating to the original publication of the Churchill memoirs in 1947, 1949, the great six-volume set of Churchill memoirs of the Second World War. And I found there a letter from the pre-war German chancellor, the man who preceded Hitler, Dr. Heinrich Brüning, a letter he wrote to Churchill in August, 1937. The sequence of events was this: Dr. Brüning became the chancellor and then Hitler succeeded him after a small indistinguishable move by another man. In other words, Brüning was the man whom Hitler replaced. And Brüning had the opportunity to see who was backing Hitler. Very interesting, who was financing Hitler during all his years in the wilderness, and Brüning knew.

Brüning wrote a letter to Churchill after he had been forced to resign and go into exile in England in August, 1937, setting out the names and identities of the people who backed Hitler. And after the war, Churchill requested Brüning for permission to publish this letter in his great world history, the six-volume world history. And Brüning said no. In his letter, Brüning wrote, "I didn't, and do not even today for understandable reasons, wish to reveal from October, 1928, the two largest regular contributors to the Nazi Party were the general managers of two of the largest Berlin banks, both of Jewish faith and one of them the leader of Zionism in Germany."

Now there is a letter from Dr. Heinrich Brüning to Churchill in 1949, explaining why he wouldn't give permission to Churchill to publish the August, 1937 letter. It was an extraordinary story, out of Churchill's memoirs, even Churchill wanted to reveal that fact, you begin to sense the difficulties that we have in printing the truth today. Churchill, of course, knew all about lies. He was an expert in lying himself. He put a gloss on it. He would say to his friends, "The truth is such a fragile flower, the truth is so precious, it must be given a bodyguard of lies." This is the way Churchill put it.

Irving went on to describe several sources of secret financial support enjoyed by Churchill. In addition to money supplied by the Czech government, Churchill was financed during the "wilderness years" between 1930 and 1939 by a slush fund emanating from a secret pressure group known as the Focus.

Irving on the Focus:

The Focus was financed by a slush fund set up by some of London's wealthiest businessmen. Principally, businessmen organized by the Board of Jewish Deputies in England, whose chairman was a man called Sir Bernard Waley Cohen. Sir Bernard Waley Cohen held a private dinner party at his apartment on July 29, 1936. This is in Waley Cohen's memoirs... The 29th of July, 1936, Waley Cohen set up a slush fund of 50,000 pounds for The Focus, the Churchill pressure group. Now, 50,000 pounds in 1936, multiply that by ten, at least, to get today's figures. By another three or four to multiply that into Canadian dollars. So, 40 times 50,000 pounds...about \$2 million in Canadian terms was given by Bernard Waley Cohen to this secret pressure group of Churchill in July, 1936. The purpose was, the tune that Churchill had to play was, fight Germany. Start warning the world about Germany, about Nazi Germany. Churchill, of course, one of our most brilliant orators, a magnificent writer, did precisely that.

For two years, The Focus continued to militate, in fact, right through until 1939. And I managed to find the secret files of The Focus, I know the names of all the members. I know all their secrets. I know how much money they were getting, not just from The Focus, but from other governments. I use the word "other governments" advisedly because one of my sources of information for my Churchill biography is, in fact, the Chaim Weizmann Papers in the State of Israel. Israel has made available to me, all Churchill's secret correspondence with Chaim Weizmann, all his secret conferences. It is an astonishing thing, but I, despite my reputation, in a kind of negative sense with these people, am given access to files like that, just the same as the Russian Government has given me complete access to all of the Soviet records of Churchill's dealings with Ivan Maisky, Joseph Stalin, Molotov and the rest of them. I am the only historian who has been given access to these Russian records. It is a kind of horse trading method that I use when I want access to these files, because it is in these foreign archives we find the truth about Winston Churchill.

When you want the evidence about his tax dodging in 1949 and thereabouts, you are not going to look in his own tax files, you're going to look in the files of those who employed him, like the Time/Life Corporation of America. That's where you look. And when you're looking for evidence about who was putting money up for Churchill when he was in the wilderness and who was funding this secret group of his, The Focus, you're not going to look in his files, again you're going to look in the secret files, for example, of the Czech government in Prague, because that is where much of the money was coming from.

Irving then revealed further details of Churchill's financing by the Czechs, as well as the facts of Churchill's financial rescue by a wealthy banker of Austro-Jewish origins, Sir Henry Strakosch, who, in Irving's words, emerged "out of the woodwork of the City of London, that great pure international financial institution." When Churchill was bankrupted overnight in the American stock market crash of 1938, it was Strakosch, who was instrumental in setting up the central banks of South Africa and India, who bought up all Churchill's debts. When Strakosch died in 1943, the details of his will, published in the *London Times* included a bequest of £20,000 to the then Prime Minister, eliminating the entire debt.

Irving dealt with Churchill's performance as a wartime leader, first as Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty and then as Prime Minister. The British historian adverted to Churchill's "great military defeat in Norway, which he himself engineered and pioneered," and mentioned the suspicion of Captain Ralph Edwards, who was on Churchill's staff at the time, that Churchill had deliberately caused the fiasco to bring down Neville Chamberlain and replace him as prime minister, which subsequently happened.

Irving spoke of Dunkirk:

In May, 1940, Dunkirk, the biggest Churchill defeat of the lot. It wasn't a victory, it wasn't a triumph, nothing for the British to be proud of. Dunkirk? If you look at the Dunkirk files in the British archives now, you will find, too, you're given only photocopies of the premier files on Dunkirk with mysterious blank pages inserted. And you think, at first, how nice of them to put these blank pages in to keep the documents apart. Not so. The blank pages are the ones that you really want to be seeing. In some cases, of course, the blank pages are genuinely censored with intelligence matters. But the other blank pages are letters between Churchill and the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, which revealed the ugly truth that Churchill, himself, gave the secret order to Lord Gort, the British General in command of the British expeditionary force at Dunkirk, "Withdraw, fall back," or as Churchill put it, "Advance to the coast." That was Churchill's wording. "And you are forbidden to tell any of your neighboring allies that you are pulling out. The French and the Belgians were left in the dark that we were pulling out.

I think it's the most despicable action that any British commander could have been ordered to carry out, to pull out and not tell either his allies on his left and right flanks that he was pulling out at Dunkirk. The reason I knew this is because, although the blanks are in the British files, I got permission from the French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud's widow. His widow is still alive. A dear old lady about 95, living in Paris. And guiding her trembling hand, I managed to get her to sign a document releasing to me all the Prime Minister's files in the French National Archives in Paris. And there are documents, the

originals of the documents which we're not allowed to see in London, and there we know the ugly truth about that other great Churchill triumph, the retreat to Dunkirk. If peace had broken out in June of 1940, Churchill would have been finished. No brass statue in Parliament Square for Mr. Winston Churchill. He would have been consigned to the dustbin of oblivion, forgotten for all time and good riddance I say, because the British Empire would have been preserved. We would, by now, have been the most powerful race, can we dare use the word, the British race, the most powerful race on Earth.

Irving pointed out that Churchill rejected Hitler's peace offers in 1939, 1940, and 1941 (Irving supports the thesis that Rudolf Hess's flight to Scotland was ordered by the Führer). Irving pinpointed one critical moment, and supplied the background:

The crucial moment when he managed to kill this peace offensive in England was July, 1940. If we look at the one date, July the 20th, this I think was something of a watershed between the old era of peace, the greatness of the British Empire and the new era, the new era of nuclear deterrent and the holocaust, the nuclear holocaust, July 20, 1940. Mr. Churchill is lying in bed that Sunday out in Checkers, when he gets a strange message. It's an intercept of a German ambassador's telegram in Washington to Berlin. It's only just been revealed, of course, that we were reading all of the German codes, not only the German Army, Air Force and Navy Codes, but also the German embassy codes. And if you're silly enough to believe everything that's written in the official history of British Intelligence, you will understand that the only reason that they released half of the stories is to prevent us from trying to find out the other half. And what matters is that we are reading the German diplomatic codes as well. On July 20th, the German ambassador in Washington sent a message to Berlin saying that the British ambassador in Washington had asked him very quietly, very confidentially, just what the German peace terms were. This, of course, was the one thing that Churchill could never allow to happen, that the British find out what Hitler's peace terms are. He sends an immediate message to the foreign office, to Lord Halifax, saying, "Your ambassador in Washington is strictly forbidden to have any further contacts with the German ambassador, even indirectly." They were communicating through a Quaker intermediary.

Now, on the same day, Churchill sent a telegram to Washington ordering Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, to have nothing to do with the German ambassador. And the same day, he takes a third move to insure that the peace moves in Britain are finally strangled at birth. He orders Sir Charles Portal to visit him at Checkers, the country residence of British prime ministers. Sir Charles Portal was Commander in Chief of Bomber Command. Now what is the significance? Well, the significance is this. Up to July, 1940, not one single German bomb has fallen on British towns. Hitler had given orders that no British towns are to be bombed and, above all, bombing of London is completely forbidden and embargoed. Churchill

knows this, because he's reading the German codes, he's reading the German Air Force signals, which I can now read in the German files. Churchill is reading the signals and he knows that Hitler is not doing him the favor.

Hitler is still hoping that this madman in England will see reason or that he will be outvoted by his cabinet colleagues. So he's not doing Churchill the favor of bombing any English towns. Churchill is frantic because he thinks he's being outsmarted by Hitler. On July the 20th he sends for Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of Bomber Command, and he says to Sir Charles Portal, as we know from records from Command to the Air Ministry, "When is the earliest that you could launch a vicious air attack on Berlin?" Sir Charles Portal replies to Winston, "I'm afraid we can't do it now, not until September because the nights aren't long enough to fly from England to Berlin and back in the hours of darkness. September, perhaps, and in September we will have the first hundred of the new Sterling bombers..." But he also says, "I warn you, if you do that, the Germans will retaliate. At present they're not bombing English targets, they're not bombing civilian targets at all and you know why. And if you bomb Berlin, then Hitler will retaliate against English civilian targets." And Churchill just twinkles when he gets this reply because he knows what he wants.

We know what he wants because he's told Joe Kennedy, the American Ambassador, Joseph P. Kennedy, father of the late President, "I want the Germans to start bombing London as early as possible because this will bring the Americans into the war when they see the Nazis' frightfulness and above all it will put an end to this awkward and inconvenient peace movement that's afoot in my own Cabinet and among the British population." I've opened Kennedy's diary, I've also read Kennedy's telegrams back to the State Department in Washington. They're buried among the files. You can't find them easily, but they are worth reading and you see in detail what Churchill was telling him. What cynicism. Churchill deliberately provoking the bombing of his own capital in order to kill the peace movement. He's been warned this would be the consequence, but he needs it. And still Hitler doesn't do him the favor.

Irving then gave a detailed account of the cynical maneuverings of Churchill to escalate the aerial campaign against Germany's civilian population to the point at which Hitler was driven to strike back against Britain's cities, supplying the spurious justification for the R.A.F.'s (and later the U.S. Army Air Force's) monstrous terror attacks against centuries-old citadels of culture and their helpless inhabitants.

The British historian further expanded on a theme he had touched on in his address to the IHR's 1983 conference: Churchill the drunkard. Irving substantiated his accusation with numerous citations from diaries and journals, the originals of which often differ from heavily laundered published editions. He concluded his address with an anecdote of a ludicrous incident which found

Churchill pleading with William Lyon Mackenzie King, wartime prime minister of Canada, to shift production in his country's distilleries from raw materials for the war effort to whiskey and gin, twenty-five thousand cases of it. According to Mackenzie King's private diary, the Canadian prime minister tore up Churchill's memorandum on the subject at precisely twenty-five minutes to eight on August 25, 1943, and Sir Winston had to soldier on through the war with liquid sustenance from other lands and climes. As Irving emphasized, Churchill's drunken rantings, often during cabinet meetings, disgusted many of his generals, as when, at a meeting on July 6, 1944, the prime minister told his commanders to prepare to drop two million lethal anthrax bombs on German cities. Of this meeting Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Cunningham, wrote, according to the Irving: "There's no doubt that P.M. is in no state to discuss anything, too tired, and too much alcohol."

Irving's demolition of the Churchill myth, based on a wealth of documentary evidence, most of which has been studiously avoided by the keepers of the Churchill flame, may constitute his most important service to Revisionism. The legendary V-for-victory-wagging, cigar-puffing "Winnie" is for many of a centrist or conservative bent the symbol and guarantee that Britain and America fought and "won" the Second World War for traditional Western values rather than to bleed Europe white and secure an enormous geopolitical base for Communism.

Irving's Churchill biography promises to make trash of such authorized studies as that of Martin Gilbert (which has already been described in private by one Establishment historian as "footnotes to Churchill's war memoirs"). The publication of the first volume of *Churchill's War* later this year should be an historiographical event of the first importance.

A Secret Report by Jan Karski

THEODORE J. O'KEEFE

One of the most durable and useful "eyewitnesses" to the alleged Jewish Holocaust has been the World-War-II Polish spy and propagandist who calls himself Jan Karski. The former courier for the Polish Underground, who was born Jan Koziński, wrote an account of his experiences in wartime Poland, *Story of a Secret State*, which was an American best-seller over forty years ago. Karski's most recent hit was his appearance in the film *Shoah*

(for which he has high praise despite its strident anti-Polonism), in which his agonized recounting of his doings in the Warsaw "ghetto" in 1942 won him additional laurels for his role as a "righteous Gentile."

It has long been evident to Revisionist scholars that Karski's several accounts of his alleged visit to the German camp for Jews located near Belzec, some 80 miles southeast of Lublin, have lost favor among Exterminationist authorities. As Arthur Butz has pointed out, "a new and sanitized version of his story" appeared in Walter Laqueur's *The Terrible Secret*.¹ Laqueur felt the need to explain Karski's failure to see any gas chambers by stating that "apparently...these were walled in and could be approached only with a special permit."² Karski was not asked about his Belzec visit during his interview by Claude Lanzmann in *Shoah*, and most recently Raoul Hilberg has cast severe doubt on Karski's 1942 Belzec visit. "I would not put him in a footnote in my book," stated Hilberg.³ As Revisionist researcher Mark Weber has lately written, Karski's claim that Jews at Belzec were put on trains and shipped away from the camp is more consistent with the Revisionist view of Belzec as a transit camp for Jews headed east than with the notion that Belzec was an extermination center.⁴

Not long ago a translation of a secret and before that time unknown report submitted by Jan Karski to the Polish Government-in-Exile appeared in a Jewish scholarly journal published in New York City.⁵ In the report, titled *Zagadnienie Żydowskie w Kraju* (*The Jewish Problem in the Homeland*), Karski provided revealing information about Jews and Poles under German and Soviet occupation, and even more revealing indications of his facility at distorting the facts in order to serve propaganda aims.

Karski's report, which carries a handwritten notation "to be put to use," was submitted to the Polish Government-in-Exile, at that time based in Angers, France, in February 1940. Karski had just returned from Poland, where he had been taken prisoner by the invading Russians, been handed over to German custody, and then escaped to the Polish Underground in the fall of 1939. According to his introduction to the report, which he composed on his arrival in Angers, he "did not make a special study of the Jewish Question while in the homeland."⁶ Nevertheless, Karski made some careful observations. After describing the situations of Jews in the pre-1919 German territories annexed by the Germans in 1939 and in the German-occupied General Government, Karski portrayed the Jewish role in that part of pre-war Poland that fell to the USSR in 1939 as follows:

The situation of the Jews in these territories is fundamentally different. Above all, "there are no distinctions made here among nationalities or religious groups." "Everyone finds conditions for work and the protection of the law."

The Jews are at home here, not only because they do not experience humiliations or persecutions, but [also because] they possess, thanks to their quick-wittedness and ability to adapt to every new situation, a certain power of both a political and an economic nature.

They are entering the political cells; in many of them they have taken over the most critical political-administrative positions. They play quite a large role in the factory unions, in higher education, and most of all in commerce; but above and beyond even all this they are involved in loansharking and profiteering, contraband, foreign currency exchange, liquor, immoral interests, pimping and procurement.

In these territories in the vast majority of cases their situation is better both economically and politically than what it was before the war.

This applies first of all the the classes of petty merchants, artisans, proletarians, and the half-educated. The wealthier and more educated circles [owners of hotels, large plants, factories, stores, as well as lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.] are subject in principle to the same restrictions as a group, as are other nationalities within the Soviet system.

Karski went on to write of the Poles' attitudes towards the Jews in the Russian zone of occupation:

The attitude of the Jews towards the Bolsheviks is regarded among the Polish populace as quite positive. It is generally believed that the Jews betrayed Poland and the Poles, that they are basically communists, that they crossed over to the Bolsheviks with flags unfurled.

In fact, in most cities the Jews greeted the Bolsheviks with baskets of red roses, with submissive declarations and speeches, etc., etc.

However, one needs to insert here certain distinctions.

Certainly it is so that Jewish communists adopted an enthusiastic stance toward the Bolsheviks, regardless of the social class from which they came. The Jewish proletariat, small merchants, artisans, and all those whose position has at present been improved *structurally* and who had formerly been exposed to oppression, indignities, excesses, etc., from the Polish element — all of these responded positively, if not enthusiastically, to the new regime.

Their attitude seems to me quite understandable.

However, there are worse cases, where they [the Jews] denounce the Poles, Polish nationalist students, and Polish political figures, when they direct the work of the Bolshevik police force from behind their desks or are members of the police force, when they falsely defame the relations [between Poles and Jews] in former Poland. Unfortunately it is necessary to state that such incidents are quite common, more common than incidents which reveal loyalty toward Poles or sentiment toward Poland.

After expressing his own sympathy for the wealthier and better educated Jews, Karski concluded that as to the Poles' feelings toward the Jews in the Soviet zone:

In principle, however, and in their mass, the Jews have created here a situation in which the Poles regard them as devoted to the Bolsheviks and — one can safely say — wait for the moment when they will be able simply to take revenge upon the Jews. Virtually all Poles are bitter and disappointed in relation to the Jews; the overwhelming majority [first among them of course the youth] literally look forward to an opportunity for "repayment in blood."

Karski devoted the remainder of his report on the Jewish problem in occupied Poland to a frank consideration of the effectiveness of German anti-Jewish measures in winning "the sympathy, recognition, and respect of a broad stratum among the Poles." After claiming that the Germans' real goals in Poland vis-à-vis the Jews were "plunder" and "the duping of the Polish populace," Karski summed up the situation as follows:

It must be admitted that they are succeeding in this.

The Jews pay and pay and pay..., and the Polish peasant, laborer, and half-educated, unintelligent, demoralized wretch loudly proclaim, "Now then, they are finally teaching them a lesson." — "We should learn from them." — "The end has come for the Jews." — "Whatever happens, we should thank God that the Germans came and took hold of the Jews," — etc.

"The solution of the Jewish Question" by the Germans — I must state this with a full sense of responsibility for what I am saying — is a serious and quite dangerous tool in the hands of the Germans, leading toward the "moral pacification" of broad sections of Polish society.

It would certainly be erroneous to suppose that this issue alone will be effective in gaining for them the acceptance of the populace.

However, although the nation loathes them mortally, this question is creating something akin to a narrow bridge upon which the Germans and a large portion of Polish society are finding agreement.

It is certain that this bridge is no less narrow than the desires of the Germans to strengthen and reinforce it are great.

Moreover, this situation threatens to demoralize broad segments of the populace, and this in turn may present many problems to the future authorities endeavoring to rebuild the Polish state. It is difficult; "the lesson is not lost."

Furthermore, the present situation is creating a twofold schism among the inhabitants of these territories — first, a schism between Jews and Poles in the struggle against the common enemy, and second, a schism among the Poles, with one group despising and resenting the Germans' barbaric methods [conscious of the danger in this], and the other regarding them [and thus the Germans, too!] with

curiosity and often fascination, and condemning the first group for its "indifference toward such an important question."

Karski and his superiors were not about to leave matters there, however. Possibly to avoid offending the sensibilities of British and French officials who might come across the report, but far more likely as a basis for propaganda among Jews and Western liberals, Karski prepared alternate versions of some of the most damning passages in his secret report, which were appended to the document. The appended passages represented the Poles as sympathetic to the plight of the Jews, and dismissive of German efforts to win them over through anti-Jewish measures. The following passage is a rewrite of the summary quoted above, and embodies what Karski and the Polish Government-in-Exile imagined (doubtless correctly) would be a more palatable, to Hitler's enemies in the West, portrayal of Polish attitudes:

It is necessary to admit that only in one part are they necessary [*sic*] in this, while in the other part they are creating an affect precisely contrary to their intentions.

The Jews pay and pay and pay..., but the Polish populace more and more frequently and in ever wider circles is thinking out loud: "This is already too much."—"These are not people."—"This must end with some horrible punishment for the Germans."

"The solution of the Jewish Question" by the Germans — this must be stated with a full sense of responsibility — *is supposed to be* in their hands and according to their plans a serious and quite dangerous tool, whether for winning over or for "morally pacifying" broad sections of the Polish populace.

Certainly it would be in error to suppose that they expect that this issue alone will be effective in gaining for them the acceptance of the populace.

They know that the Polish nation loathes them mortally, but at the same time they are convinced that this question will create something akin to a narrow bridge upon which the Germans and a certain portion of Polish society will find agreement.

They know further — and they rather expect this — that their methods with respect to the Jews threaten to demoralize broad segments of the populace, and this in turn will certainly present many problems to the future authorities endeavoring to rebuild the Polish state. They believe also that the present situation will create a twofold schism among the inhabitants of these territories — first, a schism between Jews and Poles in the struggle against the common enemy, and second, a schism among the Poles, with one group despising and resenting their barbaric methods [conscious of the danger in this] and the other [according to the German expectations the great majority] regarding those methods [and thus, of course, their authors as well] with curiosity or fascination, and condemning the first group for its "indifference toward such an important question."

At this moment it is difficult to say to what extent the Germans understand that this group is not large and will in the course of time become even smaller.

The Karski report, interesting in itself for its observations of the pro-Soviet activity of many Jews in that part of pre-war Poland occupied by the Soviets in September 1939, provides further evidence of Karski's skill and lack of scruples as a propagandist. Indeed, Karski's role as a propagandist, spreading mendacious "Holocaust" propaganda among the political leaders and press lords of American and Britain, was if anything more important to his superiors in the Polish Government-in-Exile than his activity as a spy and a courier. As his successor, Jan Nowak, wrote:

They way was opened for me by my predecessor in this role, Jan Karski. Endowed with great political acumen, very inventive, and commanding excellent English, Karski had done excellent political and propaganda work on both sides of the Atlantic. He had talked with Churchill, Roosevelt, and a whole range of influential politicians, members of Parliament, and British and American newspaper columnists. His book *The Story of a Secret State* was a best-seller in America. "I hope," said Mikolajczyk [the Polish Interior Minister], "that you will turn out to be another Karski."⁷

Through his continued activity as a self-professed eyewitness to the "Holocaust," and his defense of Claude Lanzmann's anti-Polish movie, the alleged "righteous gentile" Jan Karski seems to be carrying on his propagandist's role for different interests.

Notes

1. Arthur Butz, "Perspective in the 'Holocaust' Controversy," *JHR*, Vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1982), p. 388. Reprinted in Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, IHR, 1985, p. 352.
2. Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret*, New York: Penguin, 1982, p. 231.
3. Interview by Ernie Meyer, *Jerusalem Post*, week ending June 28, 1986, p. 9.
4. "An Open Letter to Rev. Mark Herbener," *Christian News*, April 27, 1987, p. 1.
5. David Engel, "An Early Account of Polish Jewry under Nazi and Soviet Occupation Presented to the Polish Government-in-Exile, February 1940," *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. XLV, no. 1 (Winter 1983), p. 1.
6. All quotations from the Karski report are taken from the translation presented in the the Engel article. Excerpts from a slightly different translation of Karski's report lately appeared in a letter by the British historian of Poland, Norman Davies, which was published in *The New York Review of Books*, April 9, 1987 ("Poles and Jews: An Exchange").
7. Jan Nowak, *Courier from Warsaw*, Detroit: Wayne State University, 1982, p. 234.

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*From the Spanish Civil War
to the Fall of France:
Luftwaffe Lessons Learned and Applied*

PETER H. OPPENHEIMER

Operation Magic Fire (28 July 1936 – 29 March 1939)

Hermann Göring proclaimed the existence of the reconstructed German *Luftwaffe* on 10 March 1935.¹ Within eighteen months, the new *Luftwaffe* embarked upon Operation Magic Fire, a program to assist the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. The war, which broke out in the summer of 1936, provided Hitler with an excellent opportunity to distract European attention from his machinations elsewhere on the Continent while at the same time enabling the fledgling *Luftwaffe* to field test its air warfare doctrine and equipment in military action.² The *Luftwaffe* learned much from the Spanish War in the way of strategy, tactics, logistics, and operations. These lessons were reinforced by the Polish Campaign in September 1939 and applied in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France in 1940.

Condor Legion was the name given to the German military units dispatched in November 1936 to fight in Spain. The task of this paper is to address issues surrounding the Condor Legion in Spain. Specifically, what lessons did the *Luftwaffe* learn from the Spanish War? What was the role of the Condor Legion in that war? Was the *Luftwaffe* helped or hampered by the experience of the Spanish Civil War? Did the Spanish War play a decisive role in influencing the *Luftwaffe* operational doctrine that contributed to Germany's defeat in World War II? By answering these questions, I hope to

show that the Spanish War provided ambiguous benefits to the nascent *Luftwaffe*. Although the Condor Legion involvement in Spain proved an invaluable training and testing opportunity, the lessons it taught were occasionally interpreted erroneously. On the whole, however, the Condor Legion experience in Spain established a wellspring of variegated experience from which the *Luftwaffe* was to draw heavily at the beginning of the Second World War.

Small Beginnings

On 18 July 1936, Adolf Hitler approved the Spanish Nationalist request for military assistance in the civil war that had begun one day earlier.³ Within ten days, twenty Junker Ju52s had been dispatched to Spain, flown by *Lufthansa* (Germany's commercial airline) pilots and *Luftwaffe* volunteers. Shortly thereafter, six Heinkel He51 biplane fighters were shipped to Spain, along with twenty 20mm flak guns.⁴ Although many historians have claimed that Germany entered the Spanish conflict without reservation, this is untrue. Hitler supported Franco over the objections of every ministry in his government.⁵ However, the initial German assistance was restricted in both men and materiel. Indeed, only 85 *Luftwaffe* volunteers were sent originally to serve in Spain under the command of Major General Hugo Sperre, and the designated mission explicitly excluded direct military participation in combat operations.⁶ The *Freiwillige* (volunteers) released from the *Luftwaffe* were under orders only to train Spanish men to fly the German planes. In less than a week, however, one of the Spanish trainees killed himself and destroyed a plane, while two other Spaniards crashed on their first mission.⁷ Because of these mishaps, the German pilots sought and received permission to fly combat missions.⁸

The international reaction to German intervention in Spain was both immediate and hostile. Great Britain lodged a formal protest against the German volunteers and began to support the Spanish Republicans.⁹ The Soviet Union subscribed to a French non-intervention plan in principle, but then demanded that Germany immediately cease aid, and began to aid the Republicans themselves.¹⁰ Göring, having succumbed to Hitler's desire to intervene in Spain, demanded that the *Luftwaffe* expand yet faster.¹¹

Hitler's true reasons for intervening in Spain had little to do with Franco's need of assistance or the simple desire to test and develop military equipment; rather, they were strategic.¹² A Nationalist-

controlled Spain, as Antony Beevor points out, "would present a threat to France's rear as well as the British route to the Suez Canal."¹³ There was also the tempting possibility of U-Boat bases on Spain's Atlantic coast (Spanish ports were actually used occasionally by the Germans during World War II). Hitler also viewed the war as a way to forge the Axis with Italy while distracting Mussolini's attention from Austria and the Balkans. The idea of the war as a testing ground for German equipment was secondary at best. Yet as the equipment initially provided to the Legion demonstrated itself deficient, Berlin responded by supplying new, untested aircraft.¹⁴ Spain became a testing ground for the *Luftwaffe* by chance, not design.

In Spain, the Condor Legion was divided into six parts: a command staff (S/88), one bomber wing with three squadrons of Ju52s (K/88); one fighter wing with three squadrons of He51s (J/88), a reconnaissance squadron of twelve He70s and four heavy flak batteries of 88mm guns (A/88), two 20mm light flak batteries (F/88), and a communications detachment (Ln/88).¹⁵

Pre-Spanish Civil War *Luftwaffe* Doctrine

The airwar theoreticians most influential in the West in the 1920s and the 1930s were Douhet in Italy, Mitchell in the U.S.A, and Trenchard in England. Basically, these men postulated that airplanes could be the decisive factor in the next major war. The air provided a third dimension in which the static trench warfare of World War I could be avoided.¹⁶ The essence of their idea lay in "strategic" bombing. Countries would possess large numbers of long-range bombers capable of destroying the enemy's cities and industrial base. Large-scale destruction would quickly lead to the collapse of the enemy's economy, the demoralization of his people, and a quick end to the war. Inherent in this theory was the belief that "the bomber always gets through." In other words, fast, long-range, heavily armed bombers were invincible and unstoppable. Some of Douhet's extreme adherents even claimed that air warfare made the army and navy superfluous.¹⁷

Germany's airwar visionary during this period was Walther Wever, head of the *Luftwaffe* until his death in 1936. Wever studied Douhet's teachings but believed that a broadly based air strategy was superior to "strategic" bombing,¹⁸ and he argued that the air force should complement the army and navy.¹⁹ His death left the *Luftwaffe* with less capable men in charge. Nonetheless, the doctrine governing *Luftwaffe* air power was formulated by Wever

before he died. Fundamentally, the three military services were to cooperate in order to achieve the foremost goal of any war, that of destroying the enemy armed forces. "It is the task of the air force in leading the war in the air within the wider framework of the whole war to serve this goal."²⁰ More specifically, *Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung* (Luftwaffe Service Regulation 16: Conduct of the Air War) laid down three points: (1) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority; (2) support of the army and navy; (3) attack against the enemy industry.²¹

These three points implied that the *Luftwaffe* should destroy the enemy air force over its own territory, if possible when it was still on the ground. For good measure aircraft factories, ground installations, and air fields were also to be bombed. Secondly, support of the army was critical. Bombers were to clear the way for tanks and infantry by destroying depots, harassing enemy troops, and disrupting communications. Already, *Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16* hinted at the future subordination of the *Luftwaffe* to the Army. Once these two primary tasks had been accomplished, airplanes were to bomb production centers, food supplies, railroads, ports, traffic centers, military recruiting centers, and government administrative centers.²²

Luftwaffe doctrine presumed that the defense of the homeland would be the responsibility of the flak batteries. This was not nearsighted daydreaming. Prewar anti-aircraft units were highly trained and extremely effective, perhaps the best in Europe.²³ Therefore, the prescription for aircraft production prior to the Spanish War, based on the assumption that fighters were not required for homeland defense, was three bombers to every fighter.²⁴ When, as a result of the Spanish War, Colonel Ernst Udet, head of the *Luftwaffe*'s technical department and Office of Air Armament, decided to change the *Luftwaffe*'s force structure from a three bomber to one fighter ratio to two bomber to one fighter ratio, it was for purely offensive reasons.²⁵ As far as German naval air theory was concerned, an independent naval air arm was to be created, consisting of floatplanes, flying boats, and naval fighter planes.²⁶ This arm would cooperate with the Navy, both offensively and defensively. Inexplicably, no aircraft carriers were completed by the Germans, although two were planned and construction on the *Graf Zeppelin* was begun. This strategic error indicated the myopia of the Navy general staff, which did not expect a general war until 1943-44, the landlocked nature of German air power thinking, and the fierce interservice rivalry within the *Wehrmacht* (armed services).

The psychological component of air warfare was not neglected by *Luftwaffe* theorists. As early as 1933, the *Luftwaffe* began to plan for war. Most strategists argued that the next war would be total, entailing the complete mobilization of the civilian population and the engagement of all the country's resources. Under these conditions, many people argued that the unity created by the Nazis would better enable Germany to withstand an all-out struggle. Terror bombing of cities by the *Luftwaffe* would result in the collapse of the enemy's morale and his consequent surrender. The same people assumed that a totalitarian society like National Socialist Germany would more easily endure bombing attacks than the fractured societies of France and Britain. This attitude oriented *Luftwaffe* thinking throughout the 1930's.²⁷

In spite of the explicit air power doctrine laid out by Wever in *Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16*, the *Luftwaffe* had little opportunity to field test its aircraft and theory in the years between its inception in 1933 and the beginning of the Spanish War in 1936. Thus, the *Luftwaffe's* overriding theory was "to employ maximum forces at the decisive point of the battle."²⁸ The course of the battle would necessarily dictate changes in both strategy and tactics, but this was something the *Luftwaffe* was prepared to do.

Tactical Lessons from the Spanish Civil War

It was in the realm of tactics, among other areas, that the Germany military excelled, and it was in the realm of air tactics that the *Luftwaffe* benefitted the most from the Spanish War. The key individual in this area was Werner Mölders. During the Spanish War, Mölders grasped the change in airwar brought about by the monoplane's increased speed and maneuverability, and he developed the *Rotte* and *Schwarm* fighter formation (called the finger-four by the British and Americans), which in one form or another is still in use today. Instead of the World War I fighter group locked in tight wing-to-wing "V" formation, the *Rotte* consisted of two planes, one tailing the other to protect the lead plane's rear.²⁹ A *Schwarm* consisted of two *Rottes*, and the *Schwarm* configuration mimicked that of the *Rotte*.³⁰ When several of these units of four joined to make a *Staffel* (squadron), the units were staggered at different altitudes as a means of mutual search and protection.³¹ This formation possessed several advantages. The increased distances between the planes allowed for greater maneuverability and higher plane speeds. This in turn gave pilots greater flexibility when confronting opponents and enabled them to

use their firepower more effectively against those opponents.

The Spanish War also indicated how difficult it was for conventional bombers to hit targets both at day and night.³² This difficulty led the *Luftwaffe* command to favor the more accurate dive bomber over conventional bombers. The Germans' failure to develop an accurate bombsight further reinforced support for the dive bomber. Night attacks pointed to the difficulty of not only hitting targets, but finding them as well. As a consequence, the *Luftwaffe* placed great emphasis on the development of navigational aids essential for bad weather and night operation. The ultimate result was the *Knickebein* system, first used in the Battle of Britain. *Knickebein* was a blind-bombing system which utilized radio direction to assist aerial navigation.

Low-level attacks were another result of conventional bombing's inherent inaccuracy. A First World War development refined during the Spanish conflict, low-level attacks enabled pilots to judge their bombing runs more accurately and to conduct strafing attacks which demoralized enemy troops, disrupted enemy communications, and pinpointed enemy artillery. The one great disadvantage of ground level attacks was that they exposed aircraft to ground fire. No less significantly, ground level attacks increased the chance of crashes since there was very little time for a pilot to deal with an engine stall, unexpected terrain features, or any similar disastrous surprise.

The Spanish conflict revealed the importance of communications as well. The *Luftwaffe* realized that the signal corps needed to be equipped with radios to maintain close contact between air and ground forces. Furthermore, the new *Rotte* formation dictated an increase in the distance between planes. Although hand signals had sufficed in the past, German pilots perceived that air-to-air radio communications had become critical to the success of the new tactics.

Yet in order to understand the influence of the Spanish War on the *Luftwaffe*, several other areas of air warfare tactics must be addressed in greater detail. They are the development of close ground support of infantry by the Condor Legion, the evolution of fighter tactics, bombing, and reconnaissance.

Close Ground Support

Low-level attacks and close support of the infantry were tactics developed by Wolfram von Richthofen during the Spanish Civil War.³³ During the first battle of Madrid in 1936, German air tactics proved inadequate, primarily because they were experimental.³⁴ The

Legion acted as airborne artillery, bombing and strafing Republican strongpoints and then quickly fleeing.³⁵ This proved ineffective. However, by functioning as airborne artillery, the Germans learned the importance of close coordination with the ground forces so as to avoid attacking friendly troops. The Legion developed extensive communications, linking planes and ground forces, to avoid just this danger. A Legion officer was assigned to the assault troops and linked by radio to the Legion Command Post. An advantageous relationship resulted. Because the Versailles Treaty had forbidden the Germans from having an air force, almost "all future *Luftwaffe* officers, in the early period, had extensive training and experience in the infantry, artillery, or cavalry, and held a great knowledge and appreciation for the problems of ground commanders."³⁶ In addition, Nationalist troops often attached white panels to their backs so they could be easily identified from the air. When necessary, they used flares and smoke pots as well.³⁷

The equipment initially supplied to the Condor Legion also impelled close ground support. Condor Legion pilots soon discovered that their He51 biplanes were outclassed by the Russian Polikarpov I-16 monoplanes and took pains to avoid direct combat confrontation.³⁸ Moreover, the Nationalists were deficient in artillery.³⁹ As a result, the He51 was assigned the role of low-flying artillery in support of Nationalist infantry.

Ground support tactics did not develop immediately, nor did they ever attain the simplicity of textbook formulation. Rather, experience illustrated the necessity of a flexible response to local conditions. The general pattern was for German 88mm guns to bombard enemy strongpoints, followed by bomber and fighter attacks. The infantry advanced directly behind the low-flying planes.⁴⁰ There were many variations of this basic pattern. For instance, during the Battle of Brunete in July 1937, General Sperrle divided his squadron into four flights of two planes each. Successive flights swept in abreast of the enemy flak batteries, opening fire with their machine guns while still a good distance away. Over the batteries, they salvoed their bombs and pulled up as quickly as possible to avoid their own bomb blasts.⁴¹ It was essential to neutralize the enemy flak batteries because the cumbersome Ju52 bombers which followed the fighters were easy targets.⁴² Low altitude attacks also helped ensure that the Ju52s would not bomb friendly infantry. By dispatching successive relays of air attacks, the Legion wore down Republican defenses and shattered the morale of Republican forces.⁴³

In the North, tactics perfected during the attacks against the

Basques were put into practice. Heavy artillery and aerial bombardments destroyed the enemy defenses while He111 bombers escorted by Bf109s penetrated deep into Republican territory, bombing important enemy targets.⁴⁴ During the Nationalist attack on Madrid in late 1936, the Republican chief of staff complained of the devastating air strikes launched against him. "The machine gun fire kept [his] men pinned to the ground to the point where they could not man their guns, and attacks in the rear caused great confusion."⁴⁵

Mass formation of bombers was yet another revision of tactics prompted by the well-fortified enemy strong points in the Basque North. Because an attack by only one or two aircraft simply drove the enemy into his dugouts, safe to reappear after the planes had passed overhead, the Condor Legion pilots approached the enemy from the rear, dropping their bombs all at once. The combined explosive power of the bombs was often sufficient to destroy the fortified dugouts. This innovation the pilots dubbed, "the little man's bomb-carpet."⁴⁶ Thus carpet-bombing was born.⁴⁷ The talent for responding flexibly to local circumstances characterized the Legion's development of close ground support tactics, and it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that Colonel von Richthofen deserves the primary credit for the development of these tactics.

Evolution of Fighter Tactics

Fighter tactics in World War I were crude in form, constrained by the slow and unwieldy triplanes then available and limited by the lack of knowledge about aerial combat in general. As the war progressed, pilots gained experience, armaments were developed, and airplane designs advanced. But relative to World War II, airplanes and tactics in World War I were primitive. Usually, each side massed its planes to maximize total firepower in twisting dogfights. With the advent of fast monoplanes, however, tactics changed to accommodate and exploit the improved capabilities of the single-winged aircraft. Raymond Proctor explains that monoplanes

emphasized the elements of maneuver to firepower in formations. With speed and maneuver came closure, and with it the need to sight the enemy first and to protect the vulnerable tail areas. 80% of all aerial kills are attained with the aircraft shot down never knowing the enemy is there and the attack usually comes from dead to the rear (or the 6 o'clock position). In the traditional formation the pilot of the new high-speed aircraft had far too much of his attention distracted by guarding against crashing into his wingman and was thereby vulnerable to enemy attack.⁴⁸

As a consequence of the increased vulnerability of the monoplane fighter, particularly when utilizing biplane tactics, Werner Mölders devised the *Rotte* and *Schwarm* configurations described above. Yet until the Condor Legion received advanced equipment, fighter tactics in Spain differed very little from those of World War I. Indeed, the slowness of the He51s in comparison to the Russian monoplanes was not an overwhelming handicap in most instances. Only when the pilot of an He51 broke off combat with an enemy monoplane fighter did the relative slowness of his biplane become potentially fatal.⁴⁹

On 29 October 1936 the decision was made in Germany to send modern equipment to Spain, including the Bf109 monoplane fighter.⁵⁰ The Bf109 enabled the Condor Legion to drive the Soviet I-15s and I-16s from the skies, conclusively establishing German air superiority in Spain.⁵¹ The offensive and defensive advantages of Mölder's finger-four fighter formation soon proved extraordinarily successful. Each *Rotte*, when necessary, could act as an independent entity in search, defense, and attack. Cooperation between two *Rottes* — as a *Schwarm* — increased total firepower and visual protection. When one *Rotte* was attacked, the other *Rotte* of the *Schwarm*, some 600 feet from its companion, was able to turn in on the enemy, bringing all its guns to bear. When attacking, the *Rotte* leader assumed the role of a gunship while his wingman flew in a "cone" pattern to his rear, effectively protecting the lead plane's 6 o'clock position.⁵² The increased distance between the planes of a *Rotte* allowed the pilots to focus their attention on scanning the sky rather than on striving to maintain close formation.⁵³

At times, He51s were used as bait in Spain. The biplanes flew several thousand feet below a squadron of Bf109s, which waited until Russian I-16s attacked the He51s. The I-16s were then attacked by the Bf109s. During an attack, the Bf109 sought to dive from a superior altitude and pass the enemy aircraft from below, coming up behind the intended victim in his blind spot. If the pilot missed, he could use his diving velocity to escape with speed, or climb again and attempt another pass.⁵⁴ Another particularly innovative fighter tactic involved a good measure of foresight and a careful calculation of "aloft" time. Several German planes would circle in the sky near the Soviet airfields. Soon, Soviet fighters scrambled to challenge the Condor Legion pilots, who intentionally stayed out of range until the Soviet interceptors ran low on fuel. Then, another Legion flight, carefully timed to arrive over the enemy airbase as the Soviet planes refueled, bombed and strafed the grounded aircraft.⁵⁵ Eventually, the Soviets responded with

appropriate defensive measures, but not before they had lost many planes.

Bombing

The effectiveness of bombing in the Spanish Civil War remained uncertain and for that reason provided the Condor Legion with lessons of dubious value. Spain was an unusual war because by mid-1937 the Condor Legion had achieved an infrequently contested dominance of the air, an advantage rarely enjoyed by an air force.

Throughout the war, German bomber pilots usually flew sorties without a fighter escort deep into enemy territory. The Republicans possessed little artillery, and what they had was generally ineffective. The freedom to bomb the enemy, unhindered by opposition, either in the air or from the ground, led the Germans to believe that a fast, heavily armed bomber was the decisive weapon in a military conflict involving aerial attacks. In many ways, the German experience seemed to support Douhet's concept of "strategic" bombing in that it illustrated the ability of unescorted bombers to penetrate deep into enemy territory and inflict great destruction in mass bombing attacks. Yet the Germans did not enlarge upon Douhet's theory. Rather, they attempted to combine the elements of both fighters and bombers into one plane on the assumption that the resulting aircraft would be better than either of its precursors.⁵⁶ Close ground support tactics also uncovered the desirability of combining both bombing and strafing capabilities into one airplane. In this way, the Germany military expenditures for the *Luftwaffe* could be economized, thus burdening the economy to a lesser degree. However, this was one of the many erroneous lessons drawn from the Spanish Civil War experience. The German experience with daylight bombing, night bombing, dive bombing, and naval bombing must be more fully examined to explain the development of Legion bombing tactics in Spain.

From the beginning of the war, the Legion used classical bombing tactics, adapting their methods whenever necessary to meet local contingencies. Basically, classical tactics entail close ground support of friendly infantry, interdiction of enemy supplies, and bombing attacks against enemy strongholds, troop formation, transportation, and communications. Occasionally, fighter escorts were assigned to the bombers, but this became less necessary as the Legion attained air supremacy. During the attack on Bilbao in the summer of 1937:

German bombers and other air groups dropped heavy bombs in daily attacks, from morning till night, on hill positions, tunnels, command posts, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. Also, they continually bombed the passes north of Miravellas to interrupt all traffic. All air groups were ordered not to bomb, under any circumstances, villages or populated areas.⁵⁷

The latter order, forbidding the bombing of populated areas, was soon violated. Madrid was the first European capital city in history to suffer aerial bombardment. The Germans bombed most of the residential districts of the city in a vain attempt to break the morale of the civilian population. According to Antony Beevor, this methodical experiment in psychological warfare "served only to make the populace more defiant."⁵⁸ The *Stuka* was to alter that.⁵⁹ But until dive bombing received greater emphasis, the Germans concentrated on low altitude bombing runs to compensate for the difficulty Legion bomber crews encountered in accurately placing their bombs on target. Even if the Germans had possessed an accurate bombsight, it is unlikely that it would have made much difference. Bomber crews required exhaustive training to learn precision bombing, and the Condor Legion airmen could afford neither the time nor the effort for such training. Yet, because of the minimal opposition encountered by Legion aircraft, daylight bombing was very effective. The Heinkel He111, a fast, heavily-armored medium bomber, arrived in Spain in 1938 and admirably fulfilled the role prescribed by the Spanish situation.⁶⁰

Because of the He111's successful performance in Spain, the *Luftwaffe* deduced that the medium bomber could be improved simply by designing a larger version. When the Ju52 demonstrated itself inadequate as a bomber,⁶¹ the *Luftwaffe* Technical Office staff requested a plane that would both correct the deficiencies of the Ju52 and extend the capabilities of the He111. More specifically, they ordered a medium bomber that:

- 1) had a flight time of five rather than three hours
- 2) had a bomb capacity of at least two tons
- 3) had a fully glazed nose for better visibility
- 4) had heavier armaments (*i.e.*, more defensive machine guns)
- 5) had improved radios
- 6) had a stronger landing gear and fuselage
- 7) had larger engines to cope with the increased weight and to provide improved flight performance.

The plane ultimately developed was the Ju88, the so-called "super" medium bomber.⁶² Initially, this plane proved a failure, and saw little combat action in Spain.⁶³ Nevertheless, the *Luftwaffe* had

wed itself to the medium bomber concept embodied by the He111, a concept that though spectacularly successful in Spain, eventually contributed to the *Luftwaffe* defeat several years later.

Night bombing was practiced infrequently in Spain due to the virtually insurmountable difficulties night operations posed. Yet during the early stages of the conflict, when the Republicans were still capable of mustering a significant fighter defense, General Sperre decided to engage the enemy in hours of darkness only.⁶⁴ Over Madrid the Legion bomber flights could gauge distances and destinations accurately because the truck traffic, upon which the city depended, was illuminated by its own headlights. Perceptively, Legion bombers struck when truck progress was slowed by bottlenecks at bridges and by the narrow roads of small towns. Weather permitting, the pilots flew sorties every night. However, the results left no doubt that it was difficult to hit small bridges with poor bomb sights at night. *Luftwaffe* Chief of Staff Albert Kesselring, Walther Wever's successor, drew the obvious conclusion: night bombing was effective only when the crews possessed a high degree of discipline and technical competence.⁶⁵

Night bombing was also extraordinarily demanding in terms of training, navigation, and mission execution. As a result, bomber research and development were directed towards two distinct goals. Men like Colonel Ernest Udet were convinced that every bomber should have a dive bombing capability. Others pushed *Luftwaffe* scientists to experiment with radio directional systems to aid navigation and answer the problem of bombing at night and in poor weather conditions. To fulfill the latter goal, the *Knickebein* system was developed and then tested for the first time in the Battle of Britain. The former goal, that of dive bombing, received a great deal more attention during the Spanish Civil War, where it was elaborated and refined.

The Spanish Civil War suggested to the German Air Staff that dive bombing was the single most accurate bombing method. As elucidated above, the special circumstances that existed in Spain enabled the Condor Legion to operate virtually uncontested in the skies over the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, the equipment with which the Legion was provided proved unsuitable for "strategic" bombing missions. At first, the Germans attempted to use the Ju52 as a bomber, but it was slow and lumbering, and thus an extremely vulnerable target for Republican anti-aircraft batteries. Not until later, in 1937, did the Legion receive aircraft, such as the He111, which was more adequate for "strategic" bombing missions. In any event, the unqualified success of close ground support operations underlined the need for an aircraft that could drop bombs with

pinpoint accuracy — something conventional bombers proved unable to do — so as not to scatter bombs on friendly forces. The plane that fulfilled these requirements was the Junker Ju87 dive bomber, first used during the Battle of Teruel in 1938.⁶⁶ The plane had peculiarly angled wings which gave it the appearance of an ugly vulture, and *Luftwaffe* officers in Spain claimed that the *Stuka* could drop its bomb load within five meters of a target.⁶⁷

Wolfram von Richthofen discovered the Ju87 not only to be an accurate bomber but a psychologically demoralizing weapon as well. A technician suggested attaching sirens to the landing gear, a development which gave the *Stuka* its trademark whistling sound as it hurtled down on its target. Perhaps more so than the bombs themselves, the *Stukas'* sirens scared Republican forces, sometimes creating such a panic that the troops abandoned their weapons and fled. As the *Stuka* proved the value of dive bombing, the emphasis in production in Germany shifted toward the Ju87, confirming the belief among the military staff that the bomber was a tactical offensive weapon.⁶⁸ Precision bombing replaced "strategic" bombing for the *Luftwaffe* in Spain, and this partially explains why the Air Staff neglected the development of a heavy, four-engine conventional bomber so sorely needed in later years.

For the Germans, the story of naval bombing in the Spanish Civil War was characterized by minimal results. German naval air theory in the years 1935–1939 supported the idea of an independent naval air arm with floatplanes, flying boats, and naval fighter planes cooperating directly with the Navy. However, the theory was rarely applied. Initially, land-based attacks by planes also proved ineffective. In late October 1936 Franco urged the Condor Legion to bomb Republican naval and supply ports. It did so with disappointing results.⁶⁹ Over a year later, in the Mediterranean, another attempt was made at maritime bombing to interdict Soviet shipping. This time the Condor Legion enjoyed greater success, its seaplanes raiding shipping at sea by day and in harbor by night. On Franco's orders, the maritime bombing attacks escalated into a full-scale offensive. As Willard C. Frank notes, "Raids became continuous, severely reduced the supplies needed to maintain the [Republican] civilian population, and did serve to undercut morale."⁷⁰ By the end of the war in 1939, Italian and German aircraft had sunk 115 Republican and 51 foreign merchant ships, a total equal to nearly 75 percent of all enemy ships destroyed by those two countries during the entire war. Another 225 bombing sorties during this period damaged or delayed many Republican cargoes, choking off a source of the besieged population's food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies and producing increased misery and despair.

Dive bombers were intended as the basic instrument of enemy shipping's destruction. However, the only plane available at the time, the Ju87, originally had only a one-hundred mile operational radius, a factor which limited flight time. Legion pilots did ascertain that torpedo attacks and dive bombing were very promising.⁷¹ But the *Luftwaffe* developed neither a long-range dive bomber nor a torpedo bomber. The He59 and He115 floatplanes were intended to be torpedo bombers, but they never carried out an operation. The Germans were aware of their limitations, but because of their indifferent attitude, they failed to exploit the equipment at hand. The Air Staff believed that the larger German warships received adequate service from their Arado and Heinkel floatplanes. This helps to account for the nearsighted decision not to complete the German aircraft carrier, the *Graf Zeppelin*.⁷² In any case, the High Command in 1937–39 believed that war with Great Britain could be avoided, and men like Ernst Udet did not believe that Germany would wage war against a maritime power like Great Britain.⁷³ As a result of the maritime air war during the Spanish War, the Germans falsely deduced that ships underway did not need to fear aerial attack. Consequently, naval officers procrastinated dangerously on improvements for shipboard anti-aircraft defenses.⁷⁴ Overall, the *Luftwaffe* concluded that a separate naval air arm was unnecessary, and by 1940, it had begun to be reabsorbed into air force land-based squadrons.

Reconnaissance was ultimately the most successful element of German naval air policy in Spain. Initially, reconnaissance, both over land and sea, was viewed negatively because of the scanty results obtained.⁷⁵ It was believed more important to wear the Republicans down through continual bombing. But this anti-reconnaissance attitude changed as the reports obtained through aerial observation demonstrated their value. Observation planes located the enemy, thereby conserving resources by eliminating the wasteful practice of simply sending bombers on haphazardly planned and implemented missions. Given the nature of the conflict, with the great mobility of ground forces, it was important to know the enemy's exact location at any given time. At the Battle of Brunete, Nationalist observation planes were sent aloft. Within thirty minutes of sighting the enemy concentrations, Legion bombers appeared to strike and strafe the Republican troops.⁷⁶

The Republican Air Force always made a great effort to shoot down the Nationalist reconnaissance craft, and these observation planes were forced to engage in evasive tactics to preserve themselves. As a general rule, observation planes were less heavily

armored and armed than combat aircraft. Speed was most important. When attacked, the reconnaissance planes made for a cloudbank to hide. If none was available, the planes went into a dive to gain sufficient speed to escape their pursuer, or at least limit him to one attack. Another tactic practiced by the reconnaissance planes was to begin firing their machine guns long before they were in range of enemy fighters, occasionally causing the enemy to break off his attack too early. "Considering its technical disadvantage, the Legion lost few reconnaissance planes."⁷⁷

Logistics & Operations

Mobility was the key logistical lesson taught the *Luftwaffe* by the Spanish War. The need for mobility had been demonstrated by the Italian military experience in Ethiopia in 1935-36. Mobility was frequently the key to the success of the Italian forces against the well-armed and well-trained Ethiopian Army. Yet, for the Germans in Spain, mobility meant more than just rapid deployment of men and equipment. It found its essence in ground-staff mobility.⁷⁸ The use of air transport and railroads to move entire unit installations quickly lay the groundwork for the *Blitzkrieg* as later practiced in Poland. The *Wohnzug* (railroad caravan) was the quintessential example of mobility in practice. The *Wohnzug* consisted of approximately eleven railway cars, two of which were locomotives attached at either end of the train, eliminating the need for turn-arounds. One-third of the cars contained sleeping compartments for the officers and enlisted men. At a moment's notice, the *Wohnzug* could be underway with all the squadron's equipment and support personnel. The flight crews flew their planes to the next designated base of operations to await the rest of the railroad-transported squadron. By 1939, each Condor Legion squadron was also assigned two Ju52s to be used both as transports and as radio direction-finding stations.⁷⁹ The Ju52s proved reliable workhorses, perfectly suited to the task which was set for them.

In operations, the Condor Legion learned how important ground support personnel were, particularly in the inhospitable environment of Spain. The men who fueled the motors, tinkered with the engines, and replaced broken or damaged parts played an indispensable role in the Condor Legion. At first, the Legion underestimated the number of personnel required to care for the aircraft properly as well as the number of reserves needed to replace overtired, injured, or killed front-line pilots. The exertions demanded of the men, including long, irregular hours frequently under harsh,

The lesson in operations typified the manner in which the *Luftwaffe* took advantage of the war not only to evaluate its practices but also its organization. During the course of the war, the flight elements of the battle squadrons and their ground personnel were reorganized, forming the basis for what later became standard operational configurations.⁸¹ A special combat reporting team was set up in Berlin and dispatched to Spain with orders to send back periodically for analysis and evaluation.⁸² In addition, the *Lehr Division* (Technical Development Flying Unit) was formed at Greifswald in 1937.⁸³ Its purpose was to discover the lessons of the Spanish conflict and distill the experience derived from air competitions and factory research. Essentially, the *Lehr Division* functioned as a post-graduate flight school and advanced operational training center devoted to absorbing and teaching new tactical air lessons, many of which came from Spain. Not surprisingly, much of what was learned was subsequently adopted as standard procedure to be used by the *Luftwaffe* throughout World War II.

Air Theory Applied in Spain

The theory of air doctrine described by Giulio Douhet in his book, *The Command of the Air* (1921), postulated a concept of "strategic" bombing which simply did not apply to the conflict raging on the Iberian Peninsula between 1936 and 1939. Douhet's theory was predicated on the premise that the static trench warfare epitomized by World War I set the pattern for all future ground wars and that "strategic" bombing provided the only means to avoid bloody wars of attrition. In Spain, the contest between the Nationalists and the Republicans was of a fluid and mobile nature, covering many different types of terrains and climates, constrained by delicate political circumstances, and limited by the available equipment. Douhet suggested the way to win a war was to destroy the enemy's cities and industrial base. In Spain, however, there was very little large-scale, heavy industry. It was perhaps to be expected that Spain was not, and, indeed, could not be, the war to verify Douhet's theory. Except for the unusual circumstances that

enabled Condor Legion bombers to attack the Republicans virtually unmolested, there was little proof that a well-organized fighter defense would be unable to check "strategic" bombers.

The development of close ground support tactics arose naturally, then, from the peculiar situation in Spain, as did the emphasis placed on dive and medium bombers. Many other factors contributed to the course of these developments, but they were of a more secondary nature.

On 1 May 1937 Richthofen wrote a letter to the *Luftwaffe* High Command stating "Spanish [Nationalist] artillery is always late in arriving; it fires too slowly and too poorly to keep the enemy pinned down. The load of the battle rests with the flyers; first by inflicting casualties, second, by holding him down, making him run, destroying his spirit to fight, and hindering his resupply and reinforcement."⁸⁴ Here was a cogent summary of Condor Legion air doctrine as practiced in Spain. The air force, claimed Richthofen, bore the primary responsibility for executing the attack. Intrinsic to this belief was the desirability, indeed necessity, of close coordination between the army and the air force. The goal of the Legion flight elements was threefold: (1) seek out the enemy air force in order to remove the threat to the army, (2) attack the enemy army, harass his troops, transport, and communications, and (3) protect ground troops and infantry from enemy air attack.⁸⁵ After air superiority had been established, the air force could then switch from air-to-air to air-to-ground attacks.

The *Luftwaffe* High Command was unaware of the efficacy and applicability of close ground support tactics at the outset of the Spanish War. It was still enthralled by the concept of "strategic" bombing. Von Richthofen slowly but surely weaned the High Command from its strategic airpower beliefs and persuaded it that close support tactics had great potential.

Some authors argue that Germany came to have an air force based on tactical air power rather than general air power because of the influence and predominance of the German Army.⁸⁶ For such authors, it was natural that the fledgling *Luftwaffe* be subordinated to the long-established army. But in truth, there was such general opposition to anything but "strategic" bombing that it was only Richthofen's perseverance and determination that led to the acceptance of tactical air power.⁸⁷ The first close support operations in Spain took place in March 1937, when He51 fighter bombers made a low-level attack on the Republican front at Bilbao with great success.⁸⁸ For the Germans, tactical air power as an operational doctrine and a strategy dates from this incident, and in retrospect,

changed the course of the next war and all future wars.

Other forms of bombing were not precluded as a strategy merely because Richthofen developed close ground support tactics. But that bombing was included in strategic planning does not mean the same thing as "strategic" bombing. As indicated above, high-altitude "strategic" bombing was practiced infrequently by the Condor Legion during the Spanish War because of the various political, economic, and structural circumstances. Yet the Spanish Civil War was not spectacularly successful with interdiction bombing. Its pilots discovered that conventional, high-level, precision bombing was difficult in the best of conditions and virtually impossible against heavily defended or pinpoint targets.⁸⁹ The lack of an accurate bombsight contributed to this inadequacy. Therefore, the move towards dive bombing was natural. The putative effects of "strategic" bombing — destruction of industrial bases, devastation of morale among the working population, and psychological demoralization of the civilian populace — as the 1938 *Luftwaffe* Yearbook indicates, simply had not occurred.⁹⁰ In this light, it became apparent that "strategic" bombing was not only difficult to carry out, but was ineffective as well. Dive bombing, with its promise of great precision, seemed to portend the future. Another reason for the demise of "strategic" bombing in Spain was inextricably linked to the death of Walther Wever. Wever's belief in the heavy, four-engined "Ural" bomber died with him, and there was no one else in the High Command willing to put through a costly and hypothetical program without sure knowledge of its ultimate result.

Personalities also exerted influence on the direction of *Luftwaffe* air theory. For example, Ernst Udet maintained a hold upon Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek, *Luftwaffe* Chief of Staff from February 1939 onwards.⁹¹ Udet's preoccupation with speed propelled German Air Staff policy in the direction of a fast, light bomber, rather than Wever's "Ural" bomber.⁹² As a consequence, Germany never manufactured the equivalent of the United States Air Forces's Boeing B17, a blunder that contributed to the *Luftwaffe's* failure to bomb England into submission during the course of 1940.

The intermingling of hard-headed doctrine and vain desire, economic constraints, and overrated successes led to an erroneous application of fighter forces in the defense of the Reich in 1943–44. Spain engendered a belief in the quasi-omnipotence of the flak batteries. Germany had produced an extraordinarily effective anti-aircraft gun in the 88mm, a weapon used with repeated success in the three years of the Spanish War. The 88mm gun was used in

Spain not only to protect against enemy aircraft but also to attack ships, tanks, troops, or any other ground targets. The confidence in the flak batteries was reinforced by the elite nature of the men that operated the guns. Pre-war anti-aircraft units constituted an independent, highly-trained body of men.⁹³ Total reliance was placed upon these men to protect against intruding enemy aircraft. As a result, the *Luftwaffe* neglected to develop early warning radar, as the British did, or fighter control, by the outbreak of war. This weakness was partially compensated by the excellent aircraft reporting system linking flak and fighter units (*cf.* Richthofen and close support tactics), but it was hardly sufficient. Because of the success of the flak batteries in Spain and the influence of Douhet's theory of attack, as well as Hitler's belief that the noise and the flash of the batteries had a salutary political and psychological effect on civilians, the *Luftwaffe* rested defense of the *Heimat* (Homeland) on these 88mm batteries, and manufactured fighters and bombers heavily weighted in favor of the latter. 40 percent of the pre-war *Luftwaffe* units were bombers and dive bombers and only 25–30 percent were fighters.⁹⁴ In the short-run, this imbalance of fighters and bombers was not a problem in Spain. But in the long-run, it subjected Germany to the "strategic" bombing envisioned by Douhet. Once again, the German military aptitude for brilliant short-term tactical problem-solving undermined the long-term strategic planning imperative to the successful prosecution of war.

Summary of the *Luftwaffe* Lessons from Spain

From the broadest perspective, the Condor Legion intervention in the Spanish Civil War quickened the pace of rearmament in Germany. As Edward Homze states, the war "encouraged the Reich leadership to speed up the introduction of new models as rapidly as possible even though reductions in total output and a vast increase in expenditures would result. The Spanish Civil War, coupled with the Austrian and Czech crises of 1938, also removed the last vestiges of resistance in the more conservative camp that argued for a slowdown of rearmament."⁹⁵

At peak strength in Spain in the late summer of 1938, the Condor Legion had 40 Heinkel He 111s, 3 Junker Ju 87s, 45 Messerschmitt Bf109s, 5 Dornier Do 17s, 4 He 45s, 8 He 59s and 8 batteries of light and heavy flak.⁹⁶ In addition, the Nationalist air units at that time contained 146 Spanish and 134 Italian planes. Upon returning to Germany in May 1939, the Condor Legion

counted 281 officers, 4,383 men, and 472 civilian technicians. In total, approximately 19,000 Germans served duty in Spain. The Legion shot down 386 enemy aircraft, of which 59 were downed by the anti-aircraft batteries. The Germans lost 72 aircraft by direct enemy action and 160 through accidents. In terms of lives, 298 Germans were killed while serving in Spain; 131 were killed by the enemy and 167 died from illness and vehicular accidents.⁹⁷ Those wounded by the enemy totaled 139. Though a comparatively small price to pay in relation to what the *Luftwaffe* hoped to gain, German losses were substantial because of the diminutive size of the youthful air force and the materiel constraints imposed by the German economy and military-industrial complex on aircraft production.

In the concrete realm of day-to-day operations, the Spanish War furnished a mother lode of knowledge, although at times this knowledge was misapplied. The combat experience gained by Condor Legion pilots was invaluable particularly because many of these pilots became instructional officers in pilot training schools in Germany.⁹⁸ The pilots also learned the importance of detailed maps, the benefits from rapid, positive target identification, and the need for adequate radio communications.⁹⁹ As a catalyst for the development of technology, the conflict emphasized the value of weather forecasting, radio directional systems (*i.e. Knickebein*), the use of pathfinder aircraft, and incendiary flares for effective night bombing. With regard to aircraft, Spain was a very helpful testing ground and incubator. The He51 biplane demonstrated its obsolescence as a fighter when matched against the Russian I-16 monoplanes and fruitfully exchanged that role for one of close ground support. The Ju52 proved an extremely reliable transport aircraft but a limited bomber, so it too assumed a role it was to fulfill more than adequately. During the course of 1937, the Bf109 fighter, the Ju87 *Stuka* dive bomber, and the He111 and Do17 bombers were introduced in Spain and all showed their value as combat aircraft.

The mistakes engendered by the Spanish War, more than the successes, indicate the difficulty in drawing general conclusions from an unusual and specific conflict. Because Legion bomber squadrons rarely encountered much opposition after the Nationalists attained air supremacy, the introduction of the He111 fast bomber suggested incorrectly that bombers required only a light armor and little fighter protection. The high command mistakenly believed that bombers could rely on speed alone to penetrate the enemy's defenses.¹⁰⁰ Berlin failed to perceive that even high performance,

well-armed bombers in mass formation could not protect themselves against determined fighter opposition, particularly during daytime missions. This oversight caused the *Luftwaffe* to neglect the coordination of fighter and bomber development. After realizing that bombers needed fighter escorts, the *Luftwaffe* command discovered that their fighters lacked the range to protect the bombers during the missions. A similar nearsighted rationale approved of the concept of an all-purpose aircraft for strategic and tactical operations. Indeed, Hitler demanded that heavy, multi-engined bombers possess both a strategic and dive bomb capability.¹⁰¹ The resulting hybrid aircraft, the Ju88, was unable to carry out either mission properly. The success of the 88mm flak guns in Spain suggested that flak cannons were the best weapon for air defense, and that therefore little attention need be paid to a fighter defense system to protect Germany. The horrific losses inflicted on Germany by USAF and RAF bombers attest to the inaccuracy of this belief. The most valuable lessons taught in the laboratory of the Spanish War was the tactical concept of combat operational doctrine. The Spanish experience established within the *Luftwaffe* the belief in close ground support tactics as the preeminent and foremost task of the German air force. This belief produced both the *Luftwaffe*'s most spectacular success in Poland and later contributed to the Third Reich's utter defeat.

The Polish Campaign (1 September–27 September 1939)

In many ways, the Polish campaign justified the principles which had been enumerated and developed in Spain. The first of these principles was the concentration of all available effort on one task at a time. The second principle was the elimination of any obstacle that might hamper the movement of the ground forces.¹⁰² The German Air Staff planned the military operations against Poland, *Fall Weiß* (Case White), largely according to these principles, and was rewarded with a spectacular success.

The strategy and tactics applied in Poland to implement the two principles elucidated above were taken from Condor Legion experience in Spain. Basically, the *Luftwaffe* supported infantry and mechanized armor units, clearing the path of obstacles and seeking to achieve air superiority. The Polish Campaign demonstrated the efficacy of the lessons learned in Spain: close ground support tactics, air transport, and dive bombing. The Polish Campaign also provided the first opportunity to combine the full

might of the Army and the *Luftwaffe*. *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war), as this new type of warfare was termed, was the close cooperation between tactical air and mechanized ground formations to penetrate deeply and rapidly into enemy territory.¹⁰³ The basic elements of *Blitzkrieg* had been developed in Spain. In Poland, they were fully implemented for the first time.

Prior to the attack on Poland, the *Luftwaffe* comprised 370,000 men grouped in three unequal divisions. The air force alone had 208,000 men, of which 20,000 were aircrew and 1,500 were paratroopers. The flak had 107,000 men, and the air signal units 58,000 men.¹⁰⁴ The *Luftwaffe* had amassed over 2000 aircraft in preparation for *Fall Weiß*, a number far in excess of the Polish Air Force's 500 mostly obsolete fighter planes.¹⁰⁵ Of the German aircraft, 1000 were bombers and 1050 fighters. Despite the Spanish Civil War, the *Luftwaffe* was not prepared to embark upon a campaign against Poland, or any other country for that matter. In September 1939 the *Luftwaffe* had stocked only enough bombs for three weeks and ammunition for six weeks.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the *Luftwaffe* lacked a long-range strategic bomber, an adequate night bomber, bombs heavier than one thousand pounds, air torpedos, modern mines, modern armament, and accurate bombsights. Bombers and escort fighters still lacked the means to communicate with one another.¹⁰⁷ Luckily, the campaign against Poland was short. It did not last long enough to reveal Germany's underlying inventory and supply weaknesses, nor did it fully test the limited capabilities of a still unprepared *Luftwaffe*.

Within the context of the overall German military strategy of *Fall Weiß*, the *Luftwaffe*'s first and foremost objective was the destruction of the Polish Air Force in order to attain air superiority.¹⁰⁸ Only with the attainment of air superiority could the *Luftwaffe* hope to provide unhampered support of the Army. As part of this objective, the *Luftwaffe* was to dislocate the entire Polish Air Force support, supply and organization, and to disrupt the Polish aircraft industry. Secondly, the *Luftwaffe* would take part in the destruction of the Polish Army by bombing and strafing strong points, artillery batteries, and concentrations of ground troops. The combination of planes and mechanized ground units of the Army was to prove extremely successful, as the course of the campaign illustrated.

The German attack against Poland began at 4:45 AM on 1 September 1939.¹⁰⁹ Fog and low cloud cover delayed the morning air operations, but by afternoon, the *Luftwaffe* was heavily committed. The *Luftwaffe*'s primary targets were Poland's

airfields. Those at Kattowitz, Krakow, Lwow, Lublin, Wilna, Kida, Glodno, and others received a thorough pounding. The outdated Polish P.Z.L. P.11 fighters which managed to take off were easily intercepted and repulsed by the Bf109s and Bf110s.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Polish pilots exhibited great courage and determination in the air. The Germans did not know, however, that the Polish planes that rose to meet them were decoys fighting a feinting action. Though the *Luftwaffe* had hoped to catch all of Poland's planes on the ground, Polish intelligence had discovered signs of the imminent German attack, and the Polish Air Force had transferred most of its operation aircraft to camouflaged emergency airstrips.¹¹¹ The Germans naturally attacked Poland's well-known, permanent airfields. Thus, they succeeded only in destroying outmoded fighters and a number of training craft not immediately serviceable. The bulk of the Polish Air Force escaped, giving the Polish Air Command time to improvise a plan for the defense of Warsaw.¹¹²

On the assumption that it had obliterated the Polish Air Force, the *Luftwaffe* shifted part of its efforts on 3 September to secondary targets and operations in support of the army. These operations followed the plans laid out prior to the campaign. The *Luftwaffe* bombed and strafed strong points, artillery batteries, and troop formations. To dislocate enemy supply organization, the bombers focused on factories, barracks, ammunition dumps and depots. Further behind enemy lines, aircraft attacked railway stations, bridges, tracks, and road junctions to disrupt communications and to prevent the Poles from moving up reinforcements.¹¹³

Cooperation between the air force and the army was excellent, due mostly to Wolfram von Richthofen.

So concerned was Richthofen with providing the army with what it needed from the air that he offered to share his quarters and command post inside Schönwald Castle, six miles from the front, with General Walther von Reichenau, commanding the 10th Army. It was a happy arrangement, for Reichenau's armor was scheduled to punch holes in the Polish defenses while Richthofen's ground attack formations blasted a clear path ahead. This was interservice cooperation at its closest, a thing Richthofen had learned to value while dealing with some of Franco's generals in Spain.¹¹⁴

Richthofen also stayed current on the ground situation by stationing himself as close to the front as possible. Whenever feasible, he flew over enemy territory in his Fiesler Storch to engage in personal reconnaissance. Indeed, on the first day of the attack, he was downed by anti-aircraft fire, but he crash-landed and returned

unharmd. Aside from his own fly-overs, Richthofen had at his disposal specially equipped signal units and a reconnaissance squadron to furnish him with timely intelligence information.¹¹⁵

The Battle near Kutno from 9-18 September is a good example of the effects produced by the *Luftwaffe* in Poland. Under General Kutzeba, the commander of the Army of Poznan, the Poles had successively launched a surprise attack in the area around Kutno. To counter the Polish Army's movement, the *Luftwaffe* was called in to blunt the attack. Thirty Henschel Hs123s swarmed over the Army of Poznan at low levels, utilizing their wide range of armaments to bomb, strafe, and generally disrupt the enemy troops.¹¹⁶ The Hs123s were followed by *Stukas*, *Domiers*, and *Heinkels*. The attack was so demoralizing that some of the Polish troops threw down their weapons and fled.¹¹⁷ On 18 September 50,000 Polish troops surrendered and on the next day, another 105,000 capitulated. Herbert Molloy Mason Jr. describes vividly the inferno inflicted on the Poles.

To Kutzeba's men, almost none of whom had been under air attack before, the next twenty minutes were like a nightmare in hell. The machine guns cut swaths in the ranks of men and horses; hundreds of light-weight scatter bombs flamed and exploded; the heavier detonations of the 110-pounders tore gouts out of the earth, ripped through trees and flung jagged metal shards thudding into men and animals. Even when the last of the various missiles had been delivered, the 123s were not finished with their low-level attacks. The pilots discovered that when the BMW engine was pushed to 1,800 r.p.m., the resultant effect on the three-bladed, variable pitch airscrew produced an ear-splitting and indescribable sound that was both inside and outside of the man subjected to it. Even hardened soldiers were unnerved, and ran in all directions to escape. Horses simply went insane.¹¹⁸

The Polish planes, so cleverly removed before the surprise attack to be used in the defense of Warsaw, never stood a chance against the *Luftwaffe*'s overwhelming numbers. In the skies above the capital, Polish P.Z.L. P.11 fighters rose to meet the Bf109s, only to be outgunned by the faster and more maneuverable German aircraft. Occasionally, a Polish pilot, by dint of bold determination, shot down an enemy fighter or bomber, but for the most part, the Polish fighters succumbed in the face of the larger numbers, the greater firepower, and the more modern equipment of the *Luftwaffe* fighter force.

Before bombing the Polish capital, the *Luftwaffe* dropped thousands of leaflets, requesting the city's surrender. When the request was refused, the *Luftwaffe*'s bombers went into action.

Thereafter, the skies over Warsaw were never clear of German aircraft as the *Luftwaffe* bombed the city. The operation began on 23 September with swarms of *Stukas* stacked up in groups several thousand feet apart, diving in systematic relays on the city. Following the dive bombers, Ju52 transport planes, jury-rigged to serve as bombers, blasted the city as crewmen literally shovelled loose thermite incendiary bombs out of the cargo doors.¹¹⁹ No city or people could withstand such a devastating attack, and on 27 September 1939 the Polish Government surrendered the capital.

Despite the success of the *Luftwaffe*, it was the Army which accounted for the quick and overwhelming German victory in Poland. The Army's rapid advance overran the Polish early-warning systems and forward bases, preventing a coordinated direction of Polish fighter aircraft. The army's advance also engulfed depots and dumps, thereby cutting off the supply of spare parts to the remaining operational Polish aircraft. It was not until 14 September that the *Luftwaffe* succeeded in surprising most of the Polish bombers at an airfield near Hutnicki.¹²⁰ The Polish Air Force was broken primarily by internal collapse, not external pressure. The *Luftwaffe*'s major contribution was not so much the destruction of the outmoded Polish Air Force as it was the effective close support of ground troops and the destruction of the Polish Army.

Fall Weiß proved a costly campaign for the *Luftwaffe*. Of the 10,761 Germans killed during the campaign, 189 were pilots and aircrew. 261 aircraft of all types were lost — 7.6 percent of the *Luftwaffe* force structure — mostly to anti-aircraft defenses against close ground support operations.¹²¹ Among these 261 aircraft were 47 Bf109s (5.6 percent of force structure), 81 bombers (6.5 percent of force structure) and 50 close support craft (13.2 percent of force structure). In Poland, the *Luftwaffe* suffered grave, though not irreparable damage.

The Polish campaign showed beyond doubt the value of the lessons learned in Spain. The Ju52s demonstrated their utility as transport aircraft, supplying the *Wehrmacht's Panzer* (armor) and mechanized units, and providing the Bf109 squadrons with spare parts, ammunition, and aviation fuel.¹²² Carpet-bombing was practiced occasionally, as at the Krakow airfield by 60 He111s.¹²³ The He111s were followed by the plane that conclusively proved its worth in Poland, the Ju87 dive bomber. At Krakow, thirty Ju 87s plummeted down upon the airstrip to unload over thirty tons of bombs on hangars, parked aircraft, and runways. The Ju87 achieved astounding results because the Polish Air Force mustered

little opposition to hamper it. Lacking effective opposition, the *Stukas* were able to exploit the very high inherent accuracy of the steep diving attack while simultaneously demoralizing the infantry with their piercing sirens.¹²⁴ The *Stukas'* success reinforced the belief among the German High Command that the airplane should be used primarily for ground support.¹²⁵

The overall result of the Polish campaign was to entrench firmly the notion within command circles that the air force was an exceedingly powerful weapon. At the time, much was made in the press and elsewhere of the vital role played by the *Luftwaffe* and the new type of *Blitzkrieg* war made possible by the air force. The success of *Fall Weiß* was overwhelming, perhaps deceptively so. The Polish Air Force was outdated and outmoded, and those planes which managed to get airborne were outnumbered by the Germans almost four to one. Yet, the campaign led to wild claims regarding the *Luftwaffe's* ability. In retrospect, such declarations accounted in part for Göring's claim prior to Dunkirk that the *Luftwaffe* alone could win the battle, and perhaps the war. Albert Kesselring wrote,

Beyond all other military arms, the *Luftwaffe*, by virtue of its mobility in space, accomplished tasks which in former wars had been inconceivable... The Polish Campaign was the touchstone of the potentialities of the German Air Force and an apprenticeship of special significance. In this campaign, the *Luftwaffe* learned many lessons ... and prepared itself for a second, more strenuous and decisive clash of arms.¹²⁶

Denmark and Norway (7 April – 10 May 1940)

After *Fall Weiß*, the warring countries entered a period that became known as the "Phony War." Military engagements occurred infrequently. During this time, the *Luftwaffe* units that had participated in the Polish campaign returned to their bases in Germany. Aircraft were repaired, serviced, and refitted, and the air force continued to expand in anticipation of the spring campaign in the West. *Luftwaffe* operational activity was reduced to a minimum, restricted to occasional bombing runs on shipping and reconnaissance sorties. Fighter units, especially those stationed near France's highly touted Maginot Line, were discouraged from engaging in combat.¹²⁷ The *Luftwaffe* was concerned primarily with repairing the damage suffered in Poland and preparing itself for the next attack.

In the spring of 1940, the Phony War ended abruptly. Instead of pushing westward, Germany launched a surprise attack northward

against Scandinavia. The attack was intended to pre-empt British plans to secure Scandinavia as a military base as well as to protect crucial iron ore imports from Sweden.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the Germans wished to gain Scandinavia for themselves as a strategic base for future air and naval attacks on the British isles.

Luftwaffe strategy for *Weserübung* (Exercise Weser), as the campaign against Norway and Denmark was code-named, was based on the same two principles that had dictated the course of action in Poland. Denmark, bordering Germany's northernmost province of Schleswig-Holstein, presented much less of a problem than Norway. Norway had a lengthy coastline that made the country easily accessible to intervention by the Royal Navy. As a result of these concerns, Germany needed to act covertly and with complete surprise. For the first time in modern warfare, paratroopers were used to achieve this element of surprise. Notwithstanding some tactical innovations, the *Luftwaffe's* first goal was still attainment of air superiority followed by support of the army. Once these objectives had been accomplished, the *Luftwaffe* could begin its secondary tasks: supply and reinforcement of ground and motorized units, reconnaissance of coastal areas, attacks on British naval forces, support of troops operating in Norwegian valleys, and protection by fighters and flak of territory already taken.¹²⁹

The attack against Denmark and Norway began on 7 April 1940. Ju52s dropped airborne troops on the periphery of the Danish capital as well as at two airfields at Ålborg. Land forces crossed the Danish frontier at the same time as seaborne forces landed on the Danish coastal islands. Within several hours, King Christian X had ordered his troops to cease fire, awed by a display of He111s and Do17s flying in massed formations over Copenhagen.¹³⁰ Germany had conquered Denmark with the loss of only twenty men killed and wounded.

The attack on Norway, which began concurrently with the attack on Denmark, quickly became the focus of extensive military action. German troops occupied the towns of Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, but they encountered determined opposition from Norwegian troops. Paratroops dropped on Oslo overwhelmed harbor forts that had sunk the German heavy cruiser *Blücher* as she had entered the fjord. *Luftwaffe* bombers knocked out forts at Christiansand protecting the harbor entrance so that the *Kriegsmarine* (Navy) could land troops. Large numbers of Ju52s delivered airborne troops to the strategically vital airfields at Fornebu (outside of Oslo) and Sola (near Stavanger). Long range twin-engined Bf110 fighters escorted the lumbering Ju 52s, but

opposition was slight.¹³¹ Much of the small Norwegian fighter force, its equipment largely obsolete, was destroyed by attacks on the airfields that preceded the paratroop drops. The Germans soon occupied the airfields and rushed in additional reinforcements by air.

The operation did not continue unopposed. The Royal Navy stepped up pressure on the coastal towns occupied by the Germans. At Narvik, the besieged Germans under General Eduard Dietl had to be supplied and then reinforced by air.¹³² British troops landed at Narvik, Namsos, and Andalsnes on 15–17 April. The *Luftwaffe* was forced to redirect its efforts against the British landing, the amphibious transports, and their naval escorts. Level and dive bomber units mounted continuous sorties. In the face of negligible air opposition, they inflicted serious damage on the British force.¹³³ German control of the airfields, a result of their successful surprise attacks, was crucial to turning back the British landing force. Indeed, the British had to call off a direct seaborne attack on the Trondheim area because the fleet would have been subject to air attack.¹³⁴ The distances were too great for the RAF to maintain a sizeable air contingent, and this prevented the British from establishing a force inside Norway. *Luftwaffe* reconnaissance planes spied an attempt by the RAF to operate old Gladiator fighters from frozen lakes. Shortly, German bombers arrived, unloading explosives which broke up the ice and destroyed the landing surface. Towards the end of the campaign, a small number of Hurricanes appeared, but it was too late for them to have much of an effect on the fighting.

At maximum strength, the *Luftwaffe* in Norway (*Fliegerkorps X*) comprised over 700 aircraft. There were 360 long-range bombers (He111s and Ju88s), 50 dive bombers (Ju87s), 50 single-engined fighters (Bf109s), 70 twin-engined fighters (Bf110s), 60 reconnaissance craft (Do17s) and 120 coastal types (He115s, He59s, Do18s).¹³⁵ In addition to these aircraft, 500 Ju52s were made available for transport, supplemented by a small number of four-engined Ju90Bs¹³⁶ and Focke Wolf FW200 Condors.

Throughout *Weserübung*, the Germans made extensive use of air transport to move, supply, and reinforce troops. Indeed, the primary function of the *Luftwaffe* in the seizure of Scandinavia was that of a transport service. The German expedition's commander, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, wished to execute a friendly invasion, and for this reason, the *Luftwaffe's* role as an air shuttle service was emphasized. German air transport theory was fully and successfully tested. Other lessons learned during the Scandinavian

campaign stressed the importance of fighter escorts for bombers striking targets protected by fighters. Air superiority was crucial, enabling the Germans first to establish and then to maintain troops in isolated and otherwise inaccessible areas. Furthermore, the Germans inflicted grave damage on the Royal Navy ships protecting the attempted seaborne landings at Trondheim. As Sims notes, "Air power properly installed and employed could force even the most powerful ships and navies from waters within aerial bombing range."¹³⁷ The surprise occupation of towns like Oslo and Stavanger was made possible only by the use of paratroops and air-landed units. Air reconnaissance, carried out extensively over the broad reaches of the Scandinavian peninsula, facilitated communications in areas where roads were poor. Reconnaissance also pinpointed the location of the Royal Navy, enabling the *Luftwaffe* and the German Navy to sink several British transport- and warships.

In short, the *Luftwaffe* learned five lessons in Scandinavia. Paratroops and airborne operations rendered surprise easy, caused confusion among enemy troops, and invested the attacking German troops with the initiative; the air force intervened effectively in ground fighting in the rugged terrain of the peninsula; reconnaissance aircraft facilitated communications between pockets of isolated infantry and furnished accurate information on the whereabouts of enemy concentrations; air transport proved invaluable in delivering, supplying and maintaining troops from the air; and air power inflicted great damage on naval ships lacking aerial escort. Many of these lessons served well in the planning of the next German move, an attack against the Low Countries and France.

Battle in the West (10 May – 26 June 1940)

The German attack against Holland, Belgium, and France began on 10 May 1940. The *Luftwaffe* arrayed over 4,000 planes against the Allies 1,700, a mismatch that to a large extent indicated the course of the battle. Against 1,680 bombers, France and England could gather only 830 fighters, while the *Luftwaffe* could put over 800 Bf109s into the air to escort their bombers.¹³⁸ Of the total German planes available for the attack, there were 1,300 long-range bombers, 380 dive bombers, 860 single-engined fighters, 350 twin-engined fighters, 640 reconnaissance planes, 475 transport aircraft, and 45 assault gliders.¹³⁹

For the fourth time in as many campaigns, the *Luftwaffe's* role in the Battle against France and the Low Countries was primarily that of support and transport. Initially, the *Luftwaffe* was to gain control

of the air. Then, it was to clear the way for airborne operations by powerful attacks on enemy airfields. In conjunction with airborne attacks, Ju52s were to transport paratroops to their destinations. Subsequent to and subject to the success of these objectives, the *Luftwaffe* was to support the *Wehrmacht's* armored thrust westward. Finally, the *Luftwaffe* was to supply the advancing mechanized and ground troops, keeping disparate forces in motion and in contact with command headquarters.¹⁴⁰ Hitler added, perhaps superfluously, that "the air force will prevent attacks by the Anglo-French air forces on our army and will give all necessary direct support to the advance."¹⁴¹

The meticulously prepared and well-integrated attack of the German army and air force in the Low Countries was overwhelming. The *Luftwaffe* bombed and strafed Dutch and Belgian airbases, destroying the meager and obsolete equipment those countries possessed. *Luftwaffe* paratroops seized bridges and road junctures, while glider forces assaulted the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael. This fortress, an underground system of fortifications manned by 1,200 Belgian soldiers and reputed to be impregnable, was besieged by 85 German assault pioneers until German reinforcements arrived on 11 May, forcing the garrison to capitulate.¹⁴² The element of surprise was achieved by means of airborne gliders, which had been towed by Ju52s from Cologne and released over Aachen, 15 miles from the fortress.¹⁴³ At the Hague, airborne troops captured the three main airfields and took the important Moerdijk bridge near Rotterdam. However, a plan to capture the Dutch Royal family and government failed.¹⁴⁴ The Willems bridge, spanning the Meuse River in the center of Rotterdam, was seized in an unorthodox attack by troops landed on the river by He59 floatplanes. Holland surrendered on 15 May and the Belgian Army laid down its arms thirteen days later.

The focus of the battle then shifted towards France and the all-important Meuse River crossing. The west bank of the Meuse was strongly fortified, for the river marked the last natural boundary and impediment between the advancing German forces and the French countryside beyond. On 13 May at 4 PM, the *Luftwaffe* began to bombard French positions on the west bank. As the battle got underway, the *Luftwaffe* acted as a mobile artillery barrage, providing powerful and direct air support for ground troops. The French Air Force, in the process of converting to a new generation of aircraft, proved less than a match for the *Luftwaffe*. Operational ready-rates in the *Armée de l'Aire* squadrons were as low as 40 percent.¹⁴⁵ German reconnaissance gave the German High

Command a detailed picture of the British and French forces. In the remaining hours before darkness, the *Luftwaffe* carried out over 500 sorties by dive and level bombers. As in Poland, when Richthofen had shared his quarters with the army's General Reichenau to facilitate close interservice cooperation, General Heinz Guderian carefully worked out a plan ahead of time with General Bruno Loerzer, head of *Fliegerkorps II* (Air Force Corps II), to coordinate the attack.¹⁴⁶ The two men decided that continuous support by the *Luftwaffe* would best serve the troop movements. Continuous dive bombing attacks prevented French artillerymen from firing at the German infantry crossing the Meuse. By nightfall, the troops had established a bridgehead on the west bank.

An example of the devastation wreaked by the *Luftwaffe* took place at the town of Sedan, situated on the banks of the Meuse. On 13 May, Do17s accompanied by He111s unloaded explosives on the town for over four hours, demolishing telephone lines, roads, railroad tracks, and many buildings. Following the conventional bombers, *Stukas* stacked in layers dove on the city for a total of five more hours, dropping 500 pound bombs which penetrated reinforced bunkers, upended artillery pieces, and flattened barracks. The bombers were effectively guarded by Bf109s and Bf110s which fended off British and French fighters.

The following day, as the tanks prepared to cross the Meuse, Bf109s shot down half of a French bomber squadron which had launched an attack on the pontoons spanning the river. A second attempt by the RAF Advanced Strike Force under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, with 71 Blenheims and Battles, and an assortment of 250 French Moranes, Curtisses, and Dewoitine fighters, suffered a similar fate. The attack was decimated by flak and Bf109s which broke through the fighter screen to shoot down 40 bombers. In the aerial melee, 50 of the Allied fighters also perished. "No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the RAF."¹⁴⁷ The advancing German *Panzer*s forced the French Army divisions to retreat and resistance along the river disappeared.

The rapid deployment of troops and equipment essential to the mobile warfare practiced by the Germans was made possible by the Ju52 transport planes. Fuel, spare parts, ammunition, and ground personnel were flown to their destinations because the Meuse bridge crossings were often congested. Thereafter, as the mechanized *Panzer* corps advanced, the supply lines lengthened dangerously. The Ju52s again played a vital role, transporting all the necessary supplies. The lumbering craft themselves had to be

moved forward to new airbases every day. The rapid German advance was indicative of the course of the fighting, which became a rout of the Allied forces.

As the German troops moved northwest towards the English Channel some 200 miles away, long-range bombers with fighter escorts attacked a broad spectrum of targets, from railway marshalling yards to all movements of the Allied armies. The French and British forces were subject to incessant bomber and fighter attacks, usually conducted at low levels to achieve surprise and accuracy. Bf109s and Bf110s rained a veritable hail of machine gun and cannon fire on enemy troops. Bombers followed closely behind with explosives fused for a delay of several seconds to ensure ground level explosion.¹⁴⁸

The French and British armies retreated towards the coastal town of Dunkirk. Göring pleaded with Hitler to permit the *Luftwaffe* to be the sole instrument of the Allied armies' destruction. Hitler acceded, and ordered General Guderian's tanks to halt outside of Dunkirk. What followed was the first rebuff of the *Luftwaffe* in World War II. British fighters, operating closer to their bases than the German planes, could remain over the Dunkirk beaches for a longer period of time than the Bf109s and Ju87s. The Spitfire fighters proved a match for the snout-nosed 109s, and as a result, the *Luftwaffe* failed to achieve air superiority.¹⁴⁹ During the nine days between 26 May and 3 June, the *Luftwaffe* lost 240 planes to the RAF's 177.¹⁵⁰ Poor weather also prevented the German fighters and bombers from achieving the prolonged concentration of attack essential to success.¹⁵¹ Frustrated by the quantitatively and qualitatively equal British fighters, the *Luftwaffe* also discovered that bombing the beaches was ineffectual. "Dropping 110 and 550 pound bombs into the soft sand was like stuffing firecrackers deep into sawdust."¹⁵² To deprive the *Luftwaffe* of the visibility afforded by daylight, British and French troops were evacuated under cover of darkness. Countered at almost every turn, the *Luftwaffe* focused on the ships transporting the Allied armies across the English Channel. 243 of the 861 ships involved in the evacuation from Dunkirk were sunk by German bombers.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the bulk of the Allied troops escaped — 338,226 men — and the Germans had to be content with the mass of equipment left behind.

Although France capitulated on 26 June 1940, the *Luftwaffe's* failure over Dunkirk contained ominous signs for the future aerial attack on Britain. Yet, the air doctrine applied by the German Air Force in the last continental campaign of 1940 had not been rendered invalid. The air support throughout the 46 day battle was

fundamentally a large scale application of the lessons learned in Spain and improved in Poland. The validity of those lessons was, if anything, strengthened. The *Luftwaffe* successfully attained air superiority until Dunkirk, and control of the air proved to be an element essential to the success of the ground troops. The *Luftwaffe* followed through on its close cooperation with the mechanized ground forces, delivering, supporting, supplying, and reinforcing paratroops and infantry. The reputation of the *Stuka* was further enhanced in the campaign, as it destroyed enemy dugouts, fortifications, pill-boxes, and tanks with frightening accuracy. The potential logistical problems brought about by the rapid advance of the army was averted by the dependable Ju52 transport plane.

Luftwaffe failures in the West taught the Germans that formations of unescorted bombers could not survive in the face of a well-equipped and determined fighter opposition, such as the British mustered over Dunkirk. The German bomber crews who believed their Do17s to be as fast as British fighters, and were therefore possessed of a reasonable chance of success in a dogfight, were quickly disillusioned.¹⁵⁴ The German fighter crews also realized that the twin-engined Bf110 could not confront the single-engined British fighters.¹⁵⁵ The *Luftwaffe* had been dealt a sobering lesson at Dunkirk. This lesson was soon followed by an even more disastrous defeat in the skies over the British Isles.

Conclusion

Despite the *Luftwaffe*'s failure over the beaches of Dunkirk, the lessons derived from the Condor Legion experience in the Spanish Civil War were not invalidated. Rather, the aerial battles over Dunkirk finally revealed that some of the lessons the *Luftwaffe* drew from the Spanish War experiences had been misinterpreted and misapplied.

Luftwaffe air warfare doctrine was encapsulated in *Luftwaffe-dienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung*. Throughout the course of the Spanish War and the campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France, the *Luftwaffe* adhered faithfully to three basic air warfare rules. The first was the subjection of the enemy air force and the attainment of air superiority. Second was the support of the army and the navy (especially of the army). Third was the destruction of the enemy's industrial base and the disruption of his means to wage war.

In Spain, the Condor Legion followed only the first two rules. Spain had very little industry, and the nature of the civil war often

precluded attacks on Spain's meager industrial base. Nevertheless, the application of these two rules resulted in success, and within the context of those rules, tactics were conceived and bore fruit. Close ground support tactics were developed by Wolfram von Richthofen. Fighter tactics evolved, primarily under the tutelage and perseverance of Werner Mölders. Daylight bombing, night bombing, dive bombing, and naval bombing were practiced and refined. The Condor Legion learned and absorbed the advantages afforded by mobility and rapid deployment of men and equipment. The structure and organization of the Condor Legion was rationalized and improved. When the Condor Legion returned to Germany in March 1939, it brought with it experienced pilots who taught and trained new *Luftwaffe* recruits. Inevitably, the Condor Legion brought back to Germany combat lessons and field experience which nourished the minds planning the next *Luftwaffe* campaign, the assault on Poland.

The Polish campaign demonstrated on a larger scale the value of the lessons learned in Spain. As in Spain, the *Luftwaffe* concentrated on destroying the enemy's air force and attaining air superiority. This accomplished, the *Luftwaffe* proceeded to the second rule, support of the army. The *Blitzkrieg*, first employed in Poland, combined mechanized *Panzer* units and air power to devastate the Polish Army. Reflecting the rapidity of the German advance, the Poles surrendered after four short weeks, their army and air force crushed. The *Luftwaffe's* major contributions were close ground support tactics, dependable air transport, and accurate dive bombing. Luckily for the *Luftwaffe*, the Polish Campaign was too short to reveal its supply and equipment deficiencies. Nevertheless, its strategy and tactics proved spectacularly successful, and it had time to recuperate before the next campaign.

The *Weserübung* against Scandinavia followed the basic pattern established in Poland. The *Luftwaffe* quickly attained air superiority and used paratroops for the first time in modern warfare to achieve complete surprise. The *Luftwaffe* then supported the German ground forces, providing reconnaissance and transport services to bolster the army's assault. By the end of the campaign on 10 June, the *Luftwaffe* had learned the importance of fighter escorts for bombers, the ability of air power to force naval ships from waters within aerial bombing range, the necessity of air reconnaissance, the surprise rendered by airborne assault, and the positive services provided by air transport. These lessons formed the foundation for Germany's last continental victory.

Against Holland, Belgium, and France, the *Luftwaffe* applied its

well-tested air warfare doctrine, again achieving success. Gliders delivered airborne troops, an innovation which enabled 85 men to capture the fortress of Eben Emael. The army and air force cooperated closely, relentlessly forcing the Allied army to retreat. The French Air Force, like the Polish, Norwegian, Belgian and Dutch air forces before it, failed to halt the *Luftwaffe*, while suffering grievous losses trying. At Dunkirk, the *Luftwaffe* was finally rebuffed by the Royal Air Force, which enjoyed qualitative and quantitative equality.

Over four years, the *Luftwaffe* showed the world air power unexcelled. The essence of its strategy was air superiority. Without superiority in the air, troops could not be easily transported, motorized ground units could not move rapidly, enemy troop concentrations could not be disrupted, and enemy fortifications and communications could not be destroyed. When the *Luftwaffe* failed to attain air superiority, as at Dunkirk, it failed to win. The lessons learned in Spain, and enlarged and elaborated in the succeeding European campaigns, were faithfully though not always correctly applied. After the fall of France, the *Luftwaffe's* neglect of heavy bombers, long-range fighters and radar manifested itself. The British began to outproduce the *Luftwaffe*, and the Russian quagmire swallowed entire squadrons. There can be no question that the Spanish Civil War decisively affected the development of *Luftwaffe* operational doctrine. There can also be no question that initially, the result of that doctrine was success, demonstrated as the *Luftwaffe* rendered indispensable assistance in the triumphs over Germany's enemies. At the same time, the *Luftwaffe's* deceptively easy victories hid the seeds of its defeat. Although this defeat was a long time in coming, often masked by brilliant German inventions and innovations, come it did. Like the air forces it had helped vanquish, the *Luftwaffe* too learned defeat.

Notes

1. Alfred Price, *A Pictorial History of the Luftwaffe, 1933-1945* (London: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969), p. 11.
2. Hauptmann Dr. (E.) Eichelbaum, *Die Luftmächte der Welt: Ein Bilderwerk* (Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt Verlag, 1939), p. 16.
3. Edward L. Homze, *Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1939* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), p. 170.
4. Flak is a contraction of the German *Fliegerabwehrkanone* (anti-aircraft gun).
5. Raymond L. Proctor, *Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War* (Wes-

- port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 252.
6. David Irving, *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Luftwaffe Marshall Erhard Milch* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. 49.
7. Homze, p. 170.
8. Jesus Salas Larrazabal, *Air War over Spain*, trans. Margaret A. Kelley (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969), p. 68.
9. Irving, p. 50.
10. Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 330.
11. Irving, p. 50.
12. Antony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1982), p. 113.
13. Beevor, p. 113.
14. Proctor, p. 255.
15. Homze, p. 170.
16. Paul Deichman, *Der Chef im Hintergrund: Ein Leben als Soldat von der preußischen Armee bis zur Bundeswehr* (Hamburg: Stalling Verlag GmbH, 1979), p. 58. Also see Williamson Murray, *Luftwaffe* (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1985), pp. xi-xiii (Introduction) on Douhet's doctrine of "strategic bombing."
17. Deichman, p. 58.
18. Kenneth Macksey, *Kesselring: The Making of the Luftwaffe* (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1978), pp. 46-7. Wever had thought about the creation of a "strategic" air force of which a long-range, four-engined bomber was to be the mainstay. This was reflected by a project to develop the "Ural" bomber, a long-range bomber to be used to strike eastward at Russia's industrial base. After Wever's death, the "Ural" bomber project was scrapped.
19. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 9.
20. R.J. Overy, *The Air War, 1939-1945* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 10.
21. Deichman, pp. 60-61.
22. Irving, p. 72.
23. Great Britain Air Ministry, *The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force: 1933-45*. With an introduction by H.A. Probert (London Arms & Armour Press, Lionel Leventhal Ltd., 1983), p. 45.
24. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 42.
25. Williamson Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 8.
26. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 44.
27. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 11.
28. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 43.
29. Homze, p. 171.
30. Edward Jablonski, *Terror from the Sky* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1971), p. 15.
31. Edward H. Sims, *Fighter Tactics and Strategy, 1914-1970* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. 1972), p. 92.
32. Beevor, p. 18.
33. Jablonski, p. 15.
34. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
35. Proctor, p. 90.
36. Proctor, p. 257.
37. Proctor, p. 90.

38. Heinkel He51 biplane performance statistics: SPEED - 205 m.p., CEILING - 24,000 feet, RANGE - 242 miles, ARMAMENT - two machine guns. {from Proctor, p. 89.}
39. Proctor, pp. 256-57.
40. Proctor, p. 242.
41. Proctor, p. 149.
42. Junkers Ju52 performance statistics: SPEED - 165 m.p.h., CEILING - 18,000 feet, RANGE - 800 miles, TROOP CAPACITY- 17, CARGO CAPACITY- 2,000 pounds. Three-engined transport plane used to carry cargo or troops and to tow gliders. {from Gurney, p. 340.}
43. Proctor, p. 153.
44. The Bf109 was designed by Willy Messerschmitt who worked for the *Bayerische Flugzeugwerke* (Bavarian Aircraft Company). This explains why the prefix "Me" is occasionally used in place of the "Bf."
45. Proctor, p. 153.
46. Proctor, p. 165.
47. Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr., *The Rise of the Luftwaffe: Forging the Secret German Air Weapon, 1918-1940* (New York: The Dial Press, 1973), p. 236.
48. Proctor, p. 256.
49. James J. Halley, *The Role of the Fighter in Air Warfare*, ed. Charles W. Cain (New York: Ziff-Davis Flying Books, 1978), p. 34.
50. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 49. Messerschmitt Bf109 performance statistics: SPEED - 354 m.p.h. at 12,300 feet, CEILING - 37,500 feet, RANGE - 412 miles, INITIAL CLIMB RATE - 3,100 feet/minute, ARMAMENT - two 20mm cannon and two 7.9mm machine guns. {from Sims, p. 90.}
51. Homze, p. 171.
52. Proctor, p. 256. The lead plane flew at the tip of a cone-shaped figure, while the wingman flew in a large two-dimensional circle some distance behind, drawing an imaginary "cone" in the air.
53. Jablonski, p. 15.
54. Sims, p. 139.
55. Proctor, pp. 82-3.
56. The attempt to combine elements of both fighters and bombers in one plane began in 1934. The *Luftwaffe* wanted a multipurpose, high-altitude, long-range reconnaissance aircraft that could fulfill a battle-plane function. This *Kampferstörer* was to have a speed of 240 m.p.h., a range of 1,200 miles, and a night-flying capability. The Focke-Wulf FW57 and the Henschel Hs124 were developed to fulfill these requirements. However, the *Luftwaffe* Technical Office soon recognized the difficulties in reconciling the dual assignment, and terminated the program. The requirement for a speed bomber were ultimately met by the Ju88. {from Homze, pp. 127-8}
57. Proctor, p. 136.
58. Beevor, p. 139.
59. In this instance, *Stuka* refers to the Junkers Ju87 dive bomber. However, the word is a contraction of the German *Sturzkampfflugzeug* (dive bomber), and thus actually describes all dive bombers, not any particular one.
60. Heinkel He111 performance statistics: SPEED - 255 m.p.h., CEILING - 27,500 feet, RANGE - 1,100 miles, BOMB LOAD - up to 4,000 pounds. {from Gurney, p. 339.}
61. The plane was too slow, too heavy, unmaneuverable, lacked power re-

serve, had poor climbing characteristics, an excessively dispersed and poorly coordinated crew and unsuitable radios.

62. Homze, p. 173.
63. The Junkers Ju88 was designed in 1935 according to requirements set down by Walther Wever for a conventional high-speed bomber. The first operational model could carry two tons of bombs at 300 m.p.h. and had a range of 2,000 miles. After Spain showed the failure of horizontal bombing, Junkers was ordered to redesign the plane with a dive-bombing capability. The resulting plane was a catastrophe. It was slower than the obsolescent He111, take-offs were difficult with full tanks and the plane had a nasty habit of catching on fire while in flight. Eventually after many modifications, the plane proved very successful. {from Irving, pp. 107-8}.
64. Proctor, p. 82.
65. Beevor, p. 18.
66. Proctor, pp. 182-3, Junkers Ju87 ("Stuka") dive bomber performance statistics: SPEED - 254 m.p.h., CEILING - 24,000 feet, RANGE - 600 to 1,200 miles. {from Gurney, p. 341.}
67. Beevor, p. 22. The *Luftwaffe* training wing, the *Lehrgeschwader*, conducted extensive high-altitude bombing exercises at Greifswald with disappointing results. Bombing from an altitude of 13,000 feet, experienced crews with no opposing ground fire in He111 and Do17 level bombers placed only 2 percent of their bombs inside a circle with radius of 330 feet. At 6,500 feet, their average increased to between 12-25 percent. The Ju87 dive bomber proceeded to put 25 percent of its bombs in a circle with a radius of only 165 feet. {from Mason, p. 254.}
68. Allen Andrews, *The Air Marshals: The Air War in Western Europe* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1970), p. 30.
69. Willard C. Frank, Jr., "Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939." *Naval War College Review*, January-February, 1984, p. 33.
70. Frank, p. 46.
71. Homze, p. 173.
72. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 44.
73. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 17. In a conversation with Dr. Ernst Heinkel in April 1940, Ernst Udet, Director of Air Armament said, "I never really thought there would be a war with Britain." {from Irving, p. 83.}
74. Frank, p. 48.
75. Proctor, p. 91.
76. Proctor, p. 150.
77. Proctor, p. 30.
78. Andrews, p. 30.
79. Homze, p. 173.
80. Overy, p. 9.
81. Proctor, p. 96.
82. Homze, p. 171.
83. Great Britain Air Ministry, pp. 17-18.
84. Proctor, p. 134.
85. Overy, pp. 8-9.
86. Proctor, p. 45.
87. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 17.
88. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
89. Homze, p. 172.

90. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 17.
91. Macksey, p. 55.
92. Andrews, p. 29.
93. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 45.
94. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 42.
95. Homze, p. 174.
96. Homze, p. 171.
97. Proctor, p. 253.
98. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
99. Homze, p. 171.
100. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 17.
101. Beevor, p. 258.
102. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 53.
103. Murray, p. 31.
104. Irving, p. 81.
105. Gurney, p. 43.
106. Andrews, p. 81.
107. Irving, p. 81.
108. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 54.
109. Price, p. 18.
110. The Polish Air Force in 1939 numbered only about 400 aircraft, all but 160 of which were fighters. The majority of the fighters were P.11s, gull-winged monoplanes of a design dating back to 1931; performance statistics; SPEED - 240 m.p.h. at 18,000 feet, 186 m.p.h. at sea level, ARMAMENT - initially two, and later four light machine guns. The Bf109s surpassed the P.11s in every performance category. {from Mason, p. 293.}
111. Halley, p. 56.
112. Mason, p. 293.
113. Price, p. 18.
114. Mason, pp. 288-89.
115. Mason, p. 293.
116. The Henschel Hs123 had a 880 hp BMW radial engine with a 210 m.p.h. top speed. The plane was designed to operate at altitudes under 500 feet. Four types of armament were possible: (1) two twin 7.9mm machine guns firing through the propellor, (2) two 20mm cannon in pods under the wings, (3) underwing containers holding 94 small 4.4 pound anti-personnel bombs, or (4) four 110-pound high-explosive bombs. Additionally, the plane carried a small auxiliary fuel tank underneath the fuselage that could be jettisoned with a napalm-like effect. {from Mason, pp. 297-99.}
117. Murray, p. 32.
118. Mason, p. 298.
119. Mason, pp. 301-02.
120. Macksey, pp. 62-63.
121. Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 16.
122. Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 17.
123. Mason, p. 291.
124. Price, p. 19.
125. Gurney, p. 43.
126. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 57.
127. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 57.
128. Murray, p. 38.

129. Great Britain Air Ministry, pp. 63-64.
130. Mason, pp. 319-21.
131. Halley, pp. 64-65.
132. Mason, pp. 334-35.
133. Price, pp. 20-21.
134. Sims, pp. 116-17.
135. Price, pp. 20-21.
136. These were *Lufthansa* derivatives of the scrapped "Ural" bomber design.
137. Sims, p. 116.
138. Mason, pp. 340-1.
139. Price, p. 22.
140. Murray, p. 38.
141. Murray, p. 38.
142. The fortress Eban Emael was completed in 1935. It was $\frac{1}{2}$ mile long, almost that wide, and festooned with 3" and 5" gun turrets, supplemented by machine gun cupolas. Its reputation of impregnability was similar to that of the Maginot Line in France. See also Cajus Bekker, *The Luftwaffe War Diaries*, trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 93-100.
143. Mason, p. 344.
144. Price, p. 22.
145. Murray, pp. 41-42.
146. Murray, p. 41.
147. Mason, pp. 352-53.
148. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 70.
149. The Spitfire model J had performance characteristics very similar to the Bf109 (see above). SPEED - 362 m.p.h. at 19,000 feet, CEILING - 35,000 feet, RANGE - 395 miles, INITIAL CLIMB RATE - 2,500 feet/minute, ARMAMENT - eight .303 inch machine guns. (from Sims, p. 90.)
150. Murray, pp. 42-43.
151. Macksey, pp. 73-74.
152. Mason, p. 358.
153. Mason, p. 358.
154. Sims, pp. 100-01.
155. Though the Bf110 was designed as a long-range fighter, it was easily outmaneuvered by the nimble British Spitfires. In any case, the *Luftwaffe* never had enough of them. Drop tanks designed to extend the range of the Bf109s, though initially tested in Spain, were not widely used, nor were aircrews trained in their employment. A reluctance on the part of pilots to experiment with the drop tanks was understandable in light of the pilots' inexperience with them, and because usage had not yet become routine or standardized. (from Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 9.)

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Politics, Prejudice and Procedure: The Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson

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Recent years have seen some erosion in the traditional view of the Andrew Johnson impeachment trial as a lawless episode of political partisanship. Johnson's reputation has worsened even as historians have come to see the essentially moderate character of the Republican Reconstruction program.¹ Legally, the impeachment is not as self-evidently insupportable as it once seemed. Scholars and (thanks to Watergate) public officials now generally agree that impeachable offenses need not be indictable crimes,² as Johnson's lawyers argued and some of the Republicans who voted to acquit him supposed.³ But most scholars still take it for granted that, as Raoul Berger has written, the trial was unfairly conducted and the judges prejudiced: "What made the trial 'disgraceful' was not that the charges were altogether without color of law but that the proceeding reeked with unfairness, with palpable prejudgment of guilt."⁴

This, the received view, I regard as mythical as the other tenets of the old historiography of Reconstruction. Political and personal prejudice there certainly was, but it worked both ways, and on balance, it worked to Johnson's benefit. Far from being one-sided, the Senate's procedural and evidentiary rulings were often more favorable to the defense than they should have been. Johnson had eminent counsel who outperformed the House-appointed Managers and made the most of the prosecution's weaknesses. Chief Justice Chase, presiding over the trial, succeeded in enlarging his own role

in the trial and tilting toward the defense in his comments and rulings. Despite the partisan feeling against him, Johnson was not openly deprived of his constitutional rights.⁵ Behind the scenes he bargained for the votes of conservative Republicans. Since Johnson was acquitted by only one vote,⁶ it is more likely that a fairer trial would have resulted in his conviction.

Of course the impeachment was thoroughly political. The in-court statements of both sides reflected awareness that the real issue was presidential obstruction of Congressionally ordered Reconstruction.⁷ But the Framers of the Constitution would probably not have been shocked by that dimension of the case. They expected partisan excesses by the House's prosecutors to be redressed by trial before the Senate where, as Hamilton wrote, the "security to innocence" afforded by the requirement of a two-thirds vote to convict "will be as complete as itself can desire."⁸ As Michael Les Benedict points out, if politics motivated the majority that voted to convict, it equally actuated the minority that voted to acquit.⁹

Johnson's lawyers and the scholars who echo their arguments contended that the Senate, by passing upon charges that included defiance of Congress, was judging its own case; that further bias from self-interest was injected by the happenstance that the President of the Senate, Benjamin Wade, would succeed Johnson; and that Wade's own participation in the voting was especially improper.¹⁰ Some of the Managers such as Thaddeus Stevens and Benjamin Butler had long called for impeachment and so, it is said, were biased against the accused.¹¹ (But then the Managers participated as prosecutors, not judges, and took no oath to act impartially.) The argument from Senatorial self-interest proves too much, being essentially an argument against impeachment as a process. The Framers must have anticipated that many Senators would be definitely friendly or inimical to the President, and it would be absurd to disqualify them as in an ordinary trial.¹²

The circumstance that Wade was next in succession had the most appeal for so-called Radical Republicans who hardly needed further incentive to remove a president they considered a traitor. But the prospect frightened anti-Johnson but conservative Republicans who detested Wade's high-tariff, soft-money, pro-labor and women's suffrage sentiments: such men feared that Wade would use his patronage power to secure the 1868 Republican vice-presidential nomination.¹³ Defense counsel Evarts alluded to the "shock" and "disturbance" and "confusion" which would ensue from such a succession. At least three of the seven "recusant" Republicans who voted to acquit were personal enemies of Wade.¹⁴ And so was the

Chief Justice, Chase. The men had been at odds as rival Ohio Republican leaders since the 1850's, and Chase believed, with good reason, that Wade's dark-horse presidential ambitions in 1860 doomed Chase's own campaign for the Republican nomination.¹⁵ As events were to reveal, Chase was well positioned to frustrate Wade's hopes. After the trial a Detroit newspaper wrote: "Andrew Johnson is innocent because Benjamin Wade is guilty of being his successor."¹⁶

As for Wade's own voting to convict, it was doubtless technically improper,¹⁷ but it hardly mattered. Wade and his supporters felt that his state was entitled to both of its votes, balloting equally with other states; nonetheless, he refrained from voting until the day of balloting on the verdict, and he voted to convict only after acquittal was already a mathematical inevitability. As was pointed out at the time, Johnson's son-in-law Senator Patterson should have been disqualified if anyone was, but he voted (consistently pro-defense) throughout the trial.¹⁸ Since one vote to acquit is effectively worth two to convict, the balance of bias favored the President. As a legal matter the Senate, notwithstanding its biases, had the power and the duty to try Johnson. Under the legal doctrine of necessity, a tribunal whose members are subject to disqualification for bias or interest must nevertheless act if there is no other body with jurisdiction to proceed.¹⁹ It is, after all, somewhat circular to complain of politicization in the Johnson impeachment when the nature and magnitude of the issues raised by Johnson's course of conduct must necessarily arouse political passions.²⁰

Another aspect of the issue of prejudice is the Managers' occasional pejorative references to the President — the "great criminal," as even conservative Manager Bingham called him²¹ — but there is no evidence that they had any real prejudicial impact. A famous example took place toward the close of Manager Butler's otherwise pedestrian three-hour opening statement when he said with reference to Johnson, "By murder most foul he succeeded to the Presidency, and is the elect of an assassin to that high office."²² Probably this remark did the prosecution more harm than good,²³ but in any event it was the kind of oratorical extravagance typical of both the 19th century courtroom and the political performance then a prime source of popular edification and entertainment. Johnson, certainly, was anything but squeamish in his speeches. In fact, the context of the Butler statement was his discussion of Article Ten, a minor article accusing Johnson of vilifying the Congress based on statements during his "swing around the circuit" when he called his

Republican critics traitors, likened himself to a Christ among Judases, and generally shocked Republicans by the virulence of his invective.²⁴ Such flashes of color only stand out, for better or for worse, on account of the dullness of the larger part of a sprawling 1200 page transcript. Although Johnson's lawyers may have been somewhat more restrained, one of them carried his oratory so far as to be censured by the Senate for in effect challenging Butler to a duel.²⁵ Critics of the Managers' language may be unaware of the latitude traditionally accorded to the prosecutor in abusing an accused. In California, for instance, prosecutors may use "appropriate epithets" if the language is warranted by the evidence; thus defendants have been called "sneaky mother killer," "the lowest of the lows," and "a smart thief and a parasite on the community."²⁶ Johnson had much less to complain of than many less eminent accused malefactors.

The Constitution provides that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to Try all Impeachments," and specifies that "when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside." The Chief Justice replaces the Senate's usual presiding officer, the Vice-President, on such occasions for the obvious reason that the latter is next in line of succession to the presidency, and might be biased.²⁷ The Chief Justice seemed a safe choice to preside because, as Justice Story wrote, "his impartiality and independence could be as little suspected as those of any person in the country."²⁸ Unfortunately the ambitions of the Chief Justice in 1868 confounded the Framers' precautions. Chase is often credited with conducting the trial impartially,²⁹ but there is no doubt in my mind that he prejudged the merits of the case and it is clear that he had a lively personal interest in its outcome.

Chase, like the proponents of impeachment, understood how to pursue political ends by legal means. Before the Civil War he was instrumental in formulating a dubious yet plausible constitutional grounding of the Free Soil Party ideology inherited by the new Republican Party.³⁰ Despite his single-issue radicalism respecting slavery (and later black suffrage), Chase was a conservative at heart. Although he opposed Johnson's Reconstruction measures, he made known his opposition to impeachment "as a policy." During the trial he wrote to correspondents that Johnson had "a perfect right" to dismiss Secretary of War Stanton regardless of the provisions of the Tenure of Office Act — "a grave violation of judicial ethics," in Michael Benedict's words.³¹ Even more important in shaping Chase's behavior than his legal prejudgment, political preference, and personal antipathy (to Wade and to

Stanton³²), was Chase's almost lifelong, obsessive pursuit of the presidency. He sought the Republican nomination in every election year from 1856 through 1868. Lincoln said that Chase (his Secretary of the Treasury until 1864) was "a little insane" on the subject of the presidency, and Lincoln's only concern in appointing him Chief Justice was his (well-founded) fear that Chase would "neglect the place in his strife and intrigue to make himself President." A fellow Justice said of Chase that "his first thought in meeting any man of force was...how can I utilize him for my presidential ambitions." By the time of the impeachment trial it was apparent that Grant would be the Republican nominee. Chase had hitherto been considered a Radical Republican, but changing parties for the fourth time was easy enough. During the trial, Chase solicited the Democratic nomination — that is, the nomination of what was *de facto* Johnson's party insofar as he had any.³³ At best, then, Chase fell a bit short of being the one person whose "impartiality and independence could be as little suspected as those of any person in the country."

Before the trial commenced the Senate committee which drafted rules of procedure invited Chase's comments. Chase wanted the Senate to organize itself as a "Court of Impeachment," distinct from its normal legislative capacity; and as presiding officer of that "court" he sought a vote for himself.³⁴ The Senators, some of them now doubtful of Chase's political loyalties, took care to delete all references to the Senate as a court of impeachment. The original version of the rules gave the presiding officer the right to make preliminary rulings on evidentiary matters, subject to Senate reversal after one-fifth of the Senators challenged a ruling; now Senator Chandler, Radical Republican from Michigan, sponsored an obscurely worded substitute amendment whose purpose was evidently to shift this power back to the Senate collectively.³⁵

By determined manipulation and good luck, Chase undid the committee's work soon after Wade relinquished the chair to him. Almost the first matter to arise was a Democratic challenge to Wade's right to take the oath. After some debate Senator Grimes (later a recusant) moved that the "court" adjourn for a day; Senator Howard replied that the Senate should adjourn itself and "relieve" the Chief Justice and pass to its legislative business — a subtle distinction, but one that posed a controversial issue. Chase settled it, for the time being, by an adroit *fait accompli*: "The court must first adjourn. Senators, you who are in favor of adjourning the court until to-morrow at 1 o'clock will say 'ay,' and those of the contrary opinion will say 'no'." Those who denied that the Senate was a

court could not say anything, and "the motion was agreed to."³⁶ The next day a point of order arose regarding which Senator Howard invoked Rule XXIII of the impeachment rules. Chase made his move: "The twenty-third rule is a rule for the proceeding of the Senate when organized for the trial of an impeachment. It is not yet organized; and in the opinion of the Chair the twenty-third rule does not apply at present." Senator Drake appealed the decision of the chair, but, to the cheers of the gallery, Chase was sustained by a 24-20 vote. Following up on this success, Chase told the Senate that, having now passed over into its special impeachment capacity, it would have to readopt its impeachment rules — and again he posed the question in such a way that a Senator could vote for or against the rules, but not vote against Chase's presumption that the rules had to be readopted: "Senators, you who think that the rules of proceeding adopted on the 2nd of March should be considered as the rules of this body will say 'ay'; contrary opinion, 'no'." The ayes prevailed.³⁷

Among the rules adopted (and readopted) by the Senate was Rule VIII, requiring the accused to "file his answer to said articles of impeachment" on the date specified in the summons served upon him; if he failed to appear or file an answer, "the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea of not guilty." Defense counsel appeared on the appointed date, March 13, but instead of filing an answer they sought forty days more in which to do so, invoking the analogy of criminal procedure. The Managers replied that the Senate's own rules were controlling, not analogies from other areas of law; if Johnson would not enter a plea, the rules were clear that the trial should commence then and there as if he had pleaded not guilty. No elaborate formal reply was necessary anyway since, as Bingham said,

technical rules do in nowise control or limit or fetter the action of this body; and under the plea of "not guilty," as provided in the rules, every conceivable defense that the party accused could make to the articles here preferred can be admitted. Why, then, this delay of forty days to draw up an answer of not guilty?³⁸

Why indeed? But the Senate, touchy about insinuations that the President was being railroaded, allowed ten days to answer. On March 23 the defense filed an answer even more turgid than the articles, whereupon the trial should have begun. Yet Johnson's lawyers prevailed upon the Senate to grant another continuance until March 30. Raoul Berger complains that the defense received "extraordinarily short shrift," but it got more time by far than the rules allowed it, and nothing in the answer, the course of the trial or

the verdict suggests that Johnson got any less time than he needed in order to mount a successful defense.³⁹

On the second day of the trial, Chase overturned the rules in another respect. Manager Butler was trying to elicit hearsay testimony as to the expressed intentions of General Lorenzo Thomas, Johnson's *ad interim* appointee as Secretary of War, in going to the War Department on February 21 to challenge Stanton. The defense objected that the testimony was irrelevant. Chase stated: "The Chief Justice thinks the testimony is competent, and it will be heard unless the Senate think otherwise." When Senator Drake challenged his right to make such a preliminary ruling — a power which the Senate had earlier stripped him of, seemingly — Chase insisted "that in his judgment it is his duty to decide upon questions of evidence in the first instance, and that if any senator desires that the question shall then be submitted to the Senate it is his duty to submit it." The Managers belatedly protested that Chase's arrogation of power detracted from the Senate's "sole power" to try impeachments: "Every judgment that must be made is a part of the trial, whether it be upon a preliminary question or a final question." By chance Chase got more than he hoped for by the resolution of the question. A motion that the Senate retire for consultation (in effect, to debate unconstrained by Chase) eventuated in a 25–25 tie (Wade and three others not voting). Chase announced the result and said: "The Chief Justice votes in the affirmative. The Senate will retire for conference." He then left the room.⁴⁰ Emerging from conference, the Senate defeated actions by Drake and Sumner denying Chase's right to vote, and instead the rules were amended to legitimate Chase's claim to make preliminary rulings, except that any Senator's objection would put the matter before the Senate.⁴¹ If less than a trial judge, Chase was at least more than a mere moderator.⁴²

Central to the fairness of any trial is the court's reception or exclusion of evidence. In impeachment trials, exclusionary rulings will be somewhat less important than in a jury trial, since the Senators cannot be kept from hearing about proffered evidence and taking it into account as they, severally, see fit.⁴³ Johnson impeachment critics claim that prejudicial rulings stud the record,⁴⁴ but they have ignored the possibility that the rulings were correct, or at least within the range of reasonable differences under the law of evidence as it then stood. A look at a few of the more important evidentiary controversies suggest that, as in other matters, the Senate was more than fair to Johnson. Seeming injustices, *e.g.*, the admissions of hearsay declarations against an accused but not those

in his favor, may be ingrained features of criminal evidence law, not the blatantly unequal treatment they might resemble to the lay observer.⁴⁵

Most of the eleven articles involved Johnson's dismissal of Secretary of War Stanton and his attempted *ad interim* appointment of General Lorenzo Thomas to the post, allegedly in violation of the Tenure of Office Act. Johnson's defense was threefold: the Act was unconstitutional; if constitutional, it nonetheless did not cover Stanton; and if constitutional and applicable, "the President acted from laudable and honest motives, and is not, therefore, guilty of any crime or misdemeanor."⁴⁶ The latter defense of good faith had important evidentiary implications if accepted by the Senate. If the wrongful intent, with which Johnson was accused of having acted, had to be the intent to break a law Johnson knew to be valid, then the Senate should consider evidence that Johnson desired to precipitate a test case for the courts or that his Cabinet unanimously advised him that the Act was constitutional.⁴⁷ Not so, however, if the requisite intent, as for most criminal offenses, was merely to have voluntarily and consciously done the acts charged; or if ignorance of the law is, as usual, no defense; or if, as Thaddeus Stevens argued, the object of impeachment is simply to end a course of unconstitutional conduct by removing the perpetrator: "Mere mistake in intention, if so persevered in after proper warning as to bring mischief upon the community, is quite sufficient to warrant the removal of the officer from the place where he is working mischief by his continuance in power."⁴⁸ As a matter of constitutional exegesis and common prudence, the Managers' theory is closer to the correct view, and it was evidently also the view of the Senate.⁴⁹ If so, just about every exclusion of proffered defense evidence is defensible.

But there were further infirmities in important parts of defense testimony. Defense attorney Stanbury sought to elicit from Thomas what Johnson had told him on February 21, 1868, immediately after Thomas had confronted Stanton at the War Department. Bingham objected that this was an attempt "to introduce in the defense of an accused criminal his own declaration made after the fact." Noting that the acts charged (dismissal of Stanton and appointment of Thomas) were by then completed, Butler said that "Mr. Thomas cannot make evidence for himself by going and talking with the President, nor the President with Mr. Thomas." The objection was valid. A party charged with crime can never put in evidence in his own behalf his declarations made after commission of a crime.⁵⁰ But the Senate, to which Chase submitted the point

without a preliminary ruling, voted 42-10 to admit the hearsay. Thomas then quoted Johnson's response to the War Department incident: "Very well; we want it in the courts."⁵¹

Next the defense questioned General Sherman about his talk with Johnson on January 14, prior to the final firing of Stanton. The defense argued that the Johnson hearsay was germane to intent, and Chase ruled it admissible. Because this declaration preceded the act charged, it was not subject to the previous objection — but there was still a crucial condition on letting such evidence in. Contemporaneous declarations of purpose, "made with no apparent motive for misstatement," are admissible to prove the declarant's purpose. The defense agreed such statements are admissible "if they do not appear to have been manufactured." Senators might readily conclude that Johnson was already creating evidence for use in the impending showdown over Stanton. Chase intervened to endorse the defense view, saying that "proof of a conversation shortly before a transaction is better evidence of the intent of an actor than proof of a conversation shortly after a transaction. The Secretary will call the roll." By a 23-28 vote of which Chase complained bitterly in private, the evidence was excluded.⁵²

But even this ruling, for which several arguable grounds of support appear, was effectively reversed. Later, by one of those one-vote margins made possible by Wade's self-restraint, Sherman was allowed to report what Johnson told him at later interviews (January 27 or 31) as to his purpose in offering Sherman the post of *ad interim* Secretary of War. Johnson said it was for the good of the country. When Sherman asked why the courts could not settle the conflict, Johnson said that was impossible, but "if we can bring the case to the courts it would not stand half an hour." As Stanbury said, "that which was closed to us by the decision of the court on Saturday, is now opened by the question of the senator to-day."⁵³ Yet the Johnson-Sherman talks, which came after the Senate had refused to assent to Stanton's removal on January 13, were well before the final firing on February 21 and rather remote in time to count as contemporaneous declarations of intent.

A subsidiary issue in the case was whether Johnson had contemplated the use of force to install Thomas. To prove otherwise, the defense sought to have Secretary of State Welles testify that on February 21 Johnson opined that Stanton would acquiesce peaceably in the Thomas appointment. Chase announced that he was "clearly of opinion that this is a part of the transaction, and that it is entirely proper to take this evidence into consideration as showing the intent of the President in his acts. The Secretary will

call the roll." By a 26-23 vote the evidence was admitted.⁵⁴ Again, an after-the-fact, self-serving hearsay declaration, which must have been made in anticipation of future controversy, was admitted to prove a kind of "intent" which was not really material anyway. The defense, often with the weight of the Chief Justice's authority behind it, overall benefitted greatly from the Senate's evidentiary rulings. And even when the Managers succeeded in excluding evidence of Johnson's innocent intent, the Senators heard what the evidence would have been even as the Managers made themselves look bad by trying to suppress evidence favorable to Johnson.⁵⁵

The most important lapses from procedural propriety in the impeachment trial did not take place in court at all. They consisted of negotiations between Johnson's lawyer Evarts (who would surely be disbarred for it today) and susceptible conservative Republican Senators which eventuated in a virtual trade of not-guilty votes for political favors. Senator Grimes, with the knowledge of Senators Fessenden and Trumbull, obtained assurances that acquittal would not be followed by presidential reprisals. The nomination of a conservative Republican general to succeed Stanton also pleased the Republican right. Senator Ross — a recusant often held up as the hero who placed principle above politics in casting "the vote that saved Johnson" — let the President know that his prompt transmission of the new, reconstructed South Carolina and Arkansas constitutions would cause him and others to vote to acquit. Johnson complied the next day. Johnson also agreed to enforce the Reconstruction Acts.⁵⁶ It is curious that impeachment critics who point to the immense political pressure brought to bear on wavering Senators overlook that the President still wielded enough power and patronage to outbid the Radical Republicans for enough votes to win.

The evidence is overwhelming that while an impeachment trial is a judicial proceeding before the Senate sitting as a court,⁵⁷ it is not a criminal trial.⁵⁸ Procedurally this means that the technicalities of indictment and pleading which characterized criminal procedure had no place in the Johnson impeachment trial. Hamilton wrote that such a proceeding "can never be tied down to such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors of the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security."⁵⁹ All the early commentators, seconded by the best modern authorities, agreed that the Senate was not bound to the strict forms of common-law pleading and procedure, particularly with respect to the formulation

of charges; the articles might be very general and the Senators were entitled to construe them broadly from considerations of policy.⁶⁰

The defense, however, assailed obscurities and possible technical defects in the articles as if they appeared in an indictment. In the criminal law of the day, no conviction could stand unless the proof adduced at trial closely corroborated the allegations of the indictment, even if the proof showed other criminality on the defendant's part. Johnson's lawyers cited this principle in his behalf, insisting, for instance, that since criminal intent was alleged in each article, conviction required proof of criminal intent.⁶¹ Actually it is doubtful if this rule applied even if the trial had been criminal in character. Immaterial allegations in an indictment had long been allowed to be ignored as surplusage.⁶² If most senators thought that criminal intent (at least as the defense understood it) was not necessary to sustain conviction, their disregard of allegations of criminal intent would not mean they were voting to convict Johnson of something different from what he was charged with. And yet the defense argument paid off. Five of the seven recalcitrant Republicans filed opinions justifying acquittal in part because the proof only showed an attempt to remove Stanton (because he refused to go), not an effective removal as alleged!⁶³

The fate of the eleventh article, "the gist and vital portion of this whole prosecution" as Stevens called it, illuminates the circumstances which led to Johnson's acquittal. The Radical Republicans added it because, as Stevens complained, the other articles were so narrowly and legalistically framed as to have no "real vigor in them."⁶⁴ In extraordinarily convoluted language it alleged a conspiracy to frustrate enforcement of the Tenure of Office Act and certain Reconstruction legislation pursuant to Johnson's alleged assertion that the Congress was not a constitutional body. It was the most important article and the one most likely to be adopted because, in its obscure but unmistakable way, it was understood by all to state Johnson's real offense: his obstruction of Congressional Reconstruction. Instead of meeting the charge head-on, defense counsel tried to make light of it by professing an inability to make any sense out of it. Impeachment proponents were not fooled and induced the Senate to vote on the eleventh article first.⁶⁵

Chase now made the last and possibly most important of his unauthorized encroachments upon the Senate's sole power to try impeachments. Speaking as if he were the trial judge charging the jury as to the applicable law, he prefaced the voting by his own narrow construction of the article. "The single substantive matter charged," he said, "is the attempt to prevent execution of the tenure-

of-office act [sic]; and the other facts are alleged either as introductory and exhibiting this general purpose, or as showing the means contrived in furtherance of the attempt." By collapsing the eleventh article into a mere rehash of the others, Chase effectively eliminated the breadth which was intended to distinguish it from the other ten.⁶⁶ It is argued that Chase did not determine the verdict of the trial because formally the Senate had the right to overrule him.⁶⁷ As the disposition of the eleventh article shows, that is a naïve view of the matter. By his comments, his control of the proceedings, the prestige of his office and his mastery of the *fait accompli*, Chase exerted a pervasive influence on the whole course of the proceedings, and his influence was usually exerted for Johnson's benefit.

A few years after the Johnson acquittal, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is accorded due process of the law "if the trial is had according to the settled course of judicial proceedings," consonant with "the law of the land."⁶⁸ In that sense, it was the Managers rather than Johnson who were denied due process. The case is shot through with ironies inuring to the accused's benefit. Johnson portrayed his prosecutors as prejudiced and partisan while secretly taking full advantage of prejudices cutting his way and exploiting extrajudicial political clout. His lawyers insisted he be tried solely according to the literal terms of the impeaching articles — the rule of law required no less — and then belittled those "technical and formal crimes" as "of very paltry consideration." After incurring attack for contending that the Senate was not a court, the Managers made more use than the defense of evidentiary technicalities inappropriate in an impeachment trial. Ostensibly upholding the Constitution and laws against partisan abuse, the defense — aided by the Chief Justice — repeatedly induced the Senate either to break its own rules or to rewrite them to suit Chase or Johnson. The trial included its share of errors and injustices, but they more often benefited the accused than the accusers. Unlike his prosecutors, Andrew Johnson got a fair trial.⁶⁹

Notes

1. Michael Les Benedict, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), vii, 1-8; Hans L. Trefousse, *Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), ix-x.
2. Benedict, 27; Raoul Berger, *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 53-102; Charles L. Black, Jr., *Impeachment: A Handbook* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 35; John R. Labovitz, *Presidential Impeachment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 27, 99-100; William Lawrence, "The Law of Impeachment," *American Law Register*, O.S.15 (Sept. 1867), 644, 647; William Rawle, *A View of the Constitution of the United States of America* (Philadelphia: H.C. Carey & I. Lea, 1825), 201, 204; Alexander Simpson, *A Treatise on Federal Impeachments* (Philadelphia: Law Association of Philadelphia, 1916), 30-60.
3. *Trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Before the Senate of the United States, on Impeachment by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and Misdemeanors* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1868), 1:49 (hereafter *Trial*); Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 51.
4. Berger, 264. Berger has been influential in discrediting the idea that American impeachments are criminal trials and that only indictable crimes justify impeachment. He is, however, tendentious and hyper-legalistic in all that he publishes, and his chapter on the Johnson impeachment, based on obsolete sources, is a caricature of events and issues which at times approaches the grotesque.
5. Simpson, 28.
6. *Trial* 2:486-87, 496-97. There is reason to believe, though, that several more Republicans — including the Chief Justice's son-in-law, Senator Sprague — would have voted to acquit if their votes were needed. Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 169.
7. *Trial* 1:121-22 (Manager Butler), 2:14-16 (Manager Logan), 110 (Manager Boutwell), 232-33 (Manager Williams), 270-71, 277 (defense counsel Evarts); Benedict, 135, 160; Berger, 269-70; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 140-41, 159.
8. Labovitz, 177; Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1961) No. 66 (Hamilton), 402.
9. Benedict, 126.
10. *Trial* 1:411 (defense counsel Curtis), 2:324 (Evarts), 3:360-401 (Senate debate on letting Wade take the oath); Berger, 267 & n. 100.
11. Benedict, 52; Berger, 269-70; Hans L. Trefousse, *Ben Butler: The South Called Him Beast!* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1957), 186; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 51-52.
12. Black, *Impeachment*, 11.
13. Benedict, 133-35; H.L. Trefousse, *Benjamin Franklin Wade: Radical Republican From Ohio* (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1963), 8, 284-85, 306; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 149, 176-77. In February 1868 the future recalcitrant Senator Fessenden wrote that Johnson's impeachment would mean "the end of us." Benedict, 103.
14. *Trial* 2:271; Trefousse, *Wade*, 8.

15. Thomas Graham Belden and Marva Robins Belden, *So Fell The Angels* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 181; Albert Bushnell Hart, *Salmon Portland Chase* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1899), 358; Trefousse, *Wade*, 68-69, 121-24, 140. "Chase," said Wade, "thinks there is a fourth person in the Trinity." Trefousse, *Wade*, 235. Ironically, Wade actually preferred Chase to Grant as the 1868 Republican presidential nominee. Benedict, 72.
16. Trefousse, *Wade*, 309.
17. Rawle, 206.
18. *Trial* 3:360-61 (Senator Sherman); Trefousse, *Wade*, 297, 300, 303-04. Several matters were decided by one vote or by a tie (broken by the Chief Justice) during the trial. Wade has never received historical credit for his forbearance. Given the closeness of these votes and of the verdict, Wade's abstention is another of those imponderables which might have made the difference between conviction and acquittal.
19. *In re Leefe*, 2 Barb. Ch. 39, 39-40 (N.Y. 1846). Here and hereafter an effort has been made, where legal issues are discussed, to rely on 19th century decisional law in contexts remote from impeachment. As discussed more fully later, some of the most-criticized legal determinations of the impeachment trial were fully in accord with the law at the time, a possibility overlooked by virtually all commentators on the trial.
20. Labovitz, 31.
21. *Trial* 2:407.
22. *Trial* 1:119; Trefousse, *Wade*, 298-99.
23. Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 154.
24. *Trial* 1:114-120; Benedict, 13-14. Johnson was surely among the most vulgar and uncouth of presidents save only, perhaps, the only other president to face a real impeachment threat. Johnson, for instance, attended his own and Lincoln's inauguration while drunk.
25. *Trial* 2:307 (Censure of defense counsel Nelson). One wonders what Berger is talking about when he writes: "The Managers indulged in vituperation without restraint by the Senate; yet defense counsel, who must have felt themselves in the midst of a pack of wolves, never departed from reasoned, measured advocacy" (Berger, 274-75) — except to challenge Butler to a duel! The defense team's relative restraint is perhaps to be explained less by its lofty ethical rectitude than by a shrewd assessment of tactics. Defense attorney Evarts made good use of Butler's logorrhea, evoking derisory laughter by his references to Butler's invective. *Trial* 2:285.
26. *People v. Wein*, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 397 (1958); *People v. Hardenbrook*, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 352 (1957); *People v. La Fontaine*, 79 Cal. App. 3d 176, 186 (1978); *People v. Rodriguez*, 10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 36 (1970); Robert C. Black, "Attorney Discipline for 'Offensive Personality' in California," *Hastings Law Journal* 31 (May 1980), 1132 & nn. 219-222.
27. U.S. Const., art. I, §3, cl. 6; Berger, 267 n. 100; Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States*, ed. Melville M. Bigelow (5th ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1891), 1:557; Joseph Story, *The Constitutional Class Book: Being a Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States* (Boston: Hillsard, Gray & Company, 1834); Rawle, 206.
28. Story, *Commentaries*, 1:568.

29. William R. Brock, *Conflict and Transformation: The United States, 1844-1877* (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), 347-48; Hart, 360; M. Kathleen Perdue, "Salmon P. Chase and the Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson," *The Historian* 27 (Nov. 1965), 75-92; J. W. Schuckers, *The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), 558.
30. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1971), 76-77, 87.
31. Belden and Belden, 185; Benedict, 136-37; Hart, 358-59; Eric L. McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 115 n. 42; Perdue, 89; Schuckers, 577-78.
32. Chase, who tended to see treachery everywhere, thought that Stanton had betrayed him by not resigning from Lincoln's Cabinet in 1864 when he did; Chase considered Stanton not "reliable for anything except hatred of enemies & offenses to friends." Belden and Belden, 176.
33. Belden and Belden, 198-200; Benedict, 136-37; Frederick J. Blue, "Chase and the Governorship: A Stepping Stone to the Presidency," *Ohio History* 90 (Summer 1981), 197-98, 219-220; David Donald, ed., *Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), 3, 5, 260; Schuckers, 578-79; G. Edward White, *The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges* (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1978), 87, 201 (quoting Justice Samuel Miller).
34. Perdue, 76-77.
35. Trial 1:13-15 (Senate rules of impeachment); Benedict, 115-16.
36. Trial 3:388; Benedict, 118.
37. Trial 1:12.
38. Trial 1:18-24.
39. Trial 1:33-36, 37-53 (answer); Benedict, 122-23; Berger, 267.
40. Trial 1:175-76, 180-87; Benedict, 120-22, Perdue, 81; Schuckers, 554-55.
41. Trial 1:185-87; Benedict, 121-22, Schuckers, 555-56.
42. Hart, 359. Some of the Chief Justice's claimed prerogatives may, of course, have properly belonged to him. William Alexander Duer, *A Course of Lectures on the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1845), 78 (Chief Justice as member of court of impeachment); Rawle, 206 (Chief Justice's right to vote).
43. Black, *Impeachment*, 18. Modern authorities favor a relaxation of exclusionary rules of evidence in impeachments, in the interest of shedding the fullest light on facts which may be relevant. Black, *Impeachment*, 18; Labovitz, 118; Simpson, 66. Ironically the only Senator to anticipate this approach was the much-maligned (by Berger) Radical, Charles Sumner (Berger, 269-70) who voted to admit any evidence offered by either side and, partway through the trial, made a motion to expedite the trial by receiving all evidence "not trivial or obviously irrelevant," with any objections going to its weight instead of its admissibility. The motion was overwhelmingly defeated, 13-30. Trial 1:589-90, 633.
44. Berger, 268.
45. United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430, 443 (1840); compare Trial 1:175, 194-95, 209 (admitting admissions of Thomas as Johnson's agent or co-conspirator) with 1:700 (excluding evidence that Johnson

- and his cabinet prior to the Stanton firing, considered the Tenure of Office Act unconstitutional).
46. *Trial* 1:383, 386 (defense counsel Curtis), 2:153, 169 (defense counsel Logan).
 47. *Trial* 1:462-65 (Stanbury), 689 (Curtis); Berger, 268-69.
 48. *Trial* 1:541 (Bingham), 681 (Manager Wilson), 22:24-25 (Boutwell), 220-23 (Stevens), 413 (Bingham).
 49. *Trial* 1:693; Berger, 294; Labovitz, 129-31 & *passim*; Rawle, 201.
 50. *Nudd v. Burrows*, 91 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1875); *State v. Vann*, 82 N.C. 631, 633 (1880); *Trial* 1:420-22, 425.
 51. *Trial* 1:426, 428; Perdue, 84.
 52. *Trial* 1:466, 480, 483; Perdue, 85; *State v. Fessenden*, 151 Mass. 359, 360-61 (1890) (per Holmes, J.).
 53. *Trial* 1:520-21, 524.
 54. *Trial* 1:673-75.
 55. Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 154.
 56. Benedict, 137-38; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 157-59.
 57. Berger, 264; Black, *Impeachment*, 9-11; Duer, 76; *The Federalist Papers* No. 65, at 396, 398 (Hamilton); Rawle, 205; Simpson, 21-27.
 58. Berger, 75-85, 297; Labovitz, 245. English impeachments, in contrast, were criminal in character. Matthew Hale, *The History of the Common Law of England*, ed. Charles M. Gray (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1971), 35.
 59. *The Federalist Papers* No. 65, at 395 (Hamilton); Story, *Commentaries* 1:555.
 60. Duer, 76-77; Theodore W. Dwight, "Trial by Impeachment," *American Law Register* O.S. 15 (March 1867), Labovitz, 117-18, 180; Rawle, 201, 205; Story, *Class Book*, 61; Story, *Commentaries* 1:559-60.
 61. *Trial* 1:689, 2:169; Labovitz, 88.
 62. *Respublica v. Shryber*, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 68 (Pa. 1782); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (the question is whether the variance between indictment and proof is so great as to take a defendant by surprise).
 63. Labovitz, 68-69.
 64. Benedict, 112; Labovitz, 61.
 65. *Trial* 1:10, 2:110, 114-16, 279, 484; Benedict, 114-15, 160; Labovitz, 61-62; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 138-41.
 66. *Trial* 2:480-81; Labovitz, 62.
 67. Perdue, 91-92.
 68. *Walker v. Sauvinet*, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875).
 69. *Trial* 1:475, 2:129-34, 136, 303-04.

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*The Legionary Movement in Romania**

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It is the authors' observation that most people make the mistake of not considering socio-political phenomena in their natural context in order to discover the legitimate causes, the true sense of their development, and especially their importance in the environment which fostered them. Carried away by the passion of political convictions or by the hope of immediate benefits, they reduce every phenomenon to a linear problem: good or bad, to be accepted or rejected.

Moreover, governments, the authorities, "reason" in the same manner. This maintains an atmosphere of suspicion and misunderstanding and is detrimental to the awakening of consciousness to what we believe are certain essential truths. In addition, when the age has been ravaged by bloody conflicts and when bad memories or hates are not yet dissipated, nothing is easier than to maintain this partial and prejudiced way of judging matters each time that circumstances bring the discussion of such a problem before the public.

*Ed. Note: *The authors of the following article are both members of and avowed partisans of the Legionary Movement. The history of the Romanian Legionary Movement has most often been portrayed in an antagonistic light. We feel that this actively partisan treatment, based as it is on Movement documents and extensive interviews with Movement members, will help in its way as an alternate reading and alternate primary source on this controversial period of Romanian and European history.*

This disposition of the public to a puerile partisanship is manipulated by those who are interested in compromising, or even in annihilating, a historical, political, or social truth. They know that the mass man:

...reduces everything to his personal conception, considering as false and dangerous anything which does not conform to his thoughts;

...is incapable of placing himself in the socio-historical context of the phenomenon in order to judge it according to reality, nor does he manage to make abstraction from his own reality, and comparisons are reduced to what seems just and perfect in relationship to himself;

...and is influenced by what the press disseminates without ever being able to perceive the lies, exaggerations and perfidious insinuations which infest most of these communications.

Therefore, playing upon these attitudes of the mass man, it is easy for dishonest people to direct even the most liberal and intelligent opinion and to lead the most honest and just people into error. That is not surprising, for, if the coalition of detractors is always powerful (because it works on the ease of emotional and uncontrollable arguments), those who are the target of this relentless propaganda are most often those who are ill-equipped to defend themselves. People are not sufficiently distrustful of this kind of sporadic attack, which is of little documentary importance. In the long run, for lack of pertinent refutation, these hoaxes end up being considered as authentic documents and the game is won.

Thus prejudice and the distortion of reality become lethal weapons capable of confusing the soundest minds and creating an undercurrent of hate or distrust toward certain socio-political doctrines which are valuable. Such is the case of the Romanian Legionary Movement. The purpose of this synthesis is to help the public reach a more accurate understanding of the Movement, as viewed by its former members.

Those who have read only the stories spread by the persistent detractors of the thinking, educational methods, and activities of this spiritual movement have acquired a picture of a blood-thirsty terrorist organization. That is totally unjust and far from the truth.

A doctrine which seeks to modify an individual's spiritual structure in order to make him a better, more intelligent and more honest person, a doctrine whose foundations are morality and love can certainly *not* be terrorist, racist or oligarchic. It addresses itself to every individual, regardless of race, social or professional position, regardless of culture, religion or philosophical opinion.

What is important in the realization of this "New Man" is the transformation of an ordinary person into an individual of quality. This new person can surpass himself by renouncing every tendency toward hate, materialism and the taste for power.

One young Italian writer had the courage to go beyond the prejudices imposed by the enemies of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (The Legionary Movement) and to go to the legitimate sources of Legionary Doctrine. This is what he says about the Legionary Movement:

Above all, one thing should be very clear to everyone: The Legion of the Archangel Michael is not a party as we understand it, nor a pressure group, nor a para-religious organization, nor in any way denominational. It is an absolutely original movement whose primary goal and purpose are: a spiritual and moral renewal, and the creation of a new individual — an individual who will stand in contrast to the democratic *homo aeconomicus*, who is essentially pragmatic and egotistical.¹

If, up until now, the Legionary Movement has been presented in a derogatory light, it is because the foundations of its doctrine, as well as its educational precepts, ran counter to all the political conceptions based on materialism and immorality. In it people discovered a powerful renewing force which in the long run would be capable of overthrowing the dominant conceptions of our mixed-up and indecisive world — not only at the philosophical level, but also at the practical socio-political level. A national mission and a universal vocation were perceived in the strength of its exceptional norms. Such ideas could not help but disturb the political factions which were dominant or dreaming of domination.

That may seem unlikely, given that the doctrine in question arose from a small country, from the bosom of a people without expansionist tendencies or pretensions. In the Legionary substance there is, nonetheless, a spiritually based messianism which addresses every honest man who is conscious of his human value and who wishes to change the course of history. Change is brought about through the use of moral norms in peoples' behavior and in nations' lives; these norms replace the egoism which is presently dominant. Such modification is surely difficult, but certainly not impossible. This explains the doggedness with which the Legionary doctrine and its members are still attacked today, 40 years after the Communist takeover of Romania and the outlawing of the Legionary Movement. It is because the Legionary spirit persists, invisible but tenacious, anchored in the depths of the Romanian soul as the only salvation for the nation, and perhaps for the world, which sees and feels itself carried toward the abyss.

The accusations, insinuations and lies about the Legionary Movement are well known. Every opportunity is taken to forbid its precepts or to savagely attack those near or far who envision this doctrine as the path of salvation for the Romanian Nation. It will take many years to re-establish an equilibrium and to give the original and highly spiritual content of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's doctrine its proper value in the eyes of the world.

The following work is one sincere effort among others to put some explanation of what the Romanian Legionary Movement really is at the disposal of those who have the conscience and the courage to look beyond the sordid propaganda. This is not a detailed analysis of the Legionary phenomenon, but a synthesizing summary of the various phases and attitudes assumed by the Legion of the Archangel Michael during its first fourteen years of existence: that is, up to Romania's entry into the war. At that time, several tens of thousands of Legionnaires were in the prisons of General Ion Antonescu, who had usurped the Legionary Movement's victory over the dictatorship of King Carol II and had installed his own dictatorship.

Brief History of the Legionary Movement

In the face of the ferociously materialistic, morally bankrupt tendencies which dominated the national scene, it was felt that nothing but the authority of the Commandments, a return to religious sources and the force of sacrifice could stop the slide toward total ruin.

For that reason, since the beginning, the Legionary Movement was set on original foundations:

- it has a *hierarchical character*;
- it values *personal responsibility*;
- it calls for *national affection*;
- it rests on *Christian spirituality*;
- and it raises the *notion of sacrifice* to the highest dignity.

Under these conditions, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu did not address the crowds in order to organize them and turn them into an opposition party. He was not interested in electoral change, but in the *internal change of the individual*. He sought to modify a mentality. He wanted above all to create a school which would prepare people for the future — people who would be honest, hard-working, moral, intelligent and willing to make sacrifices for the common good.

Nowhere in the Legionary norms and precepts can any incitement

to social, racial or religious hate be found. The basis of the Legionary Movement and education is love. Love in the purest sense of the word: that of *respect for one's fellow man*, whatever he may be; that of *respect for work*, even the most humble; that of *respect for each person's opinion*, no matter how absurd or contradictory it may be.

Germans, Hungarians, Turks, and Tartars entered the Legion's ranks because the Legionary ideal was not posed in racial or religious terms. They were engaging in a battle against a mentality which could dominate the masses of another race just as well as the Romanian masses. Everyone had the right and the obligation to participate. There was only one essential condition: each person had to blend himself body and soul into the great spiritual revolution. That was the only way to be able to comprehend the profound sense of the political vision of Corneliu Codreanu.

The beginnings of the Movement were extremely difficult. There were numerous reasons for that difficulty, and many of them were justified:

—The Legion of the Archangel Michael represented a new set of principles which were totally opposed to those that were then practiced.

—At the outset, the group was made up of inexperienced young people who promised absolutely nothing concrete and immediate.

—There was a natural distrust of a new organization, a new "party," which was assumed to be similar to all the others. (At that time there were around thirty different parties in Romania.)

—There was a general skepticism about anything which might announce a possible change.

—The Press immediately lumped the Legionary Movement into the ranks of the Fascists and later the National Socialists.

—Government authorities were hostile toward a voluntary movement which proved to be resistant to every attempt at maneuvering.

—There was a reticence of the masses before an unc customary political power.

—The organization being formed was in a state of total poverty. It literally started from *absolute zero*. It was not supported by any monetary power: bank, capitalist group, etc.

It is for these reasons that Codreanu based his Movement on the value of its unusual principles:

1. The Militant Organization:

He placed it under the insignia of personality, capacity for sacrifice and will.

The basic unit of the Legion of the Archangel Michael is not an assembly of members who have a political center, but a small group of individuals recruited one by one by the person who is going to become their leader. This unit, called a "Nest," is an independent unit, but it is hierarchically attached to a higher unit, and so on up to the top of the pyramid to the Leader of the Legion.²

2. The Political Organization:

This organization does not depend on committees and subcommittees which seek the satisfaction of particular interests. It is a hierarchical system ending with the Legionary Senate and Chief of the Legion, who are dedicated entirely to the nation, its well-being and its harmonious development.

3. The Spiritual Organization:

This constitutes the most important part of the Legionary purpose. The goal is to provoke a radical transformation in the mental structure and the morals of the nation through continuous work on the individual. Therefore, the Legionnaire continually seeks to educate according to moral and ethical norms, by rules of comportment, and by voluntary submission to a spiritual discipline. In the long run, this spiritual discipline will give rise to other impulses, other attitudes, other convictions about the meaning of life in society and about man as the central element of society.³

4. The Financial Organization:

The establishment of the resources which are indispensable to the activity of the Movement was definitely removed from the usual system of financing owed to particular interest groups, to social monopolies or to even more obscure organizations. It was decided that in order to arrive at a fundamental modification of the reigning mentality, the Legionary Movement would set the example of independence. It would support itself by means of its own resources. The self-sufficiency of a movement which desires to be respected signifies its independence of all other groups and gives it the opportunity to face its fight without fearing anyone. From this painful beginning up to the present, the Legionary Movement has fed its efforts by the dues and donations of its members and sympathizers.

The following is a chronological history of the Movement:

June 24, 1927: Codreanu and his four companions (Ion Mota, Ilie Garneata, Corneliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici) lay the foundations of the Legionary Movement under the name of The Legion of the Archangel Michael. The birth certificate of this organization contains only the following lines:

Today, Friday, the 24th of June, 1927, (Saint John the Baptist), at 10 P.M., the Legion of the Archangel Michael is founded under my direction. May he whose belief is unbounded enter its ranks. May he who has doubts remain outside. I hereby name Radu Mironovici, chief of the Guard of the Icon. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.

July 10, 1927: Codreanu specifies the first spiritual lines of the new Legionary life: faith in God, confidence in the mission of the Legionary Movement, love among the legionnaires, and song.

August 1, 1927: The bi-monthly magazine *Pamantul Stramosesc* (*The Land of the Ancestors*) appears. This is the first publication and the official organ of the Movement, under the direction of Codreanu.

November 8, 1927: Codreanu receives the solemn oath of the first Legionnaires. In total: 28 people.

February 19, 1928: A truck is purchased, thanks to the contributions of the first Legionnaires (begun December 1, 1927).

Summer 1928: Legionary commerce based on the new principles begins. The team responsible uses the truck to transport staples and fruits (produced by another Legionary team in a rented garden) to health resorts where they are sold.

December 10, 1928: Professor Ion Gavanescul takes the Legionary oath.

January 3-4, 1929: General Ion Tamoschi takes the Legionary oath and the first meeting of the "Nest" leaders takes place. Codreanu stipulates the fundamental principles of the system of "dynamic education." (Action is education.)

During the same meeting, the Legionary Senate is formed. The first members are: Hristache Solomon, General Dr. Macridesco, General Ion Tamoschi, Spiru Peceli, Colonel Paul Cambureanu, Professor Ion Butnaru, and Traian Braileanu.

Summer 1929: As a follow-up to the decision to use the dynamic educational system, Corneliu Codreanu organizes two educational levels whose goal is: to develop the will; to accept a hard life; and to impose the obligation for each person to be strict with himself.

December 15, 1929: The first public Legionary meeting takes place in the small Moldavian village of Beresti. The authorities appear and try to prevent the meeting.

January 1930: Corneliu Codreanu decides to intensify Legionary propaganda among the peasant masses. Legionary teams begin to penetrate the districts of Moldavia. The first "conflicts" with the authorities arise.

February 10, 1930: A large Legionary demonstration takes place at Cahul. More than 20,000 peasants are present. From this moment on, the peasants of other regions (Bessarabia, Maramures) begin to ask that the Legionnaires come to their region, too.

June 1930: Codreanu decides to launch a new national organization for combating the communist propaganda in Bessarabia. This was to be an organization inclusive of the Legion of the Archangel Michael and other youth groups not affiliated with any political party. His appeal had as its main goal a peaceful march and demonstration against the communist influence in Bessarabia.

At a meeting with his co-workers the formation and name of the new organization was discussed. Mr. Granganu proposed the name of the organization to be The Iron Guard. (The Iron Guard later became the political party of the Legionary Movement.)

An authorization from the government for the march by the Iron Guard was obtained from Mr. Vaida-Voevod, at that time the Minister of Internal Affairs. Later, however, Mr. Vaida-Voevod, under pressure from the controlled press, withdrew the approval of the planned march into Bessarabia by the Iron Guard.

July 20, 1930: The government forbids the distribution of the Legionary Movement's propaganda in Bessarabia, although it had previously given its authorization for that distribution.

Corneliu Codreanu issues a Manifesto-Notice in which he criticizes the maneuvers of the Jewish leaders and of bribed politicians. He calls upon spiritually upright Romanians to fight. An extremely violent campaign against the Legionary Movement is begun by the press.

November 8, 1930: The first center of the Legion is inaugurated at Bucharest.

December 1930: Without saying anything to anyone, an exasperated Legionnaire, Dumitrescu-Zapada, attempts to assassinate Socor, a Communist journalist who is the director of the newspaper *Dimineata* (*The Morning*).

January 9, 1931: Codreanu is arrested and confined in the prison of Vacaresti along with a group of Legionary leaders.

January 11, 1931: Ion Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, dissolves the Iron Guard and the Legion of the Archangel Michael for the first time by an executive order issued by the Council of Ministers. (An illegal act under the constitution of

Romania.) Falsified documents are published which attempt to compromise the Supreme Leader of the Legion in the eyes of the public.

End of February, 1931: In the trial of the first dissolution of the Iron Guard and the Legion of the Archangel Michael, the Tribunal of Ilfov delivers a unanimous verdict for acquittal.

March 31, 1931: After 81 days of prison, Codreanu and the six Legionnaires involved in the previously mentioned trial are freed.

June 1, 1931: The Legionary Movement participates in the general elections for the first time and obtains 43,183 votes but no deputy is elected.

August 31, 1931: Partial elections are held in the district of Neamt. In spite of many obstacles, the Legionary forces obtain their first success: 11,301 votes. Corneliu Codreanu is proclaimed deputy.

December 31, 1931: Codreanu delivers his first speech to Parliament. In this speech he specifies the cardinal points of his generation: *God, Country, King, Family, Property, and Army*.

Next he expounds on the fundamental problems of the time for Romania: "The Jewish Problem;" "The Problem of Youth;" "The Problem of Foreign Policy;" "The Problem of the Misery of the Peasant Class;" and "The Problem of Communism." He accuses the democratic political parties of being responsible for the nation's misery.

On this occasion, he also stipulates the Legionary position on foreign affairs for the first time: "As for our position, if it is a question of choosing between these two extremes (Fascism or Communism), we are among those who believe that the Sun does not rise in Moscow, but in Rome." It is also during this speech that Codreanu formulates several political measures considered of extreme urgency:

- to introduce capital punishment for defrauders of public funds;
- to confiscate the fortunes of these defrauders;
- to bring to justice all politicians who have acted against the country;
- to forbid politicians to take part in the Administrative Council;
- to expel all foreign exploiters from the country;
- to declare the territory of Romania as the inalienable and imprescriptible property of the Romanian Nation;
- to make all elected officials work honestly;
- and to institute a central administrative authority.

January 9, 1932: Codreanu opens the electoral campaign for the election of a deputy in the district of Tutova.

March 1932: The Iorga-Argetoianu government disregards the law and dissolves the Iron Guard for the second time. This does not keep the propaganda teams from continuing their efforts, but it makes it impossible for Codreanu to defend his cause in Parliament.

The press makes accusations and injurious statements and urges the annihilation of the Iron Guard. Scores of Legionnaires are beaten and imprisoned by the authorities.

April 17, 1932: Even so, the Iron Guard wins the elections at Tutova, and Professor Ion Zelea Codreanu, Corneliu's father, becomes the second Legionary deputy to enter Parliament.

July 17, 1932: General elections are held. The Iron Guard wins 70,000 votes and elects five deputies.

December 10, 1932: Corneliu Codreanu creates the first superior rank in the Legionary hierarchy: that of "Legionary Commander."

The Movement's periodicals have reached 35,000 copies per issue. The Legion owns a print shop and two trucks.

April 1933: A propaganda team dubbed "The Team of Death" leaves on a two-month journey to include the provinces of Oltenie, Banat, and Transylvania. (The team was so named because of a Legionary song of that name, and because its members were determined to sacrifice themselves to the last man without replying to the provocations and armed attacks made against them.)

June 1933: The first court case is brought against the "Team of Death" at Arad (Banat). All are acquitted.

Beginning of July, 1933: Second trial of the "Team of Death" at Alba Iulia (Transylvania), also results in an acquittal.

July 10, 1933: The A. Vaida-Voevod government forbids the opening of the community work camp of Visani, where more than 200 Legionnaires were to build a 6 km. dam. The arrested Legionnaires are brutally mistreated by the police.

August 4, 1933: Construction is begun on the *Casa Verde* (The Green House) at Bucurestii Noi (New Bucharest), a suburb north of the capital. The initial purpose of the *Casa Verde* is to make a home for the wounded Legionnaires. Later, it becomes the Headquarters of the Legionary Movement.

July–August 1933: A ferocious press campaign is launched against the Legion and its social activities. During this campaign of calumnies, the Legionary Movement is accused of

having set up a counterfeiting ring at Rasinari (Transylvania), of working for foreigners, of being financed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Moscow. The most dogged are the newspapers of Sarindar street where the Jewish press is concentrated.

November 15, 1933: The liberal government of I.G. Duca comes into power. It attempts to destroy the Iron Guard. New elections are scheduled for December 20.

The electoral campaign is very favorable to the Legionary Movement. The government unleashes an unheard of terror against the legal activity of the Iron Guard: arrests, prohibition of placarding and meeting, suspension of the Legionary press, *etc.*

November 22, 1933: The first Legionnaire falls. While hanging posters, a student named Virgil Teodorescu is killed by police at Constanta (Dobroudja).

November 28, 1933: Legionnaire, Nita Constantin, a driver, is assassinated at Jassy (Moldavia).

December 4, 1933: Corneliu Codreanu distributes a memorandum in which he criticizes the terror of the liberal government. He accuses the following members of the government of assassinating and torturing Legionnaires: I.G. Duca, Nicoale Titulescu, Victor Iamandi, Inculet, Victor Antonescu, Valer Roman, General Dumitrescu (Commander of the Police), Eugen Critescu (Director of Security).

December 9, 1933: Nicolae Balaianu, a peasant, is assassinated in the district of Vlasca (Wallachia).

December 10, 1933: The Duca government dissolves the Iron Guard for the third time in order to keep it from participating in the elections. More than 18,000 Legionnaires are arrested and imprisoned. Corneliu Codreanu succeeds in hiding.

December 1933: Gheorghe Bujgoli, a Romanian Macedonian, is assassinated in the province of Dobroudja.

December 29-30, 1933: Legionnaires Nicolae Constantinescu, Doru Belimace and Ion Caranica assassinate Prime Minister I.G. Duca, who had ordered the savage terror against the Legionary Movement. All three immediately turn themselves in to the authorities.

The terror is intensified. The assassinations carried out by the authorities multiply.

December 29-30, 1933: Sterie Ciumetti, Codreanu's secretary, a Romanian Macedonian, is assassinated by means of atrocious tortures for refusing to reveal where his leader is hiding.

December 30, 1933: Toader Toma, a tailor, is assassinated at

Tecuci (Moldavia).

The two large daily newspapers, *Calendarul* (*The Calendar*) and *Cuvantul* (*The Word*), which support the Legionary struggle are abolished and their directors, Nichifor Crainic and Professor Nae Ionescu, are sent to Jilava prison.

March 14, 1934: Three days before the opening of the trial for the dissolution of the Legionary Movement, Corneliu Codreanu presents himself, of his own free will, before the Council of War, which is to judge him. This Council is made up of five generals: Ignat, Costandache, Comanescu, Dona and Filip. Royal Commissioner (prosecutor): General Petrovicescu.

April 5, 1934: The Council of War of the Military Tribunal of the Capital declares the Legionary Movement not guilty and consequently acquits the 52 indicted Legionnaires. The three Legionnaires who assassinated I.G. Duca are condemned to life at hard labor.

From this time on, The Central Headquarters of the Legionary Movement is established in the home of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino at 3 Gutenberg Street, Bucharest.

After this acquittal the prestige of the Legionary Movement grows greater and greater. The great period of education through work begins for the Legionnaires. Community work camps spring up in every region of the country. The most famous are: Giulesti, near Bucharest (commercial truck garden and brickyard), Dealul Negru in Transylvania (construction of a school), Rarau, in Bucovina (construction of a convalescent home for the Legionnaires made ill from the prisons), Cotiugenii Mari in Bessarabia (reconstruction of a church in ruins), and Movila Techirghiol in Dobroudja (rest camp for the wounded).

September 5, 1934: A plot against Corneliu Codreanu is discovered. Mihail Stelescu, Legionary Commander and Deputy, and a very ambitious man, falls under the influence of forces which are trying to destroy the Legionary Movement. Stelescu is plotting to poison Codreanu.

September 25, 1934: Mihail Stelescu is judged by a "Council of Honor" composed of 23 Legionary Commanders, like himself, with General Cantacuzino presiding. Found guilty, Stelescu is eliminated from the Legion.

January 1, 1935: Memorandum by Codreanu containing the log of the terror of the liberal government of Romania.

—18,000 arrests

—300 hospitalized with serious injuries

—16 Legionnaires assassinated

—3 Legionnaires condemned.

March 20, 1935: Codreanu institutes *Total Pentru Tara* (Everything for the Country) as a legal party under the presidency of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino.

June 1935: Hundreds of Community Work Camps are inaugurated.

July 5, 1935: The work camp, Carmen Sylva, begins on the coast of the Black Sea. 800 Legionnaires work there under the direction of Codreanu.

July 20, 1935: In a memorandum, Codreanu explains to 242 Legionnaires of Camp Arnuta (Oltenie) what constitutes Legionary propriety: "The Legionnaire must behave in such a manner as to be the personification of a saying: 'He is as proper as a Legionnaire.' Proper from every point of view: in regard to himself, in regard to outsiders (behavior, attitude, good faith, respect, etc.), in regard to the organization, in regard to his fellows, to his superiors, in regard to his country, in regard to God."

September 13, 1935: The inauguration of Legionary Commerce. The first Legionary Cooperative appears.

September 19, 1935: Memorandum on Legionary Commerce. Codreanu gives instructions to Department leaders. He ends his memorandum with the following words: "Legionary commerce signifies a new phase in the history of commerce which has been stained by the Jewish spirit. It is called: Christian commerce — based on the love of people and not on robbing them; commerce based on honor.

October, 1935: The first meeting of the Leaders of the 13 Legionary Regions is held. These 13 regions comprise the framework of the Movement on the national level.

November 11, 1935: Codreanu institutes "The Legionary Control," whose goal is "to see that Legionary activity is maintained at the highest level of effectiveness and morality."

November 26, 1935: On the occasion of a difference of opinion between the Legionary Movement and the nationalist newspaper *Porunca Vremii* (*The Order of Time*), Corneliu Codreanu recalls in a memorandum one of the main principles of the Legionary Doctrine: "According to Legionary dogma, we are not permitted to behave dishonorably even toward our enemy. How he behaves or will behave toward us is his business."

April 5, 1936: Codreanu finishes the first volume of his book *Pentru Legionnaires* (*For My Legionnaires*).

April 22, 1936: The first Legionary camps and work projects of the year begin and throughout the country more than a thousand appear.

May 30, 1936: Memorandum concerning the external politics of the Romanian government. Codreanu denounces Nicolae Titulescu's maneuvers to draw Romania nearer to the U.S.S.R.: "That would be an act of treason on the part of the Romanian people toward God and toward the moral order of this world."

July 16, 1936: Mihail Stelescu, traitor to the Legion who continued his betrayal and infamy in his newspaper *Cruciada Romanismului* (*The Crusade of Romanianism*), is killed by a group of ten comrades who are historically to bear the name of *Decemviri* (The Ten Men).

The same day, Legionnaire Gheorghe Gligor is killed by Communists at Cernauti (Bucovina).

October 1, 1936: Even though it is banned throughout the country, Corneliu Codreanu's book comes out in Sibiu (Transylvania).

October 25, 1936: The "Corps of Legionary Workers" is organized.

November 5, 1936: Corneliu Codreanu addresses a *Memoire* on foreign policy problems to the king, the politicians and the country. In this publication he affirms: "There is neither a Petite Entente nor a Balkan Entente. Whoëver believes in all that proves that he understands nothing..."

"Two worlds are face to face. All diplomatic liaisons will crumble under their pressure in time of war. These two worlds: the States where there have been national revolutions which fight to defend the cross and a millennial civilization, and Bolshevism which, with its dependencies, fights to destroy nations and to topple Christian civilization.

"Today all those who are on the line of destiny and national history have a duty to demand and to enforce that both internal and external Romanian politics be removed from the influence and control of Free Masonry, of Communism, and of Judaism. This is the only salvation for the future of this nation."

November 24, 1936: A Symbolic team of seven Legionary Commanders (Ion Mota, Vasile Marin, Gheorghe Clime, Neculai Totu, Alexandru Cantacuzino, Banica Dobre, Father Ion Dumitrescu-Borsa) leaves for Spain to fight at the side of Spanish nationalists against Communism.

January 13, 1937: Legionnaires Ion Mota (brother-in-law of

Corneliu Codreanu) and Vasile Marin fall on the Spanish front at Majadahonda near Madrid.

January 26, 1937: Codreanu writes a Memorandum in which he clarifies the meaning of Legionary victory: "...The Legionary Movement will never resort to the idea of a plot or coup d'état in order to win. The Legionary Movement can only win by the accomplishment of an internal process of conscience of the Romanian Nation. The victory that we await in this manner is so great, so luminous, that we will never accept that it be replaced by a cheap, fleeting victory born of a plot or a coup d'état."

February 12, 1937: The "Oath of Ranking Legionnaires," who constitute the Movement's elite, takes place in Saint Ilie Gorgani Church before the bodies of Mota and Marin. Codreanu ends the eulogy with this statement:

"That is why you are going to swear that you understand that being a Legionary elite in our terms means not only to fight and win, but it also means above all a permanent sacrifice of oneself to the service of the Nation; that the idea of an elite is tied to the ideas of sacrifice, poverty, and a hard, bitter life; that where self-sacrifice ends, there also ends the Legionary elite."

February 13, 1937: Mota and Marin are buried in the mausoleum of the *Casa Verde*. The funeral procession is several kilometers long. Attendance is estimated at several hundred thousand people.

The pro-Legionary wave takes on significant proportions. The government becomes uneasy. A new campaign of calumnies and provocations is organized against the Legionary Movement with the help of the press. There is increasing talk of the plots and the "coups d'état" that the Legion is supposedly fomenting.

March 2, 1937: The liberal government of Gheorghe Tatarescu begins a new phase against the Legionary Movement:

—all Romanian universities (powerful centers of the Movement) are closed *sine die*;

—all canteens and student housing are closed;

—all cases brought against Legionary students end in sentences;

—all Legionary camps and work projects are banned.

April 15, 1937: The Council of War at Bucharest begins the trial of the *Decemviri*. The defense is eliminated from the court and the principle witnesses for the defense are not allowed to appear.

April 27, 1937: The Council of War condemns the *Decemviri*.

Eight are condemned to life at hard labor, two to ten years at hard labor.

June 18, 1937: Memorandum by Codreanu on the occasion of ten years of Legionary existence. This memorandum ends with the following words: "Be proper, be just, be pure, be of good humor as you would want every Romanian to be and to behave in his Legionary country."

July 14, 1937: Corneliu Codreanu rejects the government-demanded control by the O.E.T.R. (Office of Education of Romanian Youth) over the Legionary work camps.

October 9, 1937: Death of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino, party leader of *Totul Pentru Tara*.

October 12, 1937: Gheorghe Clime, an engineer, Commander of the *Buna Vestire*, is proclaimed the new party leader of *Totul Pentru Tara*.

October–December 1937: Legionary business takes on national proportions. Restaurants, canteens, boarding houses, cooperatives, factory warehouses, etc., are opened everywhere.

November 11, 1937: Codreanu opens the electoral campaign for the general elections which will take place on December 20.

November 30, 1937: Corneliu Codreanu's declaration on foreign policy. Among other things, he says: "I am against the great Western Democracies; I am against the Petite Entente; I am against the Balkan Entente; and I have no attachment to the League of Nations in which I do not believe. I am for a Romanian foreign policy at the side of Rome and Berlin, at the side of the States which have had national revolutions. Against Bolshevism. Forty-eight hours after the victory of the Legionary Movement, Romania will have a new alliance with Rome and Berlin and will thus begin on the path of her historical mission in the world: for the defense of the Cross, of culture and of Christian Civilization."

December 20, 1937: General elections. The Legionary Movement party obtains 16% of the votes and 66 seats in Parliament in spite of the terror unleashed against its members.

December 28, 1937: Having lost the elections, the Tatarescu government resigns. Octavian Goga is commissioned to form the new Cabinet.

January 13, 1938: On the occasion of the commemoration of the deaths of Mota and Marin, Codreanu creates a special order in the ranks of the Legionary units: "The Mota-Marin Corps" under the direction of Alexandru Cantacuzino. The members of this elite corps have as their slogan "Ready To Die." The pro-

Legionary movement among the masses is growing at a tremendous rate.

February 8, 1938: Following the infamous campaign of calumnies of the Cuza-Goga government and the deaths of several Legionnaires killed by the myrmidons of a "nationalistic government," Corneliu Codreanu reveals his decision to remove the Legionary Movement from electoral propaganda.

February 10, 1938: The Cuza-Goga government is dismissed by the king. The patriarch Miron Cristea sets up the new government.

February 12, 1938: The coup d'état of King Carol II:

- annuls the Constitution;
- adjourns elections;
- suppresses party activities;
- poses the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Romanian Church as Council President;
- imposes Armand Calinescu, the future assassin of Corneliu Codreanu, as Minister of the Interior;
- imposes a new constitution entirely directed against the Legionary Movement; and invokes the death penalty for the members of the Legionary Movement.

February 21, 1938: Codreanu decides upon the self-dissolution of the party *Total Pentru Tara* and the liquidation of Legionary commerce in order to avoid conflict with the authorities.

February 22, 1938: Codreanu sends a letter of protest to the royal Councilors in which he denounces the coup d'état and the imposition of the new Constitution.

March 5, 1938: The government suspends all salaried Legionary administrators from their posts (ministers, professors, teachers, civil servants, etc.).

March 25, 1938: Codreanu sends Professor Nicolae Iorga a letter concerning the latter's campaign of calumny undertaken against the Legionary Movement in his newspaper *Neamul Romanesc* (*The Romanian People*). In this letter, Codreanu brands Professor Nicolae Iorga's lack of character with infamy before the nation and before history: "...From the depths of my battered soul, I cry to you and I will cry even from the depths of the tomb: *you are a spiritually dishonest being* who has without reason mistreated our innocent souls. Neither you, Professor, nor those who have assumed responsibility for a bloody and unjustifiable oppression will encounter any violence or even any opposition on our part."

March 29, 1938: Codreanu addresses a letter to the director of

the newspaper *Neamul Romanesc* in which he denounces the attitude of Professor Nicolae Iorga who had published his reply to Codreanu's letter without also publishing the text of that letter. He demands that his letter of March 26 be published as the code of honor prescribes.

March 30, 1938: Professor Nicolae Iorga, instead of replying, goes to the public prosecutor and demands the opening of a lawsuit against Codreanu for insult and injury. This suit constitutes the basis of all later government action which culminates in the assassination of Corneliu Codreanu on November 30, 1938.

April 17, 1938: Codreanu is arrested at Predeal. This is the beginning of the Great Persecution unleashed by King Carol and his Minister, Armand Calinescu. Hundreds of well-known Legionnaires are sent to concentration camps. Tens of thousands of militants are arrested and imprisoned.

April 19, 1938: Codreanu is condemned to six months in prison (the maximum penalty) by the Council of War at Bucharest in the suit filed by Professor Iorga. At the same time, the government is preparing another suit in which he is to be presented as a traitor to the country, a betrayer to the Nazis and the organizer of a revolution against the regime.

May 23, 1938: This second trial takes place before the same Council of War of Bucharest. The public is not allowed to attend. The only people admitted are press correspondents.

May 27, 1938: The Council of War delivers the sentence for the second trial of Codreanu: the latter is condemned to *ten years* at hard labor on the basis of imaginary accusations.

June 16, 1938: The Legionnaires who have not been arrested organize. Ion Belgea reconstitutes the "Chain of Command of the Legionary Movement." Those who take part: Ion Belgea, Iordache Nicoara, Horia Sima, Ion Antoniu, Constantin Papanace and Gheorghe Dragomir-Jilava.

July 11, 1938: Ion Belgea is arrested. Ion Antoniu takes command. A few days later, he, too, is arrested. Constantin Papanace follows him.

July 23, 1938: Constantin Papanace is arrested and freed immediately. However, he passes the command to Horia Sima before disappearing in the country to throw off police searches.

September 8-12, 1938: New concentration camps are created and quickly filled by floods of Legionnaires who are arrested everywhere. Hunted Legionnaires are tortured and assassinated.

Beginning of October 1938: Second reorganization of Legionary Command: Vasile Cristescu, Alexandru Cantacuzino, Father Dumitrescu-Borsa, Horia Sima, Constantin Papanace and Nicolae Petrascu.

October 1938: This is the month of "Manifestos" and "Memorials" launched by the Legionary Command, student organizations, officers, *etc.*, for cessation of the terror. A revision of the case of Corneliu Codreanu is brought up for consideration, as well as the issue of responsibility in case the conflict between the king and the nation should continue to worsen.

November 10, 1938: On the occasion of Carol II's departure abroad, the Legionary Command sends a "Manifesto-Communiqué" in which Armand Calinescu's already extant plan to assassinate Corneliu Codreanu is denounced.

November 13, 1938: King Carol II leaves for London and Paris.

November 30, 1938: Under the direct order of Armand Calinescu, Minister of the Interior, Codreanu, the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri* are assassinated by the police 30 km. from Bucharest in the forest of Tancabesti during a transfer from one prison to another.

December 1, 1938: A manifesto is signed by Vasile Christescu and Dumitrescu-Borsa, a priest, in which peace and self-control are recommended to the Legionnaires.

The Legionary Movement begins a new clandestine life. The raids, arrests, summary executions and executions without due process intensify. The tension between the king and his government and the nation, revolted by the injustice and the barbaric methods employed, intensifies to the point of paroxysm.

December 15, 1938: Beginning of Legionary exile. The first group of Legionnaires passes secretly into Poland.

January 8, 1939: A second Legionary group also passes into Poland.

January 26, 1939: Professor Vasile Christescu is assassinated by the police.

February 4, 1939: Accompanied by a group of Legionnaires, Horia Sima crosses the border into Hungary, and four days later, they arrive in Berlin.

February 8, 1939: A Legionary team (Enache Nadoleanu, Martin Vucu, Gherman, Dragos Popovici and Dr. Ion Iovu), which is preparing an attempt on the life of Armand Calinescu,

Codreanu's assassin, is arrested and its members are shot on the spot, after which their bodies are thrown into the crematory oven.

February 27, 1939: With a group of Legionnaires, Constantin Papanace takes refuge in Berlin after passing through Czechoslovakia.

May 1939: In Berlin the New Legionary Command is organized: Father Ion Dumitrescu-Borsa, Constantin Papanace, Horia Sima, Ion Victor Vojen, Victor Silaghi and Alexandru Constant.

September 21, 1939: Armand Calinescu, the executioner of the Legionary Movement, is cut down by a team of nine Legionnaires, later dubbed *Rasbunatorii* (The Avengers): Miti Dumitrescu, Cezar Popescu, Traian Popescu, Nelu Moldoveanu, Ion Ionescu, Ion Vasiliu, Marin Stanciulescu, Isaia Ovidiu, and Gheorghe Paraschivescu.

After the execution of the tyrant, the team announces the punitive measure on the radio in these terms: "Armand Calinescu, President of the Council of Ministers, has been executed by a team of Legionnaires. We are sons of Romanians of Prahova, and we have accomplished a painful necessity. We have punished the one by whose consent the greatest Romanian, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, was executed."

After that, they turned themselves in. After torturing them for eight hours, the police executed them without trial. Their bodies were thrown on a public square to be exposed to the view of passers-by.

September 21-22, 1939: The great massacres. The new government of General Argeseanu orders execution on the spot of all Legionary directors in concentration camps and prisons in Romania. A total of 252 Legionnaires are thus massacred among the thousands who are imprisoned. Later several hundred others pay with their lives for being Legionnaires.

January 1940: Father Dumitrescu-Borsa, Alexandru Constant, and Victor Vojen voluntarily withdraw from the directing group in Berlin and the leadership falls to Horia Sima and Constantin Papanace.

January-March 1940: In Romania a Legionary delegation made up of Ilie Gameata, Corneliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici (all three founders of the Legionary Movement), Augustin Bidianu and Dr. Vasile Noveanu, continues the bargaining for a detente which was begun in December, 1939, with King Carol II.

March 28, 1940: The first Legionary delegation (Radu

Mironovici and Constantin Stoicanescu) arrives in Berlin with the official mission of setting forth the condition of the case for detente and to negotiate the return of the Legionary refugees.

May 2, 1940: The second Legionary delegation (Constantin Stoicanescu and Augustin Bidianu) arrives in Berlin. Horia Sima and Constantin Papanace send letters, addressed to King Carol II, in which the Legionary Movement's point of view on external politics (anti-communist) is specified.

May 5, 1940: Horia Sima, accompanied by a group of Legionnaires, leaves Germany to secretly penetrate into Romania where he is arrested on May 19.

June 13, 1940: Horia Sima is set free.

June 23, 1940: Horia Sima is given an audience with the king.

July 3, 1940: The Tatarescu government resigns. Three Legionnaires (Horia Sima, Dr. Vasile Noveanu and Dr. Augustin Bidianu) take part in the new Gigurtu government.

July 7, 1940: Horia Sima resigns. He is replaced by another Legionnaire, Radu Budisteanu.

End of July, 1940: The "Legionary Forum," whose decisions become unassailable, is created. The members are Horia Sima, Col. Zavoianu, Popescu-Buzau, Aristotel Gheorghiu, Vasile Iasinschi, Corneliu Georgescu, Ilie Garneata, Mile Lefter, Prof. Traian Braileanu, and Radu Mironovici.

August 16, 1940: There is a collective audience of Legionary directors, Horia Sima, Traian Braileanu, Corneliu Georgescu and Radu Mironovici, with King Carol II. No acceptable result is attained.

September 3, 1940: Following a Manifesto drawn up by Horia Sima on September 1, in which the abdication of King Carol II was demanded, large anti-Carolist demonstrations take place in the urban centers of the country. During these demonstrations, eight Legionnaires meet their deaths.

September 4, 1940: General Ion Antonescu is assigned to form a new government.

September 5, 1940: General Antonescu receives complete powers. The Constitution of 1938 is suspended. The Legionnaires arrested on September 3 are freed.

September 6, 1940: Abdication of King Carol II under pressure of the Legionary forces. The Legionary Movement is requested to take part in the formation of the government.

The same day, the Legionary Forum, the supreme entity of the Movement, represented by Corneliu Georgescu (one of the founders of the Legion) salutes Horia Sima as the successor of

Comeliu Codreanu.

September 14, 1940: The "National Legionary State" is proclaimed. Several Legionnaires take part in the government directed by General Antonescu:

—Horia Sima	—Vice President
—Vasile Iasinschi	—Labor and Health
—Traian Braileanu	—Education
—Ion Protopopescu	—State Inventory
—Michel Sturdza	—Foreign Affairs
—Comeliu Georgescu	—Colonization
—Constantin Papanace	—Finance
—A. Constant	—Propaganda
—Horia Cosmovici	—Under Secretary of State
—General Ion Petrovicescu	—Interior

November 23, 1940: Legionary Romania joins the Tripartite Pact which was signed on September 27, by Germany, Italy and Japan.

November 25, 1940: At the prison of Jilava, work is begun to exhume Comeliu Codreanu, the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri* who were assassinated the 29/30 of November, 1938 at the order of Armand Calinescu and with the consent of the government and of King Carol II.

November 27, 1940: The throng of Legionnaires who take part in that work are unable to contain themselves at the sight of the mortal remains of their great leader and the other martyrs. In an outburst of rage, they execute the 64 members of previous political regimes who are imprisoned at Jilava and who had tortured and massacred Legionary youths.

November 29, 1940: General Antonescu initiates official steps to oust the Legionary Movement from the government.

January 12, 1941: General Antonescu tries to cause a rupture in the heart of the Legionary Movement by proposing to Mr. Vasile Iasinschi, Minister of Health, that he take over leadership of the Legionary Movement. This proposal was made by the General in front of Mihail Antonescu, Minister of Finance. Of course the proposal was politely refused.

January 13, 1941: Legionary circles learn that that the General has been preparing a personal rapprochement with Hitler for a long time and is leaving for Berlin the next day for an interview with him. The same day, Berlin requests by telegram that Mr. Horia Sima participate in that conference. Notified at the last moment, the Movement's leader, in agreement with the other

Legionary directors, refuses to take part in it.

January 14, 1941: General Antonescu discusses with Hitler the question of Romanian participation in the eventuality of a war with the U.S.S.R. He appears disposed to such participation under certain conditions. One of the conditions is *German neutrality in case of a settling of accounts between him and the Legionary Movement*. His principal argument is that the army is entirely on his side and ready to follow him. The chain of events shows that the argument evoked carried more weight in Hitler's calculations than the Legionary Movement's ideological kinship to and spiritual influence on the Romanian nation. On the other hand, if General Antonescu posed the problem that way, it was because he envisioned taking action against the Legionary Movement shortly.

January 15, 1941: The General returns. He resumes his activities without acquainting Horia Sima, Vice-President of the Council and leader of the Legionary Movement, with the results of his interview with the Führer.

The same day, Mr. Constantin Greceanu, Romanian Minister to Berlin, is recalled to Bucharest for "consultation." It was only later that the astuteness of this re-call was understood. General Antonescu was contemplating replacing several Legionary Ministers as the first step in his plans for the coup d'état. Therefore, it was necessary that there be no one in Berlin who could promptly appeal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and protest this use of force.

January 16, 1941: It is learned that the German Embassy, by order of Ambassador Fabricius (a confessed enemy of the Legionary Movement), is spreading false news about the atmosphere brought about by the attitude of the Legionnaires. That false news goes so far as to state that in the large cities the Legionnaires are scuffling with the army; that their behavior is provoking a growing anxiety in the population; that the army can no longer put up with the audacity and provocations of the Legion's troops; that General Antonescu will be obliged to take exceptional measures.

Such news circulated everywhere. The General, approving these rumors, waited for the psychological preparation of public opinion to reach the optimum point to proceed to his politico-military offensive.

On the other side, the German Embassy collected those "internal events" (which it spread) and transmitted them to Berlin in the form of libel against the Legionary Movement.

According to them, the Legionary Movement was undisciplined, incapable of facing up to difficult political moments, questionable for the Reich in a conflict with the U.S.S.R., *etc.* The Legionary Movement had to be discredited to that extent in Romania as in Berlin before the General's authoritarian action.

January 17-18, 1941: While Legionary Ministers devote themselves to their daily work, and the organization is far from suspecting anything, General Antonescu and the forces supporting him take the last steps to assure that the coup d'état will succeed and that the guilt will fall on the Movement.

January 19, 1941: Doring, a German major, head of the military transports bound for Bulgaria, is assassinated. The anti-Legionary coalition which is preparing the coup d'état immediately releases word that the German major's death was a consequence of the negligence of the Minister of the Interior, General Petrovicescu. The goal was two-fold: it was an admirable pretext for eliminating a Legionnaire from one of the most important Cabinet posts: it was an exceptionally good way to anger Hitler and turn him against the Movement.

By the time the assassin was arrested and it was ascertained that it was a Greek who had come to Romania with a passport, it was too late to change public opinion and modify the reports sent to Berlin.

General Antonescu unilaterally decides to dismiss the Commissioners of Romanization (all Legionnaires).

January 20, 1941: General Antonescu takes a series of anti-Legionary measures without consulting the Council of Ministers, which shows that coup d'état had been ready for a long time. He removes General Petrovicescu (Minister of the Interior) from office without warning or reason. Michel Sturdza (Minister of Foreign Affairs), another Legionnaire, had already been dismissed on December 8, 1940, for reasons which were just as insignificant. The elimination of the Minister of the Interior completed a plan which was already well-established and nearing its culmination.

If in Legionary circles everyone thought Minister Michel Sturdza's dismissal was one of General Antonescu's customary whims — a whim which would pass in the long-run — the dismissal of General Petrovicescu put them on guard. It was too abusive. In Bucharest, huge protests took place.

At this time, to increase his chances of winning, General Antonescu summons all the Legionary Prefects of the entire country to be in Bucharest the next day, January 21, for

administrative reasons. The majority of those Prefects will later be arrested, tried and condemned.

January 21, 1941: While the Prefects arrive in the Capital, believing they are there for an administrative convocation, military Prefects are assigned to their places. The lists of those military Prefects had already been prepared for several days. The take-over of the Prefectures was made *manu militari*, without respecting the slightest rule of transmission of power — as happens in coups d'état.

Two other Legionnaires are dismissed for no official reason other than General Antonescu's wish: Alecu Ghica (Head of Security) and Radu Mironovici (Chief of Police of Bucharest). Still more evidence of the General's true intentions.

When the news of General Petrovicescu's dismissal spread through the country, there was a reaction on the part of Legionnaires. Where they were able to assemble, they barricaded themselves in and resisted the military forces.

The Coup D'État of January 21, 1941

One of the most unusual accusations which hovers over Legionary past is that only four and one-half months after the birth of the National Legionary State, the Legionary Movement is supposed to have provoked a rebellion for motives which are poorly defined and which the authorities of Antonescu's government have always avoided discussing. After those unhappy days of January, 1941, a host of Legionary leaders were condemned to harsh prison sentences as high as 25 years at hard labor, but *never* for reasons in direct relation to that famous "rebellion." That is because there was a painful discomfort among the ranks of the "conquerors" who knew quite well the real truth of the matter in which the Legionary Movement was only the victim.

One thing must be clear from the beginning: the uprising of January 21, 1941 was *neither prepared nor set off by the Legionary Movement*.

First, the Legionary Movement had no plausible motive to do it, because:

1. It had just emerged from a long period of persecution which had decimated its leading ranks.
2. It was in the midst of internal restructuring and administrative preparation of what had been saved.
3. It knew all too well that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to replace the existing ranks without provoking a long

period of political instability and national economic collapse.

4. In addition, the international political climate did not lend itself to that type of manifestation.

On the other hand, the Legionary Movement was in power, and it had no reason to want to overthrow General Antonescu. The duties of the two forces present (the army and the Legionary Movement) were perfectly defined.

The Legionary Movement, in accordance with its doctrine, faced a vast education of the masses according to its principles, which would require several years of arduous social, scholastic and cultural efforts. One can even advance the argument that General Antonescu's presence as the head of the government was considered indispensable. A patriotic, energetic man who kept a tight rein on the armed forces, he could not help but play the desired role of allowing the Legionary Movement to accomplish its preliminary projects and prepare the administrative and political ranks it was lacking.

For the Legionary Movement, the essential problem was not the presence or absence of General Antonescu at the head of the government, but the Communist danger, which was an unceasing menace in the East, and the actions of the political survivors of the old regime who were maneuvering in the wings to regain their former status.

With this in mind, the reconciliation between the Legionnaires and the forces supporting General Antonescu was fraternally accepted. For the same reason, a host of privileges for the army was also accepted. It was necessary to maintain internal harmony and to give evidence of complete understanding.

Why? Because the Legionary Movement was perfectly aware that political circumstances demanded *a continual sacrifice on its part*. The supreme leader of the Legion was not preoccupied by being first in the government, and even less by the idea of starting a revolution to take the place of a capable ally. The most elementary principles of Legionary life precluded such a solution. After years of persecution, irreparable losses and continual tension, the Legionary Movement hoped for a period of relative tranquility to rebuild itself and complete its mission.

The idea of breaking off collaboration with General Antonescu, especially under the circumstances of that time, and even less by force, never existed in the leading circles of the Legionary Movement. Such an idea went against the most intimate convictions of the Legionary Movement, whose fundamental principle is never to resort to brute force or to foul play: and for the Legionary

Movement, principles are not slogans meant to trick people. They are current, obligatory standards of conduct. It is only in submitting to those standards that the Legionnaire becomes a different man.

In addition, in accepting entrance into a government directed by General Antonescu, the Legionnaires had sworn fidelity to him, and nothing in the world could make them become perjurers.

Finally, it must be taken into account that the new political order proclaimed by the King and General Antonescu was based upon militant Legionary formations. The State itself bore the name of "National Legionary State." Is it humanly possible to revolt against oneself?

The most convincing evidence of Legionary innocence in this matter is that the military forces that took part in the coup d'état under the direct order of General Antonescu, encountered a massive but totally unorganized resistance. It was, therefore, resistance and not offensive attack or an organized plan on the part of the Legionary forces. They simply answered the military forces' attempts to seize administrations, prefectures, city halls, police stations, etc. which were *officially* directed by Legionnaires.

Logically, what revolutionary force in the world would start a revolution without preparing it, without having a plan of attack, without having a part of the army on its side, without starting off its "revolution" with a general offensive in several parts of the country, and without trying before everything else, to seize some members of the government in order to break constitutional continuity? That is the least that could be demanded of such an action. Not one of these characteristics can be attributed to the Legionary Movement, which only defended itself against the deliberate action of General Antonescu. In fairness, if the Legionary Movement had decided to take recourse to armed action in order to eliminate the non-legionary Ministers from the government, the famous "rebellion" would have had a different complexion and would not have ended in the defeat of those accused of having stirred it up.

Then there is the question of who planned this revolt and why.

History written by the conquerors almost always presents the conquered as the instigators of all the trouble: from evil intentions right up to the secret preparation of the operation — from the unleashing of the action up to the most odious crimes committed during the conflict. In this case, things were no different. And since after this episode the Legionnaires were either in Romanian prisons or in German concentration camps, it was impossible for them to bring out the truth. And that truth absolves them of all guilt and heaps it completely upon General Antonescu.

With the perspective of time, there is no longer any doubt in the minds of those who took the trouble to dissect the events of the time. The entire plot and execution of this said "affair" is on the General's shoulders. It was he who decided to break the pact of collaboration with the Legionary Movement and to bring about a conflict permitting him to expel the Legionnaires from power in order to become the absolute master of the government and, if possible, of the entire Movement. This was all the easier to accomplish because the Legionnaires, in their sincerity and loyalty, did not suspect anything and believed firmly in the political rapports established between themselves and General Antonescu under the aegis of the National Legionary State.

But why would the General have made such an illogical, anti-national, hazardous decision? For one and only one reason — which for millenia has brought about the worst conflicts and brought on the most disastrous consequences: ambition. Those who knew him confess that one could rarely encounter a more ambitious individual or one who longed more for greatness or was more exclusive in command. It went to such a point that he was nicknamed "the red dog" not as much because of the color of his hair as because of his character. In a book which was laudatory of General Antonescu and venomous toward the Legionary Movement, that person is described in the following manner:

Antonescu did not owe his nickname "the red dog" to the fidelity and devotion which are characteristic of the canine race. If he passed for a dog, it was in the pejorative sense. "He bites when one expects it the least," said the officers who had served under him. The first feeling that he inspired was fear. His severity, his insensitivity which caused him not even to know the meaning of the verb to pardon, certainly had a part in that. But it must be added that he was not of our time: in him lived again a man of the primitive kind which was only slowly domesticated through the ages. What feeling other than fear could be caused by the anachronistic presence among us of a direct descendant of the tricky, savage warriors of long ago?⁴

These lines are taken from a book extremely favorable to General Antonescu, written by a person in his entourage who cannot be suspected of sympathy for the Legionnaires. Caught in the web of his ambition, the General could not accept, or even envision, sharing a power which he considered rightfully his. The presence of a Legionary hierarchy, and especially the existence of Horia Sima as supreme leader of a political movement which escaped his personal influence, weighed heavily upon him. There was one organization in the State which, in spite of its loyalty, escaped him

as an organized power and foundation of the new regime.

General Antonescu would have liked for the Legionary Movement to be dependent on him and to recognize him as the sole leader of the Movement. He even tried to win the sympathy of the Legionary masses by wearing the green shirt and trying to talk and act like a Legionnaire, while trying to outdo Horia Sima's personality. These were vain efforts, for he in no way possessed the qualities indispensable to such a feat. He even went to the point of demanding that the Legionary forces recognize him as supreme leader of the Movement. This attempt also met with total failure.

Nothing was left for General Antonescu in order to satisfy his boundless ambition but to eliminate the Legionary Movement by indirect means. The circumstances lent themselves marvelously to such actions:

1. War with the U.S.S.R. was becoming imminent for Germany. The General could pose the question of Romanian participation in that war in terms of his personal prestige.

2. The General was sure that between the Legionary Movement (a nationalistic movement entirely politically independent with regard to Hitlerian doctrine and goals) and him (as head of the government and "commander" of the armed forces), the Germans would support the one who had direct hold on the fighting forces.

3. The political parties deprived of their power by the action of the Legionary Movement (September 3-6, 1940) manifested an open hostility against the Movement but never expressed any negative gestures against the intentions of General Antonescu.

4. From the political point of view, the Legionary Movement was far from reaching the threshold of equilibrium and internal consolidation. The frightful losses of elite men, the years of prison and clandestineness imposed up to that time, put it in a state of professional inferiority, which caused a certain hesitation in the activities of Legionnaires in positions of responsibility. The four months of active presence in the administrative machine were insufficient for a strong structure with a basis of Legionary elements to have time to assert itself.

5. In addition, the Legionary Movement was not distrustful. It counted on the loyalty of the General. No one could imagine that a man otherwise of perfect integrity would be capable of giving in to the morbid compulsion of his unbounded ambition. Mr. Horia Sima, Vice President of the Council, as well as the Legionary Ministers, knew the hateful, arbitrary and dominating temperament of the head of the government, but he believed him to be incapable of an act that would ruin the understanding which reigned among

them and which was sealed by the recognition of the "Legionary State." That was seeing things in the light of reciprocal loyalty which the Legionary Movement considered as existing.

6. On the other hand, General Antonescu knew perfectly well that the Legionary Movement would not start a rebellion against anyone, for the simple reason that one does not set off such an action when one is in power. Even the term "rebellion" that has been given to this tragic action is absurd; but under that name it could more easily be blamed on the Legionnaires and thus cover up the aspect of a "coup d'état" which should be attributed to it.

7. Finally, for the General, the few minor incidents which had occurred between Legionary elements and certain military representatives attached directly to the head of the government could serve admirably as a cover for the legal motivation of the foreseen act.

The contingencies were favorable to General Antonescu's intentions, as the chain of political circumstances which ended in the events of January 21, 1941, and in Antonescu's dictatorship, shows. The facts interlock like pieces of a puzzle, revealing the true character of the affair provoked and executed under General Antonescu's orders.

The entire drama effectively unfolds between the 21st and 23rd of January, 1941, when the legitimate Legionary reaction takes place against the abuse of power perpetrated by the head of the government. However, the antecedents are of such a nature that there is no longer any doubt about the General's guilt in the preparation and execution of the coup d'état.

General Antonescu's entourage, made up of a military coterie (Colonel Rioséanu at the head), a great part of the politicians ousted by the new regime, and some camouflaged Communists had been counting for a long time on the General's megalomaniac ambition. That was his weakness on which the Legionary Movement's enemies played thoroughly.

Nothing was easier than to make him think that the presence of a supreme Legionary leader diminished his authority and his prestige, and that the only way to regain his "rights" was to eliminate that obstacle. The "reason-excuses" for such an action were not lacking. It was a post-revolutionary period full of enthusiasm, of painful adjustment, of exaggerations, even of errors. In addition, it was not easy for a regime with a Legionary doctrine to exist harmoniously next to General Antonescu, an authoritarian, exclusive person, who considered any initiative not emanating from him as a direct attack on his pre-eminent position. That state of mind lead him to see the

supreme Legionary leader as a threatening shadow to his political grandeur.

Naturally, the others did not miss a chance to poison the fraternal relations established between the two forces which made up the foundation of the nationalist government. The Legionary Movement's enemies used three principal means of preparing the General's coup d'état:

a. Continual provocation by means of special agents, some of whom had even entered Legionary ranks after September 6, 1940 (later called the *Septembristi*). These agents' actions had a precise goal: to compromise the name of Legionnaire in public opinion, to attract disdain and even hate toward the Movement. It was those government agents and former political parties which committed reprehensible acts for which the Legionary Movement was then reproached. But at the same time it was very difficult to discover them and bring them to justice. Some were protected by secrecy, others by the Legionary uniform they wore to accomplish their heinous crimes.

Thus, anything disagreeable or violent that happened on Romanian territory was indiscriminately blamed on the Legionary Movement and the news was carefully spread by the General's entourage so that public opinion would lose confidence and withdraw from the Legionary Movement. The latter, sure of its innocence and preoccupied by its internal reorganization, paid too little attention to these intrigues, and waited for a better moment to re-establish the truth. That was not possible, because its presence in the government only lasted four and one-half months.

b. The second means was the exaggeration of incriminating facts in reports addressed to General Antonescu. Thus, in the eyes of the latter, each incident took on the appearance of provocation, intentional aggression, or arbitrary action. All these adjectives, knowingly set off, profoundly irritated the General's military temperament and made him consider the Legionary Movement as an anarchical organization, difficult to command; therefore, in perspective, a great danger, if not a formidable competitor, due to its ambitions. Scruples did not bother this coalition of informers, and the truth never counted for General Antonescu when his personal prestige and his desire for power were in question.

c. Finally, the third means was the job of undermining the German Embassy at Bucharest so that when the time came, the Legionary Movement would have no moral or material support from the Germans. The most perfidious calumnies were hurled at the Legionary Movement to show the representatives of the Reich

that if there were any impediments to German troops' movements toward Bulgaria or elsewhere on Romanian territory, the fault was entirely incumbent upon the Legionary Movement. Therefore, if there were a question of a war with the U.S.S.R., it would first be necessary to push Legionary elements out of the government and annihilate the Movement's influence in the country. The only sure element for an eventual war would be General Antonescu, who had the army's confidence.

These three methods all bore their fruit and brought about an irresolution in people's minds in regard to the Legionary Movement, just at the moment when General Antonescu instigated his coup d'état. Furthermore, seen in the light of consecutive facts, the coup d'état of January 21, 1941 had been premeditated quite far in advance (perhaps even from the first day that General Antonescu and Horia Sima, leader of the Legionary Movement, were united in the same government). In the anti-Legionary book, *Mémorial Antonescu — The Third Man of the Axis*, which appeared in 1950, the author states that following some conflicts between the General and the Legionary Movement,

Under Berlin's pressure, Antonescu consented to keep the Legionary Movement in his government even though his faith in the possibility of collaboration with it was definitively shaken. But from that moment on, he wanted only for a favorable opportunity to dismiss the Legionary Ministers.⁵

And later, when he recounts the preliminaries of the coup d'état (which he calls the "Legionary rebellion"), the author affirms, however, that for the army, "The disposition for the fight had already been carefully studied."⁶ In the same book are found innumerable passages which demonstrate German complicity in ousting the Legionary Movement in addition to the premeditation of the coup d'état. Germany found it easier to get along with General Antonescu than with the indomitable Legionary Movement. Thus, in the course of a visit with Hitler, in the midst of a discussion on the modern revolution, General Antonescu made the following remark:

"And what do you do with the fanatics, for it would be difficult to make a renovating movement without them?"

"You have to get rid of them," replied Hitler without hesitation, and he smilingly threw the General a look of complicity.⁷

Hitler ended his exposition with these sentences:

The man who allows himself to be dispossessed of his command — and he stared at the General with insistence — proves that he does not know how to use a machine gun. A 20th century dictator cannot be overthrown. If he falls, it is because he committed suicide...

Back in Bucharest, Antonescu maintained absolute silence about the matters discussed during the fifteen minutes he spent alone with Hitler. The conversation which had taken place in the presence of witnesses gave the impression that he had gotten satisfaction as far as his conflict with the Legionary Movement was concerned...⁸

January 22, 1941: Dawn of this day finds the military forces and the Legionnaires face to face. The military attacks buildings occupied by Legionnaires, the latter defend themselves. The clashes between the two belligerents seem more like a siege, in which the besieged are those who are accused of fomenting the rebellion and who defend themselves with whatever weapons they can find. It is a strange "rebellion" in which the supposed rebels choose not to attack and to avoid any conflict with the forces that besiege them.

There appears to be a kind of stabilization of positions and expectations of the two sides. In certain regions there is even collaboration between the army and the Legionnaires. Some local incidents have taken place in Bucharest, Braila and Prahova where several Legionnaires but no military fell.

The most serious problem for General Antonescu arises on January 22, 1941, because of the attitude of the peasant masses. By the hundreds of thousands they begin to penetrate into the cities to help the besieged Legionnaires.

In the meantime, negotiations take place during the day between the German representative, Neubacher and Horia Sima for the cessation of hostilities. Result: The Legionary Movement agrees to stop all resistance. General Antonescu pledges not to take any action against the Legionary Movement or its militants. However, parallel to those negotiations, General Antonescu increases his intrigues, his accusations against the Legionnaires and his military offers to Hitler. All of those accusations only completed the series of calumnies made in Berlin against the Legion and worsened the Legionary position in Hitler's eyes. Under those circumstances, nothing could be more natural than the order received during the night of January 22–23 by the German troops stationed in Romania to "...put themselves at the disposition of General Antonescu to crush the Legionary rebellion."

Therefore, it was the Germans who determined the fate of General Antonescu's coup d'état.

January 23, 1941: The troops being unable to rout the Legionnaires from the official buildings they occupy, General Antonescu gives the order to employ artillery against them. At the same time, the troops in the Capital receive orders to fire into the crowd of passers-by who are automatically considered as partisans of the Legionary Movement. Several hundred who had nothing to do with politics or the Legionary Movement were killed. These were premeditated actions which were to be charged to the Legionary Movement and presented to the Germans as undisciplined and unconscionable actions on the part of the Legionnaires.

And yet, at dawn, Horia Sima had ordered that the resistance cease and that the buildings be evacuated. It should be pointed out that in many cases, the public buildings occupied by the Legionnaires were first turned over to the German army, which then turned them over to Romanian military authorities so that all possibility of conflict would be entirely avoided.

The pact accepted by Horia Sima and General Antonescu before the German diplomat was categorical: total liberty for Legionnaires. Nonetheless, that pact was not respected by the General, nor even considered by the Germans. A few hours after the Legionnaires' capitulation, General Antonescu gave the order for repression. The enactment of that repression registered several hundred killed and tens of thousands arrested. The Legionary Movement entered a new phase of persecution.

April 9, 1941: Horia Sima, leader of the Legionary Movement, arrives in Berlin as an ordinary refugee.

April 18, 1941: The Legionary refugees in Germany are informed that they will be confined from then on to compulsory quarters in certain areas (Rostock, Berkenbruck, *etc.*) as a result of agreements between the German and Romanian governments.

By Way of Conclusion

This work does not pretend to serve the immense flood of problems and questions that the Legionary Movement's doctrine and behavior bring up. Its intentions are much more modest and are confined to some aspects of a past which has not succeeded in destroying the image of this organization so different from all others.

The world is still unaware of many truths which were hidden

through the care of some powers of the time. It is especially unaware of the positive, and therefore real and beneficial, side of nationalist movements. They are habitually called Nazi, terrorist, dictatorial, *etc.*, and all possible defects are imputed to them. The truth is something different, and it must come out as soon as possible, before the wind of hate which is blowing everywhere sweeps away the last vestiges of good sense and humanity. The wave of calumny must cease, and society must become aware that there are two sides to the coin.

The Legionary Movement is among those nationalistic movements that have been shamelessly abused and upon which the most unlikely accusations have been heaped even today. It is even surprising that it is possible to be so persistent and repeat the same lies about problems which are either totally invented or out-of-date for 30 or 40 years without saying one word about what is really the essence of the Legionary Movement! These are unworthy methods which play the game of the political speculators who hope to eliminate from their way the forces which are conscious of the danger they constitute for the future of the world.

As wisdom says, "patience, too, has its limits." As for us, Legionnaires of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Legionary Movement), we have reached the limits of our patience. We have decided to put an end to all the calumny, lies and absurd accusations which continue to be thrown at us with a persistence worthy of a better cause.

This work is only a beginning, an introduction to the subject, to establish certain points of reference. It does not treat any aspect in depth. It only gives a synthesizing account of some pressing problems as well as a chronological relation of the Legionary march in the midst of a politically hostile world ravaged by the lack of morality and by spiritual decomposition. It is, therefore, a focus on some truths.

The process of explaining the Legionary phenomenon was begun a long time ago in European countries. Important works on the question have appeared in French, Spanish, Portuguese, German and Italian. Only the Anglo-Saxon world remained closed to these awarenesses. We hope that other works will follow to complete this indispensable information.

Notes

1. Sburlati, Carlo, *Codreanu, il Capitano*, p. 63, Ed. Volpe, Rome, 1970. (Translation by authors.)
2. See: Corneliu Codreanu: *Carticica sefului de cuib*, Ed. Omul Nou, Munich, 1971 (in Romanian); Paul Guiraud: *Codreanu et la Garde de Fer*, Ed. Francisme, 1940; Faust Bradescu: *Le Nid, unite de base du Mouvement Légionnaire*, Ed. Carpatii, Madrid, 1973.
3. See: Faust Bradescu: *Les trois épreuves légionnaires*, Ed. Promethee, Paris, 1973.
4. *Mémorial Antonescu*, p. 14, Coll. Documents Politiques, Ed. de la Couronne, Paris, 1950.
5. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 38.
6. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 104.
7. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 73.
8. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 74.

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Book Reviews

Editor's Note: Food and hunger have, for as long as we have records, played a part in the internal and external struggle for political power. The advance to barbarism entailed in the intentional mass privation and starvation of millions of men, women and children detailed below has become an all too quickly "memory holed" part of our twentieth century heritage. The reviews of Professors' Ward and Hall are a start at illuminating this record.

We actively solicit additional reviews and articles on all aspects of the uses of starvation as a weapon.

EXECUTION BY HUNGER: THE HIDDEN HOLOCAUST
by Miron Dolot. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1985, xvi + 231 pp. ISBN 0-393-01886-5

Reviewed by Arthur S. Ward

"Holocaust studies" are now being added to school curricula across the country. Yet, as syndicated columnist Joseph Sobran pointed out recently, one of the ghastliest examples in history, the Soviet's deliberate starvation of nearly eight million Ukrainians in 1932-33, is largely overlooked.

Execution by Hunger is the first book-length account of this mass murder to be written by one who lived through these terrible events. The author, Miron Dolot (a pseudonym), is a language teacher in California, who as a 15-year-old boy, lived through the winter of 1932-33 in a Ukrainian village that became "a ghost town" that looked "as if the Black Death had passed through."

What sets the Ukrainian famine apart from others is that it was a *politically-induced* catastrophe. Ukraine (not "the" Ukraine, anymore than China is "the" China) at one time was known as "the Breadbasket of Europe." Ukrainians, who are not Russians and have their own language and culture, proclaimed their independence from Russia during World War I. But in 1921, the Red Army reconquered the area and a year later the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed by Lenin.

Ukraine had a history of free peasant farming. This fierce spirit of independence continued even after Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union. But in 1928 Stalin began his program of collectivizing Ukrainian agriculture. The author describes how city-dwelling Communists, who had virtually no knowledge of agriculture and exhibited utter contempt for farmers, took over rural villages and began to enforce collectivization on the hostile

populace. In the process, the deeply religious Ukrainians witnessed their churches torn down or turned into Communist Party offices, priests murdered, and religious objects, such as crosses, confiscated.

In 1930, Stalin announced a stepped-up campaign of collectivization and declared that all "kulaks" (so-called rich farmers, often paupers by comparison with American tenant farmers) were to be liquidated "as a social class." Collectivization was organized by Communist officials (with one Communist Party functionary for every six villagers) who were assisted by secret police agents and Red Army units. In Dolot's village a Comrade Livschitz oversaw collectivization and elsewhere, "strangers," as the author euphemistically dubs their non-Ukrainian taskmasters, managed the Red reign of terror. Villagers were divided into units of fives and tens, to keep better surveillance over them and root out those who were reluctant to join the collectives. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were deported for forced labor in the far northern regions of the Soviet Union.

The Stalin regime confiscated the entire 1932 crop, including even the seed grain. The borders were then sealed. Even after starvation set in, agents of the "Bread Procurement Commission" continued to conduct periodic raids on all homes suspected of holding small amounts of food. The author describes what took place:

Faced with starvation, the villagers tried everything possible to save themselves and their families. Some of them started eating dogs and cats. Others went hunting for birds: crows, magpies, swallows, sparrows, storks, and even nightingales. One could see starving villagers searching in the bushes along the river for birds' nests or looking for crabs and other small crustaceans in the water. Even their hard shells, though not edible, were cooked and the broth consumed as nourishment. One could see crowds of famished villagers combing the woods in search of roots or mushrooms and berries. Some tried to catch small forest animals.

Driven by hunger, people ate everything and anything: even food that had already rotted — potatoes, beets, and other root vegetables that pigs normally refused to eat. They even ate weeds, the leaves and bark of trees, insects, frogs and snails. Nor did they shy away from eating the meat of diseased horses and cattle. Often that meat was already decaying and those who ate it died of food poisoning.

By 1933 there were numerous incidents of cannibalism, and this despite the fact that the 1932 Fall harvest had been a good one. States Dolot, "From the very start of the harvest to the end, not a single pound of wheat had been distributed to the village

inhabitants. Nothing was left for them. We were told that all the grain had to be transported to the railroad stations. We also learned that there it had been dumped on the ground, covered with tarpaulins, and left to rot."

The Soviet-created famine in Ukraine was apparently intended to break the independent-spirit of the Ukrainians once and for all. In this effort, they seem to have failed. During the Second World War, many Ukrainians fought along side the Axis forces. Ukrainians are still persecuted in the USSR, at least in part because they retain their sense of awareness that they are indeed Ukrainians and not Russians.

It should be noted that this heart-rending account of the death of a once peaceful and self-reliant Ukrainian village is open to verification. As one who has taught Russian History at the college level, this reviewer can testify that the dates and details coincide with other records. Adam Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, has written the Introduction to this work, and includes a concise overview of the historical context for Dolot's narrative. This is an important work, dealing with another chapter of what the distinguished Revisionist historian, James J. Martin, has chosen to call "inconvenient history."

THE POLITICS OF HUNGER: THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF GERMANY, 1915-1919. By C. Paul Vincent. Ohio University Press, Athens (Ohio) and London, 1985; pp. viii, 191.

Reviewed by Robert A. Hall, Jr.

When did the First World War end? Yes, that is a "catch-question." Virtually everybody will reply "November 11, 1918;" but, in so doing, they will be wrong. That was the date on which hostilities on land ceased. On sea, however, although there was no more combat, the Allied (chiefly English) blockade of foodstuffs and other materials continued until July 11, 1919, eight months after the Armistice was signed at Compiègne. The purpose of the blockade? — to force the new government of Germany, the "Weimar Republic," to ratify the Versailles "peace" treaty without delay. In this way, an intentionally continued and increased scarcity of food and the resultant famine was used as a militarily enforced weapon against the civilian population of Germany. Vincent's book, originally conceived as a study of the post-1918 blockade, grew into a detailed history of the entire operation and its background, from 1914 onward.

Vincent's study is divided into six chapters. In the first two, he treats pre-1918 history; in the next three, the events of 1918-1919; and in the last, the longer-range effects of the starvation that resulted from the blockade. Chapter I, "The Loss of Innocence," deals with the developments in the first year of the war that led to the establishment of the blockade. On both sides, at the outbreak of hostilities, the populations appeared to be enthusiastic about the war and in a state of euphoria which owed a great deal of its virulence to the glorification of War by the "futurists" in literature and art, as well as by the more rabid nationalists during the first decade and a half of the new century. A major factor in this now strange headlong rush into Armageddon was the widespread expectation that the war would not, in fact, could not, last more than a few months. (Your reviewer's first coherent memory is of a bright September afternoon in Minneapolis, listening to the adults deploring the outbreak of "this terrible war" in Europe, and expressing the hope that it would be over by Christmas.)

As time passed, it became evident that both sides were going to have to take drastic measures to counteract the ill effects of the excessive strain placed upon the civilian populations. Vincent points out that "the severe wartime conditions and the experiences of the English and the French on the homefront were generally matched and in many cases exceeded in Germany" (p. 15). In the following pages, Vincent analyzes the situation in Germany, with the interesting conclusion that — contrary to our prevailing folklore — the German war-effort was poorly organized, with unwise priorities given to industrial and business interests at the expense of those of civilians and farmers. Although foreign sources of food and fertilizer were cut off, the authorities "virtually ignored the [...] effects of a food shortage" (p. 30).

Matters may have been made considerably worse by the administration of the food regulations being incredibly decentralized. Under the provisions of the Prussian Law of Siege (p. 17), the procurement and distribution of the domestic food supply was administered by no less than twenty-four separate German army authorities, under generals who differed widely in their attitudes and approaches to the problem, and who often worked at cross-purposes from each other and from the overall army administration. By 1916 the German population was surviving on a "meager diet of dark bread, slices of sausage without fat, an individual ration of three pounds of potatoes per week, and turnips. Only the turnips were in abundant supply" (p. 21). By mid-1918, the army's food ration was no better, and this scarcity

contributed to disaffection among the troops. Vincent quotes (p. 23) General Ludendorff's allegation that the German defeat was due to a "stab in the back" (*Dolchstoß*, literally "dagger-stab"). True, says Vincent, at least in part, but what was not mentioned by Ludendorff was "the fact that the army had fashioned the knife" by its maladministration of the food-supply throughout the entire war.

In Chapter II, "The Blockade," Vincent summarizes the events which led up to its establishment in 1915 and its effects in Germany. These were especially severe in the terrible *Kohlrübenwinter* ("turnip-winter") of 1916-1917, "during which the collective weight (sic) of the German population plummeted sharply" (p. 45). The blockade was almost totally effective in cutting off Germany's imports of food and materiel. In 1917, with German morale nearing the point of collapse, the Kaiser decided on the now infamous policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. In so doing, Vincent argues that the German leadership committed two serious errors: "They totally underestimated the vigor with which the Allies would counter the effects of the submarine;" and "they failed to appreciate the consequence of America's potential addition to the side of the Allies" (p. 47). By November, 1918, the food-shortage in Germany had become catastrophic; the action of the Allies in continuing the blockade, after the cessation of hostilities on land, made it even worse.

Vincent's next two chapters deal in detail with the events of the eight months after November 11, 1918, primarily on the diplomatic front. He describes the November armistice as "A Conditional Surrender" (the title of Chapter III). Even before the cessation of hostilities on land, there had been ominous anticipations of coming discord among the Allies. Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" (which included "absolute freedom of navigation" at all times) seem to have been taken more seriously by the German government and negotiators than by Foch and Clemenceau with their intense desire for unlimited *revanche*, or by Lloyd George with his stubborn insistence on undiminished British command of the seas. As a consequence, and much to the dismay of the German negotiators, the continuation of the naval blockade was made one of the conditions for the Allied granting of an armistice (hence Vincent's title for this chapter). On November 11, just before the signing, the Germans were so perturbed at the prospect of continued starvation through the continuance of the blockade that a clause was added to the armistice agreement, to the effect that the Allies "contemplated relieving the famine." This, however, as later events showed, was only an empty phrase.

"Gold, Food, Ships, and Diplomats," during the next eight months, are the topic of Chapter 5. There was a strange intermingling and clash of often diametrically opposed policies on the part of victorious Allies, so that Herbert Hoover's initial moves for humanitarian famine relief, as applied to Germany, were for months stalemated by considerably less laudable refusals on the part of the French and British to allow food to be distributed, even from stocks already unloaded in Europe. The blockade was not only maintained, but even extended. Almost wholly incomprehensible to a later generation, even German fishing rights in the *Baltic* were abrogated. The British sea lords were concerned with the continued assertion of their naval power, while the French politicians were more interested with extracting from the Germans every possible *centime* of reparations. The French government's demands extended even to the gold-reserves held by the German government which were desperately needed to pay the American farmer for the food which he had supplied. An Allied commission set up to deal with the situation, meeting at Spa, Belgium, wasted time in interminable wrangling. For three months, even eyewitness reports of the extremely bad situation in Germany failed to move either the Allied commission at Spa or the peace negotiators at Paris.

In the end, it took a violent outburst of anger on Hoover's part to persuade Lloyd George that a drastic change in Allied policy was urgently needed (pp. 110-11). On March 8, 1919, the Allies' policy was finally reversed (pp. 111-13) by the Supreme War Council, at a meeting which has been made relatively well-known by John Maynard Keynes's description of it in his memoirs (from which Vincent gives several quotations). As for the sources of French and British obstructionism during these crucial months, Vincent ascribes their behavior to several causes (pp. 115-17). These included: British desire to maintain the "very perfect instrument" of the blockade for imposing peace terms (Keynes's explanation); the ignorance of Allied diplomats as to the real situation; the Europeans' suspicion of Hoover's humanitarianism, which they interpreted (at least in part) as evidence of a presumed desire of the United States to dominate Europe; and, most important of all, French greed for German gold.

The continually worsening starvation of the German public is described in Vincent's fifth chapter, "Famine and Starvation." Not only the supplies of actual food (especially potatoes, grain and sugar), but also fodder, fats and fertilizer quickly came to be in very short supply. Not only the housewife, but the soldier and the prisoner-of-war, were affected. The resultant severe undernourish-

ment was particularly telling on the elderly, the young, and expectant and nursing mothers. Improper diet lowered resistance to or caused such diseases as tuberculosis, rickets, influenza, dysentery, scurvy, ulceration of the eyes, and hunger-edema (p. 137). The influenza-epidemic of 1918 had, therefore, a far greater effect on German mortality, which was 250 percent greater in that year, than in England (p. 141). Vincent emphasizes (pp. 146-47) the disastrous results in malnutrition, as demonstrated in many modern physiological and psychological studies, on the human brain, especially in undernourished children. Furthermore, he points out (pp. 148-50), the elementary necessity of obtaining even a barely sufficient food supply undermined traditional morality and ethical standards (pp. 148-50).

The end result of the blockade and especially of its continuation after November 11, 1918, was, as Vincent terms it in the title of his sixth and final chapter, "The Making of a Quagmire." Even while the blockade was being enforced and strengthened, perceptive observers on both sides pointed out the dangers inherent in its continuation, which could lead only to a complete breakdown of the social order. Even though the immediate situation was saved by a last-minute relaxation of the blockade on food, the longer-term results of the resultant famine were still disastrous. As Vincent observes (pp. 112):

Whether one espouses the psychoanalytical argument that childhood deprivation fostered irrational behavior in adulthood or the physiological assertion that widespread malnutrition in childhood led to an impaired ability to think rationally in adulthood, the conclusion remains the same: the victimized youth of 1915-1920 were to become the most radical adherents of National Socialism.

Additionally, Vincent observes (p. 164) "By the same wisdom, however, one cannot intellectually dismiss the important possibility that blockade-induced starvation was a significant factor in the formation of the Nazi character." His conclusion (pp. 164-65) is that:

The ominous amalgamation of twisted emotion and physical degeneration, which was to presage considerable misery for Germany and the world, might have been prevented had it not been for the postwar policy of the Allies. The immediate centerpiece of this policy was the blockade.

Two short appendices, of British reports made in 1919 on the famine prevailing in Germany, are printed on pp. 168-72. An extensive bibliography (pp. 173-82) and a not wholly complete index (pp. 183-91) finish the book. It is well-printed, with few typos. The very full references are contained in notes printed at the end of each chapter — a far better procedure than that of putting them all in one huge clump at the end of the text of the book.

Specialists in the field have, of course, known of the Allied blockade and of its results, for a long time. A major merit of Vincent's treatment is his bringing together of information from all these different sources, and welding it into a comprehensive, highly readable, and yet scholarly presentation of the whole picture of both the 1915-18 blockade and its continuation and extension in 1918-19. Your reviewer, who was brought up in an intensely Anglophile and Francophile family, but who majored in German literature as an undergraduate, was unaware (like almost all other Americans) of the nature and extent of the blockade. Vincent's book has opened his eyes to one more neglected facet of modern history. By performing this service for his readers, Vincent has made a contribution to the never-ending task of revising and refining our perception of history, which can never be one hundred percent accurate or immune to change.

THE FALCON AND THE EAGLE: MONTENEGRO AND AUSTRIA, 1908-1914 by John D. Treadway; Purdue University Press, 349 pp. \$18.00

Reviewed by W.K. v. U.-Ziechmann

Aptly titled, *The Falcon and The Eagle*, while of particular interest to the student of diplomatic history, makes absolutely fascinating reading, even for those general scanners who have but the most fleeting impression of the immediate background leading to the outbreak of war in 1914. The author, a professor of history at the University of Richmond, is thoroughly grounded in his subject, having received his doctorate from the University of Virginia, but, equally important, having studied at the University of Kiel in West Germany, as well as at the Indiana University extension in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia and the University of Belgrade. Thus, he is not merely conversant with documents in English, but also those in German and Serbian. His extensive bibliography will attest to an avid quest, à la Ranke, for source material. Particularly astonishing is his thorough searching and knowledge of the archives and

libraries in Belgrade and Cetinje, a task seldom undertaken by Western historians. Nevertheless, the wealth of documents to be found in Vienna's Hof- und Staatsarchiv (some apparently untouched until now) by far outshines and outnumbers those in Cetinje, the old Montenegrin capital, as unfortunately many of the Montenegrin documents were irretrievably lost during the course of the First World War.

Just as unfortunately, the chief formulator of Montenegro's foreign policy, the patriarchal King Nicholas, had a penchant for not committing most of the details of his policymaking to pen and paper.

Heretofore, virtually every major study of the events leading to Sarajevo, 1914, has dealt exclusively with Austro-Serbian relations, either from neglecting or ignoring Montenegro's chess game with the vast Habsburg Empire to her north. After all, the Kingdom of Serbia headquartered in Belgrade, not its rival, the tiny Serb land of Montenegro (Italian for "Black Mountain") furnished the *causus belli* that put an end to the beautiful, but catastrophic, summer of 1914. (Montenegro, which began as a theocracy under a prince-bishop [*vladik*] of the Orthodox church had become a secularized principality under Danilo II in 1852 and a kingdom [with Austrian approval] only four years before in 1910.)

Professor Treadway is not the first historian to illustrate the intrigues, great and small, which filled the vacuum created by the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It would seem that he is the first to fit Montenegro into the disparate Balkan mosaic vis-à-vis the dominating powers of Europe. Further, he demonstrates both the rivalry and the distrust between the dynasties of Belgrade and Cetinje over inheritance of the mantle of Stephan Dusan and his great Serbian Empire of the Middle Ages, an empire which had lasted until its defeat at the hands of the Turks in the 14th Century. It could be said that some 20th Century Serbians looked upon the Montenegrins as boorish louts, it should also be pointed out that Montenegro's Nicholas I of the Petrovic-Njegos family looked upon the rival Obrenovic family with outrage when the upstart, Milan, assumed the rank of King of Serbia in 1882. Yet he was hardly more enthusiastic when his own son-in-law, Peter Karadjordjevic (Karageorgevic), occupied the bloodstained throne of Belgrade in 1903. With Serbia quickly replacing Montenegro as Russia's favorite and chief agent in the Balkans, Nicholas was more prone towards rapprochement with Austria, despite ethnic and linguistic differences, than with Serbia.

Montenegro's and Serbia's relationship, kinship and feuds are

very reminiscent of those of Lebanon-Syria, although the fiercely independent Druses are more akin to the hardy mountaineers of the Black Mountain than are the denizens of either Beirut or Damascus. Yet one might be as imprudent as the other, and so Montenegro was eventually (1921) swallowed up under the Karadjordjevic standard of Greater Serbian Yugoslavism — much as their spiritual brothers of the seething Levant might well fall to a form of Greater Syrianism. The Balkans do not possess a monopoly on either intrigue or intransigence.

The cunning fox of Cetinje, Nicola of Crna Gora, descended from Herzegovinian stock, received the nickname "Father-in-Law of Europe." The temperamental ruler's comic penury gave inspiration to Franz Lehar's operetta, *The Merry Widow*, as he simultaneously sought to replenish his empty coffers and extend his frontiers, often provoking and antagonizing the foreign office of his bigger and more arrogant Austrian neighbor, the Ballhausplatz, but not necessarily the more tolerant Imperial Court, the Hofburg.

In 1911, the wily Nicholas of Montenegro had remonstrated with the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Cetinje, Baron Wladimir Giesl of Gieslingen (who would serve as the minister to Belgrade at the outbreak of war):

We lack Austria's strength, but we are a small courageous people. We, the falcons of the Black Mountain, yearn to soar ahead of Austria's eagles.

Foolhardy and reckless abandon, of course, but in his 58 year rule (1860-1918) — only the venerable Franz Josef, with a 68 year reign (1848-1916), outdid him on the Continent! — Nicholas followed an anomalous zig-zag course, motivated by a self-defeating desire for territorial expansion. His territorial acquisitions in the Balkan Wars (1912-13) did little to alleviate economic misery at home, and probably exacerbated matters, leading to discontent, vexation and isolation.

In his meticulously written volume of maturity and incisiveness, Dr. Treadway has made a judicious contribution to both European diplomatic history and historiography in dispersing two myths: (1) that Montenegro was the servile handmaiden of Serbia and Russia, and (2) that Germany was constantly trying to goad Austria-Hungary into war.

An excellent study, of interest to both the scholar and the historical amateur.

Historians Wrangle over the Destruction of European Jewry

DR. WILHELM STÄGLICH

Translated by Waltraud Martin

[Commentary on the Congress of Historians in Stuttgart, 1984]

I nternational historical conventions dealing with the question of the "destruction of the Jews during World War II" have been rare up to now, the consensus being that such events were superfluous. On that subject, historians had fundamentally adhered to what had been pronounced as "historical fact" at the various show trials held by the victorious powers in Nuremberg and elsewhere soon after the end of hostilities. Furthermore, it was arranged that in divided Germany the same "findings" should also be ratified by German judges. This state of affairs, assuredly ideal for certain circles, appears to be gradually coming to its deserved end due to the increasing influence of historical Revisionism. As early as 1982, an international convention on the subject "Nazi Germany and the destruction of the Jews" was held at the Sorbonne University in Paris.¹ This was followed by yet another assembly of prominent historians from Germany and abroad, which convened in Stuttgart on May 3-5, 1984, dealing with the same topic. The conclusions reached were published by Professors Jaeckel and Rohwer in 1985, in the form of a book consisting of the lectures presented at the congress, augmented and annotated, as well as other edited contributions to the discussions insofar as these purported to contain new insights.²

However, one who hopes to find that the complex issues of World War II had finally been subjected to an exhaustive examination and that, in particular, the matter of the technical aspects relative to the alleged murder of several million Jews, without leaving any trace at all, has even been remotely clarified, must feel disappointment at the outcome of this expensive meeting of historians from all over the world. As Eberhard Jaeckel (Stuttgart) introductorily explained in the foreground of this congress stood the "formation of the decision as an historical problem," in other words: the question of how, when, where and, as applicable, by whom the decisions were made to kill the Jews, in which order of sequence, and by what means. However, this was

putting the cart before the horse. Still lacking is a thorough, impartial investigation as to what had become of the Jews who were deported to the East. The alleged gas chamber killings are particularly questionable in more than one respect, as numerous Revisionist works have long since shown. For that reason the complaining Jewish organizations and others were unable to refute convincingly the theses of Professor Faurisson during the Faurisson trial in France.³ Likewise, in January 1985, the "U.S. authority on the Holocaust" Raul Hilberg had to admit before a Canadian court in Toronto, that to date, "no scientific study...has ever been done to prove the existence of Nazi gas chambers." In Germany this sensational admission went largely unreported, of course. Even though the Canadian press did give an account of this event,⁴ the German historians continue to feign ignorance in the matter. Even the participants at the Stuttgart congress acted as if everything had already been clarified — with the exception of the "formation of the decision." They agreed, in essence, that the destruction of the Jews did take place consistent with the propaganda which has been broadcast day after day, year after year since the trials by the victors of the vanquished at Nuremberg. Insofar as they even mentioned it, the various lecturers repeated like trained parrots the dogma of the "gassings" in the so-called "extermination camps" without touching upon any of the relevant details.

Nevertheless, the congress did offer a surprise. For the first time the German public was made aware that the establishment historians had taken up two different positions recently, the one being described as the "intentionalist" and the other as the "functionalist" school. The previously unchallenged intentionalist school — represented at this convention by Raul Hilberg (Burlington, USA), Andreas Hillgruber (Cologne), Yehuda Bauer (Jerusalem), Wolfgang Scheffler (Berlin), and Helmut Krausnick (Stuttgart) — still continues to adhere to the "purist teaching" that was produced at the Nuremberg trials, which — to summarize briefly — asserts, that the extermination of the Jews originated exclusively from Hitler's initiative. The functionalists, however, hold the position that the alleged exterminations had occurred and progressively increased, as it were by force of circumstance. To be sure, Hitler's fanatical anti-semitism was the indispensable ingredient for this, although Hitler had issued neither a verbal, nor a written order to exterminate the Jews. The functionalists also reject the still prevailing opinion that, at the so-called Wannsee conference of January 20, 1942, a kind of general plan for the extermination of the Jews

had been formulated. According to their theory, the alleged exterminations supposedly occurred out of the local necessity, such as the critical food shortages within the Polish ghettos after the start of the deportation of Jews. It reportedly began with mass executions by the Einsatzgruppen, proceeding to its terrible climax, the "gassings" in "extermination camps," evolving progressively through a process of "cumulative radicalization" (Friedlaender) rather than on account of anything planned in detail. Thus the "extermination of the Jews" was not — as the intentionalists claim — the direct consequence of a long range plan of Hitler's, but the result of a gradual escalation of ruthlessness brought about by the desperate circumstances of the war.

At the congress, Professors Broszat (Munich) and Mommsen (Bochum) represented the "functionalist school," although they were not scheduled to present any major lectures. They could state their positions clearly only during the various rounds of discussions. It should be noted, however, that credit is due to Saul Friedlaender (Tel Aviv) who in his keynote address at the beginning of the seminar did make a serious effort to objectively portray in detail the "functionalist thesis," although he for his own part was, as were all the other Jewish participants, clearly committed to the "intentionalist school." For example, he quoted verbatim the significant conclusion of Professor Mommsen (1983).

In historical research the notion still holds that Hitler himself had considered the feasibility of the destruction of Jewry from the beginning, and had drawn up a long range plan for its implementation. The carefully chronicled remarks of the later dictator addressing this problem certainly do not convincingly support this view.

Friedlaender also referred to the thesis already formulated by Professor Broszat in 1977, that "no general all encompassing directive for the extermination had existed at all, that the 'program' for the destruction of the Jews had, until spring of 1942 beginning with individual actions rather gradually evolved institutionally and factually, acquiring its determining character after the establishment of the extermination camps in Poland..."

Such remarks closely approach the position outlined in my book *Der Auschwitz Mythos*, that any "possible killings of Jews, including those by gassings,... could have occurred only through the arbitrary actions of subordinate agencies" and "in that case, one could not speak of a 'planned' extermination of Jews."⁵ However, the functionalists have yet to draw the logical inference that the special development and technical ramifications of the various

killing actions must be scientifically clarified beyond all doubt, before they can qualify as "historical fact." To continue to rely, as do the intentionalists, essentially upon the pronouncements of sundry courts cannot be regarded as a scientifically comprehensive and conclusive clarification of the events concerned, quite apart from the questionable nature of their basis. The list of references of contemporary historical works is sufficient evidence of this, insofar as it concerns the question of the gas chambers. After all, the "gas chambers" must have been the real "instruments of genocide" (Faurisson), if one is to believe the official versions.

Thus, even if the controversy over the "formation of the decision" has changed little in the overall evaluation of the entire event, the divergences between intentionalists and functionalists reveal the rise of a certain insecurity among the historians, even at the abovementioned international Colloquium at the Sorbonne. This insecurity is based, at least partly, on the apparent absence of any discernible connection between these alleged killing operations; all previous attempts to establish and trace them back to a central directive appear to be more or less contrived. Broszat's comment, made during the discussion, is significant. He wondered, "whether the rather passionately conducted discussion with the noteworthy participation of Israeli and other Jewish scholars, might have had ulterior motives, transcending purely objective and scholarly inquiry into the facts at issue." Mommsen went even further, bluntly designating an "illusion" the assumption that "the final solution of the European or world Jewish question had been systematically discussed at any time within the higher circle of leadership."

Indeed, it is difficult to believe there could have been such direction, when one considers that the various alleged killing operations, occurring in part parallel to each other, were completely different in the manner of their implementation. In addition to the mass shootings by the Einsatzgruppen, "gas wagons," "gas showers," "gassings" by means of exhaust fumes of diesel engines and "gassings" with the insecticide "Zyklon B" in specially designated "gas chambers," as well as "phenol injections" were to have been employed as means of killing. The war propaganda alleged even more fantastic methods of killing, which were no longer discussed even at the Nuremberg trials. No doubt, a Hitler with a purpose and plan would not have proceeded in such a confused and disorderly manner. The very fact that innumerable Jews were never caught up in this alleged genocide speaks against the thesis of the intentionalists.

On the other hand, the functionalists will not, or cannot, see that at least some of the features of the alleged killings, such as the use of diesel engines for the "gassings" (Gerstein report) or the use of Zyklon B, as is described in reports of alleged eyewitnesses, seem doubtful or even impossible in their practical application. Evidence other than these alleged "eyewitness testimonies" has not been produced thus far. The effort was not even made — no doubt for good reasons — to conduct any kind of tests to ascertain the presence of any traces of Zyklon B in the ruins of the alleged gas chambers of Birkenau. At any rate, nothing was ever made public about any positive findings of any scientific tests. In recent years, non-German Revisionists have submitted well-founded doubts on the possibility of the central role of the "gassings" in the context of the alleged genocide. Thus, sooner or later, the establishment historians will be compelled to respond to the Revisionist arguments, if they do not wish to lose their credibility altogether.

Today already one thing is certain: Those judicial pronouncements which, as is the rule, have as their basis that the "planned, organized physical extermination of Jews in German occupied Europe," allegedly ordered by Hitler, is a "historical fact," a "matter of historical record," or even a "publicly accepted fact," and have rejected evidence to the contrary as inadmissible on those grounds, are misjudgements resting on misclaimed competence or incorrect opinions of admittedly biased experts. For their foundation is a state of affairs which is still, or is now in any event, in dispute. Thus the truth of an already very old admonition by Professor Ernst von Beling, the highly esteemed teacher of jurisprudence during the Weimar era is reaffirmed. Beling cautioned against a "too rash judgement on contemporary events" by means of judicial decree. He opined that it would be "presumptuous of a judge to cast himself into the role of a historical writer" and referred to, *inter alia*, the difficulties involved in historical research and the unreliability of source material. He declared further, that a historical assertion could only be treated by the courts as "publicly accepted fact" if "historical research unanimously precluded all and every doubt as to its truth."⁶ It is about time that German judges reflect upon this!

The historians, however, should at last muster up the courage to detach themselves from the previous thought patterns and begin to delve into the real causes of the deaths of those Jews who did perish during World War II, insofar as that is still possible. The declaration by Professor Helmut Diwald still holds true that the fate of the Jews who were deported to the East "is despite all literature still unclarified on central questions."⁷

Notes

1. *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 1/84, p. 18.
2. Jaeckel/Rohwer: *Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Stuttgart, 1985, 253 pp. Paperback. P. 815ff.
3. *Toronto Sun*, 1/18/85.
4. *Der Auschwitz Mythos*, p. 22, loc. cit.
5. *Deutsche Strafrechtzeitung* 1918, co. 199ff.
6. *Geschichte der Deutschen*, first edition, p. 165.

*Shoah: Abraham Bomba, the Barber**

BRADLEY R. SMITH

I have now seen the complete 9½ hour film documentary, *Shoah*, which purports to be an "Oral History of the Holocaust." It was produced, directed, narrated and is now being promoted by Claude Lanzmann. From the newspapers I gather Lanzmann is an assimilated French Jew who speaks neither Hebrew nor Yiddish. He is presently 60 years old. He worked as a journalist for many years in association with John Paul Sartre and *Les Temps Modernes* until 1970 when he turned his attention to making movies.

That is, Claude Lanzmann worked for 25 years in the eye of the intellectual storm that swept across France during the years following the end of World War II. As a journalist he certainly learned how to conduct professional interviews. He certainly learned, through his association with Sartre, de Beauvoir, Camus and those who criticized the great triad, how to pursue a train of thought. Considering the high-powered company he kept it's a real eye-opener to watch Lanzmann reveal his intellectual corruption in scene after scene of this shoddy movie, which he claims took ten years to complete.

My favorite interview in *Shoah* is with one Abraham Bomba, the Barber of Treblinka. I'm not alone in my fondness for Bomba either. Many critics have commented on his performance. They gave him rave reviews. George Will of ABC Television for example wrote in *The Washington Post* that Bomba's narrative was the "most stunning episode in this shattering film." Some alleged

*Excerpt from Confessions of a Holocaust Revisionist (*A Work in Progress, Part I now available*).

eyewitnesses to "gas chamber" horrors recount stories that are so lacking in credibility that they can be dismissed out of hand. Other alleged eyewitnesses to "gas chamber" atrocities repeat stories that cannot easily be shown to be false but reveal the character of the tale-bearer to be so sniveling and shameless that one feels compromised by even listening to them. Bomba is becoming an important character in the Holocaust-survivor-eyewitness scenario in that his tales embody both of these characteristics.

The way Bomba tells the story, he had been interned in Treblinka about four weeks when the Germans announced they wanted some barbers for a special detail. Bomba volunteered, of course, then helped the SS identify 16 other Jewish barbers. All together they were taken to the "second part" of the camp where the "gas chamber" was. They were led inside the gas chamber where a kapo¹ (almost certainly a Jew) explained that the 17 barbers were to shear the hair from the women who would arrive to be "gassed."

Here Claude Lanzmann began to question Bomba about the greatest murder weapon of all time, the German homicidal "poison gas chamber."

Lanzmann: How did it look, the gas chamber?

Bomba: It was not a big room, around twelve feet by twelve feet.²

And there you have it. Claude Lanzmann is finished with his in-depth investigation of how that great horror, the Treblinka gas chamber, looked. It takes all kinds. If I had been in Lanzmann's shoes I could have thought of a few more questions to ask about "how it looked." Particularly if I had had some feelings about the stories that maybe a million of my kinsmen had been exterminated in such a room. Maybe I would have wanted to know what Bomba would say the walls of the gas chambers were made of, what the roof was made of. How would Bomba describe the ventilation system? Where exactly did the "gas" enter the room? Maybe Bomba would have remembered if the room had been illuminated or not. If it had been, how? What were the doors made of? How did they seal so that the "gas" could not escape? As the historians (incredibly) have not bothered to ask these simple questions, Lanzmann could have performed a significant service to society here.

As to whether Bomba is being honest about having seen a "gas chamber" at Treblinka consider Rachael Auerbach's description of that "gas chamber" in *The Death Camp Treblinka*.³ Auerbach is given a place of honor in this, the most comprehensive book published on the camp. As she was (she died) a permanent research staff member of the Yad Vashim Holocaust Memorial Institution in

Israel, her description of the "chamber" should not be dismissed out of hand.

...The floor of the gas chamber was sloping and slippery. The first ones in would slip and fall, never to rise again. Those who followed would topple over them.... About 25 to 45 minutes later [after the "gassing" began—*Ed.*] the chutes on the other side could be opened and the corpses tumbled out.

It would seem that while he was being interviewed for *Shoah* Mr. Bomba forgot about how "slippery" the floor is supposed to have been in his little "gas chamber." It seems he forgot how it is supposed to have slanted rather steeply in the direction of the "chutes." As a matter of fact, Mr. Bomba forgot to mention the supposed "chutes" as well. If Lanzmann had read even superficially in the literature he would have been aware that Bomba was leaving a few things out of his story. As Lanzmann claims he worked for ten years making *Shoah*, I'm going to guess that Lanzmann is aware of Auerbach's description of the Treblinka "gas chamber."

In any event, once Lanzmann's curiosity was satisfied about how the alleged gas chamber looked, he wanted to know what happened next.

Lanzmann: Can you describe precisely?

Bomba: Describe precisely... We were waiting there...inside the "gas chamber"... until the transport came in. Women with children pushed in to that place.... They were undressed, naked, without clothes, without anything else — completely naked...because they come from the undressing barrack...where they had undressed themselves.

Lanzmann: What did you feel the first time you saw all those naked women?

Bomba: I felt that accordingly I got to do what they...[Germans]...told me, to cut their hair...

There you have in a nutshell how these eyewitnesses to the "gas chamber" atrocities describe themselves. They did whatever the Germans or anyone else ordered them to do when they received a request to help prepare their kinsmen — and even their families as we shall soon see — to be murdered, or exterminated, or genocided, or holocausted or whatever else these fellows say, they hopped right to it. I don't believe them, but that's the persona they insist on projecting to the world at large. In the neighborhood where I grew up, men who behaved like Bomba says he behaved would have been spit on. In the upside-down world of Holocaust survivors however they are seen as martyrs and even heroes. It's a peculiar psychological slant to adult behavior, to manly behavior.

Lanzmann expresses a little more curiosity about how Bomba cut his victims' (for hasn't Bomba joined himself with the Germans now through his actions? Hasn't he, according to his own story, become a working partner in the alleged genocide of his people?) hair than he did about how the "gas chamber" looked. He asked if Bomba had shaved them, if he used scissors, and if there were not mirrors available inside the "gas chamber." Bomba said he had performed the haircuts with scissors and comb, that he did not shave the women, and that the Germans had not provided the barbers with mirrors.

Lanzmann: There were no mirrors?

Bomba: No, there were no mirrors. There were just benches — not chairs, just benches...

There's an interesting note. According to Bomba the Germans had provided benches inside the little "gas chamber" for the ladies and their children to sit on. We're not told how many benches. There could have been 17 individual ones, but more likely Bomba would have said — if Lanzmann had thought to ask him — that there were maybe four or five, half a dozen perhaps. Two or more ladies or kids could have sat on each bench. No matter how you slice it, traffic is picking up. Seventeen barbers, the benches for 17, and now the 17 women and kids are all there together inside the little "gas chamber," which is about the size of a small bedroom in the rear of a small house. But we're not finished yet. Hear this!

Lanzmann: You said there were about sixteen... [Ed. Lanzmann forgets that Bomba makes the seventeenth]...barbers? You cut the hair of how many women in the same room at one batch?

Bomba: In one day there was about, I would say, going into that place between sixty and seventy women in the same room at one time.

You might think that Claude Lanzmann is about to express some doubt about how Bomba is blocking out this scene for him. Sixty to seventy naked women in the 12 by 12 foot room, their kids, the benches and the 17 barbers. Lanzmann isn't going to express doubt about anything told to him by a "survivor." Lanzmann is a Holocaust Fundamentalist. The role of the fundamentalist in any cult is to accept with absolute certainty the testimony of those who claim to have been "eyewitnesses" to the original sacred event. Once the original story is made to fly, the most elegant minds can elaborate on it endlessly in good faith.

Lanzmann urged Bomba to say something more about how he felt as supposedly he went about shearing the women and their "children" before the Germans supposedly exterminated them. Something more perhaps than the homely: "I felt that accordingly I got to do what they told me, to cut their hair..."

Bomba: I tell you something. To have a feeling about that...it was very hard to feel anything...your feeling disappeared, you were dead. You had no feeling at all.

This is the almost universal response by "eyewitnesses" to the alleged "gas chamber" murders. The claim Bomba makes that his feelings were "dead," that he had "no feeling at all" resembles the "temporary insanity" claim murderers use to diminish their responsibility for their behavior in the eyes of the State. The ordinary murderer claims that his mental processes were so diminished at the time he murdered that he was not responsible for his act. The "eyewitness" to the alleged "gas chamber" murders claims that his sensibilities were so diminished while he worked as a link in the murder process that he was not responsible for his behavior. The murderer was out of his "mind," while "gas chamber eyewitnesses" ran out of "feeling." When Bomba describes himself as being inwardly "dead" he is saying he cannot be judged guilty of being a "accomplice" to mass murder. He can accuse Germans of whatever he likes, participate in the crimes he accuses them of, yet remain forever innocent while Germans remain forever guilty. It's a nice set-up.

In the film Bomba goes on to illustrate how "dead" he was inwardly while working for the Germans at Treblinka. He describes how he sheared the hair from women he knew personally from his home town, from his own street: "...and some of them were my close friends." They would ask Abe: "What's going to happen to us?" but Abe would hold his tongue. With Abe it was just snip, snip, snip. "What could you tell them?" he asks Lanzmann. "What could you tell?"

Snip, snip, snip.

Now Bomba relates to Lanzmann the story that reviewers have remarked on more than any other in *Shoah*.⁴

Bomba: A friend of mine worked as a barber — he was a good barber in my hometown — when his wife and his sister came into the gas chamber...I can't. It's too horrible. Please.

Lanzmann: We have to do it. You know it.

Bomba: (holding back tears) I won't be able to do it.

Lanzmann: (very quietly) You have to do it. I know it's very hard. I

know and I apologize.

Bomba: (struggling) Don't make me go on, please.

Lanzmann: Please. We must go on.

Bomba: (unable to control tears, leaving the frame for a moment, returning) I told you it's going to be very hard. They were taking that ... (hair) ... in bags and transporting it to Germany.

Lanzmann: Okay, go ahead. What was his answer when his wife and sister came?

Bomba: They tried to talk to him and the husband of his sister. They could not tell them this was the last time they stay alive, because behind them was the German Nazis, SS men, and they knew that if they said a word, not only the wife and the woman, who were dead already, but also they would share the same thing with them. In a way, they tried to do the best for them, with a second longer, a minute longer, just to hug them and kiss them, because they knew they would never see them again.

To tell the truth, this is my kind of story— simple and lurid. There's also some new information in it. In addition to the 60 to 70 women and their barbers and the benches there were also "SS men" inside the alleged 12-foot by 12-foot "gas chamber." We don't know how many, but as Bomba speaks in the plural he must mean that there were at least two. And then there is the welcome news that the SS would allow the barbers to "hug and kiss" certain of the naked women inside the "gas chamber." Bomba speaks only of married couples. We ought to ask perhaps how the SS were able to identify which of the naked women were married to which of the barbers? It must be doubtful that the women entered the "gas chambers" carrying their marriage certificates. Maybe the barbers had previously petitioned the SS to keep their own copies of their marriage certificates on the chance that just such a reunion would take place. On the other hand maybe the SS took the barber's word for who was married and who wasn't. If they did, it would betray a generosity of spirit that is not usually ascribed to the SS by the Jewish survivors.

Imagine trying to visualize this scene from the wife's point of view. Try imagining what could have gone through her mind at the moment she spied her husband. The hope that must have leaped in her heart. Then what her thoughts were as her husband sheared off her hair without speaking to her. Imagine what she must have felt as he held her silently for a minute or so, then turned to the next woman with his scissors and comb. Did his wife run her fingers over her skull and think:

"Ah, I've always known what kind of man you were. A schmuck when I married you and a schmuck today."

There are a number of observations that can be made about my

presentation of Lanzmann's presentation of Bomba's testimony. It could be observed that while Rachael Auerbach's research suggests that Bomba is inventing his "gas chamber" story out of whole cloth, it can still be claimed that we are left with Auerbach's scholarly outline of the horror of the alleged Treblinka gas chambers. Therefore, while Bomba's inventions may destroy his own credibility as a witness, the Treblinka gas chamber story itself remains as it was, an extensively documented story of a weapon used to annihilate a million or so Jews. To give you a quick fix on Ms. Auerbach's scholarly instincts and even-handed objectivity, I will quote a typical paragraph from her famous essay *In the Fields of Treblinka*.

As I read such passages in Rachael Auerbach's ignorant and twisted essay I take the trouble to remind myself that after the war she was "one of the first active members of the Jewish Historical Committee in Poland;" that after immigrating to Israel she became a "permanent research staff member of the Yad Vashim Holocaust Memorial Institution," and that this in-the-field-of-Treblinka garbage was thought worthy of reprinting as recently as 1979 by *The Holocaust Library* which was founded and is managed by "survivors" themselves, and is distributed by a major Jewish publishing house, *Schocken Books*.

Elie Wiesel, of course, Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Commission, is on *The Holocaust Library* advisory board. Elie Wiesel lends his name as a matter of course to the virulence, bigotry and anti-German hate propaganda regularly published by institutions such as *Holocaust Library*. Here is Auerbach:

Polish people still talk about the way soap was manufactured from the bodies of Jews. "Sent away for soap!" was the expression the Poles would use when they spoke of transports to Treblinka, Belzec and Sobibor. The discovery of Professor Spanner's soap factory in Langfuhr near Danzig proved that their suspicions had been well-founded. Witnesses tell us that when the corpses were burned on the pyres, pans would be placed beneath the racks to catch the fat as it ran off, but this has not been confirmed. But even if the Germans in Treblinka or at any of the other death factories failed to do this, and allowed so many tons of precious fat to go to waste, it could only have been an oversight on their part. They were fully capable of doing things like that. It was entirely in keeping with their proclivities. Only the newness of this branch of manufacturing was to blame for this omission. If the Germans ever would make another drive across Europe, they would not make this mistake again.

Parenthetically it should be pointed out that "Professor Spanner's soap factory in Langfuhr near Danzig" was apparently an invention of active members of self-proclaimed Jewish historical committees in Poland and its memory has been kept alive by research staffs of Holocaust memorials around the world.

Polish Jews such as Rachael Auerbach witnessed the Germans destroying their culture and destroying their neighborhoods. They witnessed the Germans tearing their families apart in the titanic, brutal resettlement programs. Polish Jews and European Jews everywhere can be forgiven some of their blind hatred for Germans. American who suffered nothing of what Jews suffered however have little right to indulge themselves with it. The historians, the journalists, the sleazy bureaucrats who pretend to have a right to believe everything Jews accuse Germans of, simply because Jews are Jews and Germans are Germans, are contemptible.

This brings me to Mr. George Will, *Washington Post* columnist and ABC Television commentator. I'm willing to accept Mr. Will's assessment of himself. He is a brilliant and principled man. I disagree with some of his viewpoints, particularly his obsessive attachment to the State of Israel, but I can't show that attachment to be wrong. He's better educated than I am and better informed. As luck would have it Mr. Will has written a column about *Shoah* where he makes a remarkable observation:

The most stunning episode in this shattering film lasts about five minutes and involves "only" the talk of a barber now in Israel. While he clips the hair of a customer he talks, never needing to raise his voice to be heard over the small sounds of a familiar ambience. He describes his duties in Treblinka, cutting hair from naked women on the threshold of the gas chamber, and the day a fellow barber saw his wife and sister enter the room.⁵

Remarkable, eh? Cutting hair from naked women on the "threshold" of the gas chamber, eh? See it? To my mind "threshold" is the place directly below the door to a room. A doorsill perhaps. An *entrance* or a *doorway*. According to Mr. Webster it is a "place or point of beginning." Taking Mr. Will's own obvious assessment of himself, he is the proud owner of a formidably organized intellect. A man who always distinguishes carefully between similar but different points of fact. While doing so enrages those lesser men who cannot do it themselves, it gives Mr. Will a lot of pleasure, which is why he does it so regularly. That being so, what

am I to make of the fact that Mr. Will has changed the wording of Mr. Bomba's testimony?

Lanzmann: Excuse me. How did it happen when the women came into the gas chamber? Were you yourself already in the gas chamber?

Bomba: I said we were already *in* the gas chamber, waiting over there for the transport to come *in*. *Inside* the gas chamber — we were already *in*. (emphasis supplied)

If Mr. Bomba swears that he was *inside* the gas chamber at that particular time, why does Mr. Will write that he barbered those naked women on the "threshold" of the gas chamber? Mr. Bomba can be seen on film saying that he was inside the gas chamber when he did it, and in the text of the film published by Mr. Lanzmann, Mr. Bomba again insists he was inside the thing. What happened to Mr. Will's brain as he wrote "threshold" rather than "inside" or "in?" Is it possible that Mr. Will found Mr. Bomba's story ludicrous? He wouldn't want to say so publicly of course as Mr. Will is one of our brightest and best Holocaust Fundamentalists. Nevertheless, having the kind of relentlessly rational mind that he does, something at the bottom of it might not have bought Mr. Bomba's story the way Mr. Will would have preferred to buy it. Maybe a single wire got crossed in the depths of Mr. Will's brain, out of the millions that are twisted around in there. Maybe Mr. Will wanted to express some doubt about Mr. Bomba's story but could not bring himself to do it. He may have been in that peculiar place where writers sometimes find themselves — where they are smart enough to know that something needs to be said but haven't got enough character to go ahead and say it. When this happens it causes a psychological malfunction described cravenly as writer's block; he's got the habit of full production, but if he wasn't going to spill the beans he had to turn *somewhere*. He turned to invention. I supposed in the moment it was easy enough for a man wired the way Mr. Will is wired to invent a threshold image and use it to replace the one Mr. Bomba invented. You can judge how much more intelligent Mr. Will is than Mr. Bomba when you compare the rationality of the two opposing visualizations.

Now that Mr. Will had Mr. Bomba on the "threshold" of the gas chamber rather than "inside" it, Mr. Will could go on indulging his fantasy about Mr. Lanzmann's *Shoah*. As the "threshold" to an exterior door not only leads inside, but turning about, leads to the great outdoors and indeed to the rest of the planet surface, there would be enough space out there for Mr. Bomba's barbers to ply their trade comfortably for the SS, and for all the naked ladies Mr.

Bomba and Mr. Will together can conjure up. Mr. Will can indulge his other fantasy as well — that no serious criticism can be made of the testimony of any of that handful of alleged eyewitnesses who claim to have actually seen a “poison gas chamber.” In this scenario, as the eyewitness testimony is not allowed to be challenged, the genocide theory can’t be challenged either, and if that is so, then European Jews had every right to conquer Palestine and the U.S. Government is morally obligated to protect forever the State of Israel. That’s the line of thought programmed into the American citizenry. Mr. Will’s threshold caper is a small example of how Holocaust Fundamentalists use invention on the one hand and suppression and censorship on the other to bolster U.S. foreign policies and cover up hypocrisies and ethnic chauvinism of the largest part of organized Jewry here and abroad.

What could be plainer than that the world-wide Jewish community is being betrayed by this nonsense? Jews are being betrayed by their own leadership, and they’re being betrayed by Gentiles like Mr. Will who profess to be friends and allies of the Jewish community but who in reality are merely allies of a disastrous Zionist leadership trapped within its own rhetoric, too ashamed to reveal the immense fraud upon which so much of its influence has been built.

Notes

1. *Kapo*: German for trustee.
2. *Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust* by Claude Lanzmann, Pantheon Books, New York, 1985. Unless otherwise noted, all the passages quoted in this chapter are from this *Pantheon Books* edition, pp. 111–117.
3. *The Death Camp Treblinka*, Ed. by Alexander Donat, Holocaust Library (New York, 1979). See Rachael Auerbach’s contribution, *In The Fields of Treblinka*.
4. The parenthetical descriptions of Bomba’s reactions here are not in the published text. I have added them from memory. While I watched the film I could not help but be touched by Bomba’s sincere distress. His tears brought tears to my own eyes. At the same time I was aware of what a laugh I thought his story is. A nice irony for the psychotherapists.
5. *The Washington Post* (15 Nov. 85).

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In 1921, Neilson became an American citizen and devoted much of his writing and energy to opposing war both in principle and practice. He wrote for the *Freeman* under the guidance of Albert Jay Nock, who also wrote the introduction to the first edition of *How Diplomats Make War*. Neilson also contributed to H.L. Mencken's *American Mercury*.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, Neilson started what was to be his magnum opus: *The Tragedy of Europe*. It is a daily account of every phase of the War and its causes. In five large volumes it is a veritable treasure-house of Revisionist material; it numbers 3,503 pages and can truly be called a monumental work.

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—Francis Neilson from his autobiography, *My Life In Two Worlds*.

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—Charles Callan Tansill (author of *Backdoor To War*) from his introduction to the third volume.

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
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343 NEMESIS AT POTSDAM by Alfred de Zayas.



Subtitled *The Anglo Americans and the expulsion of the Germans*, this book describes the background, cruel execution and the resultant consequences of the expulsion of the ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland as well as from the other Eastern territories. Millions perished as a result of the policies decided upon by the "Big Three," Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, and the fulfillment of those policies by their successors, Truman and Atlee. *NEMESIS AT POTSDAM* relates the integration of German expellees to the phenomenal resurgence of West Germany, and traces the development of *Ostpolitik* and detente through to the Helsinki Declaration. This is the revised edition with 62 photos, an excellent scholarly work. Pb, 268pp, \$11.00

366 GRUESOME HARVEST: THE COSTLY ATTEMPT TO EXTERMINATE THE PEOPLE OF GERMANY by Ralph Franklin Keeling.



First published in 1947 by the Institute of American Economics, this book is one of the earliest attempts to inform the American people of the result of the policies of their leaders. The tragic story of the expulsion of the Germans had been swept under the rug by the Establishment press and the university academicians. This is a graphic, gripping and highly informative account of the Morgenthau years of terror, mass evacuation, starvation and re-education. Pb, 140pp, \$5.00.

There is little in the history of mankind more horrible than the sufferings of the Germans expelled from their eastern provinces, the Sudeten area, and other regions, some four to six millions perishing from butchery, starvation, exposure, and disease in the process. Their sufferings were obviously far more hideous and prolonged than those of the Jews said to have been exterminated in great numbers by the Nazis. The tragedy of Lidice was re-enacted by the Czechs hundreds of times at the expense of the Sudeten Germans during the expulsion.

— Harry Elmer Barnes, "Breaking the Historical Blackout"

The Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft

PETER H. OPPENHEIMER

This paper is an examination of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (SL), a West German organization of Sudeten Germans expelled by Czechoslovakia from their homeland after World War II. This essay will place particular emphasis on the political activities of the SL. The intention of the essay is to enlighten the reader to the workings and evolution of a unique organization and advance some reasons for the successes, failures, and longevity of this group.

The continuing existence of an organization such as the SL seems to be an anachronism when one juxtaposes the original political objectives of the group and West German *Ostpolitik* since Willy Brandt. Yet, like the West German polity, the SL underwent successful policy alterations, reacting to developments both at home and abroad. To a certain extent, the SL adapted to contemporary conditions, discarded obsolete rhetoric, retrenched when necessary, and, in consequence, has survived until the present. Basically, the SL evolved from a politically oriented organization to a heritage preservation society. Although this description is exaggerated, it accurately indicates the direction of the SL's evolution. True, even today the SL still espouses the right to the Sudeten homeland and self-determination, but generally Sudeten Germans appear to be economically and politically content in West Germany and all signs

point to a continuance of their contentment.

The issues which this paper will discuss include the path of the SL from 1950 to the present and its reaction to West German, Central and Eastern European diplomatic and political developments. The questions which the essay will endeavour to answer encompass such topics as: What are the political objectives and aspirations of the SL? How has the SL influenced Bonn's Eastern policy? What tactics and strategies has the SL utilized to achieve its goals? What part have the Sudeten Germans taken in government? Do Sudeten Germans still desire to return to the homeland? These questions have no easy answers, but this writer hopes he will at least provoke some thought on a subject that even today has consequences for a divided Germany and an ideologically disparate Europe.

Background And History

In 845, several Slav chieftains accepted Christianity in Regensburg, Germany. Thereafter, many of these chieftains married German princesses, and the land where they lived, Bohemia, became a fief of Charlemagne's Empire. The Bohemian Dukes were later made kings by the German Emperor, and became electors of the German Empire.

The Bohemian rulers invited Germans to settle the uninhabited lands bordering on Bohemia and Moravia. Through this area runs a mountain range, the Sudetes, hence the region became known as the Sudetenland.¹ In 1526, a Habsburg prince was elected King of Bohemia, reinforcing Sudetenland ties to Germany. Bohemia and Moravia remained a part of the Holy Roman Empire until its dissolution in 1806. Later they belonged to the German Confederation and after 1866 Austria-Hungary included them among its territories.²

The situation remained unaltered until the collapse of the Habsburg Empire at the end of World War I. The First Czechoslovak Republic, created in 1918, annexed the crown lands of Bohemia and Moravia. The Sudeten Germans, desirous of self-determination as set forth in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, attempted to affiliate themselves with the new Austrian Republic. To prevent this "treasonous" action, the new Czech state occupied the Sudetenland with troops and forbade Sudeten German participation in Austrian parliamentary elections. Sudeten German political leaders consequently called for a general strike on 4 March 1919, and on this day fifty-four Sudeten Germans were killed by Czech troops as

they demonstrated for self-determination.³

Unable to break this iron grip, the Sudeten Germans strove for political reform within the Czechoslovak State in hopes it would grant their minority ethnic group greater freedom.⁴ Under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten German Party (SGP) was formed. Henlein actively supported Hitler's pre-war annexationism, and the SGP sympathized with the National Socialists.⁵ On the other side of the political spectrum, Wenzel Jaksch headed the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party (SGSDP). In contrast to the SGP, the SGSDP continued to work with and support the Czechoslovak Government.⁶

By 1935, Henlein's party received 60% of all Sudeten German votes, polled more than 1.2 million ballots, and became the single strongest party in Czechoslovakia.⁷ Concurrently, the influence of the SGSDP waned, and after the 1938 Munich Agreement, became insignificant. When Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, Jaksch and his group fled to London, where the party operated in exile.⁸ The SGP, having supported Hitler, was allowed to govern the Sudetenland.

Upon Germany's defeat in 1945, the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia and Eduard Benes, the former president of Czechoslovakia (1935–1938), was permitted to re-establish a government. He immediately began to expel the Sudeten Germans and eventually 3 million were "deported."⁹ Of these, 1.9 million arrived in the American Zone of Germany. By 1947, the basic framework of the SL was assembled.¹⁰

The SL argued publicly that the Sudeten Germans were expelled to cause turmoil and unrest in West Germany. According to the SL, the Czechs reckoned that a large influx of homeless people in a war-torn country would create a social upheaval favorable to communism and enable communist agents to infiltrate West Germany.¹¹ Prague maintained that it expelled the Sudeten Germans to guarantee the existence of an independent Czech State and to punish the Sudeten Germans for crimes perpetrated by the National Socialists during the Second World War.¹²

In 1948, the Czech Communist Party seized control of the country and continued the expulsions begun by the previous government. One of the most significant results of this policy was to make the Sudeten Germans staunch anti-communists.¹³ Prague in turn has viewed the SL as a revanchist organization with pan-germanic aims.¹⁴ Needless to say, both sides believed the existence of the other precluded the achievement of their own foreign policy goals. In hindsight, this has not proven to be the case, and although

Prague has triumphed, the SL is still extant.

The Structure of the SL

The SL set up regional headquarters in Bavaria in 1947.¹⁵ A national headquarters was established in Munich in 1950.¹⁶ The organization encompasses several regional groups and its membership (defined as dues-paying adherents) was approximately 350,000 in 1960.¹⁷

From its inception, the SL functioned as a well-organized association. In 1954 it became the only democratic representation of the Sudeten Germans, and the Sudeten Germans became the first ethnic expellee group in West Germany to have a democratic organization based on secret elections.¹⁸ The SL has a central assembly consisting of seventy-one representatives elected by seventy-one electoral districts all over West Germany.¹⁹ These representatives serve two-year terms and they elect the president, whose tenure is three years, and the executive board.²⁰

The Sudeten Council, loosely linked to the SL, plays a most important role in the Sudeten German cause. It consists of thirty members, ten deputies from political parties represented in the Bundestag, ten members from the SL, and ten members co-opted from other relevant West German institutions.²¹ The council is the official representation of external Sudeten German interests, and can accurately be termed the Sudeten German foreign-policy body.²²

From 1954 until 1968, the SL had a marked right-wing slant, mirroring the beliefs of its first two presidents, Rudolf Lodgman von Auen (1954–1959) and Hans-Christoph Seebohm (1959–1968).²³ Since 1968, Walter Becher, a more moderate politician, has presided over the SL. As we shall see, under his direction, the SL has more realistically reflected the political situation of present day Europe, such as that brought about by the Prague–Bonn Treaty of 1973.

Rights and Tenets

The basis for SL political aims have rested upon two rights and two tenets. Because for so long these have dictated SL foreign policy, it is necessary to outline them.

The right to the homeland and the right of self-determination have formed the cornerstone of Sudeten German hopes and aspirations *vis-à-vis* the Sudetenland. These rights, supported throughout the

years by increasingly sophisticated legalistic and moralistic arguments, hark back at least as far as Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918. The SL also has pointed to the incorporation of both of these rights in numerous international documents as a further justification of their validity. Among the documents that have declared these rights are The Atlantic Charter (12 August 1941), Statutes of the UN (26 June 1945), General Declaration of Human Rights (10 September 1948), and the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms (14 November 1950).²⁴ Most importantly, the Basic Law of the BRD* states that one of the country's duties is "to effect the unity and freedom of Germany in an act of self-determination."²⁵ However, in spite of all such legal documents, the Sudeten Germans have come no closer to the realization of either right.

The two tenets that have supplemented the basic rights asserted by the SL were incorporated in the *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, a lofty proclamation to which the SL subscribed. The tenets constitute a renunciation of revenge and retaliation in all actions, and the belief that only in a united Europe can people live in peace without fear and threat to their basic human rights.²⁶ By assuming these tenets, the SL hoped to make their cause acceptable to their countrymen and the world. In light of Germany's role in World War II, renunciation of revenge and retaliation laid the foundation for respectability for the SL. It is unlikely that the Federal Government or the Western Allies would have tolerated the existence of the organization in the post-war years if not for this declaration. The desire for a united Europe has expressed itself in the foreign policy objectives of the SL. In this context, it suffices to remark that the SL hoped that the creation of a supra-national state would enable the peoples of Europe to transcend nationalism and allow the Sudeten Germans to return to their homeland.

Political Development

The development of the SL, its foreign policy and political aspirations can be divided roughly into three periods. The first of these, from the SL's inception in 1950 until the 20-Point Program of 1961, witnessed the apogee of SL political potency as well as the climax of hard-line ideology. The second period, from the 20-Point Program until the Prague-Bonn Agreement of 1973, saw the gradual reconciliation of SL aspirations with the political realities of

*West Germany (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*)

Europe. During this period, the children of those expellees who had lived in the Sudetenland as adults reached maturity, and this accounted in part for the softening of SL rhetoric. The final period, the ten or so years since 1973, has not marked the demise of the SL, as one might have expected. West German political leaders still espouse the right of self-determination, as Chancellor Kohl did in 1983 in a speech on the state of the German Nation.²⁷ And, on the thirty-fifth annual Sudeten German day in 1984, 50,000 Sudeten Germans assembled to hear President Karl Carstens address their cause.²⁸ The survival of the SL has entailed adaptation, reconciliation and concession. It also implies that at the core of the SL there lies a purpose that transcends politics and forshadows an enduring place for the organization in Germany's future.

The First Period (1950-1961)

The first period in the evolution of the SL lasted approximately twelve years and paralleled the re-emergence of West Germany as an economic powerhouse and its acceptance into the family of nations. The SL's main goals during this period, as reflected by the 1950 Detmold Declaration, consisted a mixture of idealism, hope and *realpolitik*.²⁹ The goals included the attempt to raise their cause to an all-German and then an all-European one, the promotion of a supra-national European State — with its implications of “rolling back communism” — the enlistment of Western, especially American support, the dissemination of information to publicize their views, and the integration of Sudeten Germans into the BRD economy. The last of these goals, accomplished by the *Wirtschaftswunder*,* will not be discussed in this essay. The first five, however, will be examined in depth.

The early years of the SL were marked both with success and occasional failure. The *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen* conferred respectability on the SL and further reputability was bestowed upon the organization with the promulgation of the Wiesbaden Agreement in 1950. This document was concluded between the Czech National Committee — an organization of exiled non-communist Czechs — and the SL. Apart from an abiding belief in democracy, the Wiesbaden Agreement recognized the right of Sudeten Germans to return to the homeland, bound both signatories to work for the liberation of the Czech people, rejected the theory of collective guilt, and established claims for the compensation of

*economic miracle

damages suffered by either party.³⁰ This last point is noteworthy, for the SL was the only expellee organization to claim compensation for the expulsions.³¹ This claim contradicted the spirit of the *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, for it raised the spectre of retaliation for injury. However, the SL leadership found no difficulty reconciling the two, which suggests that beneath the façade of formal, peaceful declarations lay latent feelings of resentment. Nevertheless, the Wiesbaden Agreement enhanced the position of the SL, for it was the only *Landsmannschaft* to cement such a "foreign" agreement, and showed the type of supra-national state the Sudeten Germans desired in Europe. Evidently, this state was supposed to be democratic and non-totalitarian, implying that the elimination of communism from Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to the return to the homeland.

SL reaction to political events within West Germany and Western Europe serves as an indication of the organization's goals. The SL supported the European Defense Community and decried its demise in 1954.³² In 1955, the SL supported Germany's entrance into NATO and logically German rearmament.³³ Again in 1957, the SL approved of the European Common Market because "This marks another great milestone on the way to uniting the free peoples of Europe."³⁴ One year later, the Sudeten German Council rejected the Soviet Peace Plan because it sought German recognition of the Sudetenland as part of Czechoslovakia and the legalization of the expulsions.³⁵ The reasons the SL supported economic and military organizations was intrinsically related to the objective of constructing a supra-national European State and pushing back communism. Additionally, co-operation among Western European countries may have facilitated SL opportunities to enlist aid for their cause and as a consequence thereof, hasten the return of their homeland.

Initially, the SL endeavoured to elevate the Sudeten Question to national importance. This attempt was met with marked success and should be traced for its past, present and future implications. Even before the SL had established a national headquarters, Sudeten Germans were represented in the German Bundestag and the Bavarian Landtag. West Germany's political parties were quite supportive of expellee aims in general, and Sudeten Germans in particular. This should come as no surprise for in 1950, West Germany's population of 47,696,000 included 7,900,000 expellees, or 16% of the population.³⁶ Sudeten Germans, 1,900,000 of them, constituted 20% of Bavaria's population.³⁷ It would have been extremely difficult for political parties to ignore

such a large part of the populace, particularly since most expellee groups, like the Sudeten Germans, were well-organized. Initially, Sudeten Germans seemed to support political parties dependent upon the degree to which the party catered to their stated objectives. In 1950, a political party, the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (BHE) (the organization of expellees and those deprived of their rights) was created expressly to serve expellee interests.³⁸ However, being as socially, economically, and politically diverse as any other group, Sudeten Germans cast votes for all political parties. A brief examination of each follows.

The CDU (Christian Democratic Union), as the party in power after 1949, made a special effort to attract expellee support.³⁹ In 1945, the party established a special sub-branch led by expellees "primarily responsible for formulating expellee and refugee policy for the CDU."⁴⁰ The party's 1953 Hamburg Program upheld claims to the homeland and insisted on the right of self-determination.⁴¹ In 1966, when the BRD moved toward improved relations with Czechoslovakia, the CDU reiterated its 1953 stance, but explained that it sought reconciliation with East Bloc countries.⁴² On the regional and national levels, the CDU got marginally smaller support from expellees than the SPD (Social Democratic Party), despite its control of government and more conservative slant.

The SPD, unlike the CDU, did not establish a special expellee infra-organization until the mid-1960's but did exert efforts to obtain expellee votes.⁴³ The Bad Godesberg Party Program of 1959 explicitly demanded "Recht aller Menschen auf ihre Heimat, ihr Volkstum, ihre Sprache und Kultur."⁴⁴ However, the SPD was criticized by the CDU and CSU for being too soft towards Eastern Europe.⁴⁵ Especially after the erection of the Berlin Wall, the SPD was the vanguard of political parties adopting a more flexible attitude towards East Bloc countries.⁴⁶ Perhaps because expellees were more likely to be economically disadvantaged, the SPD, despite its policies, received substantial expellee support.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP) position regarding expellees was similar to the SPD's. In its 1957 Berlin Program, it advocated the right of self-determination, the right to the homeland, and the rights of free mankind.⁴⁷ Because the FDP was so much smaller than the SPD and CDU, its expellee mandate was correspondingly smaller.

The Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian counterpart and essentially smaller partner of the CDU, usually espoused the same

*The right of all people to their homeland, nation, language and culture.

program as its big brother. However, the CSU's chairman, Franz Josef Strauss, was perhaps one of the most outspoken supporters of expellee interests.⁴⁸ In 1961 in a resolution supporting the SL's 20-Point Program (see below), the CSU stated it felt particularly closely tied to and responsible for the Sudeten Germans.⁴⁹ Moreover, "Die CSU ist bereit, entsprechende Anträge der SL mit besonderer Bereitwilligkeit zu unterstützen."⁵⁰ This attention to Sudeten German interests has been undoubtedly rewarded at the polling place.

Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly one of the most ephemeral political parties, was the BHE. Created in 1950 specifically to represent expellee interests, it obtained Bundestag representation only once, in 1957, and declined rapidly thereafter.⁵¹ During its existence, Sudeten Germans voted the BHE ticket more than for any other political party, and supported the BHE more than any other expellee organization. The BHE eventually failed because of internal dissension, economic integration of expellees, and demographic factors.⁵² The SL did not mourn the BHE collapse, but neither did it accurately gauge Sudeten German support of the party. SL President Lodgman von Auen explained after the BHE's electoral failure in 1957, "The BHE/GB's loss of votes in the last election is no symptom of shifting interests among expellees with regard to German reunification or the lost German territory in the East. The BHE/GB never represented a majority among expellees."⁵³

The National Democratic Party (NPD), a neo-fascist group which grew in size in the 1960's, was another party which tried to attract expellee support.⁵⁴ The party was formed in 1964, and although it never broke the 5% barrier for a national mandate, it achieved regional representation. The NPD program, a mixture of nationalism, pan-germanism, and irredentism, seemed attractive to expellees. According to the NPD, the Sudetenland had been legally ceded to Hitler in 1938 in fulfillment of the principle of self-determination.⁵⁵ Thus the region was still considered a part of Germany, contrary to Government declarations which only recognized 1937 borders. In spite of the expulsions, "the Sudeten German's right to the homeland...has not been extinguished," and the NPD "pledges especially to support the SL in its battle for rights."⁵⁶ Many expellee organizations denounced the NPD as neo-fascist, however the SL was not among them.⁵⁷ Notwithstanding Sudeten German support, the NPD expired as a political party by

*"The CSU is ready to support suitable proposals of the SL with marked enthusiasm."

1970.⁵⁸ The SL, as shown below, had certainly become less politically active by this time as well. It appears that the NPD took with them their radicalism and rightist-extremism, and these -isms no longer seem to have an audience among Sudeten Germans.

On the whole, expellees as a group have come to support the major democratic parties.⁵⁹ Although 20% of all expellees "were attracted to the BHE's thin mixture of narrow economic appeal and nostalgic nationalism" this did not prevent that party's decline.⁶⁰ Indeed, one historian credits the BHE with "having organized sections of the population that were ready to swing to radicalism, of having helped to make them feel that there was a place for them in West German politics, and of having led them to participate in the processes of a new democracy."⁶¹ Whatever the case may be, the Sudeten Germans seemed to have followed the broad path towards moderation. They gave disproportionate support in comparison with other expellee groups to rightist parties — the BHE and NPD — but have gradually succumbed to mitigating political, social, and economic forces. The German economy has successfully absorbed them, Bonn's social legislation (*i.e.*, Equalization of Burdens) has recognized many of their claims, and they generally have acquired a stake in society.⁶² Sudeten Germans today are indistinguishable in their political preferences from other West Germans. Therefore, political parties, especially since the SPD came to power in 1969, have made much less of an effort to attract expellee support.⁶³

In retrospect, the number of Sudeten German representatives has fluctuated in the Bundestag, but increased absolutely in both parliaments between 1946 and 1965. The numbers themselves explain little, but government statements at the time tell that the ballot box voice of the Sudeten Germans was not insubstantial. For example, West Germany responded to the 1950 Prague Agreement by rejecting it. The Prague Agreement was a treaty of friendship between East Germany and Czechoslovakia of 14 July 1950 in which Pankow and Prague sanctioned the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans and recognized the Oder-Neisse line.⁶⁴ Bonn said that Pankow was unauthorized to represent the German peoples and refused to surrender the right of the homeland of Germans from Czechoslovakia who "had been placed under the protective patronage of the BRD."⁶⁵ Of course, Bonn reacted to national and international anti-communist pressures distinct from the Sudeten German constituency, but the proclamation was undoubtedly a victory if not a life-saver for the SL. In 1954, Bavaria became the official patron of the SL.⁶⁶ The then Bavarian Minister President, Dr. Hans Ehard, after declaring Bavarian patronage, stated that his

land would do everything in its power to support Sudeten German claims to their homeland.⁶⁷ Among his many reasons for declaring this patronage, Ehard was certainly motivated by politics, as the Sudeten Germans comprised 1.9 million of Bavaria's population. Ehard's political magnanimity was also a significant step toward raising the political consciousness of the German people on the Sudeten Question. Shortly thereafter, BRD foreign minister Dr. von Brentano assured the Sudeten Germans that "The West German Government (would) adhere to the 1950 resolution according to which it had pledged the German expellees its guardianship of their rights to the homeland in Czechoslovakia."⁶⁸ A few months later on 28 June 1956, Brentano reiterated this position adding that Bonn backed "the rights to the homeland and self-determination right of people as an unconditional prerequisite for the resolution of the fate of those persons in exile or slavery."⁶⁹ This statement was admittedly ambiguous, for exiles could refer to all inhabitants of communist ruled countries or more specifically ethnic Germans still living in communist countries. Yet, the SL inferred support of their aspirations from Brentano's remark, which was perhaps most important. Final proof that the SL had succeeded in elevating theirs to an all-German cause came as a subsection of the Hallstein Doctrine. In 1956, at the 161st session of the Bundestag, State Secretary Hallstein, *inter alia*, recognized expellees' right to the homeland and self-determination.⁷⁰ On the heels of this proclamation, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag stated that the Federal Government was "charged with defending the legal claim to German eastern territories and the expellees' right to the homeland *vis-à-vis* foreign governments."⁷¹

These proclamations signified SL success at solidifying the Sudeten Problem within the political mind of West Germany. Their success at the European level, however, was much less impressive. In 1960, Dr. Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, past president of the SL, wrote that the SL ought to extend the Sudeten German cause abroad by establishing relations with exile groups outside of Europe and their respective organizations.⁷² The absolute dearth of information on this objective in subsequent issues of the *Sudeten Bulletin*, while not proving its failure, definitely indicate the insignificance of its result. This was one of the problems of the SL; it was never able, beyond symbolic gestures, to obtain foreign or international recognition of its cause. Much hoopla was given to the Nationalist Chinese who, on 11 December 1956, brought before a plenary session of the UN the question of the German expulsions after World War II.⁷³ Seen as a step toward the international recognition

of expellee legal claims, it had only minor repercussions and the UN did not pass a resolution. A similar failure occurred when the SL tried to obtain Radio Free Europe (RFE) airtime to project their views and broadcast Sudeten German programs. Czech commentators on the RFE opposed the SL and were vehemently attacked for their anti-Sudeten German stance. One SL spokesman said, "The RFE has developed into a stronghold of the late Dr. Benes' National Socialist Party."⁷⁴ The SL was unable to obtain RFE airtime and called for its own expellee transmitter station.⁷⁵ This project, too, never reached fruition, and ultimately, the SL had to be content with transmissions by Radio Madrid of Sudeten German programs in the Czech language.⁷⁶ This string of failures marked SL attempts to achieve international recognition of their cause. The one exception, the one country that did take notice of the SL was the USA, although in a half-hearted, superficial way. Perhaps because Bavaria, the home of the majority of Sudeten Germans, had been part of the American Zone, or perhaps because the USA had a guilty conscience arising from the Potsdam Agreement, which, among other things, had sanctioned the expulsions, a steady stream of US Congressmen and Senators sent congratulatory messages to the SL every year upon the annual *Sudetendeutscher Tag*, approving their intentions and encouraging their aims.⁷⁷ For example, Senator Strom Thurmond wrote in 1957, "The spirit of independence demonstrated by the Sudeten Germans who suffered such great persecution at the hands of the communist-led government should inspire the world."⁷⁸ The inaccuracy of this statement — the Benes-led National Socialist Government, not the communists, first expelled the Sudeten Germans — typified American ignorance of Central European history and proved that US support was probably part of a general anti-communist stance for domestic political profit rather than a knowledgeable response to perceived injustice. Furthermore, the Senator's message proved that despite all efforts, the SL had failed to elevate the Sudeten Question to the international level or to enlist the whole-hearted support of the West. As the SL president lamented in 1957, the West was interested only in combatting communists in Europe and has yet to move beyond theoretical declamations on the expellee issue.⁷⁹

Against these prevailing currents, the SL participated in the World Refugee Year of 1959, and in 1961 the Sudeten German Council joined the Federalist Union of European Ethnic Groups.⁸⁰ The latter meant that from then on the Sudeten German Council still represented the 165,000 Sudeten Germans still living in Czechoslovakia. However, neither action significantly enhanced the

international position of the SL.

1961 was a benchmark year for the SL. There surfaced an internal conflict between the wish to accommodate political realities in Europe and the desire to continue the hard-line policies. One Sudeten German leader voicing the latter opinion explained that the SL "(does) not want to be a mere cultural society, or an auxiliary wing of political parties, but an ethnic organization with responsibilities and aspirations unique for all times."⁸¹ However, his was a dissenting voice amidst a growing acceptance of a conciliatory line. The 20-Point Program of 1961, while retaining many hard-line positions to pacify SL right-wingers, was the first indication of the SL's new direction.

The Annual Rally

The annual Sudeten German Rally (*Sudetendeutscher Tag*) has been and continues to be the most prominent event of the SL. As a measure of Sudeten German vitality, the rally reveals an almost uninterrupted well-being since the first one took place in 1950.⁸² Because this event provides a common thread in the SL chronology, it constitutes an appropriate transition from the first to the second period of SL history.

In the early years, the rally offered expellees the opportunity to find family and encounter old friends.⁸³ It also enabled the SL to remind the public of the right to the homeland and self-determination and to denounce the Czech Government.⁸⁴ Later, the rallies increasingly became a forum for politicians and an exhibition of Sudeten German culture (*i.e.*, sports, dances, plays, and parades).⁸⁵ Looking at pictures of the rally in the *Sudeten Bulletin*, one is struck overwhelmingly by the predominance of elderly people. Certainly the annual rally was for many simply a reunion, a time to get together to share memories of the homeland and reminisce about old times.

The number of Sudeten Germans who attended these rallies is instructive, if only in showing the extent of support for the SL and the unflagging desire of Sudeten Germans to congregate year after year. Even given the difficulty of accurately estimating such large numbers and the likely tendency of the *Sudeten Bulletin* to exaggerate, the attendance figures are impressive and reveal that there has been an attraction, be it political posturing, cultural exhibitions, or simply fond memories that has consistently drawn Sudeten Germans to the rallies.

It was usual at the rallies for SL leaders to direct verbal

exhortations at the Federal Government or Prague. Frequently, BRD representatives came to the *Sudetendeutscher Tag* as well to explain government policies with regard to expellees, as Foreign Minister von Brentano did in 1956.⁸⁶ Congratulatory messages always poured in from abroad, especially from the US, demonstrating the perceived importance of the rallies. Prague, on the other hand, often denigrated the rally, viewing it as a symbol of German revanchism. In 1956, *Rude Pravo*, Prague's newspaper, labelled the event a "rusty weapon left over from the stubborn period of the cold war."⁸⁷

The purpose of the rally, in the opinion of a member of the Bavarian Landtag, was basically to remind the world of the expulsions and reaffirm the Sudeten German claim to the homeland.⁸⁸ With the passage of time and the repercussions of such events as the erection of the Berlin Wall, the establishment of a BRD trade mission in Prague and the suppression of the "Prague Spring," the purpose of the rally gradually changed. In 1970, one spokesman described the rally as a "testimony of support for Europe, justice, and the preservation of peace."⁸⁹ The late 60's and early 70's witnessed a mitigation of Sudeten German rhetoric at the annual rally and West Germany's establishment of diplomatic relations with Prague in 1973 reinforced this trend. In more recent years, with West Germany's growing desire to improve ties with East Germany (DDR), the rally has once again become a platform for national politicians. At the thirty-fifth rally in 1984, BRD President Karl Carstens praised the Sudeten Germans for their intellectual and cultural contributions to Germany and their role in preserving Eastern German traditions.⁹⁰ As the hope of German reunification receives new life, it is possible that the *Sudetendeutscher Tag* will regain some of its lost luster while the SL itself may recoup some of its past political prestige.

The Second Period (1961-1973)

The second period of SL history covers the period 1961 to 1973 and witnessed many events of far-reaching importance in Central Europe. The period was characterized by temporizing action on the part of the SL as the organization endeavoured to withstand forces that generally ameliorated relations between West Germany and Czechoslovakia. Throughout this period, the SL maintained its existing political objectives. However, in line with numerous West German diplomatic decisions which the SL perceived to threaten its future, SL leaders exerted a greater effort to influence the BRD

government. Paradoxically, the failure of the SL to prevent, or even attempt to impede Germany from establishing diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia (CSSR) did not spell the end for the organization. Instead, that event, which marks the close of the second period, confirmed the SL propensity to focus on cultural and historical activities over political agitation as the sustaining purpose of the organization.

The Sudeten German 20-Point Program of 7 May 1961 demarcates the beginning of the second period of SL history. Beneath a biased view of the expulsions, evidence of appeasement was present. For the first time, the SL recognized that the Munich Agreement, which it had hitherto regarded as legal and just according to international law, was a document of dubious character.⁹¹ The SL also reversed its position concerning negotiations with the CSSR. The criterion of SL policy had always been to "reject negotiations with persons who instigated or carried out the expulsions."⁹² The new program averred that "people are to be judged exclusively by what they think of the expulsion today and what they are sincerely working for today."⁹³ Although this last point specifically referred to Sudeten Germans, it implied a more tolerant attitude toward Prague as well. Finally, the right of self-determination, though reiterated in its traditional form, was qualified by point 19 which explained that self-determination "admitted different constitutional or international solutions."⁹⁴

The 20-Point Program set the SL upon a new path of pragmatism. It arose largely from the realization by SL leaders that the West judged other international problems as more important than the expellee question.⁹⁵ Additionally, trends visible within the BRD government portended improved relations with Central Europe. Indeed, on 14 June 1961 the Bundestag passed a resolution calling for a gradual normalization of relations with Central European countries.⁹⁶ Apparently, the SL leaders were not purblind and, in a sense, were accommodating themselves to diplomatic developments.

One result of the 20-Point Program was that each of the major political parties of West Germany endorsed the new, liberal program as a solution to the Sudeten German Question.⁹⁷ Party support of the SL, as has been shown, was not unprecedented and in fact dated back to 1950. At that time, all of the West German parliamentary parties had sanctioned the *Obhutserklärung*.⁹⁸ In this Declaration of Protection, the BRD Government promised to protect the rights of Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia.⁹⁹ Although the parties renewed their support of the SL in 1961, they concurred with Bonn that the BRD had no territorial claims against the CSSR,

but that this did not prejudice the inalienable rights of the Sudeten Germans to their homeland.¹⁰⁰ This disclaimer was an important qualification that reflected Bonn's desire to improve relations with Central Europe. As such, it served notice to the SL that their political position was perhaps not as strong as it had previously been.

Any hope engendered by the 20-Point Program for a return to the homeland was stricken when the Berlin Wall was erected during the night of 13 August 1961. More than any other single event, this action drove home to the SL as well as the rest of the world the permanence of Germany's division. The SL's prerequisite for returning to the Sudetenland — the reunification of Germany followed by the founding of a supra-national European state — received a severe, if not fatal, blow. The shock waves that rumbled through the world community affected the Sudeten Germans no less than any other Germans, and it perhaps indicated that a more practical strategy was in order. That this was not immediately the case is illustrated by SL actions in the early 1960's.

In 1962, members of the Bavarian Diet, evidently responding to pressure from Sudeten German constituents, sent a letter to the Federal Minister of Justice of the BRD. The letter demanded the extradition or punishment of those Czechoslovak citizens responsible for the deaths of 300,000 Sudeten Germans during the expulsions.¹⁰¹ This behest contradicted the spirit of the *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen* and scarcely mirrored the more conciliatory aims outline in the 20-Point Program. Apparently, the Berlin Wall and its implications for the SL had boosted conservative sentiment within the organization.¹⁰² Bavaria's reaffirmation of its patronage of the Sudeten Germans shortly thereafter may have been related to this forward, aggressive attitude. Yet, the pre-eminence of this hard-line was short-lived.

On 11 December 1962 Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, past president of the SL and staunch conservative, died.¹⁰³ The passing of Auen seemed to weaken conservative initiative among Sudeten Germans, for in 1963, when Bonn began to consider establishing a trade mission in Prague, the Sudeten Council acted reasonably. It passed a resolution which stated in part, "The Sudeten German Council welcomes all endeavours aimed at improved relations between the two peoples."¹⁰⁴ Assuredly the council restricted its resolution by warning the BRD government to avoid recognizing Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the pragmatic, more "liberal" attitude initiated in 1961 appeared once again to prevail.

Pragmatism, however, did not prevent the negotiations between Prague and Bonn from being stormy. The CSSR demanded that

West Germany annul the Munich Agreement *hic et nunc* as a precondition to negotiations.¹⁰⁵ The SL went into a frenzied state announcing that an annulment would be extremely detrimental to their cause, essentially invalidating their claims to the homeland.¹⁰⁶ Eventually the negotiations were concluded with the Munich Agreement intact. However, the near catastrophe exposed the precarious position of the SL and the willingness of Bonn to ponder, though not as yet bargain with, Hitler's 1938 diplomatic coup. The *Münchener Abkommen* had possibly become the vulnerable shield of a retreating SL knight.

The SL knight arguably lost that vulnerable shield in 1966. In April of that year, West Germany transmitted a Peace Note to Prague avowing "The BRD is of the opinion that the Munich Agreement of 1938 was torn up by Hitler and that it is no longer of territorial significance."¹⁰⁷ Although Bonn did not explicitly annul the Munich Agreement, it was clear that SL objections had been overridden and Bonn was finally pursuing better formal relations with the CSSR.¹⁰⁸ Perhaps partly as a result of the Peace Note, partly as a result of declining interest in the Sudeten Question in the West, the *Sudeten Bulletin* underwent major changes in 1966. The bulletin dropped its title, merged with another publication, the *German News*, and was renamed the *Central European Journal*.¹⁰⁹ The editor, Anton Wuschek, explained that the bulletin's content would deal with historical and contemporary European affairs instead of solely Czech-German relations and Sudeten German issues.¹¹⁰ More important, the primary emphasis was thenceforth to be placed upon "articles concerned with modern history, international relations, arts, economics, and the current affairs of Central Europe."¹¹¹ That its major English language publication no longer focused exclusively on Sudeten German issues implied that treatment of such issues no longer supported an English-speaking readership. Western, especially American, heed of the Sudeten German Question had either declined or been replaced with a greater desire for a European detente. In any case, the SL presumably believed that its cause would be better served by stressing a broader spectrum of Central European topics instead of specific Sudeten German matters.

Two years after Bonn's Peace Note and the reorganization of the *Sudeten Bulletin*, Russian troops cracked down on blossoming intellectual and personal freedoms in Czechoslovakia.¹¹² The suppression of the Prague Spring, as it came to be known, affected both Bonn and Sudeten German leaders. Franz Josef Strauss, chairman of the CSU, must have expressed the feelings of many

Germans when he said "a curtain (fell) on the prospects for a peaceful coexistence with the East Bloc states, obscuring a view of the future."¹¹³ But the event elicited no further response in the *Central European Journal*.¹¹⁴ The silence of the journal is possibly indicative of Sudeten German disinterest and depoliticization with regard to the country of their homeland. If this is the case, it reinforced the already visible trend — axiomatic in the *Sudeten Bulletin*'s merger and change — away from purely Sudeten German political issues.

In 1970 Bavaria established the House of the German East for the Sudeten Germans in Munich.¹¹⁵ The purpose of this institution was twofold: first and foremost was to preserve the Sudeten German cultural heritage and second, to provide a place where peoples from all over Europe could meet to exchange ideas. In a closing address at the official opening of the House, a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences defined the House as follows, "These houses are a socio-political, and interpersonal necessity; they depoliticize and de-ideologize old concepts and relations... At stake is a new healthy attitude on the part of Germans from the East ...towards a new intellectual and cultural focus in Europe."¹¹⁶ As a reflection of the trend away from political activism, as a signpost indicating a new cultural-historical orientation for Sudeten Germans, and as a result of Central European diplomatic realities, the *Haus des deutschen Ostens* symbolized the SL revelation that they were not going to ever regain the homeland. Hence, the best, and perhaps only way to preserve the Heimat for their children was to create a place where their arts, handicrafts, customs, and traditions would be preserved.

The evolution of the SL from a politically oriented organization to a homeland preservation association probably made it easier for the Sudeten Germans to accept the Bonn-Prague Treaty of 1973.¹¹⁷ During preliminary negotiations, the SL magnanimously offered "its expert knowledge and advice" to the BRD Government.¹¹⁸ It is quite likely that Bonn did not avail itself of the offer, for the treaty was highly unsatisfactory to the Sudeten Germans, although it probably would have been so under any circumstance. Once the treaty was signed establishing formal diplomatic relations between West Germany and Czechoslovakia, an outcry arose from SL leaders. But it was more the form the treaty took than the fact of the treaty itself which provoked them.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, indignation among SL leaders was so great that Bavaria, as patron of the Sudeten Germans, was compelled to reject the treaty.¹²⁰ One Sudeten German explaining his displeasure said, "The Bonn-

Prague Treaty perpetuates the tragedy of 3½ million Sudeten Germans who had no effective voice in any one of the significant historical decisions affecting their fates as a people."¹²¹ Needless to say, the anti-treaty protest had no tangible effect on the ratification of the treaty. To all intents and purposes, the treaty simply reconciled the political reality of the loss of the Sudetenland with the personal conviction of many Sudeten Germans. The only apparent victim of the treaty, the *Central European Journal*, ceased publication shortly after the treaty was promulgated.¹²² The SL must have decided to channel its journalistic energies in other, more fruitful and probably less political directions. Twenty-five years after first going to press, the journal ended, culminating the second period in SL history.

The Third Period (1974-1984) And Conclusion

The third period in SL history, dating from 1974 to the present, is notable primarily for the dearth of information this writer was able to obtain. Indeed, only a few recent speeches and an article or two were located. However, with an eye to trends evident within the SL at the time of the Bonn-Prague Treaty, the balance of the 1970's was liable to have been marked by continued emphasis on cultural activities and a further decline in interest in the Eastern Question. Attendance at the annual rally dipped enormously between 1974 and 1984, supporting this hypothesis. Aging must have contributed to a declining interest in the homeland; most Sudeten Germans who had been adults in 1945 have probably died. Furthermore, for those Sudeten Germans who had experienced the expulsions and are still alive, the passage of time inevitably heals emotional and psychological wounds, including those caused by the loss of the Sudetenland. Polls taken in the 1950's and 1960's had demonstrated the diminishing desire of expellees to return to the homeland, and one author attributes this to the Berlin Wall and the complete economic integration of expellees by 1961.¹²³ If public clamoring for *Die Recht auf Heimat** did not always decline in correspondence to the true desires of expellees, this was because there was often a disparity between what some expellee leaders professed and what their followers believed.¹²⁴ On the whole, Sudeten Germans had no desire, even if given the opportunity, to return to the Sudetenland, and this accounted, most likely, for the growing lack of interest in political activity aimed at regaining the

*The right to a homeland.

homeland and the increasing stress placed upon institutions like the German House of the East.

Very recently there appears to have been a resurgence in interest in the expellee question and Sudeten Question. West German *Bundeskanzler* Helmut Kohl remarked in June, 1983, that the BRD does not "accept our German compatriots being denied the right to self-determination and their human rights being violated."¹²⁵ On 9 February 1984 Kohl appeared at the *Tag der Heimat des Bundes der Vertriebenen* (Day of the Homeland sponsored by the Association of Expellees) and enunciated the belief that expellees had been a constructive force in their support of democracy and peace in West Germany.¹²⁶ He went on to state "ich setze mich ein für ein geeintes Europa, das uns allen Heimat ist und bleiben kann."¹²⁷ With East and West Germany moving closer over the last several years, speculation about reunification has become rife, and this obviously has great significance for all expellees. SL objectives for a supranational European state are alluded to in Kohl's "geeintes Europa," and in the desire for peace, a unified Europe may lead at long last to a peace treaty ending World War II. On the thirty-fifth annual *Sudetendeutscher Tag*, Franz Josef Strauss, speaking to 50,000 Sudeten Germans, said, "Die Teilung Europas und Deutschlands werde sich ändern, auch wenn es noch so lange dauert."¹²⁸ Expellee groups like the SL may still have a role to play in Europe's future. Very few things are absolutely certain, but we can be reasonably sure about two things concerning the SL: the Sudetenland will in all probability never again be occupied by Sudeten Germans; and secondly, this is no longer a crucial matter to Sudeten Germans. Content where they are, Sudeten Germans will sustain memories of the homeland through institutions such as the Munich House of the German East and the SL, having refocused its attention on cultural and historical matters, will continue to exist for some time.

*"I declare that I am for a united Europe, that is and can remain a homeland for all of us."

**"The partition of Europe and Germany will be changed, no matter how long it takes."

Notes

1. *The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1983, p. 815.
2. "Sudeten German 20-Point Program," *Sudeten Bulletin*, ed. Anton Wuschek (Munich: Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft), June, 1961, pp. 150-52.
3. Smelser, Ronald M. *The Sudeten Problem: 1933-1938* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 9.
4. Sudeten Germans comprised approximately one-fifth of Czechoslovakia's population of 14 million in 1930. *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line*, ed. Theodor Schieder, trans. G.H. de Sausmarez et al. (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1960), Vol. IV, pp. 7, 17.
5. Schoenberg, Hans W. *Germans from the East: A Study of Their Migration, Resettlement, and Subsequent Group History Since 1945* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 99-100.
6. Luza, Radomir *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations 1933-1962* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), pp. 310-312.
7. Smelser, p. 120.
8. Bachstein, Martin K. *Wenzel Jaksch und die Sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie*, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1974), pp. 184-5.
9. Theodor Schieder, p. 127.
10. Schoenberg, p. 96.
11. *Sudeten Bulletin*, September, 1954, pp. 1-3.
12. Luza, pp. 320-21.
13. *Sudeten Bulletin*, November, 1959, p. 219.
14. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1956, p. 75.
15. *Op. cit.*, July, 1959, p. 71.
16. Schoenberg, p. 96.
17. *Loc. cit.* The Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV), a national organization comprising twenty Landsmannschaften, among them the SL, when formed in 1957 had a membership of 2.8 million (*Sudeten Bulletin*, December, 1957, p. 149). In 1970, the BdV's membership was 2.7 million (Meyer's *Enzyklopädisches Lexikon*, 1972, p. 67). Assuming SL membership has remained relatively constant, one can posit that it has declined but slightly over the ten year period.
18. *Sudeten Bulletin*, June 1954, p. 1.
19. *Op. cit.*, February, 1954, p. 2.
20. *Loc. cit.*
21. *Op. cit.*, March, 1955, p. 1.
22. *Op. cit.*, June 1961, p. 150.
23. Schoenberg, p. 97.
24. *Sudeten Bulletin*, September, 1958, pp. 177-78.
25. *Op. cit.*, September, 1958, p. 178.
26. *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, promulgated on 5 August 1950 in Cannstatt near Stuttgart, West Germany.

27. "State of the Nation in a Divided Germany," address by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the German Bundestag on 23 June 1983 (German Information Center, 950 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022 — *Statements and Speeches*, Vol. VI, No. 12).
28. *Die Zeit* (article received from German Information Center without a date — unable to ascertain date by research at SML).
29. "Detmold Declaration," *Sudeten Bulletin*, April 1960, p. 175.
30. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1954, p. 7.
31. Schoenberg, p. 200.
32. *Sudeten Bulletin*, December 1954, p. 2.
33. *Op. cit.*, March, 1955, p. 2 and May, 1955, p. 51–53.
34. *Op. cit.*, May, 1957, p. 49.
35. *Op. cit.*, April, 1959, p. 91.
36. Schoenberg, pp. 37, 43.
37. *Loc. cit.*
38. Walton, Henry. *Germany* (New York, Walker and Company, 1969), p. 59.
39. Schoenberg, pp. 244–45.
40. *Loc. cit.*
41. *Loc. cit.*
42. *Loc. cit.*
43. Schoenberg, p. 246.
44. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Lösungsversuchen 1918–1973*, ed. Wolfgang Götz (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag GmbH, 1974), p. 112.
45. Schoenberg, p. 246.
46. *Op. cit.*, pp. 248–49.
47. *Op. cit.*, p. 252.
48. *Op. cit.*, pp. 244–45.
49. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage in der Deutschen Politik*, herausgegeben vom Sudetendeutschen Rat E.V. München (Mitteleuropäische Quellen und Dokumente, Band 9), (München: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei und Verlag Dr. C. Wolf & Sohn, 1965), p. 9.
50. *Loc. cit.*
51. Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Kommers, Donald P. *The Governments of Germany* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1975), p. 95.
52. Kitzinger, V.W. *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 291.
53. *Sudeten Bulletin*, November, 1957, p. 133.
54. Schoenberg, pp. 297–98.
55. *Op. cit.*, p. 299.
56. *Loc. cit.*
57. *Op. cit.*, p. 303.
58. Nagle, John David. *The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970).
59. Schoenberg, p. 304.
60. Long, Wellington. *The New Nazis of Germany* (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1969), p. 123.
61. *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
62. Kitzinger, p. 10.
63. Schoenberg, pp. 314–15.

64. *Sudeten Bulletin*, December, 1964, p. 370.
65. *Op. cit.*, December 1961, p. 370.
66. *Op. cit.*, January, 1959, p. 2.
67. *Op. cit.*, April, 1955, p. 46.
68. *Loc. cit.*
69. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1956, p. 74 and November, 1956, p. 121.
70. *Op. cit.*, November, 1956, p. 121.
71. *Op. cit.*, January, 1965, p. 33.
72. *Op. cit.*, April, 1960, p. 175.
73. *Op. cit.*, February, 1957, p. 23.
74. *Op. cit.*, December, 1955, pp. 3–4.
75. *Op. cit.*, May, 1957, p. 132.
76. *Op. cit.*, April, 1960, p. 175.
77. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1957, p. 79.
78. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1957, p. 80.
79. *Op. cit.*, June, 1957, p. 80.
80. *Op. cit.*, January, 1961, p. 18.
81. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1961, p. 18.
82. *Op. cit.*, April, 1954, p. 5.
83. Schoenberg, pp. 118–19.
84. *Sudeten Bulletin*, April 1954, pp. 5–6.
85. Schoenberg, pp. 118–119.
86. *Sudeten Bulletin*, May 1956, pp. 73–74.
87. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1956, p. 75.
88. *Op. cit.*, June, 1957, p. 61.
89. *Op. cit.*, June, 1970, p. 291.
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91. "Sudeten German 20-Point Program," *Sudeten Bulletin*, June 1961, pp. 150–52.
92. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1954, p. 40.
93. *Op. cit.*, June, 1961, pp. 150–52.
94. *Loc. cit.*
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97. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage in der Deutschen Politik*, pp. 49–54.
98. Schoenberg, p. 249.
99. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage in der Deutschen Politik*, p. 49.
100. Schoenberg, p. 250.
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102. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage in der Deutschen Politik*, p. 112.
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104. *Op. cit.*, December, 1963, pp. 398–99.
105. *Op. cit.*, December, 1964, p. 363.
106. *Op. cit.*, December, 1964, pp. 349–50.
107. *Op. cit.*, November, 1970, p. 408.
108. Schoenberg, p. 284.
109. *Central European Journal* (i.e., *Sudeten Bulletin*), January, 1966, p. 1.
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111. *Loc. cit.*
112. *Op. cit.*, April, 1969, p. 113.
113. *Loc. cit.*
114. *Op. cit.*, October, 1968, pp. 303–08.

115. *Op. cit.*, June, 1970, p. 229.
116. *Op. cit.*, December, 1970, pp. 473-74.
117. *Op. cit.*, August/September, 1973, pp. 213-14.
118. *Op. cit.*, August/September, 1972, p. 293.
119. *Op. cit.*, March, 1974, p. 51.
120. *Loc. cit.*
121. *Op. cit.*, August/September, 1973, p. 216.
122. The last issue of the *Central European Journal* was issued for December, 1974.
123. Schoenberg, pp. 292-94.
124. Conradt, David P. *The German Polity* (New York: Longman, Inc., 1978), p. 72.
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126. *Auszüge aus der 1984 Rede von Bundeskanzler Kohl auf der Kundgebung des Bundes der Vertriebenen zum "Tag der Heimat" in Braunschweig am 2.9.* (Veröffentlicht von BPA — provided by German Information Center.)
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Not Just Japanese Americans: The Untold Story of U.S. Repression During "The Good War"

JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL

I. Pre-Pearl Harbor

The sad saga of civil liberties in the United States during the Second World War begins well before Pearl Harbor. The popular impression is that the Japanese surprise attack in December 1941 caught the U.S. government totally unaware. In an effort to counter this impression, countless Revisionist historians have raked over the diplomatic events that proceeded the attack.¹ Yet, prior domestic developments within the U.S. probably belie the impression of U.S. unpreparedness much more forcefully. For the U.S. government was, without a doubt, better prepared to fight World War II than any previous war in its history.

This unprecedented military preparedness resulted from a massive prewar mobilization that involved 1 the U.S.'s first large peacetime foreign aid program: lend-lease; 2 an emergency peacetime military buildup; 3 the first peacetime draft in U.S. history to support that buildup; 4 an array of new and heavy emergency taxes to pay for the buildup; 5 the creation of a new and broad regulatory bureaucracy, supplementing New Deal agencies, to direct the economy toward war production; 6 the use of troops to enforce labor settlements within critical defense industries; and finally 7 the adoption of a peacetime sedition law to suppress disloyalty.²

This last is what concerns us. The pre-Pearl Harbor sedition law, the Smith Act, is more generally known for its postwar enforcement, in a period of tense U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, it was just the most glaring manifestation of the growing precariousness of civil liberties as the nation went on a war

footing prior to its intervention in World War II. The deteriorating international situation brought a rash of related legislation, Congressional inquiries, executive harassment, and state government repression, all aimed at so-called subversive activities.³

Because of disillusionment with the First World War, Americans initially wished to stay out of the Second. An early generation of Revisionist historians had successfully debunked the official justifications for U.S. participation in World War I, and had overturned the judgment of exclusive German war guilt. In 1934 and 1935, a Senate committee, under the chairmanship of Gerald P. Nye, a progressive Republican, investigated the munitions industry. It concluded that American financiers and arms merchants had maneuvered the U.S. into the previous European conflict for their own profit. All of these trends coalesced into a powerful isolationist movement, opposed to any future U.S. involvement in European quarrels.

The debate between the isolationists and interventionists became intense and bitter with the onset of war in Europe. By 1940, a broad-based coalition of noninterventionists had joined together in the America First Committee. Among the committee's luminaries, supporters, and sympathizers were Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, the aviator hero of the twenties; General Robert E. Wood, chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck; Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the conservative *Chicago Tribune*; ex-President Herbert Hoover; labor leader John L. Lewis, who had co-founded the militant Congress of Industrial Organizations as a rival to the American Federation of Labor; Norman Thomas, Socialist Party candidate for President; and progressive Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler from Montana.⁴

Although the isolationists were influential enough to prevent President Franklin D. Roosevelt from dragging the nation overtly into the war before Pearl Harbor, they were unable to prevent the prewar mobilization. Eventually their loyalty came under question, and the government subjected them to increasing harassment. But before that transpired, the State had already honed its repressive instruments upon much less prominent targets on the extreme Right and extreme Left.

Numerous American fascist groups, nearly all minuscule, had sprouted in the Great Depression's fertile soil. The two most vocal were the German-American Bund and the Legion of Silver Shirts. Both groups were virulently anti-Jewish, with paramilitary trappings, and both received public attention grotesquely out of proportion to their numbers. The German-American Bund, virtually but not

officially a U.S. branch of Germany's National Socialist Party, drew its fewer than 25,000 and probably closer to 8,500 members from among recent German immigrants. At its peak, the Bund packed Madison Square Garden in New York with 22,000 sympathizers for a George Washington's birthday rally in 1939. The Silver Shirts was an independent organization, headed by mystic William Dudley Pelley. Its membership may have reached 15,000 in 1934, but thereafter it declined to less than 5,000. None of the native fascist organizations, separately or in combination, ever approached the influence of the Ku Klux Klan in the twenties.⁵

The U.S. Communist Party had likewise experienced a surge during the depression decade, growing from 7,500 in 1930 to 30,000 in 1935. By the mid-thirties, the party had adopted the strategy of joining thousands of non-communists in popular front organizations, such as the American League for Peace and Democracy. Many party members found employment in the burgeoning bureaus of the New Deal. With the signing of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in August 1939, the Communist Party also indirectly arrived at an isolationist foreign policy stance.⁶

Very early in the depression the House's Fish Committee had briefly looked into Communist propaganda. With this one lone exception, the precedent established during the post-World War I Red Scare of Congressional investigation into subversive activity had lain dormant until the German Reichstag granted absolute power to Adolf Hitler in March 1933, the same month as F.D.R.'s inauguration. Immediately, the internal threat to this country from the right received equal billing with the internal threat from the left, in what one historian has recently dubbed the "Brown Scare." The House established a new special committee to investigate these twin "foreign" dangers, with John W. McCormack as chairman and Samuel Dickstein as vice-chairman. The committee released a report in 1935 that branded the Communist Party, the Silver Shirts, and several other organizations as subversive.

The ultimate results of the committee's efforts was enactment in 1938, while events were reaching the boiling point in Europe, of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. This first of the pre-World War II repressive laws provided a maximum penalty of two years and \$1000 (later increased to five years and \$10,000) for anyone whom the U.S. government deemed a "foreign agent" but who failed to register as such with the Secretary of State.

At the time that the Foreign Agents Registration Act passed, the most significant loyalty legislation already on the books was the World War I Espionage Act. The Espionage Act had combined

three features: 1 a true espionage law, which punished spying and wartime sabotage, 2 a neutrality law, which restricted the non-neutral acts of private citizens in foreign conflicts, and 3 a sedition law, providing up to twenty years in jail and a \$10,000 fine for aiding the enemy with "false reports or false statements," for obstructing recruiting, or for causing insubordination, disloyalty, or mutiny in the U.S. armed forces. The act also empowered the Postmaster General to exclude from the mail issues of newspapers and periodicals that he felt were subversive.

The sedition portions of the Espionage Act, however, were inoperative in peacetime. During the infamous Red Scare, the Wilson Administration had sought a peacetime sedition act, but had failed. The Foreign Agents Registration Act represented a minor step toward closing that loophole.

Congress also implemented a second of the McCormack-Dickstein Committee's recommendations: an extension of the Congressional subpoena power beyond the District of Columbia. A new Special House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, created in 1938 with Martin Dies of Texas as chairman, put this added power to effective use. Like its predecessor, the Dies Committee went after both domestic fascists and Communists. It paid greater attention to the latter, however, as Dies, an arch-foe of the New Deal, attempted to taint the Roosevelt Administration with Communist associations. Each succeeding House faithfully renewed the committee, and several states copied it, with their own "little Dies" committees.⁷

While the Dies Committee's spectacular hearings and voluminous reports gathered headlines, Congress approved an array of additional security laws: the Hatch Act of 1939, which generally restricted the political freedom of government employees and specifically prohibited Communists from working for the national government; an amendment of March 1940 to the Espionage Act, increasing the act's penalties for spying, neutrality violations, and other infractions that applied during peacetime; and finally the Smith Act of June 1940.

The Smith Act bore the somewhat misleading official title of Alien Registration Act. To be sure, provisions of the act affected the 3.5 million immigrants in this country who had not attained citizenship. It required their registration and fingerprinting, and it made deportation for revolutionary activities and beliefs easier. Several states had already foreshadowed these moves. With the outbreak of war in Europe, Georgia and Pennsylvania had both required aliens to register, and Pennsylvania had also forbidden

them to hunt, fish, or own dogs.

The Smith Act's most far-reaching provisions, however, established a penalty of up to ten years in jail and a \$10,000 fine for encouraging insubordination in the military, for advocating, in speech or writing, the forceful overthrow of the U.S. government, or for joining any organization that so advocated. Thus, the Smith Act was, in fact, a true peacetime sedition law of the same sort that had previously failed to pass at the height of the Red Scare. It took the approach of World War II to secure enactment.

Following the Smith Act, Congress added still more "security" legislation. The Selective Service Act of September 1940, which gave the U.S. its first peacetime draft, also carried penalties for urging resistance to the draft. The Nationality Act of October 1940 facilitated divesting naturalized immigrants of their citizenship for radical political beliefs. The Voorhis Act, passed later the same month, required registration with the Attorney General of all *organizations* subject to "foreign control," if involved in civilian-military activities or if advocating the overthrow of the government. (The previous Foreign Agents Registration Act applied to *individuals*.) The fact that the Voorhis Act could require members of the radical organizations to incriminate themselves under the Smith Act did not faze Congress. Just before the Pearl Harbor attack, another amendment to the Espionage Act made sabotage a national crime during peacetime as well as wartime. In short, the pre-Pearl Harbor period witnessed the most sustained outburst of repressive legislation in the nation's history.⁸

Executive-branch harassment of government opponents kept pace with Congress's steady prewar infringement of people's political liberty. At the van of this harassment was the national government's police force: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To fully appreciate the FBI's prewar politicization, we must take a brief retrospective look at that agency's evolution during the interwar years.⁹

In the midst of the Red Scare, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer had established within what was then called the Bureau of Investigation (it got its current name in 1935) a special section to investigate radicals: the General Intelligence Division, with the young J. Edgar Hoover at its head. The Bureau's subsequent raids and deportations had left it, however, with a severely tarnished reputation. As a result of further revelations that the Bureau had even spied upon Congressmen in order to suppress the Teapot Dome scandal, the supposedly reactionary Coolidge Administration ordered an abrupt halt to all the Bureau's political activities and abolished the General Intelligence Division.

Unfortunately, to clean up the Bureau, the Coolidge Administration made none other than J. Edgar Hoover its new director. Defenders of Hoover cite this as proof that his role in the Red Scare had been merely perfunctory. Detractors on the other hand speculated that Hoover got the promotion because, in the words of intelligence expert William Corson, "there was enough in his files to effectively sink the Republican Party in the upcoming Presidential election." Whichever the case may be, recent documents secured by historians under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that Hoover secretly defied the Coolidge Directive against political surveillance and sporadically monitored such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), even to the point of illegal break-ins.

Nonetheless, the Bureau's low political profile coupled with its emphasis on catching criminals transformed its public image during the next decade. An extremely significant but oft-neglected feature of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal was a "war with the organized forces of crime," involving a new deal for the Bureau. Congress passed nine major anti-crime bills in 1934. These gave Bureau agents full arrest power and the authority to carry any kind of firearm, and they put a variety of crimes under its jurisdiction: robbing any bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, fleeing across state lines to avoid prosecution or subpena, extorting money by phone or mail, or transporting stolen property valued at \$5000 or more across state lines. Among these new laws was the National Firearms Act of 1934, the first federal gun control law.

In his war on crime, as in most other respects, F.D.R. was fully anticipated by President Herbert Hoover. Hoover had appointed the national Wickersham Commission to study the problems of law enforcement. In his zest for increased bureaucratic efficiency in national crime control, he had created a separate Bureau of Prisons and a separate Bureau of Narcotics. He also had signed the bill that established the Bureau of Investigation's fingerprinting division in 1930 and the Lindbergh Bill, which made kidnapping a national crime, in 1932.

Most important for the future of civil liberties, Hoover was the first U.S. President to request formally that the Bureau of Investigation collect political intelligence. We have already observed that under J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau continued throughout the twenties to monitor radical activities on its own. But President Hoover legitimized these transgressions by requesting Bureau reports on groups as diverse as the Sentinels of the Republic (a

minor far right organization), the Navy League, the ACLU, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Foreign Policy Association.

Roosevelt, upon assuming the Presidency, expanded the Bureau's political surveillance. While continuing Hoover's precedent of soliciting FBI reports on his political adversaries, he secretly ordered the Bureau to look into the American Nazi movement in 1934, and he widened that general mandate to include all potentially subversive groups in 1936. In June of 1939, with concern about foreign spies and "fifth columnists" on the rise, Roosevelt centralized responsibility over all "espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters" into the FBI's hands, with Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence playing supporting roles. This directive became public and was broadened to include "subversive activities and violations of neutrality laws," when the European war erupted later that year.

J. Edgar Hoover thereupon reactivated the dreaded General Intelligence Division and compiled a secret Custodial Detention list of persons to be jailed summarily during wartime. FBI officials opened first-class mail and regularly practiced, with Roosevelt's explicit blessing, wiretapping, despite the 1939 Supreme Court ruling that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 proscribed government wiretapping. The executive branch instituted a loyalty program for federal job holders, with FBI checks, to help implement the Hatch Act, and the Attorney General drew up his first list of subversive organizations.

At the same time, Roosevelt prepared other sections of the executive branch for the suppression of dissent. In the spring of 1940 he transferred the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Labor to the Justice Department. Roosevelt thought the Labor Department too lenient; it was the Labor Department which in 1920 had initially called a halt to the Red Scare by refusing to deport the aliens that the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation had rounded up. Also within the Justice Department, a newly established Neutrality Laws Unit (which would become the Special War Policies Unit once the U.S. entered the war) assumed responsibility for sedition prosecutions. The Post Office invoked a strained interpretation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to reinstitute its World War I practice of mail censorship. It seized and destroyed over fifteen tons of alleged foreign propaganda mailed to the U.S. from Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.

The FBI invariably serviced White House requests for derogatory information on critics of Roosevelt's foreign policy. Roosevelt's press secretary, in May of 1940, turned over to J. Edgar Hoover

for checking the names of persons who had sent telegrams critical of a Presidential fireside chat on national defense. The FBI furnished the President with reports on leading isolationists, including Senators Nye and Wheeler. After the America First Committee was organized, Roosevelt subjected it to the meticulous scrutiny of first the FBI and later the Internal Revenue Service. In an ironic twist of fate, F.D.R. even ordered ex-President Hoover put under FBI observation.

The Dies Committee, while continuing to harass the Roosevelt administration, also started a probe of the America First Committee, one month before Pearl Harbor. F.D.R., however, fully reciprocated Dies's enmity and ordered the FBI to investigate Dies and his supporters for election fraud and then, after Pearl Harbor, for fascist links. J. Edgar Hoover skillfully played both political foes off against each other. While investigating Dies for the President, he confidentially cooperated with the Dies Committee, feeding it FBI tips. This tactic generally induced Roosevelt to give Hoover wider leeway, so that the FBI could preempt the exposés of the Dies Committee.

The hardest hit victims of this labyrinth of political ploys and government intrigue were not major political figures, but usually less influential and sometimes insignificant dissidents. During the opening months of 1940, the FBI conducted two sets of widely publicized raids. The first picked up seventeen members of the Christian Front Sports Club in Brooklyn, New York — young rightists, unemployed or very poor, who were supposedly plotting to overthrow the government. The second, in Detroit, swooped down upon a dozen veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, all leftists who had fought against General Franco in the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and 1937 and were therefore charged with neutrality law infractions. The trial of the Christian Fronters resulted in an acquittal after revelations that the defendants had received drunken encouragement from an FBI *agent provocateur*, while the Justice Department, facing a public outcry, dropped its three-year-late charges against the Abraham Lincoln Brigade veterans.

The Justice Department was successful, however, in convicting Earl Browder, the Communist Party's General Secretary, of passport fraud in January, 1940, after his testimony before the Dies Committee. He received the ridiculously long and obviously political sentence of four years in prison and a \$2000 fine. (Another person convicted of the same offense shortly thereafter received merely a \$500 fine.) The government also initiated denaturalization proceedings against William Schneiderman, leader of the California

Communist Party, and deportation proceedings against Harry Bridges, the left-wing leader of the west coast longshoremen.

A federal grand jury in October 1941 indicted pro-German publicist George Sylvester Viereck for infringement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Viereck was on the German government's payroll and was among the four hundred persons who had by March of 1940 dutifully registered under the act's provisions. But he was also involved in a Congressional scandal in which he had solicited isolationist writings for insertion by various legislators into the *Congressional Record* so that he could distribute them through mass mailings under Congressional franking privileges. The State's indictment charged him with not filling out his registration forms fully and properly. His was only the most noteworthy of a whole slew of cases brought against both leftists and rightists under the same act.¹¹

The first to fall prey to the Smith Act was the Socialist Workers Party. The Socialist Workers Party was a Trotskyite splinter from the Communist Party. It was also one of the few leftwing groups still opposed to U.S. involvement in the war after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Trotskyites committed the additional political sin of gaining control over Teamster locals in Minnesota and challenging the leadership of union president Dan Tobias, a Roosevelt ally. Federal marshalls raided the Minneapolis headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party on June 28, 1941, and indicted twenty-nine leaders. Eighteen were convicted and jailed for from one to one and a half years.

The national government did devote some effort to the persecution of genuine spies. Thus, the FBI cracked the two major German rings in 1941 and set in motion the process that would put their members behind bars. It also began, under F.D.R.'s direct orders, secretly collaborating with British Intelligence, in violation of U.S. neutrality laws. Although designed to keep the State out of war, neutrality laws ended up more often in practice being used by the State to harass private citizens.¹²

A most unusual prewar espionage case involved a code clerk at the U.S. Embassy in Great Britain: Tyler Kent. Kent was presumably responsible for a leak of embassy communications to the Axis. The U.S. government, in an unheard-of diplomatic irregularity, waived Kent's diplomatic immunity so that the British could apprehend him. It then pressured the British into trying Kent, rather than deporting him to the U.S. An American trial would have disclosed the existence of the major documents that Kent had purloined — the clandestine personal correspondence between

President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, carried on *prior* to Churchill's becoming British Prime Minister, while he was still only a cabinet member in Chamberlain's war government. Such a patent exposure of F.D.R.'s unneutral designs would probably have outraged the American people and damaged F.D.R.'s bid for a third term in the 1940 Presidential race. The British trial, on the other hand, was conducted behind closed doors, under harsher statutes. Kent received a seven-year sentence, and the American public heard absolutely nothing about the case until four years later, long after the U.S. was fully committed to the war.¹³

Finding a legal basis for suppressing the German-American Bund before Pearl Harbor proved more difficult for the U.S. government. Back in 1933, it had indicted Heinz Spanknoebel, then Bund leader, for violating an obscure notification clause in the Espionage Act. But Spanknoebel fled to Germany, and after that, the Justice Department could find no grounds for further prosecution, despite all the new repressive laws. Not until June of 1941 did Roosevelt order the seizure of Bund assets as part of his general order freezing all Axis assets in the United States. Soon afterward, the government filed tax liens against the Bund.

The most telling blows against the Bund came from state and local governments. New Jersey passed an anti-Bund law, forbidding the wearing of foreign uniforms, as early as mid-1938, and several years later, confiscated the Bund's Camp Nordland. New York City's mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, bent upon imprisoning Bund leaders under any pretext, established an anti-subversive squad in the city's police department and launched an investigation into Bund finances. The young and aggressive New York District Attorney, Thomas Dewey, secured a conviction of Fritz Kuhn, head of the Bund, for misuse of Bund funds, and sent him to Sing Sing Prison for two and a half years in December, 1939. By the summer of 1941, California had a comprehensive Subversive Organization Registration Law aimed at the Bund, while Florida had made membership in any "anarchistic, communistic, Nazi-istic or fascistic organization" a felony.

The Bund was not the only fringe organization to feel the sting of state and local repression. Pelley of the Silver Shirts, to give just one more example from the right, was constantly in trouble with North Carolina authorities from 1935 on. Several states made libel of racial, religious, and ethnic groups a criminal offense. To drive the Communist Party off the ballot, many states made their ballot requirements more stringent during the 1940 election or immediately thereafter. Four states, at the instigation of the Dies Committee,

indicted over a hundred Communist petition circulators for election fraud. Oklahoma handed down sentences of ten years to four Communist leaders under the state's criminal syndicalism laws, while the Washington legislature refused to seat an elected state senator who was a former party member.

But it was neither fascists nor Communists who suffered most during the pre-Pearl Harbor hysteria. According to the the ACLU's annual report for 1940-41, "the most numerous attacks on civil liberties of any single minority were directed against the Jehovah's Witnesses."¹⁴ The Jehovah's Witnesses are a millennialist Protestant sect, founded in the last third of the nineteenth century and numbering a quarter of a million American adherents. Their theology is extremely anti-Statist, and it even opposes flag salutes. This opposition so enraged local authorities, the American Legion, and other protectors of patriotism that the Witnesses were the only group during the World War II period to endure the kind of vigilante violence that had been so prevalent during World War I. Mob attacks upon Witnesses occurred in 335 communities in 44 different states in the six months running from May to October 1940 alone. Many of the injured were women and children.

The Supreme Court defended the Witnesses' First Amendment right to distribute religious literature without restrictions from local ordinances beginning in 1938. But in the 1940 *Gobitis* case, the Court held that children could legally be expelled from government schools for not saluting the flag. "National Unity is the basis of national security," wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter in the majority opinion.¹⁵ Massive expulsions were the result, followed sometimes by state prosecutions of Witness parents for violating compulsory attendance laws. A few attempts were made to take children from their Jehovah's Witness parents but were unsuccessful. Indiana, under its state sedition law, sentenced two elderly Witness women who refused to salute the flag to prison terms of two to ten years, although their convictions were later overturned on appeal.

II. Post-Pearl Harbor

All the aforementioned events, entailing enormous gains for State power, occurred, we should stress, at a time when the United States was technically at peace. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor merely accelerated the civil liberties trends already in motion. The awesome repressive machinery constructed by Congress and the President during the prewar period now became fully operational.

The only well-known World War II civil liberties outrage is the internment of Japanese-Americans. Actually, the U.S. government amplified its harassment of aliens from *all* enemy nations at the first news of the Japanese attack. Within seventy-two hours of the attack, the FBI had 3,846 Japanese, German, and Italian immigrants in custody. A grand total of sixteen thousand were seized throughout the war and about four thousand of them were held for the duration. This was done under authority of the old Alien Enemies Act, which permitted alien internment during wartime. It was one of the four notorious Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the Federalists in 1798, and the only one of the four that President Jefferson had left on the books.¹⁶

The "enemy" aliens who were paroled or who remained at large suffered numerous other infringements of their liberty. The national government forced more than ten thousand to leave their homes near defense installations, and it imposed rigid curfews upon others. They all needed permission to travel or move and could not possess firearms or short-wave radios. The Justice Department's only leniencies were to exempt Italian aliens from these restrictions after Columbus Day, 1942, and west coast Germans two months later.

Unlike the policies already mentioned, the State's treatment of the west coast Japanese made no distinction between native-born citizens (*Nisei*) and foreign-born aliens (*Issei*).¹⁷ (None of the foreign-born Japanese were naturalized American citizens because they were legally ineligible.) As U.S. defeats in the Pacific mounted during the war's early days, west coast leaders intensified their demands that all Japanese be singled out for special treatment. These demands arose out of the area's deep-rooted racism, as well as from resentment at economic competition with this industrious minority. Many people were more than anxious to accept columnist Walter Lippmann's strained explanation for the complete absence of any act of sabotage by Japanese-Americans. According to Lippmann, this merely indicated that they were waiting with Oriental patience for the propitious moment to commit some massive coordinated atrocity.¹⁸

Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, empowering the army to exclude "any or all persons" from designated military zones. One month later, he signed a Congressional measure stipulating criminal penalties for disobeying this order. The War Department had already declared the western parts of California, Oregon, and Washington and the southern part of Arizona a "prohibited zone." No one was ordered to leave yet, but about nine thousand Japanese-Americans saw the handwriting

on the wall and decided to move inland on their own. They encountered a very chilly reception. Officials from other western states objected to being made, in the words of the Governor of Arizona, "a dumping ground for enemy aliens," and violence threatened.¹⁹

The Army therefore forbade any more voluntary evacuation. Instead, it forcibly collected at race tracks, fairgrounds, and other makeshift assembly points all persons of Japanese ancestry residing not only within the original restricted zone but anywhere within California, Washington, Oregon, southern Arizona, and Alaska. Evacuees could only take clothing, bedding and utensils. The government offered to store their remaining personal property, but would assume no liability for it. So most evacuees sold their property on five-days' notice for what they could get. After they left, their leases expired and their farms were generally confiscated. Japanese-Americans suffered an estimated \$350 million loss in property and income.²⁰

The War Relocation Agency (WRA), a civilian agency created in mid-March, erected ten semi-permanent relocation centers in inhospitable regions of seven western states. By September, the army had turned over 110,000 Japanese-Americans to these camps. Nearly two-thirds of that total were native-born American citizens. Anyone with simply one Japanese *great* grandparent qualified for internment, although this rule was later relaxed. The relocation centers were, as F.D.R. admitted in a slip of the tongue, "concentration camps,"²¹ ringed with barbed wire and armed guards. In at least one instance, a sentry shot and killed an elderly internee who wandered too close to the outer fence, in violation of camp regulations.

The WRA began granting leaves to those inmates who could prove that they were not disloyal, that they had a job waiting, and that the community would accept them. But only 35,000, mostly young *Nisei*, left the camps under this dispensation. Meanwhile, the War Department sought to register male internees for the draft, following Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's announcement of the "inherent right of every faithful citizen regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battle."²² Of the 75,000 who were asked whether they would renounce allegiance to the Japanese emperor, however, 8,700 either refused or equivocated. Many of these were Issei who, being forbidden American citizenship, were afraid to put themselves in limbo, without any formal nationality. Riots also erupted in some of the camps. The worst took place at Camp Manzanar in California, where soldiers fired into unarmed crowds, killing two and wounding ten.

Congressional critics thought the WRA was too lenient, and forced the agency, beginning in the summer of 1943, to isolate those inmates who would not swear loyalty or who were trouble-makers. The WRA consequently transferred about 18,500 to a special camp in Tule Lake, California. The Tule Lake inmates organized a campaign of passive resistance which turned into rioting, with the result that the government put the camp under military rule for two months and put two hundred internees in the stockade. After Congress passed the Denationalization Act of 1944, making it easier for Americans to renounce their citizenship, some eight thousand Japanese-Americans were eventually returned to Japan.²³

The Roosevelt Administration conceded that, whatever the military justification for evacuation, it no longer applied in the spring of 1944. Roosevelt, however, continued Japanese internment to avoid any political repercussions from west coast voters. Only after he was safely reelected to a fourth term that November did he permit the inmates to leave the camps and return home. Some, their lives disrupted and fearing racist attacks, were reluctant to leave the camps. But the WRA all of a sudden became concerned about the \$250 million that the camps had already cost taxpayers, and it booted out the last of the internees at the end of 1945.

The U.S. State extended its deprivations against people of Japanese ancestry beyond the borders. It pressured more than a dozen Latin American nations to implement similar policies and even interned two thousand of their Japanese residents right here in U.S. relocation centers.²⁴ Curiously, the Japanese in Hawaii, who numbered 250,000, one-third of the islands' population, were untouched by the internment program, except for about two thousand who were shipped to the mainland. Extensive internment would have disrupted Hawaii's economy. The government did, however, put Hawaii under strict martial law for the three years following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, suspending trial by jury, habeas corpus, and other procedural safeguards. Out of the over 22,000 military trials of civilians on the islands during 1942, 99 percent resulted in conviction.²⁵

Internment was not the only consequence of F.D.R.'s Executive Order 9066, nor Japanese the only class of U.S. citizens affected. The vague phrasing of the order would have permitted the army to evacuate or incarcerate any American anywhere in the country, had it so chosen. Thus, even after the Japanese were free to leave the relocation centers, five thousand still faced individual exclusion from the west coast. The military also forcibly ejected, after secret deliberations, 250 citizens not of Japanese ancestry from the west

coast, and an additional fifty from the east coast.²⁶

Most historical accounts of the World War II homefront report that, except for Japanese-American internment, the U.S. civil liberties record was relatively clean. It never approached, this view argues, the repressive heights of World War I. The first observation we can make about this view is that Japanese-American internment is a pretty glaring exception. Even one of the early defenders of the Second World War civil liberties record, legal scholar Edward S. Corwin, has rated the treatment of the Japanese as "the most drastic invasion of the rights of citizens of the United States by their own government that has thus far occurred in the history of our nation."²⁷ During the First World War, the total number of victims of the Espionage and Sedition Acts, of alien internment and deportation, of state prosecutions, and of mob violence could not have exceeded fifteen thousand. Contrast that figure with 110,000 interned Japanese-Americans.

Then there is the internment and imprisonment of conscientious objectors during the Second World War. True, the options available to conscientious objectors were slightly improved over the First World War. About 25,000 accepted noncombatant military duty. Another 11,950 worked in civilian public service camps at tasks mainly involving conservation, forestry, and public health. The pacifist churches and organizations agreed to fund these camps, at an eventual cost of over \$7 million.

But rigid military discipline prevailed, making the camps nothing more than outdoor prisons. The objectors in the camps received no pay for fifty hours per week of generally arduous and sometimes dangerous work. In the rare case where an objector was allowed to work outside the camps, the State confiscated his wages. About five hundred objectors volunteered for medical experiments in which they were infected with lice, bitten by mosquitoes to test typhus and malaria cures, or subjected to other potentially disabling or fatal procedures. Not until two years after the war ended did the government release the last of the objectors from these camps. Then, to add insult to injury, several states barred objectors from licensed professions, and the Supreme Court upheld these bars.

Whether one received conscientious objector status at all depended upon the vagaries of local boards. In any case, only religious objectors qualified under the Selective Service Act, and Selective Service Director General Louis B. Hershey ordered this provision interpreted strictly. Of the sixteen thousand men convicted for draft resistance of one kind or another during the war, six thousand were conscientious objectors whose status was not

recognized, and three quarters of those were Jehovah's Witnesses. Although opposed to the war on religious grounds, the Witnesses were not consistent pacifists — they declared their willingness to fight in the battle of Armageddon — and draft boards routinely denied their requests for ministerial exemptions.

The Selective Service Act provided a maximum prison term of five years. This applied not only for refusal to serve but also for failure to register, which in World War I had been just a misdemeanor. In a few cases, objectors faced the World War I procedure of being forcibly inducted and then court-martialed, with much sterner penalties. The most severe case was that of Henry Weber, a conscientious objector who was married and the father of three children. He also belonged to the Socialist Labor Party, another Marxist splinter group. The army initially sentenced him to hang, then reconsidered, and changed that to life imprisonment. Only as the war drew to a close, after several appeals, was his sentence reduced to five years and a dishonorable discharge. Overall, the jailings of conscientious objectors during World War II, not counting those interned in civilian public service camps, ran at three times the World War I rate, even in proportion to the total drafted.²⁸

If we somehow overlook Japanese-Americans and conscientious objectors, we still must appraise the State's respect for personal liberty during World War II in light of the virtual nonexistence of antiwar sentiment. After Pearl Harbor, Americans endorsed U.S. intervention with an eruption of patriotic unity unmatched in any previous war. The prewar isolationists universally abandoned their cause, closed up shop, and threw their hearts into the war. The country's organized peace movement disintegrated.²⁹ And on the extreme left, the Communist Party tried to outdo all others in its new-found American nationalism. In contrast, two powerful leftwing organizations, the Socialist Party and the Industrial Workers of the World, had opposed World War I.

Despite the Second World War's unprecedented popularity, the national government still went out of its way to conduct sedition trials, initiate denaturalizations and deportations, and practice censorship. Sometimes, as the case of the Japanese-Americans amply illustrates, it created disloyalty out of thin air, where none initially existed. In other instances, it would prosecute the same individuals in several different proceedings under several different laws, because of the paucity of eligible scapegoats. Relative to the amount of dissent, there was clearly more repression during the Second World War than during the First. But since many of the victims were viewed as pathetic rightists with odious ideas,

America's dominant liberals hardly noticed.

Repression of groups other than the Japanese-Americans during World War II required no new legislation. The prewar period provided all the necessary tools. A mass prosecution conducted under the Smith Act was to be the Roosevelt Administration's show trial. Attorney General Francis Biddle, facing constant prodding from F.D.R., indicted a heterogeneous assortment of two dozen alleged native fascists in July, 1942. The faulty indictment had to be rewritten twice, however, so that the actual trial did not begin for almost another two years. The defendants, dragged from all corners of the country to stand trial in Washington, D.C., now numbered thirty. Most of them had never met each other. They were not even all overtly anti-Jewish; all they had in common was a hatred of President Roosevelt.³⁰

The most prominent defendant was Harvard-educated Laurence Dennis, a former diplomat and author of *The Coming American Fascism*. Dennis's book was more prediction than prescription, and when told of his indictment, he exclaimed, "My prophecy is coming true. This is fascism."³¹ Viereck, the German publicist indicted before Pearl Harbor under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, was also among the defendants, and while he stood trial, his son died in action with U.S. forces in North Africa. Other defendants included Elizabeth Dilling, author of *The Red Network*, a book that charged many liberals with being Communists; Pelley of the Silver Shirts; and four leaders of the German-American Bund.

The government's indictment charged the defendants with participating in a fantastic international Nazi conspiracy, dating from 1933, to establish a fascist regime in the U.S. by subverting morale in the armed forces. The defendants had purportedly asserted, among other scurrilous and dangerous doctrines, that "President Roosevelt is reprehensible, a war-monger, liar, unscrupulous, and a pawn of the Jews, Communists and Plutocrats" and that "[t]he Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was deliberately invited by the public officials of the United States, in order to involve the United States in a foreign war." The indictment named as co-conspirators forty-two books and publications and thirty-five organizations, including the German-American Bund, the Silver Shirts, the German Embassy in the U.S., and the National Socialist Party of Germany. The first indictment had even named the America First Committee, but that organization did not appear in the final document.

The defendants engaged twenty-two different lawyers, two-thirds of whom were court appointed to represent the indigent. The trial quickly degenerated into a circus. The defendants and their lawyers

bickered among themselves, separately raised every conceivable objection, and regularly disrupted the proceedings. One lawyer concluded most of his objections with the exclamation "Your Honor, this is just another New Deal trick!" which invariably brought snickers from the jury. The presiding judge, in his efforts to maintain order, issued so many contempt citations that the cited lawyers and defendants formed a "contempt club," with badges. Some of the defendants wore masks to court and signs saying, "I am a Spy," until dissuaded by their lawyers. The judge finally kicked one lawyer off the case, while another resigned. The number of defendants fell by four, with one dying, two being severed from the case for illness, and one for unruly behavior.

After an eight-month marathon, and a trial record of 18,000 pages, the presiding judge died, and a mistrial was declared. The prosecution had still presented less than half its case, which failed to charge any overt acts, but relied solely on guilt by association and similarities between the defendants' prewar opinions and the Nazi "party line." The poorer defendants, having to either raise bail and support themselves in wartime Washington or remain in jail during the trial, suffered extreme hardships. The Justice Department pressed for a new trial for the next two years, until November of 1946, after the war was long over, when the courts at last dismissed the case, ruling that a retrial would be "a travesty of justice." Nevertheless, as Biddle coyly admits in his memoirs, "the propaganda had long since ceased." "In that sense, at least, the prosecution had accomplished the purpose the President had in mind."³²

At the time that the mass sedition trial commenced, two of the defendants were already incarcerated without trial as dangerous enemy aliens, three more had suffered involuntary psychiatric commitment, and six were serving sentences arising out of other war-related prosecutions. Among the latter group were Viereck and Pelley. Viereck's indictment under the Foreign Agents Registration Act had resulted in a conviction, encouraging the government to use the act with telling effect upon several others who had been on the fringes of the isolationist movement. Pelley, in one of the first post-Pearl Harbor cases, had received a fifteen-year sentence, while his press was fined \$5000, for articles critical of the U.S. war effort. The national government had tried him under the sedition provisions of the Espionage Act, which had become operative with the declaration of war. All of this was on top of having his parole revoked in North Carolina.

Two other defendants in the mass sedition trial were leaders of the Friends of Progress, a group which had conducted a mock

impeachment of Roosevelt and then found themselves facing no fewer than four wartime prosecutions. In addition to being entangled in the mass sedition trial, they had been convicted under both the national Espionage Act and California's Subversive Organization Registration Law (the state conviction was overturned on appeal) and charged with criminal libel in California for critical remarks about General Douglas MacArthur.

In a second mass trial, this one using the Selective Service Act, the Justice Department charged twenty-four members of the German-American Bund with counseling draft evasion. The two mass trials had much in common, including several of the defendants and many of the prosecution witnesses. The major difference was that the mass trial of the German-Americans resulted in a conviction.³³

In all, more than two hundred different persons went through such sedition prosecutions under either the Espionage Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Smith Act, or the Selective Service Act during the course of the war. The largest number of them were, interestingly enough, blacks. The FBI arrested about one hundred Black Muslims and members of other more ephemeral black religious cults that identified with the Japanese as kindred victims of white oppression. Robert Jackson, for example, the founder of the Ethiopian Pacific League, who had told a Harlem audience that the Japanese "wanted to help you and give you back your culture," received ten years' imprisonment and a \$10,000 fine.³⁴

After blacks, the German-American Bund provided the next largest number of sedition defendants. In addition, Biddle launched a crusade to revoke the citizenship of Bund members. This crusade had denaturalized forty-two by December 1940, three hundred suits were pending, and thousands of cases were under investigation. The courts, however, restrained the Justice Department, so that ultimately a total of only 180 Americans lost their citizenship.

Among them was Fritz Kuhn, the Bund leader jailed in New York before the war. His tale demonstrates the vindictive lengths to which the State carried its persecution of the Bund. Stripped of his citizenship, Kuhn was no sooner paroled by New York than he was put in a federal internment camp for enemy aliens. The U.S. deported him to Germany at the war's close, where the U.S. occupation government promptly arrested him again and finally sentenced him to ten years hard labor for associations with Hitler which Kuhn had, in fact, fabricated in order to increase his stature within the Bund. Kuhn was finally freed on appeal in 1950, and a year later, he died.

One clear difference between repression in the two world wars was the greater degree of centralization during the Second. The Roosevelt Administration, in conferences with state officials both before and after U.S. entry, reached an unpublicized gentleman's agreement that left state sedition laws nearly unenforced. Biddle, unlike Wilson's Attorney General during World War I, kept a tight reign on U.S. attorneys, who could not undertake sedition prosecutions without his approval. The national government also discouraged vigilantes and refused to revive any private loyalty organizations like the American Protective League.

Private violence and local repression did transpire, however. As in the prewar period, the Jehovah's Witnesses were the most frequent objects of mob attacks, being the only war opponents with any visibility. Mississippi arrested over fifty Witnesses for violating its new sedition law. Brutality against Witnesses did not recede until mid-1942, when the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division began to come to their aid. In one case, it secured a conviction of two West Virginia police officers for releasing several Witnesses into the eager hands of American Legionnaires, who had then forced the Witnesses to drink castor oil, tied them together with police department rope, and marched them out of town. The Supreme Court also succored the Witnesses. Although it upheld local peddlers' taxes, no matter how exorbitant, on the distribution of their literature, it overturned their Mississippi conviction and, in June 1943, reversed its previous mandatory flag-salute decision.

The Second World War also saw another upsurge in violence directed at racial minorities. The war boom and the market demand for labor, far more than the government's Fair Employment Practices Committee, opened up new economic opportunities for minorities. As blacks poured into industrial centers, north and south, racial antagonism intensified. Disorders first appeared on southern military posts, where white residents clashed with northern black soldiers, who did not proffer the customary subservience. But the most severe race riots occurred in the cities: Harlem; Philadelphia; Mobile, Alabama; El Paso and Port Arthur, Texas; Springfield, Massachusetts; Hubbard, Ohio. A two-day guerrilla war between blacks and whites in Detroit during the summer of 1943 left twenty-five blacks and nine whites dead, seven hundred of both races injured, and \$2 million property damage.³⁵ The riot only ceased when six thousand troops occupied the city. Two weeks later, during the famous zoot-suit riots in Los Angeles, white servicemen terrorized the city's Mexican-American sections for four days as the city police, the Military Police, and the Shore Patrol all looked the other way.³⁶ The

only factor which kept violence against Japanese-Americans at such a low ebb was their forcible removal.

As in World War I, the national government had an official propaganda agency. Roosevelt created the Office of Facts and Figures before Pearl Harbor and then replaced it in mid-1942 with the Office of War Information (OWI), under Elmer Davis from the *New York Times*. The OWI's first-year appropriation was nearly \$40 million, but, from the outset, it had to be more circumspect than its World War I counterpart, the Committee on Public Information. It was continuously beset with controversy, emanating both from within the agency and from Congressional critics. Congress cut off practically all funding for the OWI's domestic operations in 1943, but expanded its overseas activities.³⁷

More robust was the Office of Censorship, created by the First War Powers Act. It examined all forms of communication entering or leaving the country — letters, cables, telephone calls, even films. It went so far as to suppress private letters that painted a gloomy picture of the war. By 1944, it had detained 500,000 pieces of mail, occupying 10,000 square feet of storage space. The Office also drew up an ostensibly voluntary Code of Wartime Practices that applied to press and radio news reporting.³⁸ The military engaged in its own independent censorship covering the news it released, the mail sent and received by U.S. troops, the dispatches of war correspondents, and all media within conquered territories. When the isolationist *Chicago Tribune* innocently published too many details about the Battle of Midway, the Justice Department tried to prosecute. The grand jury refused to indict, however.

The Post Office banned single issues of domestic publications it judged subversive and then used that as justification for revoking their second-class mailing privileges altogether just as freely as it had in the First World War. This affected over seventy publications, ranging from the Trotskyite *Militant* to the Christian Pacifist *Boise Valley Herald*. The most important publication denied use of the mails was Father James Coughlin's *Social Justice*, with 200,000 subscribers. Father Coughlin was a radio priest from Michigan and probably the most influential native radical rightist. Biddle was afraid that a sedition trial would make Coughlin a martyr, so he persuaded the Catholic hierarchy to silence Coughlin instead. *Social Justice*, meanwhile, ceased publication in the face of the postal ban.³⁹ The Post Office also took advantage of the war to mount a fresh assault on obscenity. It barred about sixty additional publications from the mails for this reason, including *Esquire* magazine.

The government did not rely solely upon postal censorship, as in

the previous war, to intimidate the domestic press. It confiscated outright publications put out by American citizens if it could even tenuously argue that they were financed by enemy funds. This is what befell all publications of the German-American Bund, as well as a few domestic Japanese newspapers. The Enemy Alien Property Division of the Treasury Department handled these seizures as part of its general takeover of enemy property.

Prosecutions for actual spying and treason, as opposed to sedition, made their first widespread appearance in this country during the Second World War. The national government convicted ninety-one persons of these offenses between 1938 and 1945, sixty-four of them U.S. citizens. Many of the sentences were blatantly excessive.

For instance, one of the earliest espionage prosecutions subsequent to Pearl Harbor ensnared one Max Stephen, an inconsequential Detroit tavern keeper who gave sanctuary to a German prisoner-of-war escaped from Canada. The State dusted off its until-then rarely used treason statute and sentenced Stephen to hang. Roosevelt commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.

The State dealt even more summarily with eight German saboteurs dropped off on U.S. shores by submarines in the summer of 1942. The Coast Guard and FBI quickly apprehended all eight. Since they had not yet committed sabotage, and since attempted sabotage was a minor felony, difficult to prove, the Roosevelt Administration decided against a civilian trial. In flagrant disregard of the Supreme Court's *Ex Parte Milligan* Civil War precedent, a military commission, even less bound by judicial safeguards than a court martial, tried the saboteurs in secret. Six were electrocuted within a month and a half of their apprehension, while the two who turned State's evidence received long sentences.⁴⁰

In 1943, the U.S. secured treason indictments against eleven Americans making broadcasts from German, Italian, or Japanese radio stations. At the end of the war, when the government finally caught up with these renegade broadcasters, it convicted five. Probably the most egregious among these cases was that of Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino. She was a native-born American of Japanese ancestry caught in Japan at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. She went to work for Radio Tokyo under duress, was only one of several women broadcasters known by the generic name "Tokyo Rose," and made mostly routine broadcasts devoid of political or military overtones. But she had the misfortune to be tried in California before an all-white jury, and was sentenced to 10 years and \$10,000. Not until the Presidency of Gerald Ford did she

receive a retroactive full pardon.⁴¹

Another of those broadcasters was Ezra Pound, the renowned poet. He had worked for Radio Rome. The government did not even bother formally to convict him. Instead, it incarcerated him without a trial in a mental hospital for thirteen years.⁴²

Concomitant with the State's new attention to the crime of espionage was the birth of the U.S. intelligence community, with its ubiquitous influence upon policy. The number of FBI special agents swelled from 851 in 1939 to 5072 in 1944. The Bureau also moved into other countries, gaining responsibility for intelligence and counter-espionage in Latin America. To carry on covert actions elsewhere, Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in July 1941, with the flamboyant General William "Wild Bill" Donovan at its helm. The OSS originated from the Coordinator of Information's office, created five months prior to Pearl Harbor. It grew prodigiously during the war and and afterwards blossomed into the Central Intelligence Agency.⁴³

The military intelligence services expanded their activities as well. Their most notable operation was the worldwide interception, decoding, and analysis of radio communications. Conducted primarily by the army's Signal Security Agency, this electromagnetic eavesdropping contributed significantly to many Allied military victories. It also sometimes provided sensitive information about American citizens. It did not cease with the war's end, but rather beginning in 1952 fell under the auspices of the National Security Agency, today the U.S.'s largest and most secret intelligence agency.⁴⁴

Concern for loyalty within the State apparatus itself reached new levels. In this one area, Congress pushed the Roosevelt Administration further than the administration wished to go. The Communist Party's enthusiasm for the war brought a rapprochement with the administration, symbolized by F.D.R.'s pardon of Browder, the party leader convicted before Pearl Harbor of passport fraud. Other Communists convicted under state law also received pardons. But the Dies Committee did not go along with this rapprochement and continued to attack the administration for harboring subversives. This induced the executive branch to augment its own loyalty program and lengthen the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. As the war drew to a close, the House voted to convert the Committee on Un-American Activities from a special committee, requiring yearly renewal, to a permanent standing committee.

The one bright spot in the U.S. civil liberties record during

World War II was the courts. They ultimately upheld convictions against only about one-fourth of all the seditionists prosecuted. The Supreme Court, in particular, thwarted many civil liberties transgressions, beginning in 1943, when the tide of battle shifted toward the Allies. Even so, nearly all the Court's favorable decisions turned on narrow procedural grounds. Only in protecting such victims of the state governments as Jehovah's Witnesses did it strike down any repressive laws.

Thus, the Court overturned Viereck's first conviction under the Alien Registration Act, but when the Roosevelt Administration retried him under the same act, the Court let his second conviction stand. In *Hartzel v. U.S.*, it reversed the wartime Espionage Act conviction of a native fascist for distributing antiwar literature, and in *Keegan v. U.S.*, it reversed the mass Selective Service Act conviction of German-American Bund members, but it refused to review the Smith Act conviction of the Socialist Workers Party, and later, in 1951, it upheld that act's constitutionality. It blocked the deportation of Harry Bridges, and the denaturalization of both a Communist and a Bundist in the Schneiderman and Baumgartner cases, but it sustained the denaturalization of another Bund member in the Knauer case.

It reinstated *Esquire's* second-class mailing privileges, but it left the Post Office's power to exclude single issues of publications intact. It also approved FBI wiretapping in two 1942 decisions. It overruled the treason conviction of one German-American who had sheltered the U-boat saboteurs, but in a related case, it sustained a treason conviction for the first time in its history, and in *Ex Parte Quinn*, it certified the extralegal railroading of the saboteurs. It conceded that aliens had some constitutional rights in *Ex Parte Kuwate*, but it upheld the Federalist Alien Enemies Act in *Ludecke v. Watkins*. It ruled that the military should not have closed the civilian courts in Hawaii, but only two years after martial law there had already ended.⁴⁵

On the most grievous civil liberties violation of the war, the internment of Japanese-American citizens, the Court refused to rule at all. It skirted the issue, finding in the Endo case, on the one hand, that the government could not detain citizens who had proven their loyalty (and this only on the day after the government had opened the relocation centers). On the other hand, in *Hirabayashi v. U.S.* and *Korematsu v. U.S.*, the Court allowed the government to impose special curfews upon citizens of Japanese ancestry and to exclude them from certain areas.⁴⁶

The Second World War is still today widely regarded as the U.S.

State's last "good war."⁴⁷ The partiality of establishment liberals for Franklin D. Roosevelt is notorious, but amazingly, even his Attorney General, Biddle, has a reputation as a staunch advocate of civil liberties. The internment of Japanese-Americans is treated as an anomaly within an otherwise commendable performance.

The internment of Japanese-Americans was not an anomaly. It was representative of a wartime administration that respected civil liberties only so far as political expediency required. The repression of others whose enthusiasm for American participation in the Second World War was even slightly suspect differed in scale, not in degree. Furthermore, the repressive instruments established during this period would again be put to effective use during the McCarthy Era and the Vietnam War. The Roosevelt Administration established virtually all the precedents for Cold War political harassment.

If this is what we can expect from a "good war," we can only tremble at the thought of what the next "bad war" might bring.

Notes

1. The Revisionist interpretation of U.S. entry into World War II was presented in the immediate post-war period in Charles A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Reality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1947); William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950); Frederic R. Sanborn, *Design for War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951); Charles Callan Tansill, *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton, 1953); and Robert A. Theobald, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954).

After this initial outpouring, Revisionist scholarship fell dormant. The alleged reason — according to orthodox historiography — was that Revisionism had been discredited. In reality what happened was that the orthodox historians incorporated the salient features of the Revisionist account without admitting the fact. The early orthodox accounts of U.S. entry into World War II, such as Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor* (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), endeavored to portray the U.S. government as genuinely surprised by the Pearl Harbor attack. But such later orthodox accounts as William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy*, 2v. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952-3), and Robert A. Divine, *The Reluctant*

Belligerent: American Entry into the Second World War (New York: John Wiley, 1965), in contrast did not dispute the Revisionist factual claim that the Roosevelt administration both strongly desired and fully anticipated U.S. involvement in World War II. They instead merely argued that U.S. involvement was a worthy goal, and some went so far as to criticize Roosevelt for not achieving that goal rapidly enough.

One of the few recent Revisionist works to challenge the strategic necessity of U.S. intervention into World War II is Bruce M. Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

2. On the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, see Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969). On the peacetime introduction of conscription, see John O'Sullivan, *From Voluntarism to Conscription: Congress and Selective Service, 1940-1945* (New York: Garland, 1982), which is the published version of a dissertation written ten years earlier. The official overview of prewar mobilization in general is Bureau of the Budget, *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, [1946]). The relevant sections of Paul A.C. Koistinen, *The Military Industrial Complex: Historical Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, 1980), offer a more critical survey.
3. Because so many authors have accepted the myth about the relative mildness of U.S. civil liberties' violations during World War II, the treatment of that subject is generally woeful. Even the highly competent and usually meticulous historian Harold M. Hyman, in his otherwise excellent overview of civil liberties in U.S. history, *To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), makes the glaring error on p. 329 of finding "only twenty-six" federal indictments under security statutes that "emerged from World War II." He is apparently counting just the mass sedition trial, in fact, just the initial indictment, and overlooks all the remaining 270 or so prosecutions for both sedition and espionage.

There are to my knowledge only three works, all devoted to broader subjects, that give reasonably complete pictures of State repression during World War II: 1 Robert Justin Goldstein's sprawling chronicle of U.S. civil liberties in the twentieth century, *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978). Goldstein tries to be comprehensive, but his work is a somewhat uncritical compilation based on secondary sources, with a heavy emphasis on labor violence, and it ignores such other forms of civil liberty violations as obscenity laws. 2 Geoffrey Perrett's account of domestic events during World War II, *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The American People, 1939-1945* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973). Perrett always presents a provocative slant and forcefully overturns many myths about World War II, but he can sometimes be careless about details. 3 Leo P. Ribuffo's study of the prewar and wartime far right, *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). It is Ribuffo who coined the term "Brown Scare," and I will have more to say about his work below.

Two other homefront accounts that look into civil liberties more brief-

ly or more selectively are Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945* (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1972), and John Morton Blum, *V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976). One article devoted specifically to this subject, Richard W. Steele, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94 (Spring 1979), 15-32, hardly scratches the surface. It is chiefly interesting for the trailing comment (pp. 33-5) by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who makes a pathetic attempt to salvage the civil liberties reputation of his presidential idol.

Thus, to get the full story, one must really piece it together from historical accounts of its component parts. A good place to start is with the *Annual Reports* of the American Civil Liberties Union, which have different titles, but which the *N.Y. Times* publishing house has compiled into convenient bound volumes. v. 3, July 1937-June 1944, and v. 4, July 1944-December 1950 (New York: Arno Press, 1970), cover the Second World War period. One should also examine *In Brief Authority* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), the memoirs of Francis Biddle, F.D.R.'s wartime Attorney General. That alone should be sufficient to deflate Biddle's exaggerated reputation as a civil libertarian.

4. On the prewar isolationists, see Wayne S. Cole's definitive *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). Cole fully exposes F.D.R.'s civil liberties transgressions during the contest with the isolationists. Cole's older *America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953) is the basic work on the America First Committee. An analysis of the battle between isolationists and interventionists in Congress is David L. Porter, *The Seventy-Sixth Congress and World War II, 1939-1940* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979). John E. Wiltz, *In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), covers the Nye Committee investigations.
5. Ribuffo's *Old Christian Right* is outstanding not only for its account of State repression, but also because it is one of the few really scholarly and objective studies of the World War II far right. It finally transcends the moral indignation, the pseudo-scientific reliance upon the concept of "extremism," and the amateurish psychologizing that cloud most of the literature on the subject. Geoffrey S. Smith, *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversive, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), is an equally important work that achieves the same level of historical detachment. He shows how the far right changed from an anti-immigrant phenomenon at the end of World War I to an anti-Establishment one at the beginning of World War II, and in the process, turned the countersubversive propaganda techniques used so effectively by the State during the Red Scare against the State.

Similarly dispassionate on the German-American Bund is Sander A. Diamond, *The Nazi Movement In The United States, 1924-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). With useful facts on the same subject, but not at all dispassionate, is Leland V. Bell, *In Hitler's Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973). Two older studies, that lean toward the exposé approach, but that have information on organizations and individuals within the far right

- that more recent studies have not yet gotten to, are Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism In America: The Rise of Group Prejudice during the Decade, 1930-1940* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), and Morris Schonbach, "Native Fascism during the 1930s and 1940s: A Study of Its Roots, Its Growth, and Its Decline" (Ph.D. dissertation: University of California at Los Angeles, 1958).
6. The classic account of the growth of Communist influence during the popular-front era remains Eugene Lyons, *The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941). A more modern study is Earl Latham, *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). For the twists and turns in Communist Party policy, see Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919-1957)* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), and Philip J. Jaffe, *The Rise and Fall of American Communism* (New York: Horizon Press, 1975).
 7. The Dies Committee and its predecessors are the subject of August Raymond Ogden, *The Dies Committee: A Study of the Special House Committee for Investigation of Un-American Activities, 1938-1944* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1945), and Walter Goodman, *The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1968). The Ogden book, although older and dryer, is more scholarly.
 8. It would be nice to have a book on passage and pre-Cold War enforcement of the Smith Act or one on all the World War II repressive legislation. Until then, we must be satisfied with the account of the Smith Act's passage contained in the first two chapters of Michal R. Belknap, *Cold War Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977). Schonbach, "Native Fascism during the 1930s and 1940s," is one of the few works to give reasonably complete coverage to the other prewar security laws.
 9. The older works on the FBI, Fred J. Cook, *The FBI Nobody Knows* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), and Max Lowenthal, *The Federal Bureau of Investigation* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), are still useful for background. The Bureau's officially authorized history, Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story: A Report to the People* (New York: Random House, 1957), is less critical and far less informative. A better balanced defense of the Bureau that criticizes both the Cook and Lowenthal books is Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, *The F.B.I. in Our Open Society* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

We have recently found out a lot about the FBI's operations during the World War II period with the help of the Freedom of Information Act. Of the works incorporating this information, the most important is Kenneth O'Reilly, *Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). It covers the FBI's relationship with the Dies Committee, and is also the first work to document the FBI's continued political surveillance of radicals through the twenties.

Other newer works on the FBI and political surveillance are Athan Theoharis, *Spying On Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); Athan G. Theoharis, ed., *Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the*

Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982); and Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). Unfortunately, Theoharis and Donner, both being swept up unconsciously in the liberal Roosevelt cult, devote far too much energy to quibbling over whether the FBI went beyond F.D.R.'s prewar mandates in its domestic operations.

In a class by itself is Richard Gil Powers, *G-Men: Hoover's FBI in American Popular Culture* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983). This ambitious study links a judicious political history of the FBI with a far-ranging cultural history of American attitudes toward crime and law enforcement. The mass media is, of course, the bridge between the two, and Powers exposes Hoover's very astute manipulation of the media.

10. William R. Corson, *Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (New York: Dial, 1977), p. 69. Corson's book is a massive general history of the U.S. intelligence community with many details not found elsewhere. For instance, although the book was published before the incriminating documents were secured through the Freedom of Information Act, Corson reports the rumor that Assistant Attorney General William J. Donovan (later of OSS fame) informed Coolidge's Attorney General, Harlan Fisk Stone, about Hoover routinely violating the directive against political surveillance. Donovan's revelation, however, had no effect.
11. For a scholarly study of a prominent individual within the antiwar far right who was at the fringes of the isolationist movement and who was a defendant in not only the mass sedition trial but in other wartime sedition cases, see Niel M. Johnson, *George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972). Johnson's book is hostile to its subject, but still reliable. For a sensationalist — almost hysterical — contemporary "exposé" of Nazi mail propaganda within the U.S. during World War II, see Henry Hoke, *Black Mail* (New York: Reader's Book Service, 1944).
12. The most thorough account of German espionage within the U.S. is Ladislav Farago, *The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain during World War II* (New York: David McKay, 1971), although Farago has a journalistic tendency to exaggerate the overall importance of his subject. There is also some coverage of World War II espionage and treason prosecutions in two books by Nathaniel Weyl: *Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American Wars* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950) and *The Battle against Disloyalty* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1951). The titles and publication dates give away the McCarthyite bias of these highly colored and unreliable studies. They at least show no favoritism to either the extreme right or extreme left; Weyl heartily endorses government suppression of both.

Even that virtue eludes a recent work in the same disreputable category: Charles Higham, *American Swastika* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985). Professing to be a history of Nazi penetration of the U.S. up to the present day, the book dredges up and seriously advances the long-discredited allegations about Nazi collusion with respectable isolationists. It is astonishing in this day and age to find a new book that actual-

ly bemoans the fact that Roosevelt could not get authority "allowing for the incarceration of known enemy collaborators without trial." Indeed, Higham makes this complaint on p. 31, with reference to the pre-Pearl Harbor period.

Another redeeming feature of Weyl's books is that they are not overly concerned with the somewhat arbitrary distinction between antiwar dissent and espionage. Most civil libertarians still treat espionage, at least during the Second World War, as beyond the pale. As a result, no serious scholar has yet approached World War II espionage prosecutions from a civil liberties perspective. Any historical accounts, like Farago's, focus on the spying and apprehension parts of the story and tell us little or nothing about the actual trials or the precise laws under which the prosecutions were conducted.

13. The best treatment of the Tyler Kent espionage case is contained in Richard J. Whalen's biography of the U.S. ambassador to England at the time, *The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy* (New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 309-20. An earlier brief for Kent is John Howland Snow, *The Case of Tyler Kent* (New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs Press, 1946). Farago, writing more recently than Whalen, finds positive confirmation that the documents stolen by Kent finally did reach German intelligence. Farago, however, also repeats as true some fabrications against Kent concocted by Ambassador Kennedy but exposed by Whalen.
14. ACLU 1941 annual report, "Liberty's National Emergency: The Story of Civil Liberty in the Crisis Year, 1940-1941," p. 27. David R. Manwaring, *Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), gives a full account of the war-engendered plight of the Jehovah's Witnesses.
15. Polenberg, *War and Society*, p. 59.
16. In contrast to Japanese-American internment, U.S. internment of "enemy" aliens during World War II is wide open for research. It only receives mention in passing from works on other subjects, and the government has still to release the documents on alien internment facilities within its World War II concentration camp system. Although the Justice Department was responsible for alien internment, the camps used for this purpose were run by the military as part of its POW system. For a brief wartime report, see J. Edgar Hoover, "Alien Enemy Control," *Iowa Law Review*, 29 (Mar 1944), 396-408. Virtually the only scholarly attempt to open up this subject is a recent journal article, John H. Culley, "Trouble at Lordsburg Internment Camp," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 60 (Jul 1985), 225-47. Culley investigates the suspicious shooting and killing of two Japanese "enemy" aliens at one of the camps.
17. Japanese-American internment, of course, has received an inordinate amount of scholarly attention. The best introduction to the subject is Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971). See also his collection of documents, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans* (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1975). It has a useful text and bibliographic note.

Fuller treatments, in order of publication, are: Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1949); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, *The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II* (New York: Macmillan, 1969); Allan R. Bosworth, *America's Concentration Camps* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967); and Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York: William Morrow, 1976). The tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson work is best on legalistic details, the Bosworth book is mainly journalistic, and the Weglyn study is the most wide-ranging in its coverage.

18. Perrett, *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph*, pp. 219-220.
19. Blum, *V Was for Victory*, p. 160.
20. The economic cost of internment to Japanese-Americans is evaluated in Leonard Bloom and Ruth Reimer, *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effect of the War on Japanese Americans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).
21. Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 154.
22. Blum, *V Was for Victory*, p. 164.
23. Donald E. Collins, *Native American Aliens: Disloyalty and the Renunciation of Citizenship by Japanese Americans During World War II* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).
24. Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, reveals the U.S. pressure for similar policies with respect to Japanese residents in the Latin American countries.
25. On martial law in Hawaii, see J. Garner Anthony, *Hawaii Under Army Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955).
26. ACLU Annual Report 1942-1943, *Freedom in Wartime*, pp. 30-32.
27. Edwin S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 91.
28. The definitive study on World War II conscientious objectors is Mulford Q. Sibley and Philip E. Jacob, *Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-47* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). An examination of resistance to the draft is James J. Martin, "A Look at Conscription, Then and Now," in *Revisionist Viewpoints: Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, Inc., 1971). Martin suggests that resistance to the draft within the military, through AWOL, malingering, and other passive techniques, was substantial. So far, no scholar has given this suggestion the serious investigation that it deserves.
29. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), shows the devastating impact the war hysteria had on the organized peace movement.
30. The best account of the mass sedition trial is Leo P. Ribuffo, "United States v. McWilliams: The Roosevelt Administration and the Far Right," in Michal R. Belknap, ed., *American Political Trials* (Newport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 201-32. Essentially the same account appears in Ribuffo's book, *The Old Christian Right*. Biddle's coy summation of the results of the trial is from p. 243 of *In Brief Authority*. The prosecuting attorney, O. John Rogge, updated and published the government's ludicrous case against the defendants in *The Official German Report: Nazi Penetration, 1924-1942; Pan-Arabism,*

- 1939–Today (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961). The most prominent defendant and his lawyer meanwhile had published their own account (which reprints the entire government indictment): Lawrence Dennis and Maximilian St. George, *A Trial on Trial: The Great Sedition Trial of 1944* ([?]: National Civil Rights Committee, 1945). Eric Scott Royce, "FDR's Mass Sedition Trial," *New Libertarian Weekly*, 3 (30 Nov. 1975), 4–7, offers a competent summary.
31. As quoted in Perrett, *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph*, p. 361. Ronald Radosh, *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), devotes several chapters to Dennis and finds his reputation as a native fascist, to say the least, greatly exaggerated.
 32. Biddle, *In Brief Authority*, p. 243.
 33. Because it resulted in a conviction (albeit, one that was overturned by the Supreme Court), the mass trial of the German-American Bund members under the Selective Service Act deserves as much scholarly and journalistic attention as the mass sedition trial. But, alas, it has received very little.
 34. The only places that give much detail about the black antiwar religious cults and about the government prosecutions of their members are chapter twenty-two of Roi Ottley, *'New World A-Coming': Inside Black America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), and pp. 103–5 of Neil A. Wynn, *The Afro-American and the Second World War* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975). Wynn's comments are based on more recent research, but he makes an unfounded distinction between prosecutions for sedition and for urging draft resistance. Washburn, *A Question of Sedition*, also discusses black seditionists on p. 172, and further reveals that, if not for Biddle, F.D.R. and J. Edgar Hoover probably would have shut down the entire black press during World War II.
 35. Two works on the wartime Detroit race riot are Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York: Dryden, 1943), and Robert Shogan and Tom Craig, *The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence* (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964).
 36. The best discussion of the zoot-suit riots in Los Angeles is contained in Blum's *V Was for Victory*. Mauncio Mazon, *The Zoot Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), although a more recent book-length treatment, is marred by its psycho-historic approach, which views the riots as mainly symbolic. Mazon does, however, point out the important fact that the zoot-suit riots generated a fairly tame level of violence, especially relative to the wartime violence directed against blacks.
 37. Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), is a solid study of that agency. Blum's *V Was for Victory* also contains a lengthy section on the Office of War Information.
 38. Theodore Koop, *Weapon of Silence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), is an older study of the Office of Censorship.
 39. Charles J. Tull, *Father Coughlin and the New Deal* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965). For a more general examination of postal censorship, consult the relevant section of Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, *Unmailable: Congress and the Post Office* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1977).

40. The case of the U-boat saboteurs is the subject of Eugene Rachlis, *They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi Saboteurs in America* (New York: Random House, 1961).
41. A Revisionist look at one of the renegade broadcaster cases is provided by James J. Martin, "The Framing of 'Tokyo Rose,'" in *The Saga of Hog Island: And Other Essays in Inconvenient History* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1977); pp. 145-80.
42. Pound's incarceration is fully treated in E. Fuller Torrey, *The Roots of Treason: Ezra Pound and the Secrets of St. Elizabeth's* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984). Torrey, himself a psychiatrist, believes that Pound was sane — but still a bona fide traitor.
43. For the emergence of the intelligence community during World War II, see Corson's *The Armies Of Ignorance*. There are two good works on the CIA's forerunner: R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California, 1972), and Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: The O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
44. On the wartime roots of the National Security Agency, see James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report On America's Most Secret Agency*, rev. ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).
45. For the ambivalent civil liberties role played by the Supreme Court and the Constitution, see Edwin S. Corwin, *Total War And The Constitution In Crisis Times, 1918-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
46. Peter Irons, *Justice At War: The Story Of The Japanese-American Internment Cases* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), looks at the court cases that internment inspired, showing both that the government suppressed damaging documents and that ACLU lawyers, out of deference to F.D.R., were remiss in representing their Japanese-American clients.
47. The common notion of World War II as "The Good War" has most recently been reaffirmed in the title of a book by Studs Terkel: *"The Good War": An Oral History of World War Two* (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

FURTHER READING ON THE U.S., WWII & CIVIL LIBERTIES

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Shattering the Icon of Abraham Lincoln

SAM DICKSON

The astonishing thing about this paper on Abraham Lincoln is that it is needed at all or is considered controversial. In my opinion, one does not have to be a scholar to ferret out obscure and suppressed facets of history to see Abraham Lincoln as he was.

My views on this subject are not unusual. They are those of the overwhelming majority of Southerners both immediately before, during and for decades after the War between the States. My views were also shared by many in the North and the West. Only the passage of time and the studious cultivation of the myth of Abraham Lincoln, coupled with his timely death (timely in the sense of being providential for his place in history) have caused Abraham Lincoln to be raised to the level of a sacred cow in American history.

Nevertheless, even contemporary events show that the place and role of Abraham Lincoln in American history are a subject which is very sensitive to the Establishment. When Professor M.E. Bradford of the University of Dallas was nominated by President Reagan to head the National Endowment for the Humanities, a storm of abuse and controversy exploded. Professor Bradford's sin was that he had the effrontery to criticize Abraham Lincoln. *The New York Times* launched the attack, followed by a host of other establishment liberal spokesmen and institutions and joined by so-called "neo-conservatives" such as George Will. Mr. Will excoriated Professor Bradford as "the nostalgic Confederate remnant of the Conservative movement" and made it clear that neo-conservatives have no use for any criticism of Abraham Lincoln.¹ Obviously, Professor Bradford touched a raw and sensitive nerve when he criticized a president who has been dead for over 120 years. One wonders after the lapse of so many years why this matter is such a vital, important and sensitive one.

Part of the reason for the importance of Abraham Lincoln in the

iconography of the left is explained by the Whig Theory of History which is shared by most leftists in one form or another. The Whig Theory of History holds that history, in particular the history of the English-speaking peoples, is the history of freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent as progress is made away from tradition, authority, monarchy, and aristocracy toward democracy and egalitarianism. The leftist adherents to the Whig Theory of History see Lincoln as part of a continuum running from Runnymede to Cromwell to the so-called Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution to Lincoln to Wilson to Roosevelt to Kennedy and beyond.

Of course, this Whig Theory of History is preposterous and fallacious and maintained only by a thoroughly dishonest editing of historical events. However, the leftists are correct in viewing Lincoln and the effect of his career on the course of the United States as moving America away from an aristocratic society founded upon traditions, authority and property and towards a mass democratic society founded upon universal suffrage, equality and unlimited government-mandated social experimentation. While it is not remarkable that leftists should admire Abraham Lincoln, it is noteworthy and surprising that the Lincoln Myth has been marketed to moderate and conservative Americans.

Part of the success enjoyed by the Lincoln Myth lies in the timeliness of his death. By dying through an assassination at the conclusion of the war and prior to the commencement of a bitter and cruel peace, Lincoln could be used by all factions in America and could be opposed by none. Hence, Radical Republicans used his death, as well as a contrived propaganda campaign alleging that Southern leaders, including Jefferson Davis, had plotted Lincoln's assassination, to inflame Northern opinion and to solidify their leadership of the North in a campaign of humiliation, robbery and persecution of the conquered and prostrate South and its vanquished leaders.² Southerners were likewise in no position to attack Lincoln. The South's situation after the war was similar to that of post-World War II Germany, that is to say, utterly defeated, prostrate, the victim of inflammatory lies about atrocities at Andersonville, *etc.* Hence, the only prudent course for Southerners was to promote those aspects of the Lincoln Myth (*e.g.*, his alleged kindness and magnanimity) so as to defuse Northern anger and work patiently for the amelioration of the condition of the South.

Having touched on the foregoing points, let us examine the real Abraham Lincoln and his true place in American history. I have selected the following areas of scrutiny: 1 Lincoln the man; 2 Lincoln

from the standpoint of American patriotism and nationalism; 3 Lincoln and the coming of the War; 4 Lincoln's conduct of the War; 5 Lincoln and his place in American history.

1. Lincoln The Man

The official image of Lincoln the man according to the Lincoln Myth runs as follows: a man of upright character and honesty, a man of peace and compassion for his Southern adversaries, and a Christian of sincere religious convictions.

All of the above articles of faith are demonstrably false.

Lincoln was a demagogic politician who maneuvered with consummate skill on all sides of many burning issues of the day. Thus, in the famous debates with Stephen Douglas his position on the question of Negro equality became several positions according to which area of Illinois was hosting the debate. His pronouncements ranged from denials of Negro equality and advocacy of an inferior and degraded state of civil rights for the Negro to affirmations of the equality of Negroes. This is not to say that Lincoln was without principle. It is my belief, which will be developed in this paper, that Lincoln was an abiding leftist but at the same time was a crafty and dissimulating politician who was willing shamelessly to try to fool all of the people, all of the time.

As to Lincoln's alleged sincere "Christian" religious convictions, it is well known to students of Lincoln that he was an atheist and free-thinker. While like any crafty politician Lincoln was willing to invoke the name of God to garner support, no great importance should be laid to this practice which is common in all democratic societies.

Also, Lincoln believed in omens, was often depressed by seeing blackbirds, and would interpret dreams that he had in ways that can only be described as superstitious. Lincoln's superstition is frequently confused with piety.

Lincoln's law partner, William Herndon, was deeply disturbed after Lincoln's death by popular portrayals of Lincoln as a Christian saint. As Dwight G. Anderson, author of a recent study of Abraham Lincoln, points out, Herndon knew that Lincoln had written an essay denying the divinity of the Bible. This essay or book of Lincoln's came to be referred to as the "infidel book." Herndon's lectures and writings on the subject of Lincoln's atheism provoked immediate defense of Lincoln as a devout Christian. However, as Herndon shrewdly pointed out, the fact of Lincoln's early atheism cannot be denied and Lincoln's political career would

have been vastly helped by some public revelation of a dramatic conversion to Christianity. No such conversion has ever been established. Long after the controversy over Lincoln's atheism or devotion to Christianity, a statement of Lincoln's was discovered which Lincoln issued in reply to accusations that he was not a Christian.³ Lincoln admitted that he was not a member of any Christian church, but stated that he had not denied the truth of the scriptures and had not spoken with intentional disrespect of religion in general or of any particular Christian denomination. Lincoln's statement shows that Herndon was correct. The statement is artfully worded but does not indicate any conversion to Christianity and does not deny the assertions of Herndon that Lincoln had denied the divinity of the scriptures. Lincoln says only that he had not denied their truth. Lincoln is to be admired for his honesty in this statement in not concocting some vote-catching, born-again experience. Our admiration for his candor would be greater had he desisted from piously self-serving references to the Almighty in political speeches throughout his career.

2. Lincoln As Patriot And Nationalist

Regarding Lincoln's patriotism and devotion to the Union, he was devoted rather to the aggrandizement of his section and of his faction, which dominated that section. When broader national interests came into conflict with the interests of Lincoln and his faction, Lincoln took the side of his faction, as will be shown later in dealing with the Mexican-American War.

Lincoln's first term in the Illinois legislature coincided with the initial rumblings in Northern legislatures of the dangerous and divisive slavery issue. Responsible Americans of both sections recognized the danger posed to the American Union by the slavery issue and sought to head it off. One means of doing this was to have the legislatures of both sections pass identical resolutions expressing a national consensus on the slavery issue from a moderate point of view.

Stephen Douglas, a true American patriot, was among those instrumental in seeking to have the Illinois legislature pass this resolution. The resolution was overwhelmingly passed with only a tiny minority voting against it. Among the handful of opponents was a freshman member of the legislature, Abraham Lincoln.⁴ Beginning with this incident, Douglas was to be a lifelong adversary of Lincoln.

Lincoln's position on the Illinois resolution seriously impeaches

those who try to make of Lincoln a white racist. The fact that Lincoln was willing to go that far early in his career indicates that he was committed to Negro equality at the inception of his career and was on the far left of contemporary American thought about the Negro and slavery issues. Furthermore, Lincoln's opposition to the resolution is strong evidence for his willingness to disrupt the Union in order to promote his own faction's success. Certainly, his position on the resolution has to be laid to his discredit in assessing his career.

This is not to say that Lincoln did not craftily dissemble his views on slavery and the Negro as a practical politician, realizing the limitations within which he strove to realize his ideals. For instance, in late 1854 Lincoln was furious when he learned that radical abolitionist Republicans meeting in Springfield had adopted fiery anti-slavery resolutions and formed a party state central committee, on which they took the liberty of placing Lincoln's name.

I have been perplexed some to understand how my name was placed in that committee. I was not consulted on the subject; nor was I apprised of the appointment until I discovered it by accident two or three weeks afterwards. I suppose that my opposition to the principle of slavery is as strong as that of any number of the Republican party; but I had also supposed that the *extent* [original emphasis] to which I feel authorized to carry that opposition practically was not at all satisfactory to that party.⁵

This letter shows that Lincoln was, in fact, a staunch opponent of slavery but that he recognized, better than some abolitionists sharing his views, that it was necessary to be careful in approaching their goal.

Lincoln's aggrandizement of his sectional and factional advantage at the expense of the nation as a whole is most clearly evidenced by his opposition to the war with Mexico. President James K. Polk, certainly one of the greatest American presidents, was responsible for almost doubling our national territory by means of the war with Mexico. Through his efforts and through the heroism in battle of many genuine American nationalists like Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, a whole empire was won, out of which would be carved many of our states, from Texas to California.

President Polk's war with Mexico was not universally popular, however, even in the America of the 1840's. (It is noteworthy that many modern Liberals consider the Mexican War to have been the worst and most immoral war in our history, preferring such wars as the War between the States, WWI and WWII as "moral" wars.)⁶ Among Polk's opponents in the matter of the war was the freshman

congressman from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln. On January 12, 1848, Lincoln spoke in the House of Representatives defending the vote of his party a few days before in declaring "that the war with Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President."⁷ It was, in Carl Sandburg's words, a fiercely partisan speech, which led to strong criticism of Lincoln in Illinois. The result was that Abraham Lincoln was defeated for re-election to Congress due to his opposition to national expansion and to the war with Mexico.

It is also ironic to note that in his speech attacking President Polk Lincoln made two statements which can be cited against him in his own conduct in the War between the States. Lincoln stated:

Any people any where, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government and form a new one that suits them better... Any portion of such people that can, may revolutionize, and make their own, of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than this, a majority of any portion of such people may revolutionize, putting down a minority, intermingled with, or near about them, who may oppose their movement.⁸

These remarks clearly can be cited to justify and condone the actions of the South in seceding from the Union in 1860 and 1861. To further the irony, Lincoln condemned President Polk's initiation of the War as unconstitutional on the grounds that Polk had sent American troops into battle without congressional authority,⁹ but later, Lincoln would take far more dramatic steps to initiate war by executive fiat without prior congressional approval, as required by the Constitution, when it served his interests to do so in the secession crisis.

3. Lincoln and the Coming of The War

As we have noted previously, Lincoln in the inception of his public career in the Illinois State house took the radical position on slavery by opposing the resolutions intended to soothe public feelings in both sections.

The slavery issue continued to torment and divide the nation. However, it would be a mistake to focus, as do most Northern historians, solely upon the slavery issue as the cause of division between the two sections.

The North was already losing its Anglo-Saxon character and was rapidly changing with the inundation of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants from Europe. Furthermore, the North was industrializing and her economic interests were in many respects directly

antithetical to those of the South. Hence the North desired the erection of a high tariff barrier to enable herself to sell her industrial products with a competitive advantage over imports from Europe. Likewise, most of the nation's foreign exchange was earned by exports from the South. The tariff issue was critical in the division of the nation and probably played the major role in determining the North upon a policy of aggression and conquest when the secession came.

Lincoln had always been a national Whig. His policies were those in favor of a central banking system, which he championed during his first term in the Illinois legislature.¹⁰ The Bank of the United States which Andrew Jackson opposed was similar to our present day Federal Reserve System. Lincoln opposed resolutions in the Illinois legislature supporting President Andrew Jackson, who had vetoed the National Bank.¹¹ Lincoln also favored high tariffs, a strongly centralized government and internal improvements.¹² Lincoln himself had a direct personal reason to support such policies, since he derived a significant portion of his income from serving as attorney for the railroad interests.¹³

The estrangement and antagonism between the two sections gradually accelerated. In 1858 Lincoln made his famous "House Divided" Speech. In this speech, Lincoln declared:

A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new — North as well as South.¹⁴

Entranced by the Lincoln cult, Americans are prone to read or hear the House Divided Speech with a tingling of the spine, impressed by its dramatic tone. Set in the context of developing regional antagonism, however, the speech seems to be that of an irresponsible demagogue. The Union had existed half slave and half free from its inception. There appears to be no logical reason why it could not have continued to have existed in that fashion, given responsible leadership and good will on both sides, until slavery was eliminated by the progress of technology. Certainly the delivery of such a speech was not responsible leadership, as it did much to infuriate and alarm the South. This especially was true with Lincoln's election, which the South saw as the election of a man who seemed to have declared himself on the side of those who intended to violate the constitutional rights and property rights of

Southerners and to interfere with their self-government. As is the case with many dramatic speeches, the speech has its thrilling aspects, but was utterly irresponsible and led to tragic results.

Lincoln's activity with regard to the developing sectional strife contrasts sharply with that of his major opponent Stephen A. Douglas. Douglas consistently sought the national advantage, having been a staunch supporter of President Polk in the war with Mexico. Douglas strived to promote reconciliation and cooperation between North and South, and to develop workable compromises that avoided dogmatic impasses on either side.¹⁵

Lincoln in the Lincoln-Douglas debates was his characteristic demagogic and unprincipled self. In northern Illinois, in which the German and other non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants now were playing a major and perhaps decisive role, Lincoln declared himself dramatically for Negro equality, raising his hands to the heavens and declaring: "In the right to eat the bread his own hands have earned he is the equal of Judge Douglas, or of myself, or any living man." However, in southern Illinois, where conservative and Southern sympathies ran strong, Lincoln declared himself opposed to granting Negroes civil rights and stated that they were in fact an inferior race.¹⁶

Likewise, in 1858 in the course of the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln wrote a meditation which was not used in his debates and which his admiring biographer Sandburg described as a "private affair between him and his conscience." This statement ran as follows:

Yet I have never failed — do not now fail — to remember that in the Republican cause there is a higher aim than that of mere office. I have not allowed myself to forget that the abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain was agitated a hundred years before it was a final success; that the measure had its open fire-eating opponents; its stealthy "don't care" opponents; its dollar and cent opponents; its inferior race opponents; its negro equality opponents; and its religious and good order opponents; that all these opponents got offices, and their adversaries got none. But I also remember that though they blazed like tallow candles for a century, at last they flickered in the socket, died out, stank in the dark for a brief season, and were remembered no more, even by the smell... I am proud, in my passing speck of time, to contribute an humble mite to that glorious consummation, which my own poor eyes may not last to see.¹⁷

With his election in 1860, the real test of Abraham Lincoln's leadership in his country began. State after state in the South withdrew from the Union, as it became obvious that the South was extremely agitated by his election. Lincoln had been elected with only

39% of the popular vote. Only the splintering of the moderate-to-conservative majority made possible the election of this President. No president since has ever been elected with so little popular support. Certainly no president has ever been placed in office over the determined opposition of so many of his fellow citizens.¹⁸

Had Stephen A. Douglas been elected, it is almost certain that secession and civil war would have been averted.

In his campaign Lincoln had avoided speaking on vital issues. In the words of Reinhart H. Luthin, one of Lincoln's better known biographers, "From his election to his inauguration Lincoln's handling, or rather lack of handling of the bedeviling secession crisis might be termed 'calculated inactivity' for he was to do nothing about it nor was he to provide much leadership, with the Republic tottering in the balance."¹⁹

Lincoln had long believed that Southern talk of secession was nothing but bluff. In 1856 he had stated in a speech in Galena, Illinois: "All this talk about the dissolution of the Union is humbug."²⁰ He grossly underestimated secessionist sentiment and overestimated pro-Union strength in the upper South and border slave regions.

After Lincoln's election, a conservative Senator, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, proposed a compromise to head off secession by extending the Missouri Compromise line dividing slave states from free states all the way to the Pacific.²¹ Lincoln rejected this compromise and marshalled his party against all other compromises with the South. Lincoln said as follows concerning this:

Let there be no compromise on the question of extending slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and, ere long must be done again. The dangerous ground — that into which some of our friends have a hankering to run — is Pop. Sov. [Popular Sovereignty]. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come, and better now, than any time hereafter.²²

Lincoln also instructed his legislative spokesman from Illinois in Washington not to compromise with the South.²³

Pleas poured into Lincoln from all regions of the country imploring him to make some gesture to the South and give leadership at that critical time. However, as Luthin describes it, Lincoln continued his "sphinx-like silence" until his inauguration.²⁴

The Lincoln cultists often quote a letter which Lincoln wrote during this period, to Alexander Hamilton Stephens of Georgia, who later would serve as Vice President of the Confederacy. In this letter, Lincoln is quoted as saying:

For your eyes only
Springfield, Ill. Dec. 22, 1860
Hon. A.H. Stephens

My Dear Sir

Your obliging answer to my short note is just received and for which please accept my thanks — I fully appreciate the present peril the country is in, and the weight of responsibility on me.

Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican administration would *directly*, or *indirectly*, interfere with the slaves, or with them about their slaves? If they do I wish to assure you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, not as an enemy, that there is no cause for such fear —

The South would be in no more danger in this respect than it was in the days of Washington.

I suppose, however, this does not meet the case — You think slavery is right and ought to be extended while we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted — That I suppose is the rule — It certainly is the only substantial difference between us —

Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln²⁵

The interesting thing about this letter, which as I say is often quoted by Lincoln's admirers to show him in the official posture of the loving father holding out his hands to his erring Southern sons, is that the letter was never publicized and never received any attention in the South. The reason for this is that the preamble of the letter, which Lincoln's admirers delete in the quotation, forbade Stephens, a Unionist, upon his honor from showing it to anyone else, stating that the letter is for his eyes only.

Lincoln and Stephens had served together in Congress and knew each other very well. Lincoln, it may be anticipated, knew that Stephens would not make use of the letter in his efforts to keep Georgia (and thereby the South) in the Union in obedience to Lincoln's urgings.

The question then arises of why Lincoln wrote the letter at all. No one can answer that question with certainty but it would appear that Lincoln believed that he could entice Stephens into coming North and siding with the Union in the impending sectional war. This policy of Lincoln worked with his later Vice-President, Andrew Johnson, who had also served in Congress with Lincoln, representing eastern Tennessee, and who went North and supported the Union during the War.

Certainly any responsible American would agree that Lincoln should have moved energetically to try to deter the secession movement. The fact is that Lincoln did not. On his way to Washington Lincoln visited with a number of the so-called "war governors" in the North. These were men like Governor Andrew

G. Curtin of Pennsylvania who were in favor of coercing the South by armed force into remaining in the Union and thus remaining subject to the North's tariff laws.

While in Pennsylvania, Lincoln spoke at Independence Hall. He alluded to the Declaration of Independence and made clear that the Constitution was in conflict with the Declaration of Independence, and that it was his intention to reform the Constitution to bring it in line with the principles of the Declaration. Lincoln stated as follows:

I have never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence... if this country cannot be saved without giving up that principle [equality] I was about to say that I would rather be assassinated on this spot than to surrender it.²⁶

These statements were not calculated to soothe suspicions of Southern conservatives; they also reflect Lincoln's innate radicalism and dissatisfaction with the American Constitution. His dissatisfaction with the limitations imposed on government and executive power by the Constitution were later to become evident in his precipitation of the war and his conduct of that war.

As Stephen Douglas pointed out in the United States Senate, as the secession crisis developed, there were three possible courses for the United States to take in dealing with the sectional crisis: 1 The Union could be saved by compromise and reconciliation between men of good will in both sections; 2 The South could be allowed to withdraw in peace and set up her own government independent of the North; 3 The South could be coerced by military force into remaining subject to the Union. According to Douglas, the best solution would have been one based on compromise and reconciliation. The next best would have been to allow the South to depart in peace. The worst was to resort to violent military force to coerce the South into the Union like a conquered province.²⁷

In his inaugural address, Lincoln was ambiguous, making his famous gesture to the South in its conclusion but also containing passages stating that he would not recognize secession and would enforce the laws in all states. His original draft was much more warlike but Seward convinced him to soften it.²⁸

Continuing efforts were made to negotiate a peaceful separation. Virginia sent three commissioners to meet with Lincoln shortly prior to Lincoln's attempt to resupply Fort Sumter, which led to the bombardment of Fort Sumter and the outbreak of the War. According to the Virginia commissioners, Lincoln equivocated as to whether he would resort to armed force to coerce the seceded states

back into the Union. Virginia at that point had not seceded but had placed her legislature in a state of continuous session to await further developments. The Virginia commissioners had made it clear that if the Lincoln administration resorted to armed force against the South, Virginia and the other states of the South which had not already seceded would also go out and join their seceded sisters.²⁹

Lincoln equivocated with the commissioners. However, his greatest concern voiced to them was, "What about my tariff?"³⁰ This shows once again Lincoln's commitment to the huge vested industrial and financial interests of the North. The war in Lincoln's mind had to be fought to establish the supremacy of that financial oligarchy. The tariff under Lincoln was instated with a vigor and was raised to unparalleled heights.³¹ This economic policy of anti-Southern tariffs and economic exploitation of the South was to be continued for almost eighty years after the war and was only abandoned in the face of the crisis of World War II.³²

Lincoln after his inauguration temporarized and maneuvered. All proposals in the so-called "Peace Congress" failed, receiving no support from the administration. It was necessary to provoke the South into firing the first shot so as to rally Northern opinion, at that point strongly divided, behind a war to coerce the South. This was achieved by dispatching resupply ships to Fort Sumter, thus breaking his commitments and assurances to the South that he would not reinforce the Federal forts in the South.³³

When the news of the planned resupply of Fort Sumter reached the South, the bombardment of the fort was begun. Lincoln then used the act of firing upon the American flag to rally Northern opinion to his cause and put up a public pretence that the situation in the South was merely that of a minority of conspirators preventing the expression of the true Union sentiments of the loyalist majorities in the South. Lincoln may have believed this himself, because he always overestimated his ability to divide the South and to provoke animosity between the social classes in the South. It would not be until the war had been raging for over a year that Lincoln would realize that this was not to be.

After the surrender of Fort Sumter, Lincoln issued an executive proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers to form an army to invade the South. Virginia and the other remaining Southern states withdrew and the Confederacy assumed its basic geography.³⁴

In 1848 during his efforts to oppose the war with Mexico, Lincoln had attacked President Polk upon the floor of the House for having sent units of the United States Army into a disputed border

region between Mexico and the United States. Lincoln said that the President's action violated the Constitution's requirement that only Congress could declare war. Lincoln's own action in raising an army by Executive Order was a far greater violation of these same provisions of the Constitution dealing with the declaration of war, than the alleged violations of President Polk which he had attacked. The "Executive Order Army" could be said to be the precursor of the whole litany of executive orders which have been a favorite device of presidents from the Roosevelt administration onward. The war governors, nevertheless, hastened to provide Lincoln with the militia units and volunteers which he needed to commence the hostilities and the war was on.

The efforts of true American patriots like Stephen A. Douglas to save the Union by conciliation and compromise had been successfully thwarted. Lincoln had achieved his opportunity to rededicate the nation to the radical principles of the Declaration of Independence and to get around the impediment of the Constitution.

4. Lincoln's Conduct of the War

A civil war is usually marked by an intensity in feeling and an atrociousness of conduct which is often lacking in wars between rival powers. It is fair to say that the War between the States was waged by the Lincoln administration with a barbarity rarely equalled in any other war in American history.

Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus throughout the nation. He assumed the power to close newspapers and in fact closed hundreds of them in the North which dared criticize his policies. He arrested elected officials, including former members of Congress, who opposed him.³⁵

Vice-President John C. Breckenridge, who finished second to Lincoln in electoral votes in the 1860 election, presided over the official election and swore in his successor, Hannibal Hamlin. Breckenridge, a Kentuckian, was opposed to disunion and to Lincoln. His criticism of Lincoln was censored and the Associated Press was barred from reporting his remarks. Breckenridge remained in Washington until after the First Battle of Manassas, hoping and working for peace.³⁶ He later became a Confederate general.

The first taste of what was to come in the South in the course of the war was seen in the border states. In Missouri, the Anglo-Saxon population was disarmed and the state was garrisoned with volunteer units of Germans who could be counted on to support the Lincoln administration. The Anglo-Saxon population of the whole western tier of counties in Missouri were deported from their homes

by General Ewing's General Order Number 11, which depopulated the region by forcibly evacuating the women and children on the shortest of notice, along with burning their houses and stealing their property. Among those experiencing this deportation and expropriation was the mother of later President Harry S. Truman. The memories of the sufferings she and her family had endured while she was a small child stayed with Mrs. Truman throughout her life. On one occasion the aspiring young politician told his mother that he had been invited to dinner at the house of a prominent family in Kansas City. His mother admonished him to turn the silver over and check the hallmark because, "It's probably ours." On another occasion, Truman showed his mother his new National Guard uniform only to be ordered out of the house because the pants were blue.

In Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, Northern troops fired on pro-Southern demonstrators, dispersed legislatures, expelled elected officials and otherwise demonstrated that no respect for constitutional rights or liberties would be shown during the course of the war.

It is amazing that the Lincoln cultists have been able to shield Lincoln from the Northern atrocities committed during the war under his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of its armies. The standard line on this point, usually implied rather than stated, is that Lincoln sat in the White House exuding love for Southerners, in blissful ignorance of what Sherman, Ewing, Pope, Butler and others were doing. This, of course, is unworthy of belief and is an impossibility, given the widespread jubilant publicity in the North over the depredations of the Northern armies against the Southern people.³⁷

General Ewing's General Order Number 11 in Missouri was merely a taste of what was to come throughout the South. The most famous and widely known example of Northern atrocities was the campaign of General William Tecumseh Sherman in Georgia. No portion of this country has ever felt the scourge of war like the State of Georgia experienced it.

The city of Atlanta, *after* its surrender, was burned to the ground, and only a handful of churches and a few outlying residences escaped the holocaust. More than 4,000 edifices were burned, which was approximately 92% of the city. Only 450 buildings of any sort escaped this ruthless burning, in a city which had a population of 14,000. Captain Daniel Oakey of the Second Massachusetts Volunteers recounted the burning of Atlanta as follows: "Sixty thousand of us witnessed the destruction of Atlanta, while our post band and that of the 33rd Massachusetts played

martial airs and operatic selections."³⁸ Like the bombing of Dresden, this massive destruction of civilian property was of no military importance. On November 15, 1864, the march of the Northern troops across Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah began. Sherman created a charred avenue over 40 miles wide, destroying all railroads, seizing all provisions, pillaging, plundering and burning. There was no military force available to obstruct his course.³⁹

The devastation in Georgia was so complete that entire communities disappeared never to be heard of again. Perhaps the most dramatic of these occurred at the milltown of New Manchester on Sweetwater Creek in Douglas County, Georgia. The Union forces had occupied the town without a shot being fired on July 2, 1864. Most of the workers in the mill were women and were told to return to their homes. They were told that they would be taken out of the path of the advancing army. The mill was destroyed and the town was placed under guard. On July 8, the entire town, including the homes of the workers, was burned to the ground. Having destroyed the entire town, only the population remained, most of them women and children with a few men. The women and children were separated from the men and herded into wagons. The wagon train then set off for Marietta, Georgia, some 16 miles away. During the journey the women were forced to endure the sexual advances of the Union soldiers. In Marietta the group was joined by a similar group of deported women from Roswell, Georgia. On July 20, the entire group of women and children were shipped by train from Georgia to Louisville, Kentucky.⁴⁰ Not one woman or child is known to have returned to New Manchester. To the credit of the North, even in that section, there was strong opposition to the policy of deporting women and children.

Are we really to believe that Abraham Lincoln knew nothing of the depredations of Sherman's troops? The atrocious deeds of his troops were reported widely throughout the Northern press and extended over a period of many months, not ending until the final surrender of the Confederacy, by which time Sherman had similarly torched Columbia, South Carolina, and laid waste to parts of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Sherman, besides his legendary "War is hell" comment, wrote his wife in Savannah, Georgia, of popular opinion of the Northern liberators: "They regard us just as the Romans did the Goths and the parallel is not unjust."⁴¹

However, one should not be too hasty in condemning Lincoln. Lincoln shared the democratic sensitivity to deportations which certainly justify his being included in the trinity of Lincoln, Wilson

and F.D.R. on the subject of deportations. Not all deportations were tolerated by the White House during the war. Thus for instance when General Grant ordered Jewish speculators expelled from Tennessee, Lincoln quickly issued a peremptory order to Grant, rescinding his order and rebuking him for having deported the Jewish speculators.⁴² Like Wilson, F.D.R. and other ideological descendants of Lincoln, Lincoln knew where a democracy has to draw the line. After all, a distinction has to be made between Anglo-Saxon women and children, textile workers and farmers, and Jewish speculators.

Nor were the outrages of the Northern armies confined to the states of Georgia and South Carolina. In Virginia, for example, between July 18 and July 23, 1862, General John Pope issued four general orders providing that the Union army would as far as possible subsist upon the country, *i.e.*, steal food from the civilians. All villages and neighborhoods through which the Union forces marched would be placed "under contribution." Civilians living along the line of march would be punished if there were any injuries to railroads or other roads by bands of unknown guerillas. Also, Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr seized civilians as hostages so that they could be executed if any of his soldiers were killed by unknown persons. (One recalls the righteous indignation periodically vented at Germans for reprisals taken against civilians for guerilla actions of the "gallant resistance" in World War II.) Those refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States would be banished from their homes; if found at any point within the Federal lines or in the rear, they would be executed as spies. Anyone who communicated with the enemy was subject to the death penalty. As Hudson Strode points out in his marvelous biography of Jefferson Davis, a mother who sent her son a letter could be regarded as a spy.⁴³ Pope also proceeded to arm the recently-freed slaves against the whites. General McClellan deserves this country's admiration for denouncing Pope as "an upstart braggart" and a man who mistook brutality in war for power.⁴⁴

President Jefferson Davis writing to General Robert E. Lee, reacted to Pope's orders as follows:

We find ourselves driven by our enemies in their steady progress towards a practice which we abhor and which we are vainly struggling to avoid. Some of the military authorities of the United States seem to suppose that better success will attend a savage war in which no quarter is to be given and no sex to be spared. For the present, we renounce the right of retaliation on the innocent and shall continue to treat the private enlisted soldiers of General Pope's army as prisoners of war;

but if, after notice to the government in Washington, these savage practices are continued, we shall be reluctantly forced to the last resort of accepting war on the terms chosen by our foes, until the outraged voice of the common humanity forces a respect for the recognized rules of war.

You are therefore instructed to communicate to the Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States the contents of this letter — to the end that he may be notified of our intention not to consider any officers hereafter captured from General Pope's army as prisoners of war.⁴⁵

General Lee also wrote to the United States government condemning Pope's practices and warning of the results they would lead to. While General Halleck refused to accept Lee's letter because of its insulting statements about the United States government, nevertheless Pope's orders were modified and von Steinwehr was reprimanded for the conduct of his troops.⁴⁶

Like his ideological descendants, Wilson and F.D.R., Lincoln did not hesitate to cooperate with antagonistic ethnic groups against his own people. Thus the armies of the North were swelled with hundreds of thousands of mercenary soldiers from Europe, lured to the United States by a circular known as "the notorious Number 19" in the South. This circular from William H. Seward offered inducement in the form of pay and bounties to enlist in the service of the North, which already enjoyed an advantage in numbers of four times the White population of the South. The circular was evasive about service in the Army. Consul General John Bigelow in Paris organized a network of immigration agencies across Europe offering free land under the Homestead Act of 1862. After the war Bigelow stated that the tremendous success of recruiting of these foreign mercenaries accounted for the "mysterious repletion of our army during the four years of war."⁴⁷

Large numbers of Irish and German mercenaries arrived to assist in the suppression of the South. According to the *New York Herald*, almost 150,000 immigrants were estimated to have joined the army early in the war. Admiral Porter estimated that a majority of the eighty thousand seamen were aliens. Ultimately, it is estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 mercenary troops were enrolled in the Northern army to subjugate the South.⁴⁸

Pope Pius IX wrote a personal letter to Jefferson Davis for the Confederacy to use in Ireland and in Catholic areas of Germany to stem the recruitment of such mercenary troops.⁴⁹ This letter was read in Catholic churches across Europe to discourage Union recruitment efforts.⁵⁰ Without the large influx of mercenaries, the primitive and wasteful military tactics of Grant would have sickened the

Northern public far sooner than it did.

Southern prisoners of war also seemed to have escaped Lincoln's much acclaimed magnanimity. The death rate of Southern prisoners in Northern prison camps was much higher than the rate of Northern prisoners in Southern P.O.W. camps. To this disparity must be added the fact that the North could not claim lack of food or medicine as a reason for the horrifying high death rate in the prisons. In fact, the North refused to permit the shipment of medicine or food to Union prisoners in Southern hands. Jefferson Davis offered to pay two or three times the market price for medicine in commodities such as cotton, tobacco or even gold for the exclusive use of Northern prisoners, to be dispensed by Northern surgeons. This offer was ignored by Lincoln. Finally, the Confederates offered to release 13,000 of the most desperate cases without an equivalent exchange by the Lincoln government. The Lincoln administration waited from August to October to collect the prisoners. After they were released, atrocity photographs of the men were circulated in the North to show how the typical prisoner in Southern hands was supposedly treated.⁵¹

Sherman used Southern prisoners of war to clear mine fields by marching them back and forth across land outside Savannah where mines were suspected. Southern prisoners were also herded in front of Northern emplacements under Confederate artillery fire so as to force Southerners to fire on their own men. Thus in the siege of Charleston, 50 Confederate officers were placed in a holding pen in front of Fort Wagner on Morris Island, so as to expose them to the fire of Confederate batteries shelling the Northern positions. On June 23, 1864, an order was issued to this effect from the office of the Commissary-General of Prisoners in Washington, D.C.⁵² Once again, the idea that Lincoln was ignorant of the atrocious conditions under which Southern prisoners were held or the misuse of such prisoners is not tenable.

There is a French saying: the more things change, the more they remain the same. A book that has gotten fairly widespread distribution in the United States in the last year, called *The Long Surrender*, is worth reading because it shows us that we Americans are no more moral than foreign peoples. We have committed the same kind of war crimes that other people have committed. During the height of the hullabaloo raised over the Bitburg visit by Reagan, I learned of the disrespect shown to the Southern war dead in the course of the war. Among things cited by Burke Davis in *The Long Surrender* was the fact that after the Battle of Sharpsburg in Maryland, the Northerners announced that they would not permit

anyone to accord Christian burials to the Southern soldiers of war — they ordered the bodies to be left out to rot and to decompose. Only after the rot had gotten to the point where the public's health was being endangered were the rotted remains scooped together and buried in unmarked common ground.⁵³

Likewise after the war — of course, this can't be laid to Lincoln's account since he too was dead — the North posted soldiers at military cemeteries to prevent Southern women from putting flowers on the graves of their deceased husbands, fathers, sons and brothers.⁵⁴

When Richmond fell another interesting little tidbit of American history occurred. Lincoln's subordinates ordered that the Episcopal churches, in which it is the custom to pray for the leader of the country, were to pray for Abraham Lincoln in conquered areas of the South. If they refused to pray for Abraham Lincoln, Northern troops were to take the priest away from the altar, thrust him out of the church, close the church and turn the church over to Northern denominations.

Another development in the course of the war which shows something of the barbarity with which it was waged is the famous incident involving Benjamin Butler in New Orleans. General Butler was one of the most ruthless and cruel Northern generals. When he occupied New Orleans he embarked upon a course of insult and abuse toward the civilian population. There were hardly any males of military age left in New Orleans. They had all been sent off to the army, so that the women were deprived of their sons, husbands and fathers to protect them. It was apparently inconceivable to Butler that these women would not welcome their Northern conquerors under the circumstances of the war and he took umbrage at the fact that one Southern lady spat at a Northern soldier who persisted in making advances toward her. When Butler heard of this he issued his Order Number 28 which read as follows:

As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women, calling themselves "ladies" of New Orleans in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part [it is to be noted that there were Negro troops among the occupying army] it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall, by word, gesture or movement insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.⁵⁵

This in essence was a "right to rape" order which he issued to his troops and he undoubtedly, given his personality, was gratified by the effect it worked upon the civilian population. I assume that he

was also astonished at the outrage that it aroused around the world, because the order redounded to the great discredit of the United States. Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, wrote to Charles Francis Adams, the U.S. Minister in London the following concerning Butler's order:

I will venture to say that no example can be found in the history of civilized nations till the publication of this order of a general guilty in cold blood of so infamous an act as deliberately to hand over the female inhabitants of a conquered city to the unbridled license of an unrestrained soldiery.⁵⁵

Later he said to the English Parliament: "It is a proclamation to which I do not scruple to attach the epithet 'infamous.' Any Englishman must blush to think that such an act has been committed by one belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race."

Likewise the French Minister in Washington, Mercier, who was concerned because so many of the women in New Orleans were of French extraction, issued strong remonstrances from the French government. Finally, Lincoln relieved Butler of his command — but not because of Butler's treatment of the civilians of New Orleans; not because Butler and his brother were believed to be selling supplies through the black market to the Confederates; not because Butler ordered a civilian hanged: Lincoln did not remove Butler for these reasons. It was when Butler began confiscating foreign property and all of the foreign consuls united and objected to his behavior in a unanimous letter to Washington that Butler was removed. Lincoln's reaction to the complaints was to give Butler the assignment of Commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina and Commissioner of Prisoner-of-War Exchanges.⁵⁶ What Lincoln expected of prisoner of war exchanges can be gauged from this appointment.

When Lincoln appointed Butler he also warned Butler that if he were captured, "He [Jeff Davis] has a price on your head and will hang you for sure." This was the man Lincoln expected would be able to ensure humane treatment for prisoners of war and their exchange. The Confederate commissioner at first refused to meet with Butler. A few months after Butler's appointment, Grant ordered all further exchanges to cease.

Lincoln's depredations in the course of the war were not confined, however, to the South. As mentioned above Lincoln also interfered with the functioning of constitutional government in the North by arresting elected representatives of the people and holding them for military trial.⁵⁷ By Executive Order he closed down

hundreds of newspapers in the North which criticized the war. He abolished the writ of habeas corpus and is estimated to have held as many as 20,000 civilians in detention without trial.⁵⁸ The suffering of the North, while not as horrific as that of the South, especially since the Northern civilian population at large escaped its severity, was none the less very real. The battle losses were far in excess of anyone's expectations.⁵⁹

In this regard it is worth noting the famous letter to Lidia P. Bixby which Lincoln cultists love to cite. The text of the famous letter is as follows:

Dear Madam:

I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant General of Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle.

I feel how weak and frivolous must be any words of mine which could attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save.

I pray our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours, to have laid so costly a sacrifice on the altar of Freedom.

Yours, sincerely and respectfully,

A Lincoln⁶⁰

This letter received much publicity in the North, calculated as it was to touch the heart of any reader.

Those of us who are not Lincoln admirers may see in it a sterling example of the humbug and hypocrisy that is an inescapable part of any democracy. Lincoln's own son, Robert Todd Lincoln, was of military age and was also a resident of Massachusetts during the bloodletting of the War between the States. Unlike Mrs. Bixby's sons, however, Abraham Lincoln's son fought the war at Andover and Harvard. Only in the closing months of the War did young Robert finally see military service. His service was confined to serving on General Grant's staff where he enjoyed a bird's eye view of the war's conclusion with the rank of Captain and Assistant Adjutant General.⁶¹

But Lincoln's behavior in sheltering his son from the war at the same time he was consigning the sons of so many Northern mothers to battle contrasts sharply with the behavior of Robert E. Lee and other Southern leaders. Most of the sons of Southern leaders fought in the war. There was a famous example in one battle in which Lee was riding by an artillery unit. It was a hot day and

the men had stripped themselves of their uniforms. They were blackened by the smoke from the cannons. As Lee rode by, one private, black with powder, ran out of the unit and spoke to the General. Lee said: "Well, my man, what can I do for you?" The artilleryman replied to him, "Why, General, don't you know me?" It was Robert E. ("Rob") Lee, Jr., Lee's son and namesake in the thick of battle. Another of Lee's sons, William Fitzhugh Lee, would be captured about the middle of the war, and Custis Lee would later be taken prisoner by the North in the closing days of the war.⁶²

Finally, most Americans accept as an article of faith that had Lincoln lived he would have conducted a policy of magnanimity toward the South during Reconstruction. In view of the methods by which he provoked the war and the methods by which he waged the war, such is mere supposition. There are various statements of Lincoln's that are cited (that he was going to treat them as if they had never left, and all of that) but since Lincoln spoke out of both sides of his mouth, not too much credit can be laid to such remarks.

For example, Lincoln indicated that he was in favor of Negro suffrage in Louisiana, which would have placed the white Louisianans in a politically untenable position. He was upset when the Unionist-dominated legislature of the Reconstruction government did not grant suffrage to Negroes and he expressed a desire that Negro suffrage be granted.⁶³ Indeed, after Lincoln's last cabinet meeting Attorney General Joshua Speed, an advocate of Negro suffrage, told Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase that Lincoln "never seemed so near our views."⁶⁴ Of course, after Lincoln's assassination, Negroes were given the right to vote and they were manipulated by Northern carpetbaggers into passing harsh laws against the formerly rebellious, white, Southern population.

5. Lincoln and His Place in American History

What then is the proper place of Abraham Lincoln in American history and why they should we as Revisionists question Abraham Lincoln?

The proper place of Abraham Lincoln in American history is as part of the liberal trinity of F.D.R., Wilson and Lincoln. He had the same values they had. He advanced the country toward unlimited government as they did. He was willing to use foreigners and minority groups against his own people. He was willing to have a selective "democratic" conscience when it came to subjects like deportations. He properly ought to be considered as a major liberal force, as someone who moved the country toward the left and

toward the situation which exists today. He successfully defeated the South. The labors of the South for its freedom were all in vain. Seventy-five percent of the white male population of military age served in the Southern armies but could not overcome the disparity in numbers of the North's mercenaries.⁶⁵ The cherished dream of Southern independence was not to be. Lincoln should be seen as an example of the amazing inability of Americans to assess their history objectively because while some things may be little known, certainly everyone has heard of General Sherman's March to the Sea. We cannot exonerate Abraham Lincoln from this atrocity. Yet somehow the question is never even asked by Americans — if Lincoln was so wonderful and magnanimous and kind and good, why did the March to the Sea take place?

The Lincoln myth exemplifies the lack of historical sense and objectivity of Americans, the ability to accept "official" history even in the face of obvious facts.

Notes

1. See, for example, Eric Foner, "Lincoln, Bradford and the Conservatives," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1981.
2. Burke Davis, *The Long Surrender* (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 108-09, 203.
3. Dwight G. Anderson, *Abraham Lincoln: The Question for Immortality* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 66. Ward Hill Lamon, one of Lincoln's closest friends, wrote: "He perceived no reason for changing his convictions, but he did perceive many good and cogent reasons for not making them public."
4. Edgar Lee Masters, *Lincoln, the Man* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1931), pp. 40-3; Robert W. Johansen, *Stephen A. Douglas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 54-5.
5. Reinhard H. Luthin, *The Real Abraham Lincoln* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 178.
6. David L. Hoggan, *The Myth of the New History* (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1985), p. 72 *et. seq.*
7. Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), Volume 1, p. 367. Sangamon Edition (referred herein as "SE").
8. Sandburg, Vol. I, p. 369 SE.
9. Masters, pp. 97-8.
10. Johansen, p. 53.
11. Masters, p. 81.
12. Masters, p. 82.
13. Dee Alexander Brown, *Hear the Lonesome Whistle Blow: Railroads in the West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977), pp. 10-12. This book also details the Republicans' use of the railroads as a political tool and weapon during and after the War between the States.
14. Sandburg, Vol. 2, pp. 103-04 SE.

15. Johansen, see general chapters XXIX and XXX.
16. Sandburg, Vol. 2, p. 159 SE.
17. Carl Sandburg, *Reader's Digest Illustrated Edition Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years* (Pleasantville, New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1970), p. 136. ("RD")
18. Luthin, p. 238. It is worth pointing out that Lincoln got the same percentage of the vote as Fremont received in 1856 while the combined Douglas-Breckenridge slates increased the Democratic popular vote. This does not include Bell, who got nearly one third of Lincoln's popular vote total. The Douglas-Breckenridge vote increased from 45% (1.8 million) to 47% (2.2 million).
19. Luthin's chapter 16 outlines this nicely.
20. Luthin, p. 242.
21. *loc. cit.*
22. *loc. cit.*
23. *op. cit.*, p. 243.
24. *loc. cit.* Lincoln "pondered over patronage" while the Union dissolved.
25. Alexander Hamilton Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results* (New York: National Publishing Company, 1868), Volume II, p. 266.
26. Sandburg, Vol. 3, p. 73 SE; Masters, p. 380.
27. Johannsen, p. 850.
28. Hudson Strode, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959), p. 8.
29. C.R. Vaughan, D.D., Editor, *Discussions by Robert Dabney, D.D., LL.D.*, Volume IV (Harrisburg, Virginia: Sprinkle Publications, 1979), pp. 87-100, quoting the memoirs of Colonel John B. Baldwin, a member of the Virginia Peace Commission.
30. Vaughan, p. 94.
31. M.E. Bradford, *Remembering Who We Are: Observations of a Southern Conservative* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1985), p. 147. Lincoln raised the tariff from 18.84% to 47.56%. The tariff stayed above 40% in all but two years from Lincoln's administration to the election of Woodrow Wilson. The policy amounted to a brutally effective policy of treating the South as a colonial possession transferring wealth from the South to the Northern plutocrats.
32. Ellis Gibbs Arnall, *The Shore Dimly Seen* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1946), pp. 165-185. Ellis Arnall was Governor of Georgia from 1943 to 1947. A staunch New Deal Democrat, he was one of the most liberal governors ever elected in this history of the State. An example of what Wilmot Robertson styled an "old believer" liberal, he also appears to be that rarest of all creatures — an honest Southern liberal whose belief in multi-racialism does not include the usual hatred for his own people and region. The chapter of the book referred to in this footnote is a concise and convincing summary of the Northern exploitation of its Southern colony after the War for Southern Independence.
33. Strode, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President*, pp. 28-31; John Shipley Tilley, *The Coming of the Glory* (New York: Stratford House, 1949), pp. 58-9. See also Masters, pp. 390-96.
34. What kind of war did Lincoln expect? The largest single field army in the Mexican War was 11,000. After calling out the 75,000 militia,

- Lincoln on May 3, 1861 authorized enlistment of 82,000 additional soldiers. On July 4, 1861 he asked for 400,000 volunteers. The First Battle of Manassas was not fought until July 21, 1861. What did Lincoln plan to do with over half a million troops? Ludwell H. Johnson, *Division and Reunion: America 1848-77* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p. 89.
35. Bradford, pp. 149-150; Masters pp. 422-23. The mayor of Washington, D.C., Congressman Vallandigham of Ohio and a large portion of the Maryland legislature were jailed.
 36. Davis, pp. 69-70.
 37. It is worth noting that Dr. Goebbels did not overlook the Northern campaign techniques. German propaganda in the Second World War cited Union conduct as an example of what Europe could expect if the Americans were to begin their crusading on a broad scale. Evidently the Nazis felt the Lincoln government would be a model for the Roosevelt government. An example of this propaganda is printed in the English language version of *Signal*.
 38. Joseph T. Derry, A.M., edited by General Clements A. Evans, *Georgia: Confederate Military History* (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Blue and Gray Press), Volume IV, p. 360.
 39. Derry, pp. 360-69; Masters, pp. 455-62. See also F.J.P. Veale, *The Veale File, Volume I: Advance to Barbarism* (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1979), p. 122: "Sherman only executed the most dramatic and devastating example of the strategy that was laid down by President Lincoln himself... That Lincoln determined the basic lines of Northern military strategy has been well established in such books as Collin R. Ballard's *The Military Genius of Abraham Lincoln* and T. Harry Williams' *Lincoln and His Generals*. Grant only efficiently applied Lincoln's military policy in the field..."
 40. *Atlanta Journal Constitution, Atlanta Weekly Magazine*, April 3, 1983, p. 22.
 41. Strode, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President*, p. 125.
 42. Sandburg, Vol. 4, p. 176. *The New York Times* comment on this incident is revealing as well: "The order, to be sure, was promptly set aside by the President but the affront to the Jews conveyed by its issue was not so easily effaced. A committee of Jews took it upon themselves to *thank* [emphasis in original] President Lincoln at Washington for so promptly annulling the odious order. Against the conduct of this committee the bulk of Jews vehemently protest. They say that they have no thanks for an act of simple and imperative justice — but grounds for deep and just complaint against the Government, that General Grant has not been dismissed from the service."
 43. Strode, pp. 289-90.
 44. *op. cit.*, p. 290.
 45. *op. cit.*, pp. 290-91.
 46. *op. cit.*, p. 291.
 47. *op. cit.*, p. 500.
 48. *op. cit.*, pp. 500-501.
 49. *op. cit.*, p. 501.
 50. There is an Irish song of the era that goes:

"Hey, boys, do take my advice,

"To America I'd have you not to be coming,
 "For there's nothin' here but war,
 "Where the murderin' cannon roar,
 "And I wish I was back in dear ole Erin."

The song refers to "Mr. Lincoln's war" and being handed a gun upon arrival at the pier.

51. Strode, pp. 111-13.
52. *Confederate Veteran Magazine*, January-February, 1986, p. 7.
53. Davis, pp. 191-92.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Robert Werlich, "*Beast*" Butler: *The Incredible Career of Union Major General Benjamin F. Butler* (Washington, D.C.: The Quaker Press, 1962), p. 39.
56. Werlich, pp. 89-90.
57. Masters, pp. 422-23.
58. Johnson, p. 125.
59. General Henry Halleck, General in Chief of the Union Armies, wrote to Sherman in 1864: "It seems little better than murder to give important commands to men such as Banks, Butler, McClelland, Sigel and Lew. Wallace, and yet it seems impossible to prevent it." (Quoted in Johnson, p. 90.) Lincoln's search for a politically "right" general continued.
60. Sandburg, Vol. 5, pp. 665-69 SE.
61. Sandburg, pp. 548-49 RD.
62. Clifford Dowdy, *Lee* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1965), p. 295.
63. Stephen B. Oates, *Abraham Lincoln: The Man Behind the Myths* (New York: New American Library, 1984), p. 143. Oates is a liberal who mustered plenty of information about Lincoln's radicalism.
64. Oates, p. 145.
65. Cost of the war to the South: approximately 100,000 battle deaths, 200,000 disease deaths, 230,000 wounded of 850,000 in service. Approximately 62% casualties for the entire war. It has been estimated that 75% of all Southern white males of military age served in the Confederate armies. (Johnson)

The Persecution of P.G. Wodehouse

ROBERT A. HALL, JR.

The noted Anglo-American humorist Pelham Grenville Wodehouse (1881–1975) led, up to 1940, a life which was professionally very active and successful, but devoid of striking or soul-shaking experiences.¹ In that year, however, there occurred an event which changed the course of his life very drastically for the next six years, and cast a lasting, though gradually diminishing, shadow over the rest of his existence until his death on February 14, 1975. He and his wife were living semi-permanently at Le Touquet, in France. The town was captured by the Germans on May 22, 1940, and on July 21, he, with the other male aliens in Le Touquet, were sent off to internment-centers, first at Huy in Belgium and then at Tost in Upper Silesia. His internment lasted until June 21, 1941, on which date he was released (solely because he was almost sixty) and was sent to Berlin, where he was joined by his wife (who had been detained in France).

Up to this point, nothing untoward had happened except the detainment itself. Soon after arriving in Berlin, however, he undertook to write and record five talks describing his experiences as British Civilian Prisoner no. 796. The talks were intended to reassure his American friends that he was well, and to give a humorous description of his experience as an internee. They were made for broadcasting to the United States, with which Germany

was, at the time, not at war. They were, nevertheless, also broadcast later (without Wodehouse's having been consulted) to England. Their actual content was simply a straightforward narrative, wholly unpolitical (as can be seen by reading their actual texts²). The German authorities must have been quite insensitive to Wodehouse's brand of humor, because the over-all effect of the talks was to show what fools his SS jailers and the other army-men were. We are told³ that the American army used the Wodehouse talks, later during the war, as prize examples of subtle anti-German propaganda.

In England, however, the fact of his having made the broadcasts aroused a storm of indignation, much of it whipped up artificially by the British Broadcasting Corporation and the newspapers. In the B.B.C.'s defense, it must be said that its directors at first objected, but were ordered by the Government to undertake the slander-campaign against Wodehouse.⁴ The British public was in a state of rage against Germany because of the pounding England had been taking from the air, and were all too ready to have a scapegoat on whom to vent their anger. As Jasen says:

Comparatively few people actually heard the talks, but the mere knowledge that they had been given on the German radio was enough to whip the British press into a frenzy of hate and vituperation. Without checking the facts and without giving the astonished public a hint of what Plum [*i.e.* Wodehouse] had said in his broadcasts, the papers reviled him and accused him — placing him on a par with the arch-traitor known as Lord Haw-Haw.⁵

After the saturation-bombing of Berlin began in 1943, Wodehouse and his wife were permitted to move to Paris, where they remained until 1947. Two British officers, Major Malcolm Muggeridge and Major E.J.P. Cussen, were sent to interview Wodehouse. Although both reported that there was no evidence that he had intentionally given any aid to the enemy, nevertheless, Wodehouse and his wife were subjected to a certain amount of harassment by both the British and the French authorities. Some of his English enemies (such as a certain Quintin Hogg, later Lord Hailsham) demanded that he brought back to England and tried for treason.⁶

Wodehouse and his wife left France in 1947 for the United States, where he remained for the rest of his life. Even after his arrival in America, he was harassed, this time by the United States Treasury, with preposterous claims for allegedly unpaid income-taxes, dating as far back as 1923. The case dragged out for over two and a half years, and was finally decided in his favor on three out of four counts.⁷

The accusations made against Wodehouse have, in the last forty years, all been refuted, although uninformed persons still repeat them on occasion, either with the general assertion that "somehow Wodehouse blotted his copy-book during the war," or with more specific, though completely unfounded, statements.⁸ The best way of dealing with these falsehoods is to enumerate them, one by one, together with the truth, in parallel columns. This I shall do in three sections, dealing with his aim in broadcasting his talks over the German radio, his personal character, and his actions.⁹

I. Wodehouse's Broadcasting

The Lies

1. Wodehouse broadcast for the Nazis.
2. He broadcast Nazi propaganda.
3. He was comparable to William Joyce ("Lord Haw-Haw").
4. He was comparable to Charles A. Lindbergh, in aiding the enemies of democracy.
5. Wodehouse was a slacker, having fought in neither war.

The Truth

Wodehouse broadcast for himself, to send word of his experience to his friends in America.

He sent only information about his personal experiences, with absolutely no pro-German propaganda.

Joyce's aim was to persuade Britain to cease fighting Germany; Wodehouse made no reference to any such concerns.

Lindbergh's position was based on political and military considerations; Wodehouse was notoriously unpolitical.

He had applied to enter the British navy in 1914 and had been rejected because of poor eyesight; in 1939, he was too old.

II. Personal Character

1. Wodehouse was a rich idler and a playboy.

No professional writer ever worked harder than Wodehouse to earn his pay; his critics were confusing him with his characters, such as Bertie Wooster and the Drones Club.¹⁰

2. He was an income-tax dodger.

He had been harassed during the 1930's by both the British and the American authorities, with claims which were later dismissed in large part.¹¹

3. He expressed sympathy for Nazism.

He was almost completely uninterested in politics, and in 1939 had satirized the British Fascist Sir Oswald Mosley in the character of Roderick Spode.¹²

4. He was anti-Jewish.

He was in no wise anti-Jewish (or, for that matter, anti-any-group).¹³

III. His Actions

1. The Wodehouses lived in luxury, for free, at the Adlon in Berlin, as a reward for having made the broadcasts.

The Adlon was the only place where they were allowed to live, and Wodehouse had to pay for their lodging and food, in part from his German royalties and in part from the sale of some of Mrs. Wodehouse's jewelry.¹⁴

2. Wodehouse made false statements against Jews, Belgians, and French patriots.

He made no such statements; the allegations that he did so emanated from untrustworthy sources (especially the B.B.C.'s propagandists) and have been demonstrated to have been pure inventions.

The outcry against Wodehouse gradually died down, and was generally regarded as definitively ended when he was given a (much belated) knighthood in January, 1975, only a month before his death.¹⁵ The government's dossier on Wodehouse was still kept secret, however, until Iain Sproat finally persuaded the authorities to make the documents available to him in 1980. Nothing was found in them to warrant the attack to which Wodehouse had been subjected both during and after the war.

Why, then, was he persecuted in this way? Primarily because, from various points of view, he was a "sitting duck," a very

convenient target for governmental propaganda at a time when popular emotions were strongest and most irrational. Very few people in England had actually heard the Berlin broadcasts, and at the same time very many were ready to believe any propaganda, without verification, against anyone who was alleged to be traitorously aiding the Nazis. Being in Germany, Wodehouse did not know of the current emotional state of the British public, and, even if he had known, he was in no position to defend himself.

The same motive may well have been at work in the United States Treasury Department's post-war harassment of Wodehouse. As is well known,¹⁶ during and after Henry Morgenthau, Jr.'s tenure of the Secretaryship of the Treasury, that department was very extensively involved in determining American foreign policy, and was extensively staffed with fanatically anti-German personnel. The decision to press untenable claims against Wodehouse may have emanated from such elements in the Treasury, on the basis of his undeserved reputation for having "collaborated" with the Nazis.¹⁷ The validity of this hypothesis can, of course, not be determined until such information as is still extant in the Treasury files is made available to the public.

The basic moral of the "Wodehouse case" is, not that it is undesirable to refrain from "hating in the plural," but that persons with such an out-look should be more aware than he was of the readiness of others to yield to emotionally based mass-hatreds or to exploit them for political purposes. Persons of the Wodehouse type should also be cautious about engaging in activities which can be maliciously misinterpreted and used as pretexts for hostility and persecution.

Notes

1. There are good summaries of his life-history in several biographies, e.g. David A. Jasen, *P.G. Wodehouse, A Portrait of a Master* (New York: Mason and Lipscomb, 1974; new, revised edition, New York: Continuum, 1981); Benny Green: *P.G. Wodehouse, A Literary Biography* (London: Pavilion Books and New York: The Rutledge Press, 1981); Frances Donaldson: *P.G. Wodehouse, A Biography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981).
2. Reproduced in their entirety in Iain Sproat: *Wodehouse at War* (London: Milner and New Haven [Conn.]: Ticknor and Fields, 1981), pp. 108-28.
3. Richard J. Voorhees: *P.G. Wodehouse* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1966), p. 41, ascribing this information to Malcolm Muggeridge. The same story is told by R.B.D. French: *P.G. Wodehouse* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1966; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 116, but without mention of Muggeridge.

4. Cf. the accounts given in almost all biographies of Wodehouse, e.g. Jasen's (*op. cit.*, pp. 181-82), or Lady Donaldson's (*op. cit.*, pp. 218-21).
5. *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
6. Cf. Jasen, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-87; Lady Donaldson, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-245.
7. He wrote to his friend William Townend (*Performing Flea*, letter of May 22, 1945): "They have now gone back to 1925 and claim that I made no return that year or in 1924. I have absolutely no means of proving that I did, but I must have done. I was in America both years and left for England, and you can't get on a boat at New York unless you have paid your income tax."
8. In his *Wodehouse at War*, which is the best and the most detailed account of the entire sorry mess, Iain Sproat states (p. 31) that a certain senior politician, whom he does not name, declared as late as 1980 "Oh, yes, I know all about the Wodehouse case. The man was an out-and-out traitor. He was anti-Churchill. He broadcast propaganda for the Nazis."
9. To save space, I have not given detailed footnote references for each item separately; they are all dealt with in detail in the sources mentioned in the preceding notes, especially the books by Jasen, Sproat, and Lady Donaldson.
10. As pointed out specifically by Wodehouse's friend Denis Mackail, whom Jasen (*op. cit.*, p. 193) cites as having contrasted the accusation made by the journalist William Connor ("Cassandra") that Wodehouse was a "play-boy" with the fact that the latter was actually "the most industrious author I have ever known."
11. Lady Donaldson emphasizes this point by dedicating to it an entire chapter dealing with his troubles from 1932 to 1939, and entitling it "Income Tax" (Chapter 6, pp. 135-53).
12. In *The Code of the Woosters* (1939), Spode is a highly offensive, aggressive, over-bearing, gorilla-like character, the leader of the British "Black Shorts," a clear satire on Mussolini and Hitler.
13. Cf. my article "Was Wodehouse Anti-Jewish?" in my *Papers on Wodehouse* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Linguistica, 1985), with a definitely negative response to the question in the title. It is reported that when, after the war, Wodehouse was urged to declare that he hated the Nazis, he replied, "I don't hate in the plural." He was very much aware that there are too many individual differences among the members of any group to justify judging it *en masse*. As Edmund Burke said, in his *Second Speech on Conciliation with America* (1775), "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people." Such attitudes are not popular, however, at a time when mass-hatreds are being aroused and exploited by politicians during and after a war.
14. Mrs. Wodehouse was by no means popular at the Adlon, because of her flamboyant, irresponsible behavior (cf. Lady Donaldson's account of Ethel Wodehouse's actions, pp. 234-235).
15. He is reported to have said, concerning the knighthood, "I think it's sort of a graceful act on the part of the government — sort of their way of saying that's that."
16. For Morgenthau's role in taking the United States' foreign policy out of the hands of the State Department, and in establishing such agencies

as the War Refugee Board, cf. John Morton Blum: *Roosevelt and Morgenthau* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 520-33; or any biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (*e.g.*, most recently, Ted Morgan: *F.D.R.: A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 703-05).

17. Sproat (*op. cit.*, pp. 104-05) ascribes the long delay in releasing the Home Office's dossier on Wodehouse to two factors: a desire to protect the name of some man who travelled with Wodehouse from Tost to Berlin, and an intent on the part of bureaucrats to cover up their own or their colleagues' errors for as long as possible. We may wonder whether, perhaps, a third factor may have been the efforts of anti-Germany elements in the British bureaucracy, similar to those in the United States Treasury, to keep Wodehouse's name blackened for as long as they could.

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Book Reviews

ORWELL: THE WAR COMMENTARIES, Edited and with an introduction by W.J. West. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, 253 pp., \$18.95.

Reviewed by Jeff Rigenbach

George Orwell, too, had feet of clay. This will come as no surprise to some, of course. There are at least a few who know already, and a much smaller number who have long known, that no human being ever lives fully up to the standards and expectations of another — not even when the actions on which he or she is to be judged are severely restricted to a narrow and circumscribed realm, like the realm of literature or the realm of philosophy or, as in the present case, the realm of intellectual integrity.

One problem with expecting intellectual integrity from someone is that intellectual integrity is by no means universally recognized as a thing to be desired. At bottom, intellectual integrity means consistency of thought. And consistency of thought has had its prominent detractors for more than a century.

"A foolish consistency," Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in 1841, "is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do."

"If you are bound to your past hour," Max Stirner wrote three years later, "if you must babble today because you babbled yesterday, if you cannot transform yourself each instant, you feel yourself fettered to slavery and benumbed." "If I am required to be consistent," Stirner complained, "would I not be bound today and henceforth to my will of yesterday?... My creature — to wit, a particular expression of (my) will — would have become my commander.... Because I was a fool yesterday I must remain such my life long."

"Do I contradict myself?" Walt Whitman asked in 1855. "Very

well, then, I contradict myself; I am large — I contain multitudes.”

“The question is,” Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty declared in 1872, “which is to be master” — words, or the human beings who invent and use them?

“Consistency,” said Oscar Wilde, “is the last refuge of the unimaginative.”

Still, most of us — especially those idealistic youngsters among us who are most susceptible to Orwell’s peculiar charm and therefore most likely to adopt him as a kind of secular saint — persist in seeing virtue in “practicing what you preach.”

Those who know Orwell best, however, know that it is not at all clear what ideas we should expect him to have practiced, because it is not at all clear what ideas he held. Those who knew him in life agree that he had a quality of great earnestness and sincerity about him, and this quality certainly comes through for most of us in his best writing. But if you look at Orwell’s *œuvre* as a coherent whole, you soon find yourself uncertain as to exactly what he did believe.

This uncertainty is only complicated further by the fact that Orwell expressed himself so often through the mode of fiction. It is much more difficult to be confident as to just what a writer is trying to tell you if he dramatizes his message in a story rather than putting it before you straightforwardly in expository prose. This is why, today, both conservative cold warriors like Norman Podhoretz and democratic socialist peace advocates like Irving Howe claim with equal certainty that if Orwell were alive today he would be on their side.

Even in his journalism, however, Orwell is hard to pin down. As his friend and biographer George Woodcock writes, “he was mainly concerned with the implementation of those fairly general ideas which he brought together under the heading of ‘decency,’ ideas like brotherhood, fair play and honest dealing which he had absorbed from writers like Dickens.”

“What concerned him much more deeply than political programs,” Woodcock continues, “were...general principles of conduct, particularly conduct affecting other men.” To Orwell, “it was important to tell the truth. It was important to preserve the objectivity of history. It was important, above all, to create a world in which every man’s right to self-respect would be jealously preserved.”

“It was when he talked to me about the state,” Woodcock recalls, “that Orwell seemed particularly confused. On one side he was still influenced by the traditions of the sahib class into which he had been born, traditions of dedicated public service coupled with the

wielding of unchallenged authority. But he also cultivated an anti-authoritarian strain of thought that was never far from the surface in his reactions to established government. So there were occasions when he would speak...of extensive and disciplined nationalization of industries, of state control over wide sectors of social life. But at other times — and here I felt his real inclinations were emerging — he seemed to envisage a decentralized society...with a great deal of room for individual initiative. Similarly, he would argue that authors should be state-supported, and at other times appear to contradict himself by maintaining that the less a writer had to do with any organized body, the better for him and his work."

Of course, Woodcock is speaking here of Orwell's conversation, not his published work. But as he makes clear in his classic study *The Crystal Spirit* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), from which the foregoing quotations have been extracted, it was in Orwell's conversation that his work, especially his journalism, originated.

One would have a conversation with Orwell during the 1940s, Woodcock writes, "and then, a week or two later, one would find that this conversation had become part of his writing and formed the basis for one of his highly readable essays.... I think it was this close relationship between his talk and his writing that enabled Orwell to be at once such a prolific and such a generally successful journalist. Once an idea had taken shape and even a degree of polish in conversation, it was a fairly simple matter to write it down. Some of Orwell's articles, as he admitted rather shamefacedly, were actually typed out immediately and published in their first draft, without any substantial revision."

Still, it is his less definite, more ambiguous novels that reach the widest audience and win Orwell most of his most fervent disciples. To the young reader who has just discovered *Nineteen Eighty-four* and *Animal Farm*, it seems obvious that Orwell is a crusader for truth, individual liberty and the use of the English language — or any language — to express truth and convey beauty rather than to subvert thought and perpetuate tyranny. And for such a reader, the biggest revelation of *Orwell: The War Commentaries* is likely to be the news that this fighter for truth and justice spent a good part of World War II as a propagandist for the British government, using the English language to mislead and to preserve the undeserved loyalty of a foreign people, a people long oppressed by the British government, a people whose freedom from British domination was a cause he had long given many readers and friends plenty of reason to believe that he fervently supported.

The people in question were the people of India, and Orwell's job

was to research, write, and in a few cases to deliver on the air, weekly radio "commentaries"—news summaries would be a more accurate term — on how the war was going up to the time of broadcast. The summaries were written for the Indian section of the Eastern Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and were beamed into India from December 1941 through mid-March 1943.

As has been noted, Orwell often worked out the ideas for his more topical writing in conversation. Also, like many other great writers, he tended to write not just for the eye and the intellect, but also for what might be called "the mind's ear." He wrote, that is, with attention to the sound and rhythm, as well as the sense, of his sentences. Orwell was, therefore, a natural for the medium of radio.

But why was he given this particular assignment by the BBC? Radio was, of course, the television of the 1940s. Television itself existed at that time. The BBC itself had pioneered regularly scheduled television broadcasting in the 1930s. But too few people owned television sets at the outset of World War II for the technology to have much potential as a source of information for the general population, and the war temporarily halted the process by which the manufacture of sets and their placement in homes had been steadily accelerating. For almost everyone alive at the time, the fastest way to learn of events that had just taken place halfway around the world was to listen to the radio.

This is not to say that radio did for World War II what television did for the Vietnam War. Listeners in the early 1940s were not able to hear the battles of the war as they occurred. The news they received from their radio sets was often several days old and was often based on reports which broadcasters had no way of checking. Nevertheless, radio represented a major improvement over the newspapers on which people had had to rely for information during World War I. Thanks to radio, civilian populations during World War II were better informed than civilian populations had ever before been during wartime.

They were also better proselytized. The Axis powers had realized early on that radio could facilitate the dissemination of propaganda as well as the dissemination of "straight news." Aiming broadcasts into enemy territory had much more potential than dropping leaflets from the air.

Among the Axis broadcasts aimed at undermining the British war effort during 1941 and 1942 was a series directed at India from Berlin and masterminded by the exiled Indian nationalist, Subhas Chandra Bose. It was these broadcasts which Orwell was specifically assigned to counter.

India was a major source of military manpower for the Allies, particularly in its African campaigns. It was also something of a powder keg — a country in which an already strong nationalist movement was commanding more and more public support. The British could ill afford to fight a civil war in India at a time when the battle against the Axis powers was already severely taxing its resources. Nor did the British want to risk losing or even weakening their control of India at such a crucial moment. The major figures in the Indian nationalist movement — men like Gandhi and Nehru — were committed to non-violence, and an independent India under their leadership might therefore be neutral in the war. This would deny the Allies access to an important source of troop strength.

All these same considerations made Axis propagandists eager to make what they could of the Indian situation by encouraging the more militant nationalists. Not only could they create problems for the Allies by helping to bring about independence for India, they might also create some solutions for themselves. India, was, for example, rich in certain natural resources which were crucial to the war effort, but which the Axis powers sorely lacked. The most notable of these was rubber — a commodity whose scarcity in Germany led the Reich to invest vast resources in the development of synthetic substitutes. And even if an independent India were neutral in the war, it might well look favorably on trade with nations that had aided its quest for freedom from the British.

For this reason, the German government was happy, early in the 1941, to provide sanctuary to Bose, a major leader of the more militant Indian nationalists and a recent escapee from imprisonment by the British. By the end of that year, the Reich was providing Bose with more than sanctuary. It was financing both his Berlin-based Free India Radio news service and his plan to build an "Indian Army of Liberation in the West" by retraining Indian prisoners of war then being held in Germany and Italy. This special fighting force was to be used eventually to liberate India from British control. The idea for such an Army of Liberation may seem fanciful to some readers today, but in fact it grew to a size of some 3500 men before the Allied victory ended its existence.

Much of this historical background information is to be found in the Introduction, the Appendix and the notes which W.J. West had provided for *Orwell: The War Commentaries*. (The Appendix, which is especially helpful, includes the text of several of Bose's broadcasts over Free India Radio.) But for much of it, I was forced to turn to other sources, including West's earlier volume, *Orwell:*

The Lost Writings (New York: Arbor House, 1985), a collection of mostly literary scripts Orwell wrote for the BBC during the same period. (Both volumes are compiled from materials recently uncovered by West in the BBC archives.) Time and again, the reader of *The War Commentaries* is referred to the earlier volume for supplementary information. On occasion, he is referred to the earlier volume even for essential information — information without which it would be impossible to assess the importance, the truthfulness or the purpose of Orwell's news summaries. This may be an effective strategy for selling two books instead of one, or for saving the publisher money on the price of paper for the second volume, but it is an annoyance and a disservice to the serious reader.

Nor is this the only fault the serious reader will find with this book. There are also a few curious, apparent lapses of scholarship. At one point, for example, when Orwell refers in a news summary dated 4 April 1942 to the "paid Indian mouthpieces" of the Japanese, West notes that this is "one of Orwell's very rare references to his main opponent, Subhas Chandra Bose and his supporters." In fact, however, Subhas Chandra Bose did not move his operations to Japan, or begin working closely with the Japanese on common goals, until nearly a year later. Orwell's reference was probably to another Bose, Rashbehari Bose, a militant Indian nationalist who had made his home in Japan since around the time of World War I.

The most important failure of West's book, however, lies not with its editor's scholarship, but in the fundamentally uninteresting character of its contents. Pieces that were written to be read aloud on radio and then forgotten are seldom effective in printed form, especially if they are, as in the present case, for example, highly repetitive. A radio writer cannot assume that the audience this week was also listening the week before, and he certainly cannot assume that all his listeners have tuned in faithfully every week from the beginning of his broadcasts. Therefore, he repeats certain essential items of information week after week, script after script, so that those who have just tuned in can understand what is being said. In a book, such endless repetition is deadening. One can only bear being told about the potential importance to the Japanese of the Burma Road as a supply route so many times before the impulse to skip and skim becomes irresistible.

Moreover, these pieces contain almost no political analysis — no "commentary," in the strict sense of that word. The analytical content of all 49 pieces collected here, if put together, would

scarcely fill one page. In part, this may be the result of censorship. Each of Orwell's scripts had to be submitted to a censor before being broadcast. Also, analysis seems not to have been a part of Orwell's job in preparing these scripts. They appear to have been intended primarily as news reports. They are "slanted," of course, in the sense that they obviously regard the Allied cause with favor. But their slant becomes evident more through simple sloganeering than through any kind of thoughtful discussion of issues.

Orwell writes, for example, that the war is an effort by "the free nations of the world" to "put an end to Fascist aggression." One wonders if the Soviet Union qualified in those days as one of "the free nations of the world." We know that Orwell and other BBC propagandists were under explicit pressure to soft pedal or avoid any criticism of the Stalin regime, which only a short time before, during the period of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, had been a favorite target of official criticism by the British. West quotes at length from an official memorandum that established guidelines for writers like Orwell on this issue. It delineates important "differences" between the Soviet and German styles of dictatorship which supposedly justify cooperating with the one and working indefatigably for the destruction of the other. This memo is curiously reminiscent of more recent attempts by certain conservatives to explain why we should fight to the death against "totalitarian" regimes but be willing to ally ourselves with "authoritarian" regimes, no matter how repressive they may be.

In other scripts Orwell writes of the virtual unanimity of public support for the Allied cause. He informs his listeners that opposition by Americans "to the idea of being involved in a war abroad, and specially in Europe," which had been common before the United States entered the war, "has entirely disappeared," and that "the ordinary people" of England "would welcome greater sacrifices" if they would aid the war effort. As West notes, these comments bear a certain resemblance to the government broadcasts in *Nineteen Eighty-four*, with their incessant talk of the happiness with which the common people accept sacrifice as the price of Oceania's victory against whatever nation is its enemy of the moment.

It is well known that the World War II-era BBC was Orwell's model for the satanic Ministry of Truth in *Nineteen Eighty-four*. Why did Orwell consent to do the work of an institution which he regarded as having within it the seed of so monstrous an evil? As George Woodcock explains it, Orwell was "a thorough English patriot, dedicated to defending the people and the countryside of

England even if he had little use for most of its existing institutions." Also, Woodcock writes, "he believed that the left-wing libertarian socialism which he had adopted in 1936 could only survive if the Nazis were defeated." W.J. West concurs with this image of Orwell and adds that while he "believed passionately that India ought to be given her freedom at the earliest possible moment," he "also saw clearly that there were far greater dangers for the Indian people in domination by a non-English-speaking totalitarian power than in the mere continuation of British rule for a few more years, or even until the war ended."

Orwell told George Woodcock in 1942 that "I doubt whether I shall stay in this job much longer, but while here I consider that I have kept our propaganda slightly less disgusting than it might otherwise have been." He resigned the following year, and took a job as literary editor of a left-wing London paper, *The Tribune*. The work he had done for the BBC, as this collection makes clear, was by no means "disgusting." It was, however, consistently mundane and virtually without intellectual content. Orwell completists and serious students of World War II propaganda will want to own this book. Most general readers, however, will probably want to pass it by. It won't afford them much entertainment or edification, and it may well undermine any delusions they have about the purity of heart and the intellectual integrity of the author of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-four*.

TAKING SIDES: AMERICA'S SECRET RELATIONS WITH A MILITANT ISRAEL by Stephen Green. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1984.

Reviewed by Robert Atelier

This excellent, heavily-documented and footnoted book should indeed, as the blurb on the inside dust-jacket promises, "cause major reassessments in the published literature in this field, at least as far as mainstream sources are concerned." Mr. Green has waded through an ocean of official (American) sources — filing over a hundred Freedom of Information Act requests — and has been personally responsible for the de-classification of many documents important to historians of the very strange relationship between Israel and the United States 1948–1967. (A companion volume — hopefully out very soon — will continue tracing the history of this relationship up to the present day.) The documents reproduced in

facsimile and plain text in the appendix to the book are a goldmine in themselves, well worth the price of the book alone.

The text of the book itself, then, can almost be considered a bonus. Stephen Green thoughtfully (but thoroughly) debunks many of the shibboleths of Israeli-American relations, such as the "accidental" nature of the bombing of the United States Ship *Liberty*, the myth of "Poor defenseless Israel surrounded by her overwhelming enemies," the related "miracle" victory of 1948 (which some religious leaders in the United States have set much stock in), and, perhaps most frightening of all, the blind eye turned by the American government to Israeli attempts to obtain nuclear material and atomic weapons technology. Perhaps none of this is new to the readers of *JHR*, but *Taking Sides* is able to shed new light on these matters through its use of formerly-classified sources.

If I have any bones to pick with the author, it is with his attempt to distinguish between the "bad" militaristic wing of the Zionist movement who have been encouraged by the U.S. (despite many a Zionist kick in the teeth to Uncle Sam!), and the "more humanistic" elements in the Israeli government. (Little is said about the non-government underground resistance to Israeli militarism.) Stephen Green's book itself tends to show how the Moshe Sharets of Israel have tended, willingly or unwillingly, to act as window dressing — ineffective, ignored, and discarded when their criticism or noncooperation with militaristic plans becomes too inconvenient.

Other than that, a good and thoughtful book, deserving more than the "anti-Semitic" and "Pro-P.L.O." smears which, I suppose (alas!), are inevitable.

IT HAPPENED IN OUR LIFETIME by John Phillips.
N.Y. and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1985,
copyright by Time, Inc., 277 pp., illustrated with 445
black & white photos, \$24.95, ISBN 0-316-70609-4.

Reviewed by H. Keith Thompson

In 1985 John Phillips published his *It Happened In Our Lifetime: A Memoir in Words and Pictures*. The former *Life* magazine photo-journalist reports on his many assignments from 1936 into the post-war period.

As is, I suppose, to be expected with any establishment mass-media journalist or photo-journalist, Phillips is consistently anti-Nazi, and anti-German. Nevertheless, he does some small service

by pointing out that there were large and articulate German minorities in Romania, and especially in that Frankensteinian-crafted country, Czechoslovakia, a significant plurality of whom advocated *Anschluss* by the Reich.

For example, perhaps it's too much to expect him to know that the German "Knödel" (dumplings) is the obvious parent of Czech "knödlí." It's also the less obvious parent of French "quenelle," which, like "quiche" (from German "Kuchen"), entered French via German-speaking Alsace. Phillips relates an idiotic story of his Czech driver's distress at the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the driver's even greater distress at being able to find no "knödlí" as the German troops arrived to the delight and for the liberation of the Sudeten natives. Phillips seems to confuse "Sudeten" with "Southern" and frequently makes that error. Nevertheless, a careful perusal of his photos makes it abundantly clear that the Sudeten Germans were in fact expressing their right of "self-determination" and achieving it when they were incorporated into the Reich. That right had been cynically, viciously, and brutally denied them by the Allies when they concocted "Czechoslovakia."

In another section of his book, "Retribution in Prague," Phillips does some grisly gloating and shows ghoulish photos he took of "war criminal" Dr. Josef Pfitzner's sentencing and hanging in the fall of 1945.

Pfitzner, a former professor of History at Prague's German University, as Phillips points out, had been deputy mayor of Prague during the war.

Pfitzner was accused of having affirmed that Prague was founded and built by Germans. The *Karlsuniversität* was in fact the first German University, older even than Heidelberg. The outcome of the "trial" was a foregone conclusion although Phillips seems to think it was a legal model. After defending himself (in Czech), Pfitzner, when taken to the gallows, moments before his judicial murder, cried out, "Ich sterbe für Deutschland" (I die for Germany).

Another Pfitzner, the composer Hans, left another German borderland, Alsace, when the Americans reconquered it for France in 1918. After the Second World War, the Americans having reconquered Alsace for France once again, the Allies put Hans Pfitzner into one of their concentration camps. He died not long after release. Yet Hans Pfitzner fared better than Josef Pfitzner in Prague.

Another composer, Mozart, was very popular in Prague. Mozart danced to his own *Deutsche Tänze* (German Dances) at the Breitenfeldhall in Prague. Prague and Vienna communicated

musically, and in so many ways, through the centuries.

Nothing is lost in History. All is recycled, including martyred history professors and mayors of Prague. And it may not be at all as Phillips saw it, when he snapped his prurient camera on the mutilated corpse of Prague's former deputy mayor.

So much in Europe, in the world, was recycled wrongly, largely due to evil, ignorant American intervention in two world wars.

Interestingly enough, one German source in Bohemia continues to flow, to bring currency to Czech coffers. Joachimsthal may no longer mine silver for dollars, but dollars flow to the Communist marketers of "*Pilsener Urquell*," that famous Bohemian beer, whose name means "Original Source of Pilsen." Its quality has declined, of course, since the days Bohemia was German. But at least the name remains. Blood flowed in Bohemia. The Gods recycle it and make their eternal cakes and "Knödel."

RUSSIA AGAINST JAPAN, 1904-05: A NEW LOOK AT THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR by J.N. Westwood. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986, \$34.50 Hb.

Reviewed by Samuel Edward Konkin III

Ever wonder what a Revisionist book might read like if it were published by, and with the consent of, the Establishment? If such could happen, it would have to be about an obscure little war whose impact on modern ruling relations was considered unexceptional. Such a book was published this year by SUNY in Rockefeller-land, written by an Honorary Research Fellow at Birmingham University in Round-Table Rhodes country.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 is nearly forgotten today; ask anyone for a quick list of the twentieth-century wars. Yet it was fought between the two major empires in Asia, decided not only the new balance of power in the East but also the West, and shifted the perception of modern warfare in the minds of those who would plan the strategies for World War I.

Conspiracy miners will find plenty of nuggets in Westwood's slim tome. Perfidious Albion is deeply involved *against* Russia only two years before the Triple Entente. Both Russian and Japanese court intrigue is covered. And even the finance-capitalists' loans to the belligerents are detailed.

Those *JHR* readers fascinated with the early political role of Zionism will find relevancy in the peace process, which happened

in the U.S.A. in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, with arch-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt acting as arbitrator. Even then, says Westwood,

[Russian statesman and Finance Minister Sergei] Witte also took care to conciliate the American Jewish community, which was influential and could determine the success of any further Russian attempts to raise loans on the American market. Displaying some courage and adaptability, Witte visited the Russian Jewish community where he defended Russian policies in the presence of people who had left Russia to escape the anti-Jewish discrimination and violence of Nicholas's government. As Witte was known to be opposed to governmental anti-semitism, his reception was not unfriendly.¹

Sergei Witte was the key figure of the Russo-Japanese War in that he created the Russian situation in the Far East, lost control of it in the power struggles, watched the war destroy his efforts and then returned to favor just in time to clean up the mess by negotiating the peace.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought neither on Russian nor Japanese soil. It was the purest imperial war, fought by two now-dead empires. The Russian Empire had all the advantages except proximity; it lost through bureaucracy and decadence. In several battles when Russian troops attacked with high morale and valour they were ordered to retreat following a new strategic theory.

The situation in 1904 can be summed up fairly quickly. Witte had expanded the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria and established a Russian city at Harbin. The fiction of a private railway, Chinese Eastern (CER), covered the sovereignty lapse. The CER was linked to the Russo-Chinese Bank, by which Witte controlled Manchurian finance. Witte portrayed Russia as China's friend against Japan, who had beaten China in the war of 1894-5.

Pseudo-entrepreneurial groups, lead by A.M. Bezobrazov, won the Czar's ear, overruled Witte's cautious, well-worked-out plan, and had Russia expand southward to Port Arthur, the Liaotung Peninsula, and expand the CER branch to Port Arthur. Then the statist speculators moved into Korea, via the tried and true imperialist method.

After several false starts this group had set up its East Asian Development Company. Bezobrazov had frankly described this company as modelled on that of the old British East India Company, and its aim was to exploit a concession in Korea...²

Japan thought they had won Korea (a weak kingdom, supposedly independent) and Port Arthur in the Sino-Japanese

War. With the Europeans consolidating their "concessions" in China after the Boxer Rebellion (an anti-imperialist insurgency by "a secret society"), this further advance into what Japan regarded as its rightful sphere of influence was intolerable. In 1902, Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in preparation for war against Russia. Since at least the Crimean War, Russia and Britain had been at odds. As Westwood says, "...in the British press and Parliament 'Russian scares' were as frequent in the nineteenth century as 'red scares' in the twentieth."³

The British Empire clearly assisted the Japanese during the war, particularly through their formidable international press control (which pressured the U.S. State to join the British alliance against the Central Powers only a decade later), and actually passed up cases of Russian ships accidentally firing on British trawlers to avoid conflict. Later, the Japanese would uphold the treaty to scoop up the German far-eastern colonies in World War I.

Both sides lied to their people and both suffered domestic political upheaval in return. The Russian State — on the advice of the rehabilitated Witte — gave in to the strikes and mutinies and created the Duma, opening power to the liberal bourgeoisie. But the Japanese, too, suffered "anti-peace riots" when their hardest-lining politician, eking out a fairly favourable settlement, fell drastically below the unrealistic expectations of the deluded populace.

The actual conduct of the war can be summarized simply (Woodward does a credible narrative of the detail). After two years of negotiation with both sides convinced of war's inevitability, the Japanese struck à la Pearl Harbor. In fact, as Pearl was the American Empire's westernmost naval outpost, Port Arthur was Russia's easternmost. The surprise attack was far less successful than Pearl Harbor was to be, but the Russians frittered away time in harbor, running their fleet out eventually, suffered losses, returned to port and suffered final destruction by the land artillery of the slowly encroaching Japanese forces.

The Japanese marched into the Liaotung Peninsula, drove the Russians back from Port Arthur to Mukden, and captured the Manchurian capital — all to heavy losses from *Banzai* charges. Port Arthur fell after a long siege. Unbelievably, at this point the Russians were stronger than ever, their reinforcements finally arriving over the railway, while the Japanese were drafting bottom-of-the-barrel, aged reserves and their officer corps was depleted to crisis levels.

The Russians did suffer a decisive defeat: on the sea. The Baltic Fleet sailed through the English Channel, under harassment, around the Cape of Good Hope (smaller ships passed through Suez) and

through the Indian Ocean. The French bent their neutrality to counteract the British and let the Russian ships rest and rendezvous in Madagascar. Germans supplied coaling ships to feed the voracious Russian boilers. (Kaiser Wilhelm supported his cousin the Tsar in Eastern expansion.) After that epic voyage around the globe, the Russian fleet attempted to run the Straits of Tsushima between Korea and Japan to rendezvous with the cruisers raiding out of Vladivostok and ran into the Japanese fleet under Naval Commander Admiral Togo.

Westwood makes a plausible case that the Russian fleet of Admiral Rozhdestvensky could have come out better with a few better breaks; nonetheless, Togo gambled on the classic "crossing the T" tactic and pulled it off. After several hours, and an attempt by some cruisers to break through to Vladivostok, all the Russian capital ships were sunk, surrendered or were scuttled.

(Historical coincidence: The Russian fleet's last safe port had been Cam Ranh Bay in Viet Nam, then French Indo-China. The Soviet fleet uses it again today.)

Both sides were racist; the Russian press portrayed the Japanese as "yellow monkeys" and the Japanese portrayed the Caucasians as subhuman barbarians. But other Asiatics, particularly the Indians suffering under the British imperial yoke, took heart at an Asian victory over Europeans. (The Japanese "Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" propaganda of World War II cashed in on the good will they reaped from this war.) But both sides were fairly careless with the lives of their own soldiers in battle. The Russian reserves mutined on their way home during the 1905 uprising.

Nicholas relieved General Kuropatkin after the fall of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden, rightly considering that the land war would swing over to them. But the naval disaster of May 1905 at Tsushima nearly toppled him and he agreed to Roosevelt's offer of arbitration. The Japanese, equally desperate, sought him out first, and accepted his "suggestion" of peace talks on June 10, two days before the Russians. Because it implied a loss of face, it was the first inkling the Japanese populace had that all was not going well. The Japanese ruling caste was willing to go for almost anything that left them intact and in control of Korea. Even though Witte was out-negotiating them, showing remarkable understanding of manipulation of the modern press by "generous leaks," Nicholas gave up the south end of Sakhalin Island to seal the deal without conceding any indemnities. The lack of monetary compensation left Japan deep in the debt of international finance.

Military buffs and wargamers will enjoy *Russia Against Japan*

not only for battle details but also for their impact on World War I. According to Westwood, the military historians studied this conflict for a decade, drawing correct — and erroneous — conclusions. Most of their publishing was lost through bad timing when the guns of August 1914 sounded. All the military protagonists of World War I studied the Russo-Japanese War; most of the Russian generals were veterans and the defeated General, Kuropatkin, “displayed the same quality of bureaucratic caution.”⁴ Two of these generals, Samsonov and Rennenkampf, carried their feud to 1914 where Rennenkampf failed to rescue Samsonov at the Battle of Tannenberg, a major German victory.

Though the beloved British balance of power was maintained in the Far East, Russia and Japan maintained a healthy respect for each other for forty years. The Soviet policy continued the Imperial Russian; when Japan was clearly defeated, they moved into Korea back to their 39th parallel division of 1903, recaptured Sakhalin, and reestablished Manchurian control — only to lose it to Emperor Mao after 1949.

Japan preferred war with the U.S. to another round with Russia in 1941.

The war shifted European alliances. Britain was now ready to enter an *entente* with the weakened Russian Empire, especially after the Moroccan crisis of 1905 turned the German Empire into the new prime enemy. Bismarck’s plans to avoid a two-front hostile alliance failed.

Libertarians will enjoy the brief allusions to counter-economic activity of the always-enterprising Chinese on both sides of the war. Although the war was fought on Chinese (and Korean) territory, nobody consulted or cared what the Manchu court thought. The Manchus fell to Sun Yat-Sen’s bourgeois revolt six years later.


Foreshadowing World War I, the Russo-Japanese War ended with massive loss of human lives and economic treasure, loss of faith and “sacred honour,” and an insurgent, revolting populace anxious to reform or sweep away *ancien régimes*. The Russian State, fighting two senseless wars in a decade on foreign soil, for gains incomprehensible to those fighting and paying, reaped the whirlwind of revolution. And the Japanese State, learning all the wrong lessons in the war, collapsed in two mushroom clouds almost exactly forty years after the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed.

Notes

1. *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-59.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 13.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.
4. *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

TAKING SIDES: AMERICA'S SECRET RELATIONS WITH A MILITANT ISRAEL

By Stephen Green



Why the Middle
East is in such
turmoil and
why it will
remain
that way
unless
something
radical is
done or
until
World War
Three
breaks
out
there.

#618, Hb, 301pp, \$15.00

AUSCHWITZ: TRUE TALES FROM A GROTESQUE LAND by Sara Nomberg-Przytyk. Translated by Roslyn Hirsch. Edited by Eli Pfefferkorn and David H. Hirsch. Chapel Hill, NC and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985, xii + 185 pp., ISBN 0-8078-4160-9.

Reviewed by Theodore J. O'Keefe

A*uschwitz: True Tales from a Grotesque Land* is a collection of stories garnered by Sara Nomberg-Przytyk, allegedly during the year she spent at the Auschwitz concentration camp between January 1944 and January 1945. For the most part the tales she recounts are from the stock repertory of the Auschwitz "survivor": incredible brutality and callousness on the part of the Germans, noble endurance or brutish self-interest among the inmates, poignant romances, miraculous escapes, mass exterminations.

Some of these things Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk claims to have witnessed; others she has at second or third hand. Dr. Mengele bulks larger than life, as usual, demonic and indefatigable, dispensing lethal injections, tormenting dwarves, and consigning the unfortunate to the gas chambers with his customary gusto. Ilse Koch appears, in a cameo role, as "commander of the camp," presiding over a ceremonial execution which is forestalled by a grisly suicide. Several well-known Auschwitz legends are recounted, including the end of the Gypsy camp; the death of a German NCO, shot by a Jewess with his own pistol; and the escape, recapture, and sad end of two star-crossed lovers.

A number of features of life at Auschwitz as told by the author have an incontestable basis in historical fact. She presents rather well the role of the prisoner hierarchy, which exercised considerable authority over every aspect of the inmates' existence, an authority which by all accounts the prisoner *Kapos* (foremen) and *Blockälteste* (barracks chiefs) often misused. The powerful Communist infrastructure in the camp is touched on (Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk is anything but unsympathetic to the Communists). Her focus on the Germans' strenuous efforts to safeguard their charges' health in infirmaries, hospitals, and quarantine stations, as well as through preventive measures (baths and gas chambers for delousing inmates and their clothing) is in incongruous contrast to the supposed function of Auschwitz as an extermination center.

Nevertheless, the critical reader, particularly one with some

knowledge of Auschwitz, will have more than a few doubts as to the accuracy of Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk's stories, even if he is a convinced Exterminationist. Does the author really imagine that Ilse Koch was at Auschwitz? (She was never anywhere near the place.) How could a Greek girl temporarily evade her fate by leaping from a second-story window after being led into the gas chamber, when all the buildings alleged to have housed gas chambers were either of one story or had underground gas chambers? Is it conceivable that Dr. Mengele had his cruel sport with a whole family of full-grown, 50 centimeter-tall midgets (that's less than 20 inches)?

Sara Nomberg-Przytyk's funny way with facts is clearly perturbing to the editors, David H. Hirsch, a professor of English at Brown, and Eli Pfefferkorn, director of research for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council. In an "Editorial Afterword" the two make a labored analysis. They tell us: "It is one of the still unresolved problems of that body of writings called Holocaust literature that the events seem to overwhelm all attempts to impose formal order, either of literary history or literary criticism. The problem of ordering, categorizing, and interpreting is further exacerbated by the perverse efforts of so-called revisionist historians who deny everything, deny that the Nazis exterminated millions of Jews and others, thereby placing an additional burden on those who wish to study the ways in which imagination modifies memory and fiction vitalizes history."

Sorry, but this won't wash. Either Professor Hirsch has so restricted his scholarship to browsing amid the dry stubble of literary realism that he is incapable of analyzing imaginative literature, or he and his collaborator don't know what literary criticism and literary history are, in which case they might be advised to seek out a qualified scholar of, say, the Homeric question, an expert in Biblical exegesis, or a specialist in the composition and transmission of folk literature.

A third possibility, of course, is that Hirsch and Pfefferkorn are attempting to blur the boundaries between fiction and history relegating the less credible elements of Sara Nomberg-Przytyk's "tales" to the realm of literary fancy, or "dramatization," as they refer to it. It is difficult, after all, to distinguish between the allegedly literary efforts of Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk and the accounts of such Auschwitz inmates as Filip Müller, whose *Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers*, despite its supposed "simple, straightforward language," its lack of "embellishment" and "deviation" (according to Professor Yehuda Bauer's foreword), employs many of the same threadbare literary artifices as *Tales from*

a Grotesque Land.

It is instructive that the editors take refuge in a characteristic pronouncement of Holocaust Kabbalist and Nobel Prize winner Elie Wiesel, in reference to his own Holocaust writings: "Things are not that simple, Rebbe. Some events do take place but are not true; other are, although they never occurred" (*Legends of Our Time*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968, p. viii).

Holocaust Revisionists will not likely be deterred from examining with a cold eye the literature of the concentration camps by such formulas as this. They will continue to wonder at such details as Filip Müller's crematory ovens, supposedly capable of completely disposing of nine corpses per hour, or at the miraculous escape of Sara Nomberg-Przytyk's Fela, who escapes death by hiding in the chimney of the hearse bringing her to the crematorium, and draw their own conclusions about a literature which increasingly seems devoid of either *Dichtung* or *Wahrheit*.

Students of the "Holocaust" will be thankful to the author and her editors for several passages that have the ring of truth, however, particularly that which concludes her book. Sara, who escaped from the Germans in the chaos of the last days of the war (she had been removed from Auschwitz to first one, then another camp in central Germany), makes her way back to the Polish city of Lublin in a freight train crammed with Poles. Keeping her own counsel in the car in which she sits surrounded by the Poles, she muses, "They could strangle me in this terrible car if they found out that I am a Red." Soon they arrive in Lublin, and *Auschwitz: True Tales from a Grotesque Land* closes with these two paragraphs:

At twelve noon the door suddenly slid open. We were in Lublin. I was the first one to leave. As I reached the street, I was greeted by a colorful Easter procession. There was a colorful crowd of women dressed in their native costumes, children, and elegant men. There was no room on the street. All of the balconies and windows were decorated with rugs, flowers, and pictures of the Holy Family.

So this is Poland. I understood the words of the Polish soldiers whom I met on the border: "Don't tell the people you meet that you are a Communist." The fight had not ended. A fight takes time. (p.161)

These ringing words will doubtless discomfit those Poles and Polish-Americans who imagine that there is room on the Holocaust bandwagon for them, too, as will the involvement of Mr. Pfefferkorn from the taxpayer-supported Holocaust Memorial Council. The fact that the team of Pfefferkorn, Hirsch, and Hirsch's wife Roslyn, who translated the book from the original

Polish, were supported at every step in the way by tax-exempt "philanthropy" (The Sigmund Strocklitz Foundation, The Brown Faculty Development Fund, the American Philosophical Society) will likely be of little solace either. Those from less favored ethnic and religious groups may console themselves with the observation that, even though the Holocaust bandwagon is full, there is plenty of room in the traces for willing drayhorses.

HISTORICAL NEWS AND COMMENT

Joseph Sobran and Historical Revisionism

MARK WEBER

One of America's best conservative writers, Joseph Sobran, is currently under fire for his outspoken criticisms of Zionism and, in part, for an implied sympathy for historical Revisionism. Sobran writes a twice-weekly syndicated column that is distributed to about 70 newspapers in the United States. He is also a senior editor of *National Review* magazine.

Sobran's first "thoughtcrime" column, which vigorously defended President Reagan's decision to honor German soldiers buried at Bitburg, appeared in April 1985. In one essay he wrote: "Imputing diabolism to Hitler can be a strategy of pretending that his was a peculiar aberration. This allows us to evade the gross fact that communism has proved a far more potent and persistent evil than Nazism, which was a brief flare-up by comparison." Thus, he wrote, "it strikes me as misleading to speak of Hitler's crimes as 'the Holocaust.' This has been a century of holocausts. There is no 'the' holocaust. We are kidding ourselves if we talk as if there were anything 'unique' about what the Nazis did." Therefore, we "have no right to denounce 'the Holocaust' as long as we shut our eyes to the (communist) holocaust in progress."

In another column a few days later, Sobran wrote: "Along with those who care deeply about what Hitler did to the Jews, there are the Elmer Gantrys who inevitably attach themselves to every legitimate cause. In the '60s we were manipulated by people who used the memory of slave ships to extort moral deference and expressions of white guilt, which were parlayed into political power and — the bottom line — money. The same thing is now being done with Hitler's mass murders. If you don't condemn them in the prescribed ritual ways, the guilt-mongers will find a way to lump you with Hitler himself." Sobran jokingly added that, because of its obsession with one particular chapter of history, *The New York Times*, "really ought to change its name to Holocaust Update."

The Sobran columns that raised the most hackles appeared during April and May 1986. One raised an issue that hasn't been mentioned in the "respectable" American press for more than four decades. Sobran quoted from the Talmud to point out that, besides the legacy of Christian animosity towards Jews, there is also a little-

known but very real history of Jewish hostility against Christians. Unfortunately, Sobran wrote, the public gets "a false and distorted history, the sort of history one gets when one reads too many newspapers and not enough books."

Sobran came under especially vicious attack for a May 1986 column that included a few words of qualified praise for *Instauration*, Wilmot Robertson's hard-hitting monthly journal. Sobran called it "an often brilliant magazine, covering a beat nobody else will touch, and doing so with intelligence, wide-ranging observation and bitter wit." In its almost twelve years of publication, *Instauration* has frequently cast doubt on the Holocaust story and has run numerous sympathetic reports on the achievements and travails of the Institute for Historical Review.

In a column that appeared in early June, Sobran sought to answer his boisterous critics. He criticized the illegitimate way that critics of Israel or of the pro-Israel lobby are routinely silenced by branding them as "anti-Semitic." The mere threat of being so labelled is enough to intimidate almost all potential critics. The term "anti-Semite," Sobran wrote, "carries the whiff of Nazism and mass murder. 'It means,' as a friend of mine put it, 'that you ultimately approve of the gas chambers.'"

The self-appointed watchdogs of American cultural life are now busy trying to silence Joseph Sobran permanently. Leading the self-serving crusade is the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the husband-wife team of Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter. (Podhoretz edits the American Jewish Committee's monthly journal, *Commentary*, and Decter heads something called the Committee for the Free World.) *National Review* editor-founder William F. Buckley Jr., apparently alarmed that what Sobran wrote on his own would result in a loss of circulation and advertising revenue for his magazine, publicly repudiated his senior colleague for violating what Buckley accurately called "the structure of prevailing taboos."

Several Sobran critics have been particularly upset over his friendly words for *Instauration* because of the feisty journal's staunch refusal to bow before the Holocaust totem. In the words of *Newsweek* writer Jonathan Alter, for example, "*Instauration* denies the reality of the Holocaust — a classic [!?] anti-Semitic gambit." Alexander Cockburn, a regular contributor to the liberal weekly, *The Nation*, was riled at *Instauration*'s use of the term "Holohoax."

As the Sobran affair shows, public skepticism about the Holocaust is still far from being "acceptable." Nevertheless, Sobran's iconoclastic commentaries are a welcome indication that things may be changing, however, slowly, for the better.

*Critique of John S. Conway's Review of
Walter Sanning's Dissolution of Eastern
European Jewry, From The International
History Review, August, 1985*

DAN DESJARDINS

In the annals of anti-Revisionism, one does not often find Establishment academia types appraising Revisionist works directly. However, Dr. A.R. Butz has recently discovered just such an endeavor, involving, indeed, a book to which he wrote the preface: Walter Sanning's *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*. The deed was done by one John S. Conway, of the University of British Columbia, writing for *The International History Review*, VII, 3, August 1985, pp 450-51.

After a preamble in which Conway praises Sanning for avoiding sensationalism, (*i.e.*, refraining from the assertions that gas chambers never existed or that the Holocaust is mere Zionist propaganda), he launches into a reasonable summary of Sanning's demographic findings. Conway even acknowledges the extensive use of Jewish and Israeli sources in establishing Jewish population shifts into the Soviet Union, revealing that much of European Jewry avoided the German advance and did not reside within its sphere of occupation. However, Conway then deplores that these same documents are not used to establish Nazi crimes. The implied grievance would be that in using Jewish and Israeli documents, one ought to do so in a way which would most please Jewish and Israeli partisans, else one is not properly reciprocating for services rendered. I here proclaim a minor truth: if one trusts a source in instances, one is not obliged to endorse the entirety; and if one uses a source in instances, one is not obliged to use anything but what is relevant to the purposes at hand. In this regard, it was unwittingly apt that Conway chose to preface his complaint with the words "needless to say:" for that is it, exactly. By contrast to Sanning's half measures, Conway is prepared to demote the credibility of Sanning's entire thesis because the latter calls Operation Barbarossa (the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union) a "preventive aggression." I shall not argue that pre-Barbarossan Soviet

aggression against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, and Eastern Poland might have established any sort of plausible trend, but instead ask that Mr. Conway take this up with fellow historians Toland, Irving, Diwald, and Franz-Willing — for their reputations are in question here also.

Mr. Conway readily admits that he is not a competent demographer, but is certain that if one were found, he “would expose many of the errors in this work.” I might ask: does Conway specifically know which data are in error and which are not; and if not, how does he “know” that there are “many” errors, or that there are errors at all? Still lacking the demographer’s expertise, Conway elaborates his suspicions to include “juggled figures” and “dubious conjectures about demographic trends, fertility patterns, death rates, emigration opportunities, and other equally unverifiable suppositions...” I am afraid that I am in the same predicament regarding Conway as Conway is regarding Sanning. There is one major difference, however. Whereas Sanning provides various data, tables, and background as the foundation of his conjectures, Conway’s suppositions are unverifiable on their face: no evidence, no contrary information, no examples by which to substantiate his accusations, no information whatsoever, other than his own bald assertions. Because of this, such generalizations cannot be investigated or refuted except in a general way. I will say only this: to the degree that Conway uses his claim of “dubiousness” as an inference that Sanning’s conjectures are false, he is liable to the fallacy of *argumentum ad ignorantiam*: the proposition that if a thing cannot be proven (*i.e.*, “unverifiable”), it is necessarily disproved. Both Dr. Butz, in his prefatory remarks to the text, and Sanning, its author, are aware that certain estimates “have no claim on absolute certainty” (p. 11). A similar intellectual honesty, however, might ask to know why Sanning’s “unverifiable suppositions” are necessarily dubious, while suppositions based on the same Jewish, Israeli and Allied sources by persons such as Poliakov, Reitlinger, or Dawidowicz do not suffer any such reservation. Whereas Conway is rather undemocratic in this regard, he is otherwise the perfect egalitarian: he implicitly suggests that Sanning’s suppositions are equivalently unverifiable, while in actuality they are equal only to the degree that Conway’s claims themselves cannot be verified because they remain mere innuendo, without a single example specified.

As with unmentioned Nazi crimes, Conway is similarly distressed that concentration camps such as Auschwitz, Chelmo, Maidanek, and Treblinka are not mentioned. The defense, I suspect (as Faurisson gives for not mentioning Babi Yar or the Sonder-

kommando), is that it is not a necessary part of the subject. But I give Conway credit in recognizing that it could have been. Sanning might have attempted to determine from concentration camp records the number of Jews interned throughout the German occupied countries. If this is possible, assuming the existence or accuracy of such records, I do not know. Admittedly, it would have been an interesting study to determine the numbers of Jews actually held in such camps versus the numbers which were present at the time of liberation. Still, Conway should be advised that this itself would not necessarily determine the cause of death for those who perished, or that death ought necessarily to be assumed for those who were missing.

Conway closes his review of Sanning with a final extended chastisement, which I quote:

This book is in fact no more than a perverse attempt to concoct a contrived analysis of the Jewish 'population changes' during the Second World War, which not only mendaciously exonerates the Nazis, but hypocritically seeks to create a distorted account of the Jewish experience which does without the Holocaust, without Hitler, without history at all.

Conway does not simply say that Sanning may have derived mistaken or faulty conjectures, but that his analysis was a wilful and perverse attempt at concoction. I think Conway was a bit injudicious. He is claiming no less than libel, and may be subject to same.

For Conway, it is obvious that no purpose dealing with the Jewish experience during World War II can be historical if certain features are missing, *i.e.*, concentration camps, "Holocaust," and Hitler. I must first register dismay that academia counts among its members persons with this low an opinion of the meaning of history. Secondly, it is unfortunate that this is the paltry level of intellect with which Revisionism must sometimes contend. Whereas Conway earlier refers to a misuse of alleged erudition disregarding Sanning's "unverifiable suppositions," I would have to say that this is certainly in contradistinction to Mr. Conway's disuse of same. For while Conway's complaint seems to focus on the impropriety of Sanning's analysis, *i.e.*, that it "exonerates" Nazis while "distorting" the experience of Jews, he reveals an ignominious and thoroughly unacademic criterion in his critique: not concern with truth for its own sake or the sake of history, but history primarily as a servant to politics and philosophy. Sanning reiterates his book's purpose on page 196:

The purpose of this analysis was not to investigate the content of truth in the "Holocaust" story, but to outline the extent and the direction of the Jewish population movement before, during and after World War Two.

This is certainly his right as a demographer, and reasonably so, as it is sharply delineated and restricted to the authors field of expertise. I would instead question that any account which attempts to elaborate Nazi crimes, the daily routine of concentration camps or the life and death of Adolf Hitler is within the reasonable scope of the intended analysis. It is not Sanning's demographic study which "distorts" accounts of the Jewish experience, but Conway's demands, which attempt to distort this specific purpose by insisting on a general one. Though Conway has elsewhere expressed appreciation that Sanning does not openly deny the Holocaust, this is not enough: full satisfaction demands Sanning proclaim its existence as a foundation to his study. This is not to say that this should be satisfactory to the purposes of a demographer — or a historian.

Sanning's book has amassed 24 tables, 453 references and footnotes quoting 98 publications and authors (almost entirely Allied, Zionist, and other "sympathetic" sources), with 205 pages of text. Conway has condemned the entirety by simply claiming "errors" (which supposedly will require the services of a demographer to expose), "juggled figures" and "dubious conjectures" (accusations unelaborated and without any example), "contrived analysis" (Conway's reciprocity here is 1.2 pages without reference or bibliography), and that Sanning's account is "without history at all." To say that there is "no history" if one's purpose is without Hitler or the "Holocaust" is to redefine history in a rather narrowminded, precarious and utterly Orwellian fashion. Whether this is a politicized definition, or one which is merely foolish, Conway has made of himself a person whose undocumented attacks defy serious treatment. His review of a work which he considers ahistorical is ironically performed in a manner which is anti-historical and non-analytic, an approach which carelessly substitutes dogma for integrity: assumptive, unsubstantive, and by his own accusation, hypocritical.

Appendix

In the interest of fairness we would like to reproduce John S. Conway's review so our readers can judge for themselves.

History, Hitler, and the Holocaust

JOHN S. CONWAY

EBERHARD JÄCKEL. *Hitler in History*. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1984. Pp. 115; GERALD FLEMING. *Hitler and the Final Solution*. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. 219; MALCOLM C. MACPHERSON. *The Blood of His Servants*. New York: The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1984. Pp. 310; ISABELLA LEITNER. *Fragments of Isabella: A Memoir of Auschwitz*. New York: Crowell Publishers, 1978. Pp. 112; JAMES BENTLEY. *Martin Niemöller 1891-1984*. New York: Free Press, 1984. Pp. 253; SAUL S. FRIEDMAN. *The Oberammergau Passion Play: A Lance Against Civilization*. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. Pp. 270; DAVID S. WYMAN, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. Pp. 445; WALTER N. SANNING. *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*. Torrance, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983. Pp. 239.

As Archibald MacLeish once remarked, "We are deluged with facts but we have lost or are losing our human ability to feel them." He might well have continued: "It is possible to refuse full realization of unprecedented horror because we are unable to face the implications of these facts." Or as William Shawcross has recently written, "Few people want to believe tales of atrocities; resistance to them is a natural defence mechanism. And the more awful the speculations, the greater the resistance." Such was the case when the news of the annihilation of Europe's Jews first became known in the 1940s. The rational scepticism of the experts and the innocent incredulity of ordinary citizens could not embrace the rumours and reports seeping out of Nazi-controlled Europe. In subsequent decades, the same factors have widely affected the reception of the "Holocaust" as it is now called, so that witnesses, survivors, and historians alike still have an uphill battle to gain full acceptance for any objective and complete description of the

twentieth century's most portentous genocide. As a notorious recent trial in Toronto has shown, there are still some extremists who wish to disbelieve the accumulation of evidence, preferring to convince themselves that the Holocaust story is a deliberate post-war hoax, perpetuated by a world-wide conspiracy of Jews, Freemasons, and Bolsheviks and designed to bring into discredit the otherwise admirable German nation. This defiance of the available contemporary evidence about the Nazi state and its intentions, and of the vast researches of scholars during the past four decades on the extermination of the Jews, must be judged intellectually dishonest and obscene. "It is an appalling lie that the Holocaust did not happen; it is a monstrous truth that it did."

...

Finally, a piece of sophisticated Holocaust detail. Walter Sanning, one of the team who writes for the Institute for Historical Review in Torrance, California, avoids the kind of sensationalism exhibited in the recent Toronto trial. He does not assert that the gas chambers never existed, that the Holocaust is mere Zionist propaganda, or that the Nazis were basically respectable citizens. Instead, Sanning claims to have undertaken a detailed examination of the population statistics of eastern Europe, and in particular of the Jewish inhabitants, in order to show that the extermination figures attributed to the Nazis are greatly exaggerated, because there simply were not that many Jews — no more than 3.5 million — in all the areas controlled by the Germans. For example, Sanning claims that emigration and death had already, by 1939, reduced to 2.6 million the 3 million Jews in Poland in 1931, and that thereafter no fewer than 2.1 million Jews were deported by the Soviet Union to Siberia, including such notable figures as Menachem Begin. More escaped through other routes, leaving only 750,000 in German-controlled Poland by 1941. For obvious reasons, the Germans exaggerated the figures in order to justify their policies, while the Soviets have imposed a total silence. Sanning makes the further claim that the large number of Jews in Russian-controlled Poland in 1941 and other populations in the Ukraine, the Baltic countries and western Russia were forcibly deported early in 1941 to work in the relocated industries behind the Urals. Thus, only 720,000 Soviet Jews fell into German hands in 1941–2, mostly older people in any case liable to higher death rates through natural causes. But the vast majority must have survived the war, since the figures of Jews present after 1945 amount to nearly this total. The fate of the Jews deported by the Russians to Siberia was far worse (by implication than those under Nazi control). He quotes

extensively from Jewish and Israeli sources to prove how large the Jewish population in the Soviet Union had become by 1950, with a view to establishing that the eastern European Jewry had "dissolved" without any participation by the Germans. Needless to say, neither the same sources nor Nazi war-time documents are quoted about the Nazi crimes. Despite the warm endorsement of Sanning's statistical tabulations by A.R. Butz, Professor of Electrical Engineering, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, the credibility of his thesis is not enhanced by such absurd claims as that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was purely "preventive" in order to forestall a planned Soviet aggression. It will require the services of a competent demographer to expose many of the errors in this work. The potpourri of juggled figures, using dubious conjectures about demographic trends, fertility patterns, death rates, emigration opportunities, or other equally unverifiable suppositions, adds up to a misuse of alleged erudition. Naturally, Auschwitz, Chelmo, Maidanek, or Treblinka are not mentioned. This book is in fact no more than a perverse attempt to concoct a contrived analysis of the Jewish "population changes" during the Second World War, which not only mendaciously exonerates the Nazis, but hypocritically seeks to create a distorted account of the Jewish experience which does without the Holocaust, without Hitler, without history at all.

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
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